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Abstract 
This study is concerned with the institution-building and capacity-building of 
the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and its interactions with the foreign policies 
of member states, exemplified by the foreign policies of China and Vietnam. 
The structure of the GMS includes not only central governments, but also 
subnational units (provincial governments) and non-state actors (NGOs, firms). The 
involvement of actors other than the central government is due to the 
transnationalisation of issues such as poverty and environmental degradation. This 
also put central government departments other than the foreign ministry on the 
foreign policy scene, such as the ministries of trade, environment or public security. 
As transnational problems cannot be solved within the domestic context only, 
domestic policy demands have come to inform foreign policy decisions, which relate 
directly to transnational subregional concerns, such as integrating the local 
economies of China's west and Vietnam's north into the subregion in order to tackle 
widespread poverty in these regions. 
A result of this diversification and proliferation of actors in the GMS is a 
system of committee governance, which is not based on rules but on norins. 
Although still dominated by central governments, it is nevertheless stable as it has 
led to a regular exchange of information and enhanced transparency and 
predictability of policies and priorities of member states. This contradicts the 
premise of international regimes, namely that cooperation can only be stable if 
legally-binding rules are introduced. 
However, for central governments - exemplified by China and Vietnam - 
GMS cooperation also has a global dimension. Central governments aim at using the 
institution of the GMS in order to attain foreign policy goals, which go beyond the 
specific transnational concerns of subregional cooperation. Here, Vietnam and China 
have devised foreign policies, which - due to the traditional antagonism - have 
resulted in opposed aims towards the GMS, leaving the institution little space for the 
development of an independent capacity, which could in turn structure the bilateral 
relations between China and Vietnam. 
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As a result, we can observe in the GMS in general and in the Chinese- 
Vietnamese border regions in particular a mix between the Westphalian and the 
post-Westphalian international system: although central governments are the 
dominant decision-making authorities and set the framework for actions of 
provincial governments and NGOs, subnational units and non-state actors are 
increasingly active in forming a transnational substructure in the GMS. In the 
Chinese-Vietnamese border regions this is manifested by, for instance, locally 
implemented central agreements (provincial governments), cross-border financed 
infrastructure projects (firms) and youth exchanges of provincial party committees. 
The fact, however, that central governments dominate the cooperation structure 
gives the GMS no independent institutional capacity with which it could soften the 
antagonism between China and Vietnam. As a result, the asymmetry between China 
and Vietnam remains essentially unaffected by the GMS, a situation, which thwarts 
hopes of Vietnam to make China's foreign policy less assertive through cooperation 
in the GMS. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Chapter One introduces the relevance of the topic and the aims of this study. 
Section One gives a brief account of the events, which led to the establishment of the 
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and presents the main themes and arguments the 
study is concerned with. Section Two addresses the research methodology and 
relevant practical and ethical isssues, which emerged during the research process. 
Lastly, Section Three explains the structure of the study, including a short summary 
of content and purpose of Chapters Two to Seven. 
1.1. Topic and aims 
Interest in the economic development of the Mekong river can be traced back 
to the year 1866, when a French-headed group left Saigon for a Mekong expedition 
to survey the river and use it as a trade route into south-western China in order to 
connect Indochina with China. The Mekong expedition lasted until 1868, its report 
was written by Louis de Carn6, who was one of its members. ' In the end, the 
expedition failed. The next attempt at Mekong cooperation was marked by the 
inauguration of the Mekong Committee in 1957. Member states were Thailand, 
Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. 2 The aim of the committee was to push the 
economic development of the region with the help of the United Nations and the 
United States in order to stabilise the often fragile non-communist governments 
against communist China. However, as a Cold War exercise in a region suffering 
intra-regional problems, which were exacerbated by outside Cold War interference, 
this meant that the Mekong Committee quickly became dysfunctional. In 1975, 
when Pol Pot seized power, Cambodia withdrew from the Committee. It did not fail 
The edition used for this study was published in 2000 (Carn6,2000). The original 
version was published in French in 1872 as Voyage en bido-Chine et dalls 
VEMpire Chinois (Paris: Dentu Ed. ). The first English version was also 
published in 1872 titled Travels in Indo-China and the Chinese Enipire 
(London: Chapman and Hall). A description of the expedition can be found in 
Osborne's book River Road to China (Osborne, 1976). 
2 Vietnamese locations are presented in the official Vietnamese way of writing, that 
is, divided into syllables with the exception of popular place names of Hanoi 
and Haiphong and Vietnam. 
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altogether, however, but continued to exist as an Interim Committee from 1978. In 
1991, the year of the peace agreements to settle the Cambodia conflict, Cambodia re- 
joined. 3 In 1995, the Interim Committee emerged as the Mekong River Commission 
(MRC). Three years earlier, in 1992, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) had 
initiated the Greater Mekong Subregion. The 2001 Agreement on Commercial 
Navigation on the Mekong between China, Laos, Myamar and Thailand - the so- 
called 'Golden Quadrangle' or, formally, the Quadripartite Economic Cooperation 
(QEC) - was a further step to revive the old idea of connecting China with the 
Indochinese region by making the Mekong a commercial shipping route in order to 
transform the region into a cohesive economic area (Kristensen, 2001C). 4 
This study is concerned with an analysis of collaboration in the Mekong 
region, specifically within the Greater Mekong Subregion, which is a manifestation 
of the so-called 'new regionalism' in growth triangles (GTs) in Northeast and 
Southeast Asia. 5 The study will explore inter-state cooperation and the role of 
subnational units (provincial and local governments) and transnational actors 
(NGOs, firms) in building and maintaining the subregion. It will consider the 
relationships between actors on the three levels, their influences within the structures 
of decision-making in the GMS, their policy pronouncements and roles in the GMS. 
The GMS is the only cooperation endeavour in the Mekong basin that includes 
all riparian states of the Mekong. Regarding the creation of a 'region', Hettne argues 
3 The agreements, three in total, were signed at the peace conference in Paris on 23 
October 1991. See Texts of the Agreeiiiews signed hi Paris oiz 23 October 1991 
by the States Participathig in the Paris Confereiice oii Cai? ibodia as published 
in SiIdostasieii aktuell in January 1992. The three agreements have the official 
UN document number A/46/608-S/23177, individually they are numbered as 
I/S/23177,2/S/23177 und 3/S/23177. Following the peace agreements, on 9 
November 1991, UNAMIC (United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia) 
was sent to Cambodia, followed on 15 March 1992 by the peacekeepers of 
UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia) in order to 
supervise the re-conciliation process leading up to the national elections of 23- 
28 May 1993. 
4 Kristensen's statement was not without criticism. For more see Chapter Five, 
Section Two. 
5 More on the new regionalism and growth triangles see the next chapter. 
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that 'nation-states typically conceive it as an arena where national interests could be 
promoted' (Hettne, 1999b: xxiii) before the respective area becomes 'an actor in its 
own terms' (Hettne, 1999b: xxiii). Thus, at least in their early stage, regional 
institutions are dependent on the national interest of their member states. This study 
will explore the historical background of cooperation in the GMS and discuss how 
far cooperation in the GMS has developed from the mere promotion of the national 
interest of individual states towards an institution as an independent actor able to 
influence relationships between its member states instead of only being influenced 
by them. It will scrutinise the nature of GMS cooperation and the character and 
capabilities of the institution of the GMS, exemplified by the bilateral relations 
between China and Vietnam. Here, the study will combine the analysis of 
subregionalism and institution-building in the GMS with an analysis of China- 
Vietnam relations by combining theoretical approaches to regional integration in the 
form of the regime approach with foreign policy analysis. Regimes are norm-guided 
institutions, which influence policies of their members. Studies on Mekong 
cooperation tend to focus on either foreign policy (for instance Liebman, 2005) or 
institution-building (for example Dore, 2003). In-depth analyses of a combination of 
both pillars of Mekong cooperation and their potential influences on each other are 
missing so far. This study sets out to fill this gap. 
This study argues that the outcome of regional institutions depends on the 
foreign policies members of this institution try to realise by cooperating in the 
multilateral institution. This leads to the premise that with regard to regional 
institutions central government policies have two dimensions: one that is concerned 
with policies specific to the region, and one that is concerned with using the regional 
institution for globally-oriented foreign policies, thereby producing a strategic 
situation in which the lines between foreign and domestic policies become blurred. 
This situation reflects the 'new regionalism', which encompasses new concerns of 
foreign policy in the form of human or non-traditional security. This development 
adds new localised transnational dimensions to the foreign policies of central 
governments. Therefore, from central government perspectives, regional institutions 
have not only the function of tackling problems of traditional security (building 
confidence in order to acquire problem-solving capacities, which enable member 
states to settle problems without recourse to military force); but they also need to 
deal with human or non-traditional security (such as food security, environmental 
security, drug trafficking and the development of local economies through 
transnational integration processes for poverty reduction. The latter point is dicussed 
in Chapter Six with relevance to the localities at both sides of the border between 
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China and Vietnam). In the case of the Mekong, the transnational issue of water 
cooperation as a source of GMS development (transport, energy and agriculture) 
enters the scene of multilateral cooperation with a potential of tensions between 
states as well as between states and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) about 
how to use the seemingly abundant water resources of the Mekong. The issue of 
environmental security vis-A-vis economic development is central here as well as the 
involvement of NGOs, and in particular environmental NGOs, in the fon-nal 
decision-making processes of the GMS. The thesis will elaborate on the relations 
between NGOs and the central governments of Vietnam and China in Section T'wo 
of Chapter Five. 
Conflicts between actors on one level and between actors of different levels are 
indicated here. Chapters Two and Four will examine these issues in more detail. It is 
the premise of this 'Study that the GMS is an institution, which represents an 
international system in which nation states and their central governments in the 
fashion of the so-called Westphalian state system form the dominant decision- 
making bodies and are therefore able to set the parameters for the actions of 
subnational units and non-state actors. However, the GMS also shows signs of a 
post-Westphalian system in which the central government is not a unitary actor and 
subnational units as well as transnational non-state actors become increasingly able 
to challenge the sole authority of the nation state. The author will elaborate on these 
concepts in the following chapter, and we shall see in Chapters Five and Six how 
this applies to the GMS. 
This study holds that China's and Vietnam's foreign policy strategies directly 
translate into foreign policies towards the Greater Mekong Subregion. Furthermore, 
the study argues that the traditional antagonism between China and Vietnam 
translates into opposed foreign policy strategies towards the GMS. Thus, the 
imperatives of China's and Vietnam's foreign policies affect the nature of the GMS. 
Consequently, they are able to showcase if and how the GMS might be able to 
structure the traditionally antagonistic relationship between the two countries. This 
then will enable us to generalise on and draw conclusions for the institutional 
capacity of the GMS. Therefore, Hettne's mentioning of a region moving from an 
area to promote the national interest towards a coherent region, which has an 
independent capacity to act, can be exemplified by an examination of China's and 
Vietnam's policies towards subregional cooperation in the GMS. It is important to 
emphasise at this point that although the GMS is only one of a multitude of 
cooperation schemes in the Mekong basin (for a list see Chapter Five), it is the only 
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one that includes both Vietnam and China. It therefore provides the only option for 
Vietnam to work with China in a multilateral forum in the subregion. Although 
wider regional cooperation involves both countries as well, the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the Asia- 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
suffer from their inclusiveness: the political diversity of member states, their 
disparate levels of economic development and the difficulty to negotiate a consensus 
among all of the member states. The GMS thus holds a chance for Vietnam to deal 
with China not only in a multilateral forum, but also in one that is restricted as 
regards its membership. Hence, the bilateral relationship is discussed in the context 
of cooperation within the GMS. 
The cooperation structure of the GMS will be analysed along the lines of the 
regime approach, a strand of the literature on regional cooperation, which started 
with the work of Ruggie (1975). The purpose of this is to judge the nature of 
Mekong cooperation, analyse its organisational structure, assess the relevance of 
non-state actors within this structure including the system of intra-GMS governance 
that emerges from it, and evaluate the implications of the institutional set up for the 
policies of the member states exemplified by the bilateral relations between China 
and Vietnam. The regime approach is of importance to the GMS because 
subregional cooperation in Southeast Asia often does not establish strong physical 
organisations (Dosch, 1997: 65). The present study argues that the concept of 'soft 
regionalism' of non-intervention and non-binding rules, created by ASEAN and 
transferred to APEC, has also been moved to the GMS. By doing so, Southeast 
Asian cooperation schemes embody the particular kind of cooperation that allows 
member countries to adapt economically at their own individual pace. While neither 
realist nor neoliberal institutional paradigms alone can explain GMS cooperation, 
the moulding of both theories to the regime approach offers a means of examining 
the validity of the concept for the GMS. The very usefulness of the regime approach 
for Mekong cooperation is its applicability to informal modes of cooperation. The 
recent character of Mekong cooperation can thus prove a testing ground for the 
existence or emergence of regimes and shed light on both the character of Mekong 
cooperation and the future of it. 
Dealing with international regimes raises the question of their effectiveness, 
that is, to ask whether or not they have an impact on the policies of their members. 
In order to be effective, a regime must impact upon the conduct of its members 
towards the particular issue-area concerned, produce convergent expectations 
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towards a solution of the problem and, finally, make states enter into cooperation 
under the consideration that the other members will abide by the regulations that are 
being drawn up. The regime concept is especially important as it can 'reflect patterns 
of cooperation and discord over time' and consequently enables the researcher to 
study continuity and change within the international system over a specific period of 
time (Keohane, 1984: 63-64). As conflict remains a part of regional politics, the 
incentive to cooperate remains strong, because, according to Keohane, discord is 
essential for cooperation for without it there would only be harmony and hence and 
no need to become better off through cooperation (Keohane, 1984: 12). The regime 
approach thus helps us to understand cooperation and conflict throughout the course 
of time. Previous organisations or institutions to the current one(s) are therefore also 
of importance to the exploration of the GMS, because the ability to cooperate may 
depend on the availability of existing patterns of cooperation and confidence already 
created through prior cooperation efforts: '[flegimes rarely emerge from chaos; on 
the contrary, they are built on one another. We should therefore think as much about 
the evolution of regimes as about their creation ex nihilo' (Keohane, 1984: 79). 
Importantly, the evolution of international regimes over time turns the region 
they are situated in into a history book of cooperation in the area under scrutiny. As a 
result, progress and impediments of multilateral cooperation in the Mekong basin 
can be observed when looking at the history of the Mekong Committee of 1957 as 
the first multilateral institution in mainland Southeast Asia, its fate during the Cold 
War and its resurrection as the Mekong River Commission of 1995. A shortcoming 
of the regime approach is that it neglects history and the evolution of cooperation, 
but instead starts from the premise that states have an interest in cooperation. As a 
result, factors and foreign policies influencing cooperation both negatively and 
positively prior to the establishment of a regime are likely to be left out of the 
picture. The present study sets out to remedy this problem by combining an analysis 
of the institutional structure of the GMS along the lines of the regime approach with 
1) the historical foundations of cooperation in the Mekong basin, including an 
analysis of the historical events, which time and again hampered Mekong 
cooperation during the Cold War and eventually pushed it forward after the 
conclusion of the East-West antagonism; and 2) China's and Vietnam's foreign 
policy designs and the ramifications for the cooperation structure of the GMS. 
The GMS is a cooperation scheme whose members are the governments of 
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar and China's provinces of Yunnan 
and Guangxi (Guangxi was admitted to the GMS programme in summer 2005: see 
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ADB, August 2005: 2). As provincial scope of action rests upon central 
govermnental decisions, the central government in Beijing is also involved in the 
deliberation processes. Thus, in order to be effective, the GMS must influence the 
conduct of the respective governments. It must change national policies. As the 
GMS is part of the foreign and security policy strategies of China and Vietnam, the 
study will analyse the strategic relevance of the GMS within the foreign policy 
conceptions of China and Vietnam. It will further consider whether the GMS 
impacts upon the foreign policy conduct of China and Vietnam towards each other 
when dealing with conflicting issues within the GMS framework, and whether they 
are willing 'to accept obligations that restrain one's own freedom of action in 
unknown future situations if others also accept responsibilities, since the effect of 
these reciprocal actions is to reduce uncertainty' (Keohane, 1984: 17). 
China-Vietnam relations will hence be viewed in the context of regional 
cooperation. The GMS will be analysed at first independently and then as a function 
of Vietnam-China relations. There are therefore two steps: firstly, the historical 
examination of the conditions for cooperation, followed by an analysis of the GMS 
structure along the lines of the regime approach (Chapter Five); and secondly, the 
institution's strategic relevance, that is, how states make use of it to realise their 
foreign policy agendas, as exemplified by China-Vietnam relations (Chapter Six). 
The study will address the following questions relating to these concerns: 
9 How do China and Vietnam perceive each other and how do these views 
shape the foreign policies of both countries towards the GMS? 
* What roles have Vietnam and China allocated to the GMS? 
Is GMS cooperation a means to attain foreign policy goals, or is it an end in 
itself (such as integrating the economy into the subregion), or is it both a 
means and an end? 
9 Is the GMS able to affect the bilateral relations between China and Vietnam 
through its cooperation structure? 
Are the strategies of China and Vietnam towards the GMS complementary or 
contradictory? 
Are there dual Chinese and Vietnamese strategies in foreign policy and 
economic policy towards the GMS? Are there different strategies and 
different agendas of different actors on and between the national, local and 
transnational levels pertaining to cooperation in the GMS? 
-20- 
9 Who are the actors on the three levels of cooperation and which central 
government departments are involved in GMS cooperation other than the 
foreign ministry, that is, who in the central administrations is involved in 
managing China's and Vietnam's foreign relations? 
9 What are the structures in which GMS cooperation takes place? 
1.2. Methodology: methods, issues, ethics 
In order to approach the circumscribed problems and answer the research 
questions, collection and analysis of data includes primary and secondary sources. In 
detail, sources encompass the following: 
examination of the relevant existing literature, i. e. official publications 
(including governmental statements, press releases, white books, conference 
material in particular of ADB-sponsored conferences), secondary literature, 
articles of region-wide and country-based newspapers, news agencies and 
news magazines; 
analysis of documentary material, including primary sources: white papers, 
treaties, transcripts of speeches, and the interviews conducted by the author. 
For international relations, documents can explain the reason for 
governmental actions and also the motivations for moves in foreign policy. 
When using documentary material, the origin of the document and the 
motivation of the producer - that is, the intention of the document - has to be 
taken into account; 
interviews: qualitative interviews were held with Vietnamese scholars and 
governmental advisors. Interviews were also conducted with Chinese, 
Burmese, Japanese and Western scholars and governmental advisors in order 
to enquire into Vietnamese and Chinese foreign policy and integration 
strategies towards the GMS and to explicate the functioning and 
cohesiveness of the GMS and its role in and for Southeast Asia. The 
knowledge gained from the interviews served to clarify the motivation for 
foreign policies, inconsistencies within Vietnam's foreign policy, 
dependencies on or orientation towards other countries as well as 
congruencies and incongruencies of strategies between Beijing's and Hanoi's 
foreign policies. The background and position of the person interviewed was 
taken into account during the interviews. 
The interviews were transformed into a textual basis in three ways: 
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1) transcription of tape recordings, when the interviewee agreed that the 
interview could be tape recorded; 
2) verbatim notes taken during the interview where agreed upon with the 
interviewee and when recordings were not wished by the interviewee or 
deemed not suitable by the interviewer; 
3) memory protocols when note taking and recording were either not wished 
by the interviewee or deemed not suitable by the interviewer. 
Regarding the interviews, their explorative character was employed in order to 
allow open ended questions and the use of non-standardised questionnaires. The 
advantage of qualitative over quantitative interviewing is that questionnaires can be 
adjusted to the respective person during the interview, paying tribute to the process 
character and interactiveness of the research process (Lamnek, 1995: 4,24). The 
interviews followed a flexible modus operandi which allows the researcher to take 
into account new issues, take new directions during the research process, and change 
the definition of relevant data in the same way as he gains new insights and 
understandings of the researched object. In this respect, the researcher does not have 
to follow an 'established scientific protocol' that coerces him 'in advance of his 
studies to present a fixed and clearly structured problem, to know what kinds of data 
he is to collect, to have and hold to a prearranged set of techniques, and to shape his 
findings by previously established categories' (Blumer, 1969: 41). 
The field of foreign affairs is especially dependent on the perspective of the 
person interviewed, as the interviewee's personal opinion concerning the respective 
issue stems largely from his national and professional background. Hence, flexibility 
in exploration means the inclusion of the advancement of knowledge during the 
research process for the overall research project. Openness is therefore a pre- 
requisite for qualitative research so that the person interviewed is not restricted and 
is willing to give infon-nation. Although the interviews were semi-structured, - they 
were based on only a few guiding questions (for particulars on them see below) in 
order to enable adjustment of the interview to the specific interview situation, which 
in most cases was of conversational character, and to further enable incorporation of 
new aspects by both the interviewer and the interviewee. Another advantage of semi- 
structured interviews is that questions allow for open-ended answers, and the 
interviewee is able to answer in his or her own words. Opposed to this, the 
structured interview (such as ticking boxes) is too inflexible and would not allow the 
incorporation of new issues and therefore a flexible reaction to changing interview 
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topics or interview situations. The unstructured interview was deemed too relaxed 
and not suited to the interviews, which had to deal with a particular set of topics. The 
flexibility resulting from the explorative nature of the qualitative interview thus 
means the adjustment of the tool to the research process and the individuality of the 
researched object (Lamnek, 1995: 22,28). An important result of qualitative 
interviewing is therefore that it elicits more nuanced information than can be 
expected from quantitative or structured interviews. As the professional (such as 
governmental official or independent researcher), national (Chinese, Vietnamese or 
other) and educational (lived and educated in Vietnam, in China or other countries) 
background of the interviewee may influence the way foreign policy is perceived and 
analysed, the explorativeness of the qualitative, semi-structured interview was 
deemed the most suitable way to obtain the nuanced infori-nation necessary, and to 
understand the views expressed by the interviewees in relation to his or her personal 
background. These issues are also relevant in relation to validity and reliability of the 
inforination obtained during the intervieW. 6 
Guiding questions were used throughout the interview, which pertained to 
three blocks of questions: firstly, Vietnam's view of its strategic environment after 
the Cold War and the relevance of China, Japan, the USA, ASEAN and the 
European Union; secondly, the strategic relevance of the GMS for Vietnam and 
China (how the GMS is used for the goal attainment of Chinese and Vietnamese 
foreign policy makers); thirdly, the nature of GMS cooperation (its effectiveness and 
resilience). The same set of questions was used for several of the interviews to allow 
triangularisation of information through multiple interviews. According to the 
situation and the specific background of the interviewee, however, new aspects were 
added and other aspects replaced. In addition, there was no fixed order of questions 
in order to create a flexible and naturally flowing conversational environment. 
Anonymity was assured. The interviews appear in Chapters Five and Six. They are 
shown in relevant sections of each of the chapters in the form of topical summaries, 
after which their contents is further discussed. Since the small sample of interviewed 
key informants carries the danger of a personal bias on the side of the informants and 
hence a distortion of the results of the research, the information gathered from the 
interviews will be triangulated with relevant documentary material and secondary 
literature (Tinsley, 2005: 187-188). 
6 For the aspect of validity and reliability see also the discussion below on the use of 
interpreters during interviews. 
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At the beginning of each interview, the interviewer introduced himself, the 
subject area he was working on, as well as the purpose of the interview, namely to 
inform the research of a doctoral dissertation. This was generally met by the 
curiosity of the interviewees, who without exception asked for the purpose of the 
interview and the field of work the interviewer was interested in. Then usually 
followed an introduction by the interviewees to their employing institution and their 
work. A mutual interest in the work of interviewer and interviewee - and, indeed, 
the explicitly stated delight of one Vietnamese researcher to engage in the 'positive 
aspects of globalisation', namely to discuss Chinese and Vietnamese foreign policy 
in a language non-native to both the interviewer and interviewee (English) between a 
Vietnamese person and a German person studying in the United Kingdom - greatly 
helped to transfer the formal introduction towards a more relaxed and naturally 
flowing conversation. As a result, before each interview started, informed consent of 
the interviewee was assured. 
It is the belief of the author that this situation of ensuring a naturally flowing 
conversation also helped to mitigate the danger of perceiving a European person as 
intruding on the sensitive issue of national security, which is not very easily 
discussed and shared with outsiders. Here, it was also important for the interviewer 
to respect the authority of the interviewee, who in most cases was a senior scholar, 
and therefore to pay attention to the high regard for authority, which is traditionally 
paid in societies of China and Southeast Asia. The interviewer therefore also paid 
attention not to appear aggressive when asking questions, nor did the interviewer try 
to question the statements of the interviewee. Rather, to elicit more nuanced 
information, questions were posed in a different context or different form, 
sometimes at a later stage of the interview. With regard to authority, it is important 
to point out that relationships of authority within, for instance, a governmental 
administration, may prevent people on less senior levels from talking freely about 
sensitive issues, as they feel not to have the authority (or indeed do not have the 
authority) to talk about it without their superior's explicit authorisation. This 
happened to the author once when informally meeting a junior govenu-nental 
employee, who had agreed to meet the author, but when she showed up said that she 
had talked to her boss before and was now instructed no to talk about 'certain 
issues. ' Again, the trust established at the outset of each interview, the interviewer's 
respect for the authority of the interviewee, and, indeed, the above mentioned 
4positive aspects of globalisation' associated with a European person taking an 
interest in Vietnam's view of the world, helped to overcome this danger with the 
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exception of this case. In addition, what eased the danger of this issue, was that most 
of the interviewees were established senior scholars and heads of departments 
involved in advising governments on security issues. This is not to say that these 
issues are entirely irrelevant in European or American countries. However, the 
likelihood of these issues influencing the interview is generally lesser giving the 
different cultural backgrounds. 
These issues relate to the question of positionality of the researcher in 
interviews in general, and in cross-cultural interviews in particular. This problem has 
also been acknowledged by researchers, who conducted interviews within their own 
ethnic community abroad. A Taiwanese researcher, for instance, interviewing 
members of the overseas Taiwanese community in the United States, reported a 
'shifting nature of [... her] positionality' as she in her role as a young researcher 
with a feminist identity was often in conflict with traditional Chinese values 
represented by her interviewees, who did not accept her as part of 'their' group. This 
created a situation in which her insider status, she herself had perceived of due to an 
ethnic and linguistic homogeneity and her and her interviewees' residential status in 
a foreign country, was compromised by her 'modem' background. In addition, 
traditional Chinese values of seniority, face saving and the value of a good education 
generated 'multidimensional power relations that shaped the interview process. ' As a 
result, the anticipated unproblematic establishment of trust and openness was 
difficult to achieve (Lee, 2000: 2-3). 
The relaxed interview situations of my own interviews were only challenged 
once in the case of an interview conducted with a senior researcher and 
governmental advisor in Hanoi. For this interview, a questionnaire had to be 
submitted to the interviewee in advance. This apparently gave the interviewee 
sufficient time to prepare answers, which merely reflected the official governmental 
pronouncements of Vietnam's principles and practices of foreign policy. During the 
inter-view process, however, it was possible to elicit answers, which were more than 
just the reiteration of Vietnam's official policy towards China. Helpful here was the 
conversational character of the interview structure, which helped relaxing the 
initially formal atmosphere. Also especially necessary in this particular interview 
was knowledge about the political culture and the political system of Vietnam, the 
relations between provinces and the central government within the political system 
as well as decision-making issues particular to the political system of Vietnam, such 
as the principle of collective leadership, in order to interpret implicit answers to 
explicit questions. As Rubin and Rubin (1995) mentioned: 
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A cultural arena includes those who have similar understandings, 
expectations, and values; such people usually have had common 
experiences or a shared history. A cultural arena is not defined by a 
single belief or rule, or by a handful of phrases unique to the group, but 
by a whole set of understandings that is widely shared within a group or 
subgroup (Rubin and Rubin, 1995: 22). 
This problem was in particular related to a question regarding different 
strategies of the provinces bordering China and the central government in Hanoi for 
border cooperation and integration with China within and outside the framework of 
the Greater Mekong Subregion, that is, disagreements between the provinces and the 
central government. The answer here was that there were no disagreements. It needs 
to be noted here, that it was indeed the case, but that disagreements were handled 
behind the scenes, with the government having the final decision-making authority. 
So, indeed, in the final analysis, there are no disagreements bursting out into the 
open in a system, in which a province has to follow central government directives. It 
is similarly important to have a thorough knowledge of the history of China-Vietnam 
relations and the concept inherent in the political systems of China and Vietnam 
governing the bilateral relations in the past (such as tianzi, tianxia and hila, for an 
explanation see Chapter Five), which to some extent are still of relevance today, 
even if they are stripped of their traditional philosophical background and attuned to 
contemporary demands of realpolitik. This was particularly evident during the fall 
out between Hanoi and Beijing during Beijing's 1979 'punishment expedition' 
against Hanoi, in the course of which rhetoric was employed that was strongly 
reminiscent of pre-colonial concepts of power and conquest. To understand 
contemporary policy and interpret official documents correctly, it is equally 
important to have a good knowledge of the colonial period in Vietnam and China, as 
the origin of the communist parties and of post-colonial foreign policies are partly 
rooted in the colonial experience. The rhetoric of China's national defence white 
papers, for instance, is full of denunciations of neo-colonial policies alluding to 
policies of the imperial countries in China between 1840 and 1945 (for these and 
similar issues see Chapters Five and Six). 
The introductory phase of each interview as described above, which helped to 
establish trust between interviewee and interviewer, also included the offer by the 
interviewer and the requests by the interviewees to make their names and 
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institutional affiliations anonymous when using the interview material for research. 
This agreement helped talking about the interviewees personal opinions and as a 
result brought about material not found in official statements (except in large parts 
for the one case mentioned above). The guarantee of confidentiality and the need to 
create a natural conversational atmosphere also made it necessary in almost all cases 
to conduct the interview without tape recording it, and often without taking notes 
(see above). 
Interviews were held at conferences, university departments, international 
organisations, goverm-nental administrations and research institutes. The following 
table shows the inter-view schedule. 
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Table 1: Interview Schedule 
Date Location Position of 
Interviewee 
Institution Length 
25 Jul 2003 Bonn Senior officer Bundesministerium ffir 1.5h 
wirtschaftliche 
Zusammenarbeit und 
Entwicklung (Federal 
Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and 
Development) 
16 Dec 2003 Birmingham Senior Researcher Comparative Regional Ih 
Integration Studies, 
United Nations 
University 
2 Mar 2004 New York Senior member, Columbia University 1.5h 
Department of 
Political Science 
5 Mar 2004 New York Chief analyst United Nations th 
12 Mar 2004 New York Senior diplomat United Nations th 
20 May 2004 Hanoi Senior member, Yunnan Academy of lh 
Institute of Social Sciences 
Southeast Asian 
Studies 
20 May 2004 Hanoi General Director, Vietnam Academy of lh 
Institute of World Social Sciences 
Economy 
21 May 2004 Hanoi Visiting Fellow, Chulalangkorn Ih 
Institute of Security University 
and International 
Studies 
4 Jun 2004 Hanoi Head, Department Vietnam 1.5h 
for Politics and 
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International Affairs 
Studies, Institute of 
Southeast Asian 
Studies 
5 Jun 2004 Hanoi Assistant Director Ministry of Foreign lh 
General Affairs, Institute for 
International Relations 
5 Jun 2004 Hanoi Director, Centre for Institute for 1.5h 
Southeast Asian International Relations 
Studies 
7 Jun 2004 Hanoi Researcher Hitotsubashi University Ih 
9 Jun 2004 Hanoi Junior Researcher Ministry of Foreign lh 
Affairs 
10 Jun 2004 Hanoi Director, Center for Academy of Social 2h 
Chinese Studies Sciences 
5 Jul 2004 Hanoi Researcher Ministry of Foreign 1.5h 
Affairs, Institute for 
International Relations 
18 Jun 2005 H6chst/ Senior Research Stiftung Wissenschaft Ih 
Odenwald Associate und Politik (German 
Institute for 
International and 
Security Affairs) 
As can be seen from the table, no interviews were conducted in China. This is 
due to practical constraints relating to time and financial matters. However, 
interviews were conducted and informal talks held with Chinese scholars at a GMS 
conference in Hanoi7 in addition to informal exchanges with Chinese researchers in 
the United Kingdom. To make up for it, Chinese language sources were used 
throughout the study, in particular relating to China's interests in the GMS. 
7 Economic and Non-Traditional Security Cooperation in the Greater Mekong Sub- 
Region: Perspectives, Opportunities & Challenges, 19-21 May 2004. 
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The two interviews in Germany (Bonn, H6chst im Odenwald) were conducted 
in German, as this is the native tongue of both the interviewer and the interviewees. 
All other interviews were conducted in English, with the exception of one interview 
in Hanoi: during this interview, an interpreter was present in order to translate the 
questions, which were posed in English, into Vietnamese, and to translate the answer 
from Vietnamese to English (the interviewer is able to read Vietnamese but has no 
sufficient speaking ability to conduct an interview in the language). The interviewee 
was a senior researcher working on China-Vietnam relations. The interpreter was a 
junior Vietnamese researcher knowledgeable of the subject matter and fluent in 
English. 
Using an interpreter to conduct interviews poses a number of challenges with 
regard to the originality and a potential distortedness of the data emerging from the 
interview during the inter-view process as well as in the process of putting orally 
gathered data into written form. This relates, firstly, to the knowledge, the interpreter 
has of the languages he or she translates. The interpreter must be fluent in both the 
source and the target language and should ideally be acquainted with the cultural 
context the languages stem from. In addition to language proficiency, the interpreter 
should also have a profound knowledge of the subject matter of the conversation in 
order to properly transfer concepts from one language into the other. In relation to 
the issues of subject matter and language, it should be noted that cultural 
misunderstandings can lead to incorrect and deficient translation (Fischer, 2001). 
This problem in turn relates to the issue discussed above regarding prior knowledge 
of the interviewer of the cultural context he or she is researching in, including the 
history and the nature of the political systems of the respective country. In relation to 
this, culturally bound concepts are sometimes difficult if not impossible to translate, 
carrying the danger of losing or even changing their original meaning on the way 
from the source language in the target language. This may result in misconceptions 
of the recipient of the translation. Having been a student not only of international 
relations but also of Chinese language, Chinese history and philosophy, a prominent 
example that comes to mind is the Chinese term dao, a central concept of both the 
religion and the philosophy of Daoism, which is usually translated as 'way', a 
translation which however does not encompass the religious-philosophical idea 
behind this concept, and simply suffers from the problem that the meaning of the 
concept cannot be accurately reflected in a single-word translation. In a similar 
manner, the concepts of hita, tianzi and tianxia, mentioned above, fall under the 
same category, as they are inherently connected with the political culture and 
philosophy of China. This may make it necessary to deviate from the sentence 
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structure of the source language in order to accurately translate the meaning of the 
words. In those cases, the interpreter perforrns not only a translation, which may or 
may not be verbatim, but he also takes the role of an intermediary between two 
cultures. In order to perfon-n this function, the interpreter needs to overcome a 
potential cultural bias in order to correctly construe the questions asked and transfer 
it into the language of the interviewee and do the same process when transferring the 
answer into the language of the interviewer. At this point, the researcher has to be 
aware of a potential cultural bias, too, in order to accurately construe the meaning of 
the answer given. Although the concepts relate to the field of ethnography and 
anthropology, we are very close to the discussion of a dichotomy between emic 
research and etic research: the use of concepts and categories of the researcher's 
culture to describe another culture (etic research, position of an outsider) or the use 
of concepts and categories relevant to the culture under observation (emic research, 
position of an insider), and the problems for generalisation of the research findings 
that emerge from an emic, perspective. When dealing with two or more cultures, or 
when the researcher of culture A researches culture B, it becomes important to 
transgress the emic-etic divide: 
The solution is to have as much emic 'insider' infon-nation possible for 
all the cultures under investigation, but for the researchers to consciously 
consider how to transfon-n that emic 'culturally sensitive' knowledge 
into etic 'culturally universal' constructs, models, and measures (Tinsley, 
2005: 189). 
Hence in order to understand a different culture, it is necessary for the 
researcher to 'complement' his outside position with knowledge of the culture he or 
she is dealing with. 
A further problem to be considered is the professional background of the 
interpreter. In the field of foreign and security policy in closed regimes such as 
China and Vietnam, it is of high importance to have an independent interpreter, who 
is not connected to, or espouses the views of, governmental agencies. Interpreters 
representing the official views might choose to alter the words of the interviewee in 
the translation process, add own views, or leave out whole aspects of the 
interviewee's answers. Such an interpreter might perform the function of a 
governmental watch dog and inhibit the interviewee, prevent the interviewee from 
adding own views and thwart attempts by the interviewer to establish a naturally 
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flowing conversation situation. In the author's own case, it was important for me as 
interviewer to observe that the body language between interviewee and interpreter 
showed a great deal of acquaintance and familiarity between both persons, and they 
appeared to be very comfortable with each other (smiles, seemingly casual talking at 
the introductory stage of the interview) and the interview situation. It is therefore 
important, as Freed (1988) noticed, to consider the role of the interpreter, the parties 
present at the interview, the cultural dimension and the background of the 
interpreter. 
The search for a middle-ground between etic and emic research described 
above is similarly important to the search for a middle-ground between positivism 
and interpretivism. This perceived dichotomy oflen leads to a dispute between 
positivist-deductive and interpretive-inductive epistemology, or even objectivist- 
positivist-deductive-quantitative versus constructivist-interpretive-inductive- 
qualitative research strategies. The dispute between both paradigms deals with the 
problem of neutrality and values-based research. The barrier may be broken down by 
acknowledging that positivism may acquire both deductive and inductive dimensions 
throughout the research process. This gives rise to a situation, which helps solving 
the problem of objectivity in positivist research and may include qualitative 
methodology, thereby recognising that the researcher is part of the research process 
and does not act within a value-free vacuum (see the above remarks on cross-cultural 
research and positionality). This insight relaxes the ontological position of 
objectivism as the basis of positivism, - which in its extreme form sees reality as a 
cconcrete structure', external and beyond the influence of social actors, which can be 
accurately observed and measured, and within which humans 'respond to events in 
predictable and determinate ways' - and accepts that 'human beings, far from merely 
responding to the social world, may actively contribute to its creation' (Morgan and 
Smircich, 1980: 493,495 and 498). Positivism is deductive in that a priori 
hypotheses generated by a pre-formulated theory will be tested in the research in 
order to either confin-n or disconfirm it. This is the approach generally pursued in 
this study in order to be able to empirically examine the structures, in which GMS 
cooperation takes place, along the lines of the regime approach. This is not to say, 
however, that inductive elements are completely excluded: in the course of research, 
the positivist approach may (unconsciously) acquire an additional inductive 
character, in that facts are gathered (through qualitative - not quantitative - 
interviewing, analysis of documentary material etc. ) that accumulate knowledge 
independent of the pre-formulated theory (here: the regime approach); and this 
knowledge gained through observation in turn helps to refine and adjust the 
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theoretical framework. This is to say that '[fln practice, the distinction is not 
altogether sharp. Induction does not take place without a theoretical understanding 
and deduction requires empirical experience. Therefore, the two alternatives may in 
some cases appear as different stages in a process' (Lidstr6m, 1998: 99). Both 
approaches 'are highly concerned with existing empirical conditions. While 
inductive research takes this as its starting-point, empirical facts provide the final 
test for the deductive approach' (Lidstr6m, 1998: 109). And Morgan and Smircich 
(1980) advocate a mix of approaches from within the spectrum of the 'subjective- 
objective continuum' dependent on and according to the phenomena under scrutiny, 
the research questions posed and the orientation of the researcher (pp. 498-499). 
With respect to the present study, in order to supplement the positivist 
approach of theory testing, qualitative interviewing was used in order to examine 
how foreign policy makers relate to the processes of GMS cooperation, what 
directions foreign policy takes regarding regional cooperation, and what the strategic 
relevance of the GMS is in the overall foreign policy frameworks of Vietnam and 
China. Qualitative inter-viewing was employed, because, in foreign policy research, 
quantitative interviewing would not yield usable results, since, as described above, 
the view point of the respective expert depends a lot on his or her personal and 
professional background. Standardised questionnaires for all interviews to be 
conducted are technically possible, but the results are likely to distort the way in 
which security or threats to security are individually perceived. It is therefore 
indispensable to be not only personally present at the interview, but it is essential to 
observe how the interviewee reacts to questions (body language), how he or she 
formulates answers, and if the interviewee gives only implicit answers, which need 
to be interpreted by the interviewer through his or her knowledge of the culture he or 
she is dealing with. Another important aspect is the dimension of trust. As foreign 
policy, and in particular security policy, is not easily talked about in any given 
country, European and East Asian countries alike (although in secretive states such 
as China and Vietnam it is even more difficult to gain access to foreign policy 
experts and make them talk about security), the establishment of trust between 
interviewer and interviewee is of high importance and a precondition to establish an 
interview situation, in which the interviewee feels comfortable enough not only to 
talk about security, but also to voice his or her own opinions on the matter. This in 
turn makes a non-standardised questionnaire (here in the form of semi-structured 
questionnaires) an indispensable research tool. Personal contact and qualitative 
interviewing are therefore both essential in order to gain valid and reliable data on 
the sensitive issue of foreign and security policy. 
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1.3. The structure of the study 
Chapter Two will give an overview of the history of cooperation in Northeast 
and Southeast Asia during and after the Cold War. In particular, it will deal with the 
first and second wave of regionalism in the region and discuss the concept of the 
cnew regionalism. ' The chapter will then discuss the core concepts of this study, 
namely regionalism, regionalisation and subregionalism. In a further step, the 
chapter will proceed to discuss subregional cooperation in the Mekong basin by 
drawing upon the major strands in the literature on subregional cooperation. 
Chapters Three and Four will introduce the regime approach and relate it to the 
analysis of the GMS. The concept of international regimes will be used in order to 
analyse the structure of the Greater Mekong Subregion and to explore the 
cooperation and institutionalisation processes of the GMS. The chapter will outline 
the origins of the regime concept, which were presented by the transnationalists of 
the 1970s, notably Keohane and Nye. The regime approach was developed out of 
dissatisfaction with the major explanatory paradigms of international relations, 
neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. The regime approach is beneficial to the 
exploration of GMS cooperation, as it 1) is able to combine the major competing 
strands of the international relations theory debate and 2) defines several stages of 
cooperation and institution-building, which are useful in order to identify stages in 
more informal ways of cooperation, which are the dominant form of cooperation in 
Southeast Asia and are enshrined in the so-called 'ASEAN way. ' Furthermore, there 
is no official founding document laying down the structure and tasks of the GMS. 
Instead, both elements of the institution of the GMS were developed step by step 
during specialist and ministerial meetings and finally concluded in ministerial 
conferences. The proceedings of the ministerial conferences will be used in order to 
examine the development of structure and tasks. This step-by-step development can 
best be elucidated using the regime approach. 
Chapters Five and Six will examine the structures in which GMS cooperation 
takes place and will relate the history and current processes of cooperation in the 
GMS to the Cold War and post-Cold War history of region against the backdrop of 
the multiple ideological split between capitalist and socialist development paradigms 
as they became manifest in the split between China, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) and Vietnam. The chapters will discuss the failure of Mekong 
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basin cooperation during the Cold War and its resumption after the solution of the 
Cambodia conflict, which was itself a result of internal conflicts and outside Cold 
War interference, exacerbated by differing perception of the security environment by 
China and Vietnam. The chapters are designed to show the directions of Vietnam's 
and China's foreign policies and to put them in the context of historical and current 
processes of cooperation in the Mekong basin. By relating GMS cooperation to the 
foreign policies of China and Vietnam, the chapters furthermore explore the strategic 
relevance of the GMS in Northeast and Southeast Asia and for the policies of 
Vietnam and China. In this respect, China-Vietnam relations serve as a case study 
for the strategic relevance of the GMS. The chapters will devote sections to the 
discussion of conflict and cooperation in the Sino-Vietnamese border regions. The 
border situation is of relevance, as it is integrated in the GMS framework and has 
become an important area of economic development for both countries. 
Finally, a conclusion will refer to the main points of analysis. 
In order to avoid misunderstandings it is decisive to note that it is not the aim 
of this work to deliver an economic analysis, but that the study is placed within the 
realm of international relations. It takes economic cooperation into account where it 
appears as part of foreign and security policy. Thus, economic policy is seen as a 
foreign policy tool and will be used for foreign policy analysis. 
A remark on bilingual newspapers and translations: for the Chinese daily 
Reninin Ribao (the English edition of which has the title People'S Daily) and the 
newspaper Zhonggito Ribao (English edition China Daily), both the English and 
Chinese versions are used throughout the study. In both cases, because it concerns 
the same newspaper and hence the same source and political opinion, only one title 
is used, namely the Chinese title. For the same reasons, the same arrangement 
applies to the news agency Xinhua or Xinhita She, which has the English title NeIv 
China Neivs Agency. As a consequence, the Chinese titles of both the newspapers 
and the news agency are used for reference in the text and the bibliography at the end 
of this study. Whenever the English editions are used, this is indicated. 
Unless otherwise indicated, translations of non-English (Chinese, Vietnamese 
and German) material are the author's translations. 
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The next chapter outlines the main events leading to subregional cooperation in 
Southeast Asia and explains the central concepts this study is concerned with. 
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Chapter 2 
Explaining Subregional Cooperation: Events, Concepts and the 
Mekong Basin 
This chapter examines the events in the global sphere and in Northeast and 
Southeast Asia, which led to subregional. cooperation in the Mekong basin. Section 
One examines the major events during and after the Cold War. It analyses the 
changes in the global power structure, which was reflected in changes in the regional 
power structure and led to the emergence of the so-called 'new regionalism' in 
subregional cooperation in Northeast and Southeast Asia. Section Two then sets out 
to explain these concepts with relevance to subregional cooperation: the theoretical 
concepts of region, regionalism, regionalisation, new regionalism and 
subregionalism and the foreign policy implications of the new global and regional 
settings, including the issue of actors other than the central government, which are 
active in the field of foreign relations. Section Three explains these concept with 
relevance to the Mekong basin. Section Four closes the chapter with a short 
conclusion emphasising the major theme of this study: the mutual influences of 
subregionalism and foreign policy in the GMS and the role of the issue of human 
security. 
2.1. Events: Cold and post-Cold War developments 
The CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) summit of 
NATO and Warsaw Pact in Paris from 17-21 November 1990 marked the official 
end of the East West divide in Europe. The conclusion of the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of 19 November 1990 intended to 
create a military balance between the two 'groups of States Parties' (Art. 11,1. A)) 
referring to NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. In the Charter of Paris for 
a New Europe, the heads of state or governinent finally concluded that the 'era of 
confrontation and division of Europe has ended' (p. 3). On I April 1991, the military 
structure of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation was dissolved. In December 1991, the 
Soviet Union ceased to exist. The end of the East West schism in favour of the 
Western world brought Fukuyama's 'end of history' thesis, which argued that liberal 
democracy marks the 'end point of mankind's ideological evolution' and the 'final 
form of human government' (Fukuyama, 1989: 4). Instead, however, new frontlines 
emerged: international terrorism in its fundamentalist Islamic fashion has been the 
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new issue of international relations since 11 September 2001 and the new fashion of 
the related academic discipline. Earlier, the Asian values debate shortly indicated an 
Asian versus Western conflict, but it soon disappeared into the Asian crisis of 1997. 
Although the number of interstate conflicts decreased, internal conflicts increased; 
and the nature of violent conflict changed from the prevalence of interstate conflicts 
fought between political elites of different states to deep-rooted conflicts fought 
within a state and potentially involving all social strata from the political elite to the 
individual community member. Deep-rooted conflicts combine identity factors, such 
as race, language and religion with distribution factors, namely a 'perceived 
imbalance' in the distribution of economic, social and political resources between 
the identity groups (Bloomfield and Reilly, 1998: 9). The rise of the danger of 
internal conflicts and the importance of non-state actors brought about a major 
paradigm shift in the concept of security, from national or home security to human 
security, thus from the survival of the state within the international system to the 
survival of the individual and the community within a given state. The issue was 
conceptually embraced by the United Nations in the 1994 Hunzan Developinent 
Report (UNDP, 1994). The importance attached to human security acknowledges a 
link between issues such as poverty and political and societal stability (Wolf, 2004: 
1). Where it concerns water, the picture looks gloomy. Wolf, drawing on his studies 
of conflicts over international waters -a concern which will be analysed later in this 
study - concludes that the history of international waters 'suggests that the simple 
fact that humans suffer and die in the absence of agreement apparently offers little in 
the way of incentive to cooperate - even less so the health of aquatic ecosystems' 
(Wolf, 2004: 9). 
In Northeast and Southeast Asia, the Cold War split did not emerge as clear as 
in Europe. At least four groups emerged during the Cold War, with shifting 
'membership': the Soviet-leaning, the Chinese-leaning, the US-leaning, and the non- 
aligned. Furthermore, the split went directly through the core of ASEAN regarding 
the China threat perception. 
The result of the Cold War split of Northeast and Southeast Asia was an 
'institutional deficit - the absence of institutionalized regional intergovernmental 
collaboration. '8 This can be explained with an idea of regionalism that was foreign 
8 For a short history of Cold War Pacific security and economic arrangements, hence 
the reasons for the 'institutional deficit' see Ravenhill, 1998: 248-250. 
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to the region, firstly because it stemmed from European practice of an ever deeper 
economic integration that would eventually be joined by a political integration; and 
secondly because its rationale was concerned with balance of power strategies and 
not a promotion of regional awareness (Liu and R6gnier, 2003: xiii). Therefore, this 
'old regionalism' ultimately transferred a foreign concept to the region, which 
attempted to replicate the global bipolarity on a smaller scale. 
In 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations was founded, but did not 
work as a region-wide linkage. The first institution fulfilling this task was APEC in 
1989, followed by a quick increase of proposals for intergovernmental cooperation 
across the whole Asia Pacific (Ravenhill, 1998: 247-248). ASEAN was founded as a 
body for regional cooperation to enhance the overall security environment 
(cooperation in economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative 
issues and to promote regional peace and stability without references to rules and 
obligations: ASEAN, 1967: articles 2-3). The Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation 
(SEATO), in existence from 1955 to 1977, was an attempt to build a Western-type 
regional security coalition of nation-states. SEATO was a true creation of the Cold 
War and already this purpose made it hardly more than a marriage of necessity. It 
never became viable and was eventually abandoned in 1977. ASEAN lacked a 
concrete vision and the negotiation processes were often jam-locked, particularly 
being influenced by differing perceptions of China as a security threat to Southeast 
Asia and also by the concept of soft regionalism of which non-interference in a 
member country's internal affairs forms an essential part. 9 In particular, ASEAN's 
handling of regional conflicts - most notably the Cambodia conflict - was often 
criticiscd as being highly ineffective (for instance M611er, 1998). Raszelenberg 
argued that ASEAN is more occupied with the 'limitation of damage' rather than an 
active solving of the problems of regional cooperation'O (Raszelenberg, 2002: 18). 
ASEAN's ideal was to abstain from military conflicts and controversial issues. The 
goal of promoting regional peace and stability implied a view of security, which 
meant to safeguard independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national 
9 For more on soft regionalism see Chapter Five. 
10 'Die ASEAN ist nach wie vor eine eher lockere, beizeiten äußerst ineffektive 
Vereinigung, die häufig kaum in der Lage ist, substantielle Probleme regionalen 
Zusammenwachsens zu lösen, sondern sich mit Schadensbegrenzung begnügen 
muss. ' 
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identity (Haftendorn, 1995: 459). It did not imply military intervention in a crisis 
situation. 
The division of Southeast Asia during the Cold War indicates that an area 
called Southeast Asia was not a natural condition, but rather an artificial 
construction. Thus, the evolution of an area with the name of 'Southeast Asia' needs 
clarification. The term 'Southeast Asia' (SUdostasien) was first used in a geopolitical 
sense in 1923 by Karl Haushofer' 1, an early theorist of geopolitics who wrote 
predominantly during the Weimar Republic and the Hitler regime. In the same year, 
the ethnologist and prehistorian Robert Heine-Geldern showed ethnic, cultural and 
linguistic commonalities of the peoples of this region. In a historical sense, the 
region had long been viewed as a transition zone between India and China rather 
than an independent area. In the English speaking world, the term Southeast Asia 
was first introduced in 1943 with the formation of the combined allied Southeast 
Asia Command under Lord Mountbatten. This designation served to identify areas, 
which were mostly under Japanese occupation and were planned to be recaptured 
from Japan: French Indochina, British Burma and Malaya plus Thailand for the 
mainland, the Philippines and the Dutch Indies for the insular areas. Thus, in the 
latter case, Southeast Asia emerged in the process of an accidental geographical 
partition through military necessities (Feldbauer, Husa and Korf, 2003; Ufen, 2004: 
72 and note 1). 
First attempts at regional cooperation happened after the conclusion of the 
colonial period: 
Track-one initiatives12: track-one diplomacy designates the 'official' 
diplomacy carried out between governments, governmental officials and 
Haushofer, Karl (1923), 'SUdostasiens Wiederaufstieg zur Selbstbestimmung, ' in 
Geopolitik der Selbstbestininning (Leipzig: Bibliothek der Weltgeschichte R6sl 
u. C. MOnchen). The same contribution appeared later in 1923 in Haushofer, 
Karl und Josef Mdrz (eds. ), Zzon Freiheitskanipf in Sfidostasien (Berlin: Kurt 
Vowinckel Verlag), pp. 19-162. For a discussion on Haushofer's life and work 
see the two-volume biography by Jacobsen (1979). 
12 The two track-one organisations not mentioned here because of their economic 
focus are the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) and APEC. APEC and ASEM are 
mentioned passirn throughout the study. 
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diplomats. The organisations listed below are therefore organisations which 
were established by governments and for governments. Track-two 
organisations are often bedevilled by power rivalries among its member 
states and are often beset by a zero-sum understanding of power. This 
understanding makes cooperation difficult and has the ability to thwart ideas 
of collective security meant to soften the contentious nature of diplomacy. 
Collective security is applied to the military alliance of NATO, but found a 
universal application in the League of Nations and the UN, a form that has 
been difficult to sustain. 
- In 1955, SEATO was founded but then failed in 1977. The Manila Pact of 
September 1954, which established the Southeast Asia Collective Defence 
Treaty, on which SEATO was based, was modelled on NATO and was signed by 
the USA, France, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand and 
the Philippines. SEATO was hampered by internal problems and lost 
significance after the Paris agreements of January 1973. In 1975, it was decided 
to abandon SEATO in June 1977 (Ufen, 2004: 72). 
- The Five Power Defence Agreement between Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Singapore and the United Kingdom originated in the Anglo-Malayan Defence 
Agreement of 1957 (Singapore ceased to be a member upon its expulsion from 
the Federation of Malaysia in 1965). The aim was to provide Malaysia with a 
security guarantee against Indonesia, whose hostility against Malaysia 
culminated during the period of konfrontasi between 1963 and 1966 (Ravenhill, 
1998: 248). 
- In 1961, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was founded. It consisted of 
the Philippines, Thailand and the Federation of Malaya. Owing to US support, 
Indonesia regarded ASA as imperialist continuation of SEATO. ASA failed due 
to the territorial conflicts between Malaya and the Philippines, but, as regards to 
its goals and organisational structure, it can be considered a predecessor of 
ASEAN (Ufen, 2004: 72). 
- Maphilindo of Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia, founded in 1963, failed 
due to Sukarno's policy of konfrontasi. Only with Suharto's 'New Order' of 
1965/66 and his orientation towards the Western industrialised countries and 
Japan, was regional cooperation possible. ASEAN was founded in the wake of 
this shift in foreign policy (Ufen, 2004: 72-73). 
- The ASEAN Regional Forum was founded as a dialogue network with the 
intention to diffuse tensions within the context of a regular dialogue mechanism. 
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It is based on an initiative of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post 
Ministerial Conference in Singapore on 23-25 July 1993. The inaugural meeting 
was held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994. The primary - although not openly 
announced - goal was to involve China in regional consultation processes. The 
ARF's commitment to open regionalism was supposed to give it relevance 
beyond Southeast Asia and to engage China in dialogues with countries outside 
Northeast and Southeast Asia. The ARF is complemented by the track-two 
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) (see below). The 
members of the ARF are the following countries: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the 
Philippines, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, East Timor, the United 
States and Vietnam. 
The Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) was founded in 2002 in order to 
integrate existing regional cooperation schemes in Asia, such as ASEAN, the 
SAARC and the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
The Shangri-La Dialogue was founded in 2002 in the Shangri-La Hotel in 
Singapore. It is organised by the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IISS), takes place annually in Singapore and concerns itself with military 
security. Apart from the ARF, the Shangri-La Dialogue is the only multilateral 
defence institution in Northeast and Southeast Asia with a general regional 
concern. 
For specific discussions, the six-party talks between the United States, North and 
South Korea, Russia, Japan and China were set up to persuade North Korea to 
give up its alleged atomic weapons or the desire to build them. The six-party 
process started on 27 August 2003 but ran into problems during the third round 
of negotiations in June 2004, after which North Korea left the process. Contacts 
between the United States and North Korea were maintained through the so- 
called 'New York channel', North Korea's mission to the United Nations. In 
February 2005, North Korea claimed to posses nuclear weapons. In July 2005, 
North Korea announced that it would return to the group for the next round of 
negotiations on 25 July 2005.13 
13 For more details on the six-party talks see the BBC's detailed timeline on the 
North Korea problem at http: //news. bbe. co. uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2604437. stm. 
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Track-two initiatives: if track-one initiatives form the 'official' governmental 
diplomacy, track-two processes are the 'unofficial' non-governmental 
diplomacy. Track-two diplomacy usually involves academics and academic 
institutions, such as think tanks or interlocutors, or non-governinental 
organisations. Track-two and track-one actors often cooperate, a process 
which combines informal and fon-nal channels of communication. 
Cooperation between track one and track two has been increasingly 
recognised as a means for the prevention and resolution of conflicts. 14 
The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) was founded 
on 16 December 1993. Its roots date back to a roundtable discussion in Seoul on 
1-3 November 1992, which brought together representatives from study centres 
in Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and the USA. The idea was to intensify and enhance track- 
two processes in the Asia Pacific and to establish links to the track-one forum 
ARF. The link between the ARF and CSCAP is through the chairman of the 
ARF (Peck, 1998: 18 1). Countries are represented by member committees. 15 The 
CSCAP deals with five areas of security: comprehensive and cooperative 
security, confidence and security building measures, maritime cooperation, the 
North Pacific and transnational crime (web site: wwwxscamorg . 
- The Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) was founded in 1980. It has 
an economic focus and comprises participants from the three fields of business 
and industry, government and academic circles. Similar to the CSCAP, the 
PECC links up with track-one forums, in this case APEC, by observing APEC 
proceedings and providing analytical SUpport16 (web site: . vwwj)ecc. org). 
14 For a summary of the debate on track-one track-two diplomacy see Nan and 
Strimling (2004). 
15 Member committees are from the following countries: Australia, Cambodia, 
Canada, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, New 
Zealand, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, Vietnam, China, the Philippines, 
Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and the USA. The Pacific Islands 
Forum has observer status. 
16 Member committees are from the following countries: Australia, Brunei 
Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, 
Singapore, the Pacific Islands Forum, Taiwan, Thailand, the USA and Vietnam. 
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The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) was founded in 1993. It 
comprises foreign ministry officials, defence ministry officials, military officers 
and academics from China, Russia, North and South Korea, Japan and the 
United States. Regular meetings allow members to discuss sensitive security 
issues in an informal way. The NEACD is designed to keep lines of 
communication open and 'create an institutional mechanism for dialogue and 
communication in order to minimize tension and build cooperation in the 
Northeast Asia region. ' As a security forum, the NEACD also discusses 
economic issues, which have security implications: energy, maritime trade and 
nuclear energy (web site: www. wiredforpeace. org). 
There are more tracks, however. Louise Diamond and John W. McDonald, 
who founded the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, define nine interwoven tracks 
involved in peace processes, in the form of a circular diagram: 
Figure 1: The Nine Tracks of Multi-Track Diplomacy 
Track Nine (inner circic): 
Public Opinionýcolllrtltlnication Track One: Government 
Track Eight: Fun( : T-v%-o: Profcssional 
lict Resoltition 
Track Scvcn: Rcligious 
Track Six: Acti, 
Track Thrcc: Busincss 
Four. Privatc Citizcn 
Track Five: Rcscarch, 
Training and Education ZLI 
Source: Louise Diamond and John W. McDonald, The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy 
(IMTD), http: //Nvww. imtd. org. 
Associate members are France (Pacific Territories) and Mongolia. Institutional 
members are the Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) and 
the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC). 
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In this diagram, tracks one and two encompass the organisations described 
above. For the GMS, the business community (track three) is important in helping to 
maintain the GMS processes and provide funding for projects in addition to money 
given by central governments and the ADB. The business community is organised in 
the GMS Business Forum (GMS-BF). The issue of funding is interwoven with track 
eight. Tracks four, five, six and eight encompass the work of NGOs, research 
institutions and international organisations, such as the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). They are active in the fields of education, poverty alleviation, 
or environmental protection, trying to influence or use public opinion (track nine). 
These tracks add a 'human element' and a social dimension to otherwise abstract 
governmental or institutional negotiation processes (McDonald, 2003). In the 
context of peace-building, McDonald calls it '[s]ocial peace building', as opposed to 
'[p]olitical peace building' and '[e]conomic and institutional peace building', which 
are both functions of track-one diplomacy (McDonald, 2003). 
One must ask the question of what caused the end of the 'institutional deficit' 
observed by Ravenhill? Generally speaking, when the Cold War status was at first 
alleviated during the 1980s and eventually lifted at the turn of the decade, 
governments embraced new opportunities for cooperation. Looking at the global 
sphere, the disappearance of the Cold War led to a full viability of the UN Security 
Council and as a consequence led to its interference in an increasing number of 
conflicts. The power structure of the Cold War had obstructed efficient work of the 
Security Council, with the permanent members' veto being used to realise often 
diametrically opposed interests. Being unable to work efficiently translated into the 
inability to handle conflicts waged as proxy wars across the globe by both 
superpowers. Many of these Cold War-influenced conflicts were now approached by 
the Security Council, the most significant conflict being the Cambodia conflict 
(Gabriel, 1993) within the Asian Pacific. As will be discussed in detail later, the 
Cambodia conflict formed an essential element in jam-locking plans for exploiting 
the opportunities of the Mekong basin, as the conflict involved all riparian states 
with the exception of Myanmar. 
The result of the Security Council's enlarged and improved ability to act was 
the necessity for more effective tools at the UN's disposal to handle conflicts. On 
request of the Security Council, the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros- 
Ghali elaborated the Agendafor Peace of June 1992 to set out refined strategies for 
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an effective and cfficient post-Cold War conflict resolution (Weiss, 1993: 51; 
Boutros-Ghali, 1992). 17 
The increased opportunities for effective and efficient cooperation in the global 
sphere were echoed by similarly increased opportunities on regional and subregional 
levels. The internationalised Cambodia conflict is one of the best examples of a 
conflict being irresolvable during the Cold War, becoming solvable during the 1980s 
and being solved in 1992 in that it was 'de-intemalize[d]' (Findlay, 1995: 155). 18 To 
de-internationalise the conflict meant to take away the influences on the inner- 
Cambodian actors exerted by Beijing, Moscow, Washington, Hanoi and Bangkok 
and their mutual alliances (from 1979 onwards: Beijing, Washington and Bangkok v. 
Moscow and Hanoi). The Cambodia conflict was a mixture of Cold War strategies 
and older pre-colonial conflicts using the Cold War as a tool for realising old goals 
in the Indochinese region. The de-internationalisation of the conflict re-opened the 
way for cooperation between the countries involved. An event of particular 
importance in this respect was Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech of 28 July 1986. 
The speech initiated the rapprochement with China by showing willingness firstly to 
reduce Soviet military presence along the common border with China and Mongolia, 
and secondly to pull out of Afghanistan. The speech therefore indicated Gorbachev's 
willingness to accede to Chinese demands to stop the military encirclement of China 
by abolishing all of the so-called 'three big obstacles' posed by Beijing as 
precondition for a rapprochement with Moscow. The third obstacle was Soviet 
support for the Vietnamese military presence in Cambodia. Since 1984, Beijing had 
stylised Moscow's support of Vietnam's Cambodia policy as the most significant of 
these problems (Opitz, 1991: 159). While the Cambodia conflict is the first conflict 
that was targeted under the refined strategies of Boutros-Ghali's Agendafor Peace, 
the forming of APEC in November 1989 is the first track-one project of a region- 
wide cooperation scheme in the Asia Pacific, drawing together old enemies under a 
17 Full name of the Agenda: An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diploniacy, 
peacemaking and peace-keeping. Report of the Secretary- General pursuant to 
the statement adopted by the Sunindt Meeting of the Security Council on 31 
January 1992, UN doe. A/47/277-S/241 11. The Agenda came into effect on 17 
June 1992. 
18 See Findlay for more details on the settlement of the Cambodia conflict, its 
failures, successes and chances for the future from a mid- 1990 perspective. 
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common cause of promoting multilateral trade and investment (APEC Secretariat, 
2002: 2). 
Apart from a boost in region-wide cooperation as manifested in APEC, 
followed later by increasing membership in ASEAN and the establishment of track- 
one and two institutions as mentioned above, new subregional cooperation schemes 
sprung up and existing schemes were revived. One of these is the Greater Mekong 
Subregion. Confronted with a broadened scope for policy actions after the 
superpower structure on proceedings in international politics was lifted, fanner 
patterns of trade and communications were remembered and formed a starting point 
for renewed collaboration and cross-border cooperation. 
For Vietnam, the advent of the 'new regionalism' was a second chance in 
various respects: firstly, the Chinese-Soviet rapprochement, pressure on Vietnam to 
pull out of Cambodia, and the solution of the Cambodia conflict removed the Cold 
War structure from Southeast Asia. Secondly, Mekong cooperation was taken up 
again after the abortive attempts during the preceding decades. As a result, Vietnam 
was given the opportunity to break out of its isolation and re-join the international 
community. Indeed, since the inception of its reform programme of doi moi in 1986 
and the start of the multi-directional foreign policy in 1988, Vietnam has turned to a 
'socialist market economy' and a diversification of its foreign economic relations. 
This was designed in order to overcome the economic and diplomatic isolation, 
which had commenced with the occupation of Cambodia in 1978/79 and into which 
Hanoi had slipped even further after Gorbachev had started perestroika and glasnost. 
The policies have materialised not only in Vietnam's engagement in regional 
organisations (ASEAN, ARF), but also in a multitude of subregional cooperation 
schemes in the Mekong basin - most importantly the Greater Mekong Subregion. 
For China, the breakdown of the bipolar world between 1989 and 1992 
imposed the need on the Chinese leadership to adjust its view of the international 
security situation. The expected multipolarity did not take place as the United States 
took the position of the last and sole remaining superpower. Since then, China has 
viewed the international system as unipolar, while much of the Western literature in 
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international relations talks about a post-Cold War multipolarity. 19 As a 
consequence, elements and orientation of Beijing's foreign policy changed. 
Southeast Asia as the neighbouring region and former scene of superpower 
contention was seen as crucial to China's domestic stability since the inception of 
the '4 modernisations' (si ge xiandaihita: V9-^Iý-JJr1fM) in December 1978. In 
Southeast, Asia, a rising China is regarded as a security challenge to the region, its 
economic potential being both a threat and a chance as two sides of the same coin. 
However, China's focus on the domestic reform programme, plus the need of a 
peaceful neighbourhood were important factors in the transfon-nation of the 
contentious regional environment to one of increased confidence-building measures 
and multilateral as well as bilateral dialogues. 
As mentioned earlier, the establishment of the GMS was only possible with the 
end of the Cold War. Regionally, the changes in the global structure were reflected 
in the normalisation of China-Vietnam relations. In the wake of the end of the 
bipolarity and the normalisation of diplomatic and economic relations, a second 
wave of regionalism spread into Southeast Asia, manifesting itself in the re- 
emergence of cross-border cooperation and the so-called growth triangles in 
Northeast and Southeast Asia. 20 The GMS is one of them. It is also the only one that 
includes all of continental Southeast Asia with the exception of the continental part 
of Malaysia. China-Vietnam relations are hence a major factor for the viability of the 
GMS, and the GMS is also a mirror of a resumption of genuine trade relations in the 
subregion. 
Under the GMS scheme, the participating countries cooperate, drawn together 
by the Mekong as a common resource, the contentious use of which has to be 
regulated in order to create political and economic stability and security. This puts 
cooperation over water resources of the agenda of states' foreign policies. China- 
Vietnam relations are of particular importance here as the traditional antagonism can 
form a disruptive element in the cooperation efforts with repercussions for regional 
19 For instance, Rosenau (1990) analyses the international system as 'turbulent', and 
Hettne (1999a and b) argues that multipolarity as expressed in regionalisation 
processes is the result of the demise of the superpowers. 
20 For a discussion of the various denominations for growth triangles see Section 
Three in this chapter. 
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stability. Since subregional cooperation schemes can themselves be integrated in 
cooperation networks beyond the region, integration in subregional cooperation 
holds the opportunity of facilitating a country's economic development and linking it 
to the global economy. Consequently, both China and Vietnam have developed an 
interest in a politically and economically stable region for the purpose of pursuing 
each others respective domestic reform programmes. 
2.2. Concepts: region, regionalism, regionalisation, new 
regionalism and subregionalism 
The global situation after the Cold War, which ended the oversimplified idea 
of good (West) and bad (East), was characterised as 'new complexity'21 (Schmid, 
1993: 118-120), as simultaneous processes of divergent developmentS22: on the one 
hand internationalisation, transnationalisation, globalisation of economic, societal 
and cultural processes; on the other hand defensive discrimination, disintegration, 
fragmentation of political institutions and societal networks (Senghaas, 1993). 
Roscnau observes a state system that is decentralised and multi-centric, with roots in 
the years preceding the Second World War23 (Rosenau, 1990: 10-11,107-108). In 
this system, the policy of the state is influenced by non-state actors and subnational 
units. Its character is non-unitary. Rosenau's ideas bear similarity to the concept of 
'complex interdependence', as developed by Keohane and Nye in the 1970s, which 
encompasses interstate, transgovernmental and transnational relations (Keohane and 
Nye, 1972, see Chapter Three). 
21 'neue Unübersichtlichkeit' 
22 'Gleichzeitigkeit von Ungleichzeitigkeiten' 
23 The British and French colonial empires broke apart, and the bipolar Cold War 
structure was replaced by the split in the communist camp and the emergence of 
the non-aligned movement. These structural changes towards a decentralisation 
of the state system were accompanied by changes in attitudes towards ideas of 
legitimacy and authority, which were expanded to include 'new norms and 
values appropriate to the bifurcated world of sovereignty-bound and 
sovereignty-free actors' (Rosenau, 1990: 107-108). 
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Rosenau (for the following see Rosenau, 1990: 127-135) acknowledges that 
the statC24 is not always retreating, but instead in some fields has increased its 
capacities: as agent in shaping the economy, and through technological innovations, 
which enable it to 'maintain order, mobilize consent, control opposition. ' Thus it can 
shape 'the social and political lives of its members. ' This, however, does not 
necessarily help to solve the issues at hand, such as eradicating poverty, pollution, 
unemployment, transnational crime such as drug trafficking, international migration 
and other forins of cross-border movements of goods and people. These issues not 
only have an international component, but are also influenced by internal divisions 
within a country through groups within or outside the state, which influence policy- 
making processes (Rosenau, 1990: 127-135). Similarly, Hettne (1999b: xxii-xxiii) 
argues that a state's national interest, as it translates in policies towards a particular 
region, is 'the result of internal debates in the respective states and communities, 
since the "country positions" are nothing but the predominant point of view existing 
at any particular point in time. ' Rosenau also says that, despite increased capacities 
in some fields, the state has eventually less scope of action, less autonomy, less 
capacity to adapt to changes and less effectiveness as it is not a unitary actor: it has 
less scope, because due to the dual processes of decentralisation within a country and 
interdependence through globalisation, the realms of foreign and domestic policy are 
no longer properly distinguishable; it has less autonomy, because domestic issues 
have become intemationalised and their resolution demands international 
cooperation: the transnationalisation of domestic issues increases the vulnerability of 
the state and can result in the attempt of the state to increase domestic controls in 
order to decrease this vulnerability [this bears resemblance to what Robertson called 
'deglobalization [ ... ] attempts to undo the compression of the world' (Robertson, 
1992: 10), that is, for the purpose of this study, attempts to bring transnational 
processes under national control]; it has less capacity to adapt to change because it is 
dependent on favourable international circumstances and international cooperation; 
it is less effective because it is exposed to the demand of statist subgroups, which are 
characterised by 'enduring membership and specifiable authority relationships 125, 
24 'governments that speak for the whole collectively - for the economy, society, and 
polity as a single entity' (p. 134). 
25 For instance, national bureaucratic agencies and subnational local governments on 
the polity level; organisations dealing with problems of the poor, handicapped, 
children, refugees, minorities, political prisoners on the societal level; public- 
relations firms representing foreign businesses and governments and research 
institutes on the economic level. 
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and a demanding citizenry with enhanced abilities to participate in public affairs, 
partly through technological innovations. As the state loses its capacity to perform 
effectively and provide the necessary services, subgroups move to take over 
responsibilities. These varied influences on the state can pose dangers such as 
fragmentation and eventual paralysis. The result may be a crisis of and a challenge to 
the authority and legitimacy of a state (Rosenau, 1990: 127-135). 
Rosenau's analysis is mirrored by Hocking, who explains that the involvement 
of localities in foreign affairs is due to the fact that central governments are not 
always able to serve the 'community interest from a single centre of power', and that 
subnational localities have convinced themselves that the interest of the local 
community needs to be served through enhanced involvement in the international 
system. The results are local efforts to attract FDI and promote exports, or centrally 
encouraged local export promotion programmes, devolution of greater authority to 
provinces to achieve foreign economic policy goals, and the involvement of local 
units in managing cross-border relations within the framework of a sensitive bilateral 
relationship between states (Hocking, 1993: 13 and 15). Blurred lines between the 
realms of foreign and domestic policy can be observed in manifestations of the new 
regionalism. Sasuga, examining microregionalism in East Asia by using cross-border 
production networks of the electronics industry, made clear that a characteristic of 
the new regionalism is a 'deterritorialization' of the nation-state [the counter 
movement of which might be Robertson's above-mentioned 'deglobalization'] 
through a formation of cross-border cooperation. These cross-border schemes give 
rise to cross-border governance mechanisms, which in turn give subnational 
administrations, such as provincial governments, an important role in managing 
foreign relations. They hence may pose a challenge to the authority of the central 
government (Sasuga, 2004: 14,30,34,35-37): 
the new regionalism in East Asia is a manifestation of the broader impact 
of economic globalization, and involves a deep-rooted restructuring at 
the regional and firm-levels as an expression of new international, 
regional and horizontal networks of governance within and between 
regions (Sasuga, 2004: 4). 
Sasuga argues that the changing role of the subnational level through the 
expansion of cross-border relations in the wake of globalisation and new 
regionalisation processes involves a new relationship between the national and 
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subnational level, which in essence shifts authority (and perhaps autonomy) to the 
subnational level. The equation of nation-state and territory has been losing validity 
in a process of 'deterritorialization. ' This in turn has resulted in a process of 'spatial 
restructuring' or 'reterritorialization', hence the rise of new forms of regions, such as 
growth triangles. Sasuga observes that 'in China the discretion of the subnational 
level has traditionally been strictly limited by the state. ' Therefore, central-led 
processes of decentralisation and recentralisation 'are seen as the primary measures 
of Chinese regionalisation from above, and the subnational responses to this 
movement can be seen as an expression of subnational regionalisation from below' 
(Sasuga, 2004: 5-6 and 30). This view is confirmed by Cheung and Tang, who state 
that the provinces become drawn into foreign affairs 'not by encroaching upon the 
prerogatives of the central government in diplomacy or national defense, but rather 
by exploiting new opportunities and maximising their interests within the broad 
framework of the existing policies of the central government' (Cheung and Tang, 
2001: 93). 
In communist China, decentralisation processes started with Deng Xiaoping's 
programme of reform and opening (gaige kaifang), which was adopted in December 
1978. The decentralisation of economic power away from the central government 
has increased the provinces' and localities' involvement in foreign affairs. This 
enabled the provinces to participate in the global economy and fon-n international 
contacts (Cheung and Tang, 2001: 91). As decentralisation measures meet processes 
of globalisation, growth triangles may emerge. However, Scalapino's notion of 
cnatural economic territories' (Scalapino, 1991/92: 20-21) reminds us that the 
processes of decentralisation and globalisation may only reconnect areas which had 
experienced long traditions of trade and community-building before national and 
Cold War borders disconnected them. 26 In the GMS, cross-border cooperation is 
promoted by the ADB. With regard to the China-Vietnam border, the inclusion of 
Yunnan and Guangxi in the GMS is facilitated by ADB funds for the provinces' 
integration in mainland Southeast Asia through cross-border infrastructure links. 
Among them in particular is Vietnam's north-western province of Lao Cai with its 
rail link between Kunming and the sea port of Haiphong via Hanoi, and its major 
border crossing at Lao Cai-Hekou. It is thus a characteristic of the new regionalism 
that 'local governments have more responsibility for direct linkages with other 
regional actors, including firms' (Sasuga, 2004: 38). Cheung and Tang see three 
26 For more on this see Section Three in this chapter. 
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factors, which influence the involvement of China's provinces in foreign affairs: 
physical conditions, central government policies and provincial development 
strategies. Regarding the second point, while the provinces share revenues with 
Beijing and 'play key roles in supporting China's foreign policy', defence, foreign 
and foreign economic policy are determined by the government in Beijing (Cheung 
and Tang, 2001: 96-97). 
This development involves what Hocking called a 'multilayered diplomacy' 
with intertwined goals of economic and foreign policy development (Hocking, 1993: 
3 1). He argues that foreign policy has been 'localized' in the sense that central 
governments increasingly have to take into account the interests of subnational units 
and their involvement in cross-border relations as interdependence in world politics 
grows. This does not eclipse 'national foreign policies', but rather adds another 
element to the traditional centralised foreign policy making processes (Hocking, 
1993: 8-9 and 26-29). 
While national interests drive the agenda of regionalisation, the national 
interest becomes intertwined with transnational. concerns. These manifest themselves 
in the processes of regionalisation and a shift of the system of nation-states 'from a 
Westphalian to a post-Westphalian logic' (Hettne, 1999b: XXiii-XXiV). 27 In this shift, 
the central government is losing the capacity of controlling and solving domestic 
problems as they gain an international component in the wake of rising 
interdependence, followed by increasing involvement of subnational units and non- 
state actors in solutions to intemationalised problems. This is a dilemma, which for 
instance the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) finds itself involved in as China joins 
international organisations. As Saich argues: 
By and large China is an Empire with a Westphalian concept of the 
nation-state trying to operate in an increasingly multilateral world. In 
fact, what China wants is an economic order that is international in terms 
of the benefits it brings but not necessarily global if that means 
decentring decision-making away from the nation-state (Saich, 2004: 
308). 
27 For the Westphalian state system see Hettne, 1999b: xxxvi. 
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Apart from Europe, regional integration is largely limited to the economic 
sphere, while political integration is virtually absent (Gruppe von Lissabon, 1997: 
160-161). Dosch (2003a), by reviewing the regionalism debate, explains that today 
Europe's integration experience is regarded as 'unique and does not present a global 
model of integration' (p. 31). Instead, attention has shifted to other regions and their 
integration experiences, and accordingly the research agenda has turned to problems 
such as interrelations between nation-building and integration or globalisation and 
regionalisation. Whereas the 'old regionalism' was associated with the European 
integration experience, the 'new regionalism' concept represents a turn to 
cooperation endeavours which differ from the European Union (pp. 31-32). 
Importantly, economic or political integration is no longer regarded as a necessary 
result of processes of regionalisation (p. 32, table 2.1). Instead, many groupings 
'consciously avoid the institutional and bureaucratic structures of traditional 
organizations and of the regionalist model represented by the EC' (Fawcett and 
Hurrel, 1995: 3). 
Bj6m Hettne and colleagues at the World Institute for Development 
Economics Research at the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER) in Helsinki 
defined 'new regionalism' as a multidimensional phenomenon instead of an 
economic phenomenon, which would reflect 'a trade promotion policy built on 
regional arrangements. ' New regionalism partly pertains to what has already been 
mentioned above, namely to 'reverse the process of globalization in order to 
safeguard a degree of territorial control and diversity of cultures. ' In this sense, the 
concept of the new regionalism cannot be applied to APEC and open regionalism, as 
they form a "'stepping-stone" in a linear process' towards globalisation (Hettne, 
1999a: 14 and 1999b: xx). New regionalism is distinguished from 'old regionalism' 
in that the processes of regionalisation cannot be explained anymore with 'classical 
integration theory' and went beyond free-trade arrangements and security alliances 
to incorporate the social, cultural and political dimensions of regionalism (Hettne, 
1999b: xv-xvi). Hettne argues that regions 'are created and recreated in the process 
of global transfon-nation. ' He sees regions as 'territorially based subsystems of the 
international system' with 'different degrees of "regionness"', a term which he 
defines as 'the degree to which a particular region in various respects constitutes a 
coherent unit' - hence regionalisation 'is the process of increasing "regionness... 
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(Hettne, 1999b: xv and 1999b: 9). 28 A recreation of regions can also recreate old 
regionness, for instance in areas, where the drawing of national and Cold War 
boundaries cut into formerly well-connected, linguistically and ethnically relatively 
homogeneous regions. In those regions, a latent regionness might have survived 
during the years of division and has turned out to be beneficial for a recreation of 
regions and their regionness. As 'human interconnectedness' rose quickly after the 
Second World War, reinforced by the developments in information technology, the 
world became seen as 'compressed' as the 'subjective sense of geographical distance 
[ ... ] dramatically changed' (Hettne, 1999a: 3). Ohmae took this idea to the extreme 
by evoking the concept of a 'borderless world' (Ohmae, 1996: 80). 29 The 
development of a 'compressed' world also triggered comments about the 'end of 
geography', a term reminiscent of Fukuyama's 'end of history' and equally 
meaningless as one observes the fluid patterns of construction and deconstruction of 
regions. According to Hettne, the participants of the UNU-WIDER project defined 
regionalism consensually as both the 'general phenomenon as well as the ideology of 
regionalism; that is, the urge for a regionalist order, either in a particular 
geographical area, or as type of world order. ' While regionalism thus denotes a 
condition, regionalisation refers to the 'process and [ ... ] normally implies an activist 
element, a strategy of regionalization', a process that manifests itself in increasing 
levels of regionness (Hettne, 1999b: xix). Globalism, to which regionalism 
respondS30, is defined as a 'qualitative deepening of the internationalization and/or 
28 Hettne identifies five degrees of regionness: the region 'as a geographical unit, 
delimited by more or less natural physical barriers and marked by ecological 
characteristcs'; the region 'as a social system, which implies translocal relations 
of varying nature between human groups' with a power balance as security 
system; the region 'as organized co-operation in any of the cultural, economic, 
political or military fields'; the region 'as civil society, which takes shape when 
the organizational framework promotes social communication and convergence 
of values throughout the region; the region 'as acting subject with a distinct 
identity, actor capability, legitimacy, and structure of decision-making' out of 
which could grow a 'region-state' (Hettne, 1999: 10-11). 
29 See also Section Three in this chapter. 
30 'Regionalization is [ ... ]a more varied phenomenon than globalization, which implies a homogenization of the global space. As a response regionalization takes 
different forms both over time and between different cultural areas of the world. 
However it homogenizes regional space and reduces the sovereignty and changes the 
role of nation-states. The crucial issue in relating the two processes [ ... ] is the development logic, which in the current regionalization process is captured and 
-55- 
transnationalization processes, thus strengthening the functional and weakening the 
territorial dimension of development. ' Again, while globalism is the condition, 
globalisation refers to the process: 'growth of a world market, increasingly 
penetrating and dominating subordinate 'national' economies, which in the process 
lose some of their 'nationness. ' The result can be loss of control of a central 
government over parts of the economy and a loss of cultural diversity (Hettne, 
1999b: xix-xx). 
Regionalisation takes place at various levels (Hettne, 1999a and b): firstly at 
the global level: the processes of the 'new regionalism' were made possible through 
hegemonic decline and are a manifestation of increased multipolarity after the end of 
the Cold War. The old regionalism during the Cold War simply 'reproduced' 
hegemonic Cold War patterns in the various regions; secondly at the level of 
interregional relations: the behaviour of one region has an impact on other regions. 
In that way, processes of regionalisation in Northeast and Southeast Asia can be 
understood as response to bloc building in other regions (EU and NAFTA); thirdly at 
the regional level: taking place here is a 'homogenization, the elimination of 
extremes, in terms of culture, security, economic policies and political systems. ' The 
level of regionalisation can be seen in the level of regionness. At present, the regions 
cconstitute arenas for sometimes competing, sometimes converging national interests 
which increase their control over global forces'; fourthly at the subnational level due 
to processes of disintegration of states and the absence of the 'stabilizing controls' 
during the Cold War: 'ethnonational' movements have produced 'microstates'; and 
as the geopolitical environment changes, microregions have emerged and connected 
subnational regions to the world economy. While in Europe, 'microregions relate to 
the macroregional process (providing them with a stable transnational framework), 
in East Asia they operate in a global space' producing a globally oriented 'open 
microregionalism' versus a 'secluded microregionalism' (Hettne, 1999b: xix and 
xxii and 1999a: 9 and 14-16). 
subsumed under a territorial as distinct from a functional interest. Regionalism 
implies a return of "the political" in one form or the other' (Hettne, 1999a: 7). 
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Table 2: New and Old Regionalism 
Old Regionalism New Regionalism 
Specific objectives: security-oriented or more comprehensive in that a region 
economically-oriented; harmonisation of moves from heterogeneity to increased 
trade policies leading to deeper homogeneity regarding several 
economic integration with political dimensions, most importantly culture, 
integration as possible future result (for security (security community), 
instance as spill-over effect) environment, economic policies (more 
penness towards the region and the 
global economy), political regimes 
(democracy as necessary but not 
sufficient condition) including problems 
such as accountability and legitimacy 
Shaped by bipolar structure shaped within multipolar world order. 
superpowers are downgraded to regional 
powers and are competing with 
emerging regional powers. superpower 
structure was a premature globalisation, 
therefore the decline of it is a 
deglobalisation 
Created from above by the superpowers spontaneous process from within the 
region and from below as the constituent 
states and other actors drive 
regionalisation 
Economic integration, inward-oriented, more open, hence compatible with an 
protectionist interdependent world economy 
Concerned with relations between includes non-state actors at several 
formally sovereign states levels of the global system 
Source: Hettne, 1999b: xvii, xxi-xxii and 1999a: 7-8. 
It should be noted, that both fonns co-exist as '[r]elatively few organizations 
are formed. In some cases the existing regions just continue as before, in others they 
widen the scope of action from security to development and vice versa' (Hettne, 
1999a: 8-9). 
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2.3. Explaining the 'new regionalism' in Southeast Asia: 
subregional cooperation within growth triangleS31 
2.3.1. Characteristics and rationales for growth triangles 
The prominent manifestation of the second wave of regionalism in Southeast 
Asia, with which this study is concerned, is subregional cooperation, or growth 
triangles. As explained in Section Two above, the growth triangles demonstrated the 
new opportunities of cooperation after the Cold War. This strong push for 
collaboration within a subregion was, firstly, a natural response to resume trade in 
formerly closed border areas. In this sense, the emergence of subregional schemes 
was itself a 'manifestation of the intensified intraregional investment flows and the 
accompanying trade flows in the Asia-Pacific region' (Chia and Lee, 1993: 226). 
Secondly, subregional trade was employed by goverm-nents to pursue economic 
strategies, which generally aimed at: 
e mitigating the problems of region-wide schemes such as ASEAN or APEC, 
e guarding against a possible failure of the Uruguay Round32, and 
mitigating possible disadvantages arising from the strengthening of the 
trading blocs of EU and NAFTA (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995: 1). 
Young describes the feeling of countries in Northeast and Southeast Asia 
against the background of the launch of the EU's internal market and the proposal to 
form NAFTA as having 'been left out without a bloc of their own', and that 
proposals in the region to form a regional trading bloc emerged as a result of this 
feeling: Mahatir Mohamad put forth his idea to form an East Asian Economic Group 
(EAEG) in 1990 after the breakdown of the Brussels ministerial meeting on the 
Uruguay Round; he later changed the EAEG to the East Asian Economic Caucus 
(EAEC), because the EAEG proposal was not very well received (Young, 1993). 
31 This section is partially based on an article written together with J6m Dosch and 
published in 2005 in the European Journal of East Asian Studies (Dosch and 
Hensengerth, 2005). 
32 The Uruguay Round started in September 1986 in Punta del Este in Uruguay and 
ended in December 1993 in Geneva. The results were signed in April 1994 in 
Marrakech and came into force on I January 1995. At the closure of the 
Uruguay Round, GATT was replaced with the WTO. For detailed information 
on the Uruguay Round see for example May, 1994; Gerke, 1994; Whalley, 
1993. 
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Most notably, the United States opposed the idea owing to its exclusiveness, which 
would have left the US with less influence in Northeast and Southeast Asia. 33 Sadly, 
Young ignores the processes of subregional cooperation in Southeast Asia and 
instead discusses the likelihood of the formation of an East Asian trading bloc 
similar to that of the EU. Admittedly, processes of subregional cooperation were still 
young; but the economic cooperation between Singapore, Johor and Riau (SIJORI) 
had already been implemented, a cooperation scheme that gave rise to the term of 
the 'growth triangle. ' 
The new subregional schemes in Northeast and Southeast Asia emerged due to 
difficulties in forming trading blocs in East Asia, namely: 
a an insufficient volume of internal trade and a general export orientation of 
Asian economies towards the US and the EC/EU; 
9 differences in laws and regulations governing trade and investment, and 
diverse economic systems; 
9 disparate income levels; 
*a lack of geographical proximity making communication and transport 
difficult; 
a lack of political commitment and policy coordination due to different 
political interests, historical backgrounds and social and economic systems 
(Min Tang and Myo Thant, 1995: 7-8). 
By the end of the 1980s, the new subregional cooperation schemes were 
termed growth triangles, a term first used by the then Singaporean Deputy Prime 
Minister Goh Chok Tong to circumscribe SIJORI cooperation, a scheme expanded 
into IMS-GT in December 1994. SUORI was officially proposed in December 1989 
cas a new form of subregional economic cooperation in ASEAN through cooperation 
in investment rather than through trade' (Chia and Lee, 1993: 229). 
In the following years, the term GT was applied to other existing subregional 
schemes within Northeast and Southeast Asia as well as to new ones. The literature 
33 For more remarks on the strategic nature of the EAEC see the Chapters Five and 
Six. 
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offers congruous analyses of what a GT characterises. The most basic definition 
possible is that of a 'transnational investment zone', (Low, 1996: 13; Min Tang and 
Myo Thant, 1995: 2) 'spread over well-defined, geographically proximate areas 
covering three or more countries where differences in factor endowments are 
exploited to promote external trade and investment' (Min Tang and Myo Thant, 
1995: 2). GTs can be established quicker and at a lower cost, and the influx of FDI, 
low labour costs and the involvement of neighbouring regions make them 'more 
attractive and competitive than traditional regional blocs. ' They can involve 
countries at different stages of economic development and with different social and 
economic systems. Benefits can be spread to other parts of the region and economic 
failure can be confined to adjacent areas, keeping political and economic risks at a 
low level (Hasan, 2000: 2-3; Krongkaew, 2000: 34-35). The most comprehensive, 
and at the same time best compressed (and one of the earliest) definition of what a 
growth triangle must involve in order to be successful, is given by Chia and Lee 
(1993: 232-235 and 236). They list 
" economic complementarity (or a common resource such as a river which has 
to be exploited peacefully and effectively), 
" geographical proximity, 
" the policy framework, politically and economically [or in other words 
political commitment and policy coordination (Min Tang and Myo Thant, 
1995: 9-14)], 
" infrastructure development to support geographical proximity, and 
" access to world markets. 
Tongzon adds the presence of a catalyst, for example a multilateral institution 
or a lead state, in order to set the agenda for a GT and achieve quick success 
(Tongzon, 2002: 91). This notion will be of particular importance later in this study 
as the Asian Development Bank is generally seen and views itself as an intennediary 
in the negotiation processes within the GMS. According to the ADB Charter, the 
ADB has the following functions: 
The purpose of the [Asian Development] Bank shall be to foster 
economic growth and co-operation in the region of Asia and the Far East 
(hereinafter referred to as the 'region') and to contribute to the 
acceleration of the process of economic development of the developing 
member countries in the region, collectively and individually. Wherever 
used in this Agreement, the terms 'region of Asia and the Far East' and 
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'region' shall comprise the territories of Asia and the Far East included 
in the Tenns of Reference of the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Asia and the Far East (ADB, 1966: Chapter 1, Article 1). 
The ADB's regional departments cover five subregions, for which the bank 
extends technical assistance grants and project loans. The five subregions are: the 
GMS, IMT-GT, BMIB-EAGA, the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation 
Unit (CARECU) and the South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) 
initiative. 34 Chen and Ho also stress cultural affinity when it comes to cooperation 
between Chinese cultural regions as in the Southern China Growth Triangle, which 
covers parts of Greater China. But they qualify this factor as '[i]ts role is subsidiary 
to that of economic complementarity and favorable policies' and 'only moderately 
important as a motivation for investing' (Chen and Ho, 1995: 40). 
Thus, we have a comprehensive set of characteristics which apply to the nature 
of a growth triangle. Of all these, different combinations of them can apply to 
different growth triangles according to the nature and the rationale of the latter; but 
all sets of aspects have in common the fact that economic and natural factor 
endowments need to be supported by favourable government policies in order to 
start and successfully develop an economic cooperation scheme. The nature of the 
political economy and the political framework of the individual country as well as 
the rationale behind the forming of a particular GT is responsible for whether private 
sector initiatives dominate public initiatives or vice versa. 
The abundance of subregional cooperation schemes in Northeast and Southeast 
Asia led to a similar abundance of terms for the phenomenon of the growth triangle: 
especially for cooperation schemes with more than three members, some authors 
offer names such as the growth quadrangle and subsume them under the term 
geometric polygons (Low, 1996: 1). Weatherbee uses the term hexagon 
(Weatherbee, 1997). 'Also, growth triangles are referred to as subregional economic 
zones (Chia and Lee, 1993: passim), natural economic territories (Scalapino, 
34 For more information on the ADB's subregional activities in general see the 
ADB's web pages on subregional cooperation: 
http: //www. adb. org/Documents/RCSPs/default. asp? pfgtM and 
http: //www. adb. org/Countries/sub-regional. asl2. 
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1991/92: 20-21), extended metropolis or extended metropolitan regions (MacLeod 
and McGee, 1996). Ohmae even sees the 'end of the nation state, and the rise of 
cnatural economic zones' in a borderless world (Ohmac, 1996: 80). For the purpose 
of the thesis, I will refer to all of these cooperation schemes as growth areas or 
growth triangles. For the cooperation scheme between Laos, Thailand, Myanmar and 
China, I will also use the customary terrn of the Golden Quadrangle. 
One of the most important features of the 'new regionalism' in contrast to the 
old one modelled on the experience of the EU is that 
the new debate does not consider regionalism as quasi identical with 
integration. Integration is regarded as one possible feature of regionalism 
but no longer the only one. In other words: while the old school had the 
tendency to deny the presence of regionalism in Southeast Asia because 
of the absence of integration, for the new school regionalism is a 
multidimensional phenomenon (Dosch, 2003a: 38). 
Regionalism in that sense is, according to Hasnan Habib, 'the expression of 
regional consciousness that develops from a sense of identity among states situated 
in geographical proximity which motivates them to mutually cooperate in one or 
another mode to attain common goals, satisfy common needs, or to solve political, 
military, economic, and other practical problems' (Dosch, 2003a: 30 cited Habib, 
1995: 305). Elements of regionalism are hence the emergence, existence, and 
advocacy of regional cooperation (ibid. ). 
At the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore on 27-29 January 1992, two 
important decisions were made: firstly, AFTA was formed (ASEAN, 1992b); 
secondly, the GT approach was officially endorsed: '[ASEAN] Member States 
acknowledge that sub-regional arrangements among themselves, or between ASEAN 
Member States and non-ASEAN economies, could complement overall ASEAN 
economic cooperation' (ASEAN, 1992a). By this, the ASEAN principle of open 
regionalism and non-discrimination against outsiders was transferred to the GT 
concept. The GMS makes use of it in that China is one of its members. The 
following table gives an overview of the current growth areas in Northeast and 
Southeast Asia (leaving out the question of viability). 
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Table 3: Growth Areas in Northeast and Southeast Asia 
Cooperation Scheme Members Cooperation Type 
IMS-GT (Indonesia- Singapore; Johor, Melaka, Metropolitan spill over 
Malaysia-Singapore Negri Sembilan, southern into the hinterland 
Growth Triangle, formerly Pahang / Malaysia; Riau, 
SIJORI or Singapore- ambi, Bengkulu, South 
Johor-Riau Growth and West Sumatra, 
Triangle) Lampung, West 
Kalimantan / Indonesia 
IMT-GT (Northern North Sumatra and Aceh Joint development of 
Triangle, Northern Growth Indonesia; Kedah, Perlis, natural resources and 
Triangle or Northern Penang and Perak infrastructure 
ASEAN Growth Triangle) Malaysia; Satun, 
Narathiwat, Yala, 
Songkhla and Pattani 
Thailand 
Brunei Darussalam- Mindanao and Palawan / Joint development of 
Indonesia-Malaysia- Philippines; Kalimantan, natural resources and 
Philippines-East ASEAN Sulawesi, Maluku, Irian infrastructure 
Growth Area (BIMP- aya. / Indonesia; Sarawak, 
EAGA) Sabah and Labuan 
Malaysia; Brunei 
GMS (Greater Mekong Cambodia; Laos; Vietnam; Joint development of 
Economic Subregion) Burma; Thailand; Yunnan, natural resources and 
Guangxi / PRC infrastructure 
Golden Quadrangle or Laos; Burma; Thailand; Joint development of 
Quadripartite Economic Yunnan / PRC natural resources and 
Co-operation infrastructure 
Southern China Growth Hong Kong; Taiwan; Metropolitan spill over 
Triangle or Greater South southern PRC (parts of into the hinterland 
China Economic Zone Guangdong and Fujian) 
Tumen River Area southern Primorskie Krai Joint development of 
Development Programme Russia; South Korea; natural resources and 
or Tumen River Economic Rajin-Sonbong Free infrastructure 
Development Area Economic Zone / North 
(TREDA) Korea; southern Jilin / 
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Source: adapted from the ADB (http: //iv%v-%v. adb. org/Countries/sub-regional. W); Low, 1996: 4; Min 
Tang and Myo Thant, 1995: 2-3; Chia and Lee, 1993: 227; Tongzon, 2002: 81-82; Evangelista, 2000: 
61-89. 
2.3.2. Evaluation of rationales and successes of growth triangles 
There are two broad lines of analysis for subregional economic cooperation: an 
economic and a security-related. They are usually combined - as are the rationales 
for states to engage in subregional economic cooperation. This is especially apparent 
in the case of Singapore, which traditionally acts out of a perceived vulnerable 
position between Malaysia and Indonesia. Singapore pursues a foreign policy that 'is 
rooted in a culture of siege and insecurity which dates back from the traumatic 
experience of an unanticipated separation from Malaysia in August 1965' (Leifer, 
2000: 4). The character of vulnerability generating from the separation is twofold: 
a perceived isolation as a state with an ethnic-Chinese majority surrounded 
by Malaysia and Indonesia with a 'shared ethnic-Malay identity' and the 
differences in economic performance as sources of mutual mistrust; 
-64- 
a 'non-viability of an independent and primarily urban Singapore' without a 
'natural hinterland', 'exemplified' in Singapore's dependence on Johor for 
drinking water and a 'lack of self-sufficiency in food supply'; 
On the whole a 'combination of limited scale and a potential domestic fragility, 
together with a confined geographic location, has served to generate worst-case 
thinking in foreign policy, even though that location has also been a source of 
Singapore's material good fortune' (Leifer, 2000: 2). As a result, 'considerable 
diplomatic resources and energy have been devoted to trying to set agendas in a 
multilateral context as a way of mitigating a vulnerability arising from geopolitical 
circumstances' (Leifer, 2000: 8). One such multilateral initiative is involvement in 
SIJORI (IN4S-GT), which acts as a link for Singapore with Malaysia and Indonesia; 
and '[a]part from the economic advantage anticipated from such a formal trilateral 
economic arrangement, there was also the expectation that such an institutionalised 
economic interdependence would help to defuse recurrent political tensions with 
both neighbours' (Leifer, 2000: 140). 
As for the GMS, Grundy-Warr, Peachey and Perry argue that GTs are facing 
the same obstacles as ASEAN: 'As is the broader pattern across Southeast Asia, 
there is little willingness to countenance the development of a functionally integrated 
cross-border economy that might compromise national sovereignty, incidentally 
questioning interpretations of the growth triangle projects as part of the trend toward 
a "borderless" world economy' (Grundy-Warr, Peachey and Perry, 1999: 306). Sakai 
speaks of the 'complexity' (which he separates from the category of 'frustrations' as 
manifested in slow progress of projects as well as 'policy and regulatory 
deficiencies') of GMS cooperation through the fact that several donor agencies are 
involved in funding the same projects. He exemplifies this complexity by using as an 
example the so-called Second International Mekong Bridge from Mukdahan to 
Savannakhet and road improvement measures, which are part of the East-West 
Corridor35, and by showing the need of multilateral agreements that must be reached 
before projects can be carried out (Sakai, 2000: 17). This adds to the 'two plus' 
principle (ADB, 2002a: 3) of voluntary cooperation within GMS projects and the 
multifarious cooperation schemes found within the Mekong basin, which essentially 
35 The East-West Corridor is funded by Japan's Overseas Economic Cooperation 
Fund OECF, the Japan International Cooperation Agency JICA, the World Bank 
and the ADB. 
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make the GMS look more like many subregions instead of one. These phenomena 
are further explained in Chapter Five. 
Concerning Mekong basin cooperation, it was noted as early as 1969 that 
cooperation among Mekong countries could essentially contribute to a pen-nanent 
stabilisation of the region (Black, 1969). Proponents of the idea in the US 
government pushed the idea that multilateral economic cooperation sets the 
framework for political rapprochement and reduction of tensions. This analysis was 
put forward as an alternative policy against the backdrop of the contemporaneous 
Vietnam War to safeguard US interests in the era of domino theory without 
Washington's heavy military engagement and the subsequent idea of a 
'Vietnamisation' of the Vietnam War: economic cooperation of countries in a 
politically fragile region does not only enhance the local security situation, but is 
also of major interest for global players who must avoid spill-over effects into their 
own regions and countries. Hence, Mekong cooperation must be assisted by those 
countries, which have the economic and technical means (for instance, for granting 
development aid) and share the political interest to turn an instable region into a 
stable one. At the time of Black's writing, the Committee for Coordination of 
Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin (henceforth: Mekong Committee, also 
named Joint Commission on the Investigation and Survey of the Lower Mekong 
Basin (Nguyen Manh Cam, 2000: 22) - the predecessor of the 1995 Mekong River 
Commission), had already been founded in September 1957. Consisting of Laos, 
Cambodia, Thailand and South Vietnam, it had been pursuing a line of plumbing 
possibilities for joint cooperation in the Mekong's economic opportunities, and had 
raised donations from a wide range of individual countries, international 
organisations, private foundations and private enterprises (Black, 1969: 15-16). To 
push this line in the interest of the world's well-being, Black argued that it has to be 
'creat[ed] a multilateral framework for a policy designed to engage the energies of 
the leaders and peoples [ ... ] in building things - durable things like hydroelectric 
dams, irrigation systems, new highways, and railroads. ' This cooperation and the 
idea of developing the Mekong, however, can, according to Black, only be 
successful and practicable if it 'serves a political purpose' (Black, 1969: 11 and 12). 
Among Mekong states, China is seen as important for economic and security 
purposes. The argument is bifurcated and somewhat paradoxical: China's economic 
growth is regarded as a factor of strength for GMS development, and its 
participation enables the GMS project to build economic and political bridges 
between China and Southeast Asia (Sakai, 2000: 20), to engage China in multilateral 
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cooperative efforts and to allocate it a catalytic role in the GMS as it runs the most 
advanced economy and is already a dialogue partner of ASEAN. Also, it can link the 
economies of the GMS to Japan and South Korea (Chongkittavorn, 2000: 25-26) and 
it would therefore profit from enhanced cooperation within ASEAN+3. On the other 
side, China's economic force is seen as overwhelming and a threat to the slowly 
developing economies in the countries of the lower Mekong basin. As well, there is 
fear especially in Vietnam and Laos, of becoming increasingly dependent on their 
northern neighbour politically, diplomatically and economically. 
Consequently, while the GMS's 'main objective is to jointly develop natural 
resources and infrastructure by exploiting geopolitical interest and geographical 
proximity' (Mya Than and George Abonyi, 2001: 128), the security goal is a 
political stabilisation through economic cooperation. Twenty-four years after Black 
offered his suggestions of an occupational therapy for the Mekong countries, Chia 
and Lee (1993) again identify Mekong basin cooperation as belonging to the now 
newly established category of growth triangles with the rationale of 'joint 
development of natural resources and infrastructure in order to minimize 
disputes over ownership and utilization of a common resource such as a major river, 
and to exploit the economies of agglomeration' (Chia and Lee, 1993: 236); and in 
2001, Mya Than and George Abonyi wrote that the 'main objective of the GMS is to 
jointly develop natural resources and infrastructure by exploiting geopolitical 
interest and geographical proximity for the development of the Mekong basin 
subregion' (Mya Than and George Abonyi, 2001: 128). Grundy-Warr, Peachey and 
Perry agree in that they subsume cooperation in the Mekong basin under the category 
of 'resource management growth triangles [ ... ] where cooperation is primarily 
motivated by the need to coordinate the use of a shared resource, in this case the 
Mekong River' (Grundy-Warr, Peachey and Perry, 1999: 306). With this rationale, 
the element of conflict minimisation among the Mekong countries shifts into the 
analytical focus, making economic development a substantial part of security 
considerations. 36 In this sense, Mekong cooperation is primarily concerned with 
minimizing the potential conflicts over a common resource. It works as a 
confidence-building organ, and the economic field is a major source for security. 
The political element is in the foreground. 
36 Both articles - Chia and Lee as well as Grundy-Warr, Peachey and Perry - attempt 
a categorisation of growth areas in Northeast and Southeast Asia. A third is to 
be found in Dosch (2003b). 
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2.4. Conclusion 
We can close this chapter by concluding that the new regionalism arose 
together with and encompasses new concerns of foreign policy, which are tied 
together in the following ways: 
Human security has caught the attention of central governments, because 
unsolved social questions in the wake of economic reforms and the ideological 
vacuum after the introduction of the four modernisations in China and doi 111oi in 
Vietnam have resulted in growing unrest in both countries. Poverty reduction is high 
on the agenda of China and Vietnam. Aside from central government initiatives 
(such as regional campaigns relevant to Vietnam's central highlands or China's 
south-western landlocked provinces), foreign investment and regional economic 
integration is viewed in both countries as crucial to maintain economic growth and 
tackle poverty by keeping the economy growing at a steady rate. The development of 
Yunnan's and Guangxi's economies and of the economies of Quang Ninh, Lang 
Son, Lao Cai, Cao Bang, Ha Giang and Lai Chau on Vietnam's side of the border 
puts emphasis on the foreign economic relations of Beijing and Hanoi on developing 
these regions within the framework of subregional cooperation in the GMS and its 
donor structure. Furthermore, environmental degradation as part of the human 
security phenomenon has attracted increasing criticism from foreign and domestic 
activists and organisations in both China and Vietnam. In China in particular, 
growing protest against issues such as dam-building and resettlements of the local 
population has led to growing concerns on the side of the central government in 
Beijing regarding its policies of unrestrained economic growth. As a result, the 
fourth leadership generation with Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao changed the tone of its 
economic policy. It is now eager to emphasise its concerns for those loosing out in 
the era of capitalist reform. A prominent phrase of Hu Jintao is yi ren ivei ben 
generally translated as putting people first, or people-centred policies. 
The phrase is also frequently used by Wen Jiabao. This policy implies a shift from 
GDP-centred to people-centred policies, which put the emphasis on a more equal, 
socially sustainable development. Whether this will result in actual policies or 
remain in the realm of rhetoric remains as of yet to be seen. Nevertheless, the new 
tone indicates the nervousness with which the government observes the frequent 
eruptions against the unsolved social questions and the increasingly loud 
demonstrations against the old paradigm of economic development and solutions to 
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the issues of water supply, energy production and agricultural irrigation through 
dam-building activities (for the environmental question see for instance 
McCormack, 2001; Economy, 2004). In November 2005, the issue of environmental 
security and its potential impact on societal stability and the problem solving 
capacity of the central goverm-nent was particularly prominent due to the benzene 
leak into the Songhua river at Jilin, which flows into Russia's Amur, and which has 
led to severe water shortages in the riparian city of Harbin and to irritations in the 
bilateral relations with Russia: Beijing apologised to Moscow through a consultation 
between Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing and Russia's Ambassador to China, Sergei 
Razov (BBC, 26 November 2005); and, on the subnational. level, Viktor Ishayev, 
governor of the Khabarovsk region, said he would be seeking compensation from 
China for the money spent on emergency measures for the region and especially the 
city of Khabarovsk in order to remedy pollution of the Amur, such as using activated 
charcoal to treat the benzene as well as purifying water and drilling new wells in 
order to ensure supply of drinking water (BBC, 16+20 December 2005). 
This shows that the issue of human security in general and environmental 
security in particular cannot be solved unilaterally, because its character is 
transnational. This is also true for issues such as drug trafficking and smuggling. The 
transnationalisation of problems has prompted Beijing and Hanoi to engage in 
multilateral cooperation frameworks in order to solve these problems, because they 
are either seen as problems in themselves or as problems, which have to be solved 
simply because they pose a challenge to the authority of the central government. 
Here, the issue of human security prompts central governments to adjust their 
foreign policies towards the solution of transnational non-traditional security issues, 
which may threaten the authority of the ruling elite. 
This challenge to the authority of the central government is at the same time a 
challenge to the capacity of the central government to solve problems alone. This 
pertains not only to the need for multilateral cooperation, but also to the need to 
consult and work with actors outside the central government, which have become 
increasingly active in voicing policy propositions, which run counter to central 
government policies. These actors include non-state actors such as firms and NGOs, 
as well as subnational units. Among these, environmental NGOs are the most active 
to raise concerns about environmental degradation as a corollary of the rapid 
economic development in the subregion. Consequently, they have been pressing 
central governments to engage in solutions to these problems, the result of which 
will be discussed in this study. Subnational units especially in border regions have 
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been forging relations with neighbouring subnational units across the border for 
economic or cultural reasons, or in order to tackle cross-border crime centred in their 
administrative area. They have thus challenged the domain of the central government 
in foreign affairs. This, if subnational units and non-state actors turn out to be 
influential enough, involves a new distribution of authority between central and local 
governments. This study will examine the degree to which this is possible by using 
China and Vietnam as examples. 
These issues highlight the blurred lines between the realms of foreign and 
domestic policy. The involvement of central governments in multilateral institutions 
tackling these problems can be seen in the context of addressing the 
deterritorialisation of the nation state. Therefore, the creation of a region, such as the 
GMS, may mirror deglobalisation attempts by central governments. At the same 
time, these efforts seem to produce subregions, which are being attached to the 
global economy. It may thus be said that by deglobalising processes to tackle 
subregional problems and to spur subregional economies, these subregions are being 
prepared for the challenges and pressures of globalisation by giving them an 
infrastructure backbone for an economic build-up with the aim to reattach them to 
the streams of global trade. 
The institution of the GMS operates at this interface between foreign policy 
and domestic policy: it includes the creation of subregion-wide infrastructure, 
streamlined border-crossing formalities, the spanning of tourism networks and 
human resources development in order to spur and maintain economic development 
among the countries involved; and it tackles transnational crime such as drug and 
human trafficking and cross-border smuggling. Foreign policy adjusts to take into 
account local and transnational concerns, which central governments have come to 
regard as problems worth solving to increase their capacity and authority. The 
problem of environmental degradation seems to have been left out this process so 
far, although awareness in central governments to consider the issue may be rising. 
The development has resulted in the governments of GMS countries to tackle issues 
such as drug trafficking and smuggling together, but also to build a subregion-wide 
infrastructure for the development of their economics. In order to do this, central 
governments must find common interests in cooperation. Therefore, without central 
governmental interest in multilateral cooperation and the development of 
cooperative foreign policies, GMS cooperation would not be possible. 
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The issue of central governmental interest in multilateral cooperation is 
directly linked to the uses of multilateral cooperation for wider foreign policy 
concerns. Aside from being a cooperation endeavour designed for economic growth, 
the diminishing of transnational crime and the solving of the human security issues 
for its own sake and the sake of the authority of central governments, the GMS 
functions as a means to bridge the political and economic differences between China 
and Southeast Asia. Apart from its issue-specific local orientation, therefore, GMS 
cooperation has a global orientation as it is part of broader foreign policy strategies, 
which will be discussed using the cases of Vietnam and China. Vietnam's aim here 
is to bring China closer to Southeast Asia and, by tying it into multilateral 
cooperative networks, to make its moves predictable in a power struggle for 
influence in Northeast and Southeast Asia, which also involves the United States and 
Japan. Vietnam also endeavours to use GMS cooperation to increase its economic 
attractiveness for US, Japanese and EU investors, thereby enhancing its role and 
importance in the world economy vis-A-vis China. This role of the GMS in 
Vietnam's foreign policy seems to run counter to the role China has ascribed to the 
GMS, resulting in contradicting foreign policies of both countries. For a deeper 
understanding of these policies, their impact on Mekong cooperation, and the current 
processes of cooperation in the GMS, it is necessary to explain the evolution of these 
policies from isolation to cooperation within and after the multiple ideological 
schism in the Mekong basin between communist and capitalist development 
paradigms and within the communist countries between China, Vietnam and the 
USSR. 
The proliferation of NGOs, the diversification of multi-track diplomacy and 
the increasing role of subnational units in the foreign relations of states also mean 
that regimes are more difficult to establish the more actors are involved, who try to 
exert influence on central governments with regard to the issues the emerging 
institution will be dealing with. In addition, such a multilateral institution is 
dependent on central governments' foreign policies of the countries involved. Thus, 
central governments determine how strong the institution is and how diversified the 
structures of the regime are. This relates the nature of the emerging institution 
directly to foreign policy strategies. Consequently, the institution, when established, 
tackles only those issues, which the central governments involved have agreed to 
deal with in a multilateral forum. If there is disagreement over the involvement of 
issues, then they are likely to be left out of the institution's future working plan. It is 
therefore that the list of issues dealt with in the GMS framework can be regarded as 
the (lowest) common denominator of all the GMS countries. 
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However, while the proliferation of actors may complicate the establishment of 
an international regime, the fact that political and economic integration is no longer 
a necessity on regionalisation agendas in times of the new regionalism may make the 
creation of an international regime easier in a region that unlike Europe has long 
been without strong cooperative and institutional structures, or, thinking of SEATO, 
has failed in the attempt to build structures along the lines of European integration 
concepts brought to the region by outside powers in times of Cold War contention. 
The involvement of subnational units and non-state actors with decidedly local 
agendas may foster regional awareness in times of the post-Cold War new 
regionalism; but this may only be possible through the establishment of institutions 
without a strong integrative structure and philosophy. This kind of institution can 
serve as platform for confidence-building and the establishment of trust. This seems 
beneficial for Vietnam and its endeavours to temper China's foreign policy, which is 
viewed with distrust and generally perceived as aggressive. The avoidance of closely 
knit organisational structures may well serve Hanoi's foreign policy designs by 
engaging with Beijing in the GMS and its numerous specialised working groups and 
annual ministerial and senior officials meetings. China, for its part, as will be 
discussed throughout the study, has designed its foreign policy to avoid alienation of 
sovereignty when it is not deemed necessary for the attainment of the national 
interest. Therefore, it seems to be content with loose structures, which address its 
domestic, regional and global policy concerns. It is therefore that the establishment 
of institutions and the structure in which cooperation takes place, in the case of this 
study the GMS, are dependent on the local and global orientations of the foreign 
policy strategies of their member countries. 
We will now proceed to the exploration of the regime approach in order to 
relate the above discussion to the analysis of the structure within which GMS 
cooperation takes place. 
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Chapter 3 
The Regime Approach 
Eventually, any institution is likely to become obsolete. The question is 
under what conditions international institutions [ ... ] facilitate significant 
amounts of cooperation for a period of time. Clearly, such institutions 
can change the incentives for countries affected by them, and can in turn 
affect the strategic choices governments make in their own self-interest 
(Axelrod and Keohane, 1985: 252). 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the regime approach, which will 
guide the analysis of the institutional structure and the institutional capacity of the 
Greater Mekong Subregion. After an introduction to the regime concept and its 
definitions, the chapter will explain the dominant explanations for the existence of 
international regimes laid out by Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner. The chapter 
closes with a conclusion reflecting on the combination of the explanations and the 
applicability of the concept to cooperation in the Greater Mekong Subregion. 
3.1. Preliminary remarks 
The purpose of employing the regime approach for GMS cooperation is to 
judge whether subregional economic cooperation has produced a better security 
environment and whether real subregions have emerged, that is, if regionalisation on 
the subregional level has really taken place. The regime approach helps to carry out 
this task in that it looks at the structure of a cooperation scheme and analyses the 
coherence of it. 
While in the early 1990s the literature on international regimes turned from its 
initial concern of regime formation (Ruggie, 1975; Keohane, 1984), to the 
exploration of regime maintenance and effectiveness (Haas, 1989; Breitmeier and 
Wolf, 1995; Stokke, 2001), the present thesis will - due to the early stages in 
Mekong cooperation - remain at the examination of the possibilities of regime 
formation in the GMS and the effectiveness of these early cooperation efforts. 
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3.2. What are international regimes and how do they exist: 
definitions 
When the Cold War started to subside, opportunities arose for resumption of 
old patterns of trade. In general, the increasing trade flows in the Mekong area since 
the vanishing of the Cold War meant return to post-Cold War patterns of trade. The 
re-opening of cross-border trade in the 1990s, in particular between Vietnam and 
China, provides a case in point: official trade at the Hekou-Lao Cai port of the Red 
River (Hong He/Song Hong) officially re-opened on 18 May 1993 after 14 years of 
blockade (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 18 May 1993b: 14-15). Earlier 
that year, from 27 February to 10 May 1993, China, Laos, Thailand and Myanmar 
jointly surveyed the Mekong river starting from Simao in order to collect data for 
developing the river into a shipping route (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 
18 May 1993a: 15). Border trade between Myanmar and Yunnan had already been 
officially re-opened in 1988. As for China and Vietnam, Nguyen Than Due 
emphasises that trade relations between both countries 'have proceeded dynamically 
along their shared border. ' This is highlighted by the opening of railways, roads and 
seaports, the reduction of non-tariff and tariff barriers, and Vietnam's initiative to 
build the 'open economic zone' in localities close to the border (Nguyen Than Due, 
2005: 124). 
As already shown, the disappearance of the Cold War gave rise to so-called 
growth triangles or subregions as part of the new regionalism. The GMS forms one 
of these areas that emerged throughout Northeast and Southeast Asia after the 
collapse of the Cold War structure. What does the forination of the GMS mean for 
cooperation in the subregion? Cooperation within GMS is clearly conceived long- 
term, given the importance countries attach to it, be it security or economics or both. 
How, then, is it organised? The chapter answers the questions of what regimes are, 
how they emerge and how they might affect state behaviour. The chapter then 
continues to discuss the mainstream approaches in the analysis of international 
regimes, exemplified by the developments of the regime as an analytical tool by 
Robert 0. Keohane and Stephen D. Krasner. In the next chapter, the regime 
approach is linked to cooperation over water resources and explores the relevance of 
regimes for cooperation in the area of contested river waters. This is relevant to the 
GMS, as the subregion is formed by the Mekong as a common river and common 
water resource for the production of electricity, development of transport and 
production of food through agriculture and fisheries. 
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3.2.1. Origins of the regime concept 
As Haufler explained, regime analysis is linked to the transnationalists of the 
1970s (Keohane and Nye, 1972) and the development of the power-structural 
hegemonic stability theory (Kindleberger, 1973). In the latter, a hegemon is 
instrumental in the creation of the regime, and the maintenance of it is closely linked 
to the power of the hegemon. The state-centric view of regime analysis, which 
Haufler criticises, is derived from this traditional perspective. Analytically, 
'[h]egemonic regime theory melds the state-centric focus of neo-realism with a 
liberal's concern for co-operation and institutions' (Haufler, 1995: 94-95). The 
danger inherent in regimes created and maintained by a hegemon is that the regime 
declines when the power of the hegemon declines. The central reason for creating 
such a regime is the attempt of the hegemon 'to reduce costs of its leadership by 
institutionalizing the framework for negotiation in particular issue areas' (Haufler, 
1995: 95). The classic case of a regime of this type is the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (since 1996 the World Trade Organisation WTO), an 
economic regime to spread and maintain the system of economic liberalism, initiated 
and maintained through the hegemonic status of the United States in the capitalist 
world in the era of the Cold War. However, the consequences of hegemonic decline, 
the decline and eventual dissolution of regimes, did not take place. Instead, states 
continued to cooperate on the basis of the existent GATT regime and developed it 
into the WTO. In the words of Keohane, 'hegemony is less important for the 
continuation of cooperation, once begun, than for its creation' (Keohane, 1984: 12). 
The inability of hegemonic stability theory to explain post- and non-hegemonic 
existence of regimes, led to the explanation of 'regimes qua regimes' (the most 
prominent proponent of this idea is Keohane (1984)). This explicated post- 
hegemonic regime maintenance with the idea that regimes 'gained value for their 
members over time' which prevented the regime from being abandoned (Haufler, 
1995: 95). International regimes emerged as institutions of international governance 
in a Westphalian state system. In this system, regimes introduced the possibility of 
norm-guided behaviour and rule-based exchange of information and values to 
achieve a public good, hence a form of 'orderliness', in an anarchic state system, 
which lacked a global governing body for the establishment of hierarchies, as they 
can be found in national government administrations. 
According to Zimmerling, the tenu 'regime' originated in international law 
and was taken over by political science (Zimmerling, 1996: 3). In international law, 
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a ... regime" is a recognized set of rules devised by governments (or non- 
governmental actors) for regulating conflict-prone behaviour' (Zimmerling, 1996: 3 
cited Haas, 1980: 396-397). In political science, the idea of mutually agreed-upon 
regulations was kept, while the limitation of regimes as a term for binding 
agreements under international law was abandoned (Zimmerling: 1996: 3). 
The term 'regime' found its way into political science in the mid-1970s and 
was first employed as an analytical concept by Ruggie in 1975. The term was soon 
challenged concerning its vagueness (one of the early most critical authors was 
Strange, 1983) and generality, such as Oran Young's observation that '[w]e live in a 
world of international regimes' (Young, 1980: 331). Critical attitudes by regime 
theorists towards their own concept turned the focus to this problem. Kratochwil, for 
instance, by addressing the problems of boundary and formality of nonns, and the 
danger to 'see regimes everywhere', set out to deal with this question stating that 
'[w]ithout a proper boundary of the regime concept the impact of regimes on 
decision-making cannot be assessed' (Kratochwil, 1995: 73). 
The vagueness and differing conceptualisations of what a regime actually is 
that were in place after 1975, were merged into the so-called consensus definition, 
elaborated at two conferenceS37 at the start of the 1980s in order to standardise the 
use of the 'regime' as an analytical tool. The consensus definition, developed by 
Krasner, reads as follows: 
Regimes can be defined as implicit or explicit principles, nonns, rules, 
and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs 
of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour 
defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific 
prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are 
37 The conferences took place in Los Angeles in October 1980 and in Palm Springs 
in February 1981. The outcomes were published in a special issue of 
International Oi-ganization (Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1982) and re-printed in an 
edited volume (Krasner, 1983). 
-76- 
prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice 
(Krasner, 1983: 2). 38 
This definition has to date been the point of departure for regime analysts. 
However, even after the consensus, not always were all four elements regarded as 
necessary elements of a regime, with some scholars making a selection, some using 
all of them (Zimmerling, 1996: 5-6). Virginia Haufler and Harald MOller belong to 
those theorists, who argue that all of the four elements have to be in place for a 
regime to be identified. MUller argued that a security regime exists when all of the 
four elements are in place and when the regime exercises sufficient control over 
variables in the respective issue-area in order to 'affect [ ... ] parties' behaviour by 
channelling or terminating unilateral self-help39 with regard to the regulated 
variables' (Miiller, 1995: 361). Haufler, who challenges the state-centric view of 
regimes, argues that activities of private organisations (such as corporations and 
non-governmental organisations) can shape world politics as much as states can 
(Haufler, 1995: 94). She maintains that '[flegimes include principles and norms, not 
just rules and decision-making procedures' (Haufler, 1995: 102). Haufler's primary 
aim is to show the relevance of non-state actors for regime creation and 
maintenance. By doing so, she distinguishes between a traditional view of the 
relationship between states and non-state agencies, in which the state either creates 
the regime on practices and norms previously created by the private sector, or first 
creates the regime and then uses private sector organisations to 'implement some of 
its functions' (Haufler, 1995: 94). This latter view is relevant for the creation and 
implementation (and, at a later stage, maintenance) of the Greater Mekong 
Subregion and will be discussed later in this study. 
3.2.2. Uses and functions of international regimes 
In 2002, the former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, 
Jayantha Dhanapala, argued that regimes come into existence where unrestrained 
competition bears undesirable costs for states, which multilateral action can largely 
avoid. Thus, a certain degree of independence is traded for membership in a regime 
38 To complement Krasner's explanations of the four elements underlying 
institutionalised cooperation see Otto, 2000: 43-44. 
39 For the idea of the international system being a self-help system see Waltz, 1979. 
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(Dhanapala, 2002). By the same token, Keohane has argued that it can make sense 
for states to trade a portion of their sovereignty for future pay-offs (Keohane, 1984: 
17). Making the case for regimes in the fields of disannament and non-proliferation, 
Dhanapala shows that regimes can differ in their binding nature of rules (treaty- 
based versus not treaty-based, that is, legally-binding versus not legally-binding), 
membership and goals. It also becomes clear here that regimes deal with issue areas 
only: for instance, security regimes do not deal with the entire security domain 
(MUller, 1995: 361). There is therefore not a disarmament regime as such nor a non- 
proliferation regime as such. MUller, however, subsumed various treaties, 
agreements and practices under one regime instead of treating each treaty as basis for 
one particular regime. Thus, in the mid-1990s, he found four security regimes in 
existence, namely the strategic nuclear weapons regime (SALT I and H, the ABM 
Treaty, parts of the INF Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty and START), the European 
military order (various treaties and practices), the regime for the prevention of 
nuclear war (more than ten agreements), and the nuclear non-proliferation regime 
(the NPT, the London Suppliers' Guidelines, the IAEA Statute, the safeguards rules 
in INFCIRC/66, the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties) (MUller, 1995: 361-362). 
This is in accordance with his earlier findings that regimes should be regarded as a 
'functional whole' - 'ein funktionales Ganzes' - that consists of a heterogeneous set 
of agreements, practices and institutions, which together create permanent 
cooperation (MUller, 1989: 282). 
Non-proliferation regimes are also in place in the field of export control. 
Export control regimes are maintained by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia 
Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Non-proliferation regimes exist 
for specific weapons systems and include the International Code of Conduct Against 
Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC), forinally brought into effect in The Hague on 
25 November 2002 (also called the Hague International Code of Conduct Against 
Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). Disarmament regimes include the Biological 
Weapons Convention (BWC) or the Chendcal Weapons Convention (CWC) 
(Dhanapala, 2002). Legally-binding regimes in the field of disarniament based on 
formal treaties endeavour the irreversibility of disarmament. They are also open to 
universal membership. Non-proliferation regimes are often not universal, and rules 
are determined by 'the few' in 'a clubby environment, typically in private meetings. ' 
These "'coalitions of the willing" on behalf of global norms' are often viewed with 
suspicion by countries of the developing South, and analysts tend to see them as 
weak due to their lack of means of verification and enforcement (Dhanapala, 2002). 
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Regimes are often confused for international organisations and must therefore 
be distinguished from them. Otto has argued that regimes are institutions 
since they form stable patterns of behaviour on the basis of prescriptions 
and proscriptions. Yet, whereas regimes are the institutional framework 
of action guiding rules, formal organizations are corporate actors. Hence, 
organizations can engage in goal-oriented activities whereas regimes are 
not actors in international relations (Otto, 2000: 45-46). 
International organisations are 'physical entities' with offices, personnel, 
equipment, budgets and so forth (Otto, 2000: 45 cited Young, 1986: 108). Regimes 
may be embedded in international organisations or can exist without such a one. For 
instance, the WTO is an international organisation while its rules and procedures 
establish the trade regime. NATO is an international organisation based on a security 
regime (the NATO treaty). Both 'can engage in goal-oriented activities, for example 
through their secretary-generals. However, they are only the "keeper" of regimes and 
cannot undertake sovereign action on their own account. ' The Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT http: //wývw. fas. org_/Ouke/control/npt/) is an example of a regime 
existing without a formal organisation structure and without any actors. Regimes 
focus on a particular issue-area whereas international organisations handle a set of 
goals (Otto, 2000: 45-46). 
However, the NPT relies on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
for carrying out safeguard activities. The NPT was adopted on 12 June 1968 and was 
opened for signature on I July 1968. It entered into force with the deposit of the US 
ratification on 5 March 1970. The NPT requires the five acknowledged nuclear- 
weapon states not to transfer nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices to 'any 
recipient whatsoever' and not 'to assist, encourage, or induce' non-nuclear weapon 
states to acquire them. Non-nuclear weapon states are required not to seek nuclear 
weapons (Articles I and 11). The NPT explicitly excludes peaceful applications of 
nuclear material for research and energy production (Article IV). The Treaty is under 
strong criticism regarding its safeguarding component. Safeguarding is not part of 
the actual NPT, but is supposed to be enforced through an additional agreement 
between non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the treaty and the IAEA (Article III). 
At the time of writing (March 2005), Iran in particular is under criticism of acquiring 
nuclear weapons through uranium enrichment (which in itself does not necessarily 
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indicate plans to build nuclear weapons). In addition, Iran is accused of breaching 
UEA safeguards obligations. 
Following Otto's distinctions between regimes and organisations, the ADB as 
a physical entity is an international organisation. The Mekong River Commission is 
a physical entity, too, but its organisation is based on the 1995 agreement, which not 
only established this physical entity, but also the regime, which the commission 
supervises. 
Regimes, such as the Mekong River Commission, often use the advantages of 
organisations, which consist of- 
" stable channels of communication, even in the absence of bilateral exchange; 
" provision and flow of information; 
" facilitation of decision-making procedures; 
" use of international teams to observe compliance; interriationalised 
observation increases confidence in the regime and enhances its stability; 
" facilitation of supervision of compliance (MOller, 1993: 30, see also 37-39 
for regime functions). 
International regimes can also be incorporated into interstate agreements or 
treaties (Keohane and Nye, 1977 [1989]: 20). They may also evolve from formal 
international arrangements that were never implemented, as in the case of the GATT 
trade arrangement, which arose from the proposed International Trade Organisation 
after the Second World War (Keohane and Nye, 1977 [1989]: 20). In the case of the 
CWC, the treaty that established a regime also established an organisational 
structure to carry out, for instance, on-site inspections to ensure compliance 
(Dhanapala, 2002). In the case of the CT13T, a global monitoring system is in place. 
The treaty, however, has not yet entered into force, leaving the envisaged regime 
abandoned and goal attainment to rely on voluntary actions by individual states 
(Dhanapala, 2002). In the case of the International Code of Conduct Against 
Ballistic Missile Proliferation, it does not have an implementing organisation. It is 
infon-nal, consisting only of a set of general principles and few commitments. It is, 
however, open to all states and is intended to supplement the Missile Technology 
Control Reginie (MTCR) of 1987, an explicitly voluntary and informal arrangement, 
including common export control policies for a specific list of items. Since January 
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2003, its mandate includes the goal of preventing terrorists from acquiring missiles 
and missile technology. The MTCR does not affect national legislation. 40 The 
general problem of non-proliferation and disarmament regimes is that they 'are weak 
in the area of enforcement - since none confronts potential violators with mandatory, 
multilateral ly-imposed consequences - unless material breaches are reported to the 
Security Council and acted upon' (Dhanapala, 2002). 
Taking up the NPT, the field of non-proliferation regimes provides a case for 
the problems facing creation and effectiveness of regimes. The Conference on 
Disarmament, 'the single multilateral negotiation forum', has been stalled since 
1998 (for an overview over the problems see the United Nations Disarnianlent 
Yearbook 2003: 241). In the words of the United Nations Under-Secretary-General 
for Disarmament Affairs, Nobuyasu Abe, 
[a]t the heart of the stalemate appears to be a fundamental lack Pf trust 
among States. Those without WMD [weapons of mass destruction] 
believe that those who have them have no real intention of relinquishing 
them. Meanwhile, those who have WMD are preoccupied wit h stopping 
the spread of such weapons to other States, or keeping them from 'falling 
into the hands of terrorists. Hence where you stand on disarmament 
depends very much on where you sit (Abe, 2004: 1 and 8). 
40 Bureau of Nonproliferation, US Department of State, 2 August 2004, Missile 
Technology Control Reghne (MTCR), available online at 
http: //www. state. gov/t/np/rls/fs/27514. htm; Bureau of Nonproliferation, US 
Department. of State, 6 January 2004, Intenzational Code of Conduct Against 
Ballistic Missile Proliferation, available online at 
http: //xv%vNv. state. gov/t/np/rls/fs/27799. htm. The Missile Technology Control 
Reginte can be found at http: //www. mtcr. info/english/. The text of the 
Intenzational Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Prolifei-ation of The 
Hague, including its previous drafts, is available at 
http: //projects. sipri. se/expcon/hcoe. htm. More information on the code see 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands, Non-proliferation of Ballistic 
Missiles: Confei-ence of the Inteniational Code of Conduct against Ballistic 
Missile Proliferation (ICOC) / The Hague, 25-26 Novenibel- 2002, at 
http: //%vxv, %v. minbuza. nl/default. asp? CMS ITEM=MBZ460166. 
41 The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 2003 was published in August 2004. 
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However, while acknowledging the very difficulty of the task ahead, as a 
proponent of a realist but at the same time tirelessly optimistic organisation, he 
maintains that regional cooperation on WMD and conventional arms 'may well 
promote habits of working together that can spillover at the global level, as trust 
grows from experience' (Abe, 2004: 8). 
Haufler, as indicated above, challenged the solely state centric view of the 
regime debate. Her more 'radical approach' is to 'reverse' the relationship between 
the private sector and states, in which the private sector either constructs the regime 
on its own or carries out functions equal to those of the state. Private corporation 
regimes exclude cartels and oligopolies as the latter two establish rules for and 
cooperate solely over issues' such as price, supply and market share, but do not 
establish principles and nonns. Furthermore, the realist assumption that 'states set 
the framework within which other actors must operate' has to be taken into 
consideration when looking into the possible impact of regimes that are either purely 
private or exist through interaction between the public and the private sphere 
(Haufler, 1995: 95-96,102-103,110). In general, it is the intention of neoliberals to 
challenge the realists' position that 'each state will be the autonomous judge of all its 
interests' (Kratochwil, 1995: 81). An example of a regime, in which the private 
sector has become influential through transnational policy coalitions, is the global 
human rights regime. Within it, organisations such as Amnesty International are able 
to pressure govenu-nents to change their human rights practices and treatment of 
political prisoners. Another example is the role of environmental movements in the 
creation of nature conservancy regimes (Haufler, 1995: 98-99,103-105 and 107). 
Here, we can establish a parallel between subregional cooperation and regime 
formation: central issues of regime formation, namely reduction of transaction costs, 
increase of information flow and decrease in uncertainty (Keohane, 1984) are 
equally important for the establishment of subregional cooperation. In both cases, 
long-term cooperation lowers transaction costs and produces transparency in that 
rational actors are supplied with necessary information that otherwise would not be 
available (Kratochwil, 1995: 80). International organisations can facilitate these 
agreements as non-partisan brokers. As will be shown, cooperation schemes in the 
Mekong valley are guided by or have been established by international organisations. 
While the roots of Mekong cooperation can be traced back to the 1950s, when 
hegemonic cooperation was induced by the United States, post-Cold War 
cooperation rests on mutual agreements by a number of countries. As for the GMS, 
reminding ourselves of Tongzon's remark about the necessity of a multilateral 
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institution or a lead country (Tongzon, 2002: 91), the ADB works as facilitator and 
is thus an important factor in subregional cooperation and institution-building. 
Importantly, compliance is to be ensured not through supra-national 
arrangements, but through self-regulatory governance without government: 'states 
and other international actors recognize the existence of obligations and feel 
compelled, for whatever reason, to honour them by their behaviour' (Mayer, 
Rittberger and ZUm, 1995: 392-393). Regimes do not necessarily take the form of 
formal and legally binding treaties under international law, but can also exist in the 
form of non-treaty-based mutual agreements (Zimmerling, 1996: 9) - or what 
Dhanapala called 'regulatory regimes' as opposed to binding treaty-based regimes 
(Dhanapala, 2002) - in order to regulate issues that have a tendency to incite 
international conflicts. In the second case, nonns are not legal nonns but social 
nonns, while social norms must be distinguished from customary behaviour in the 
way that simple regularity of behaviour does not necessarily reflect cooperative 
behaviour (Zimmerling, 1996: 9). The notion of Mayer, Rittberger and Ziirn that 
regime members 'feel compelled, for whatever reason' to comply can be a result of 
either social or legal norms, depending on whether compliance is achieved through 
the sole belief of legitimacy in norms and rules or through binding rules. Missing a 
supranational organisation to which nation states convey their sovereignty and which 
is in charge of control, the regime approach studies 'international governance 
beyond anarchy short of supranational government in a given issue area' (Mayer, 
Rittberger and Zflm, 1995: 392-393). 
3.2.3. The problem of empiricism 
A question commonly posed is, do regimes matter (for instance, Haas, 1989)? 
A general answer to this is that regimes 'matter in areas where participants believe 
they would be better off with a co-operative solution to a shared problem. They have 
little impact in areas of fundamental conflict, where actors operate on short-term 
calculations of interest and power, and the gains to unilateral action outweigh co- 
operation' (Haufler, 1995: 109 cited Rittberger and Zilm, 1990). The general 
problem of empiricism for the identification of regimes was tackled at the start of the 
1990, when a 'Regimes Summit' was held in November 1991 at Dartmouth College 
in order to further operationalise Krasner's consensus definition. There, a 'new 
consensus' was reached, after the first international gathering of researchers took 
place roughly a decade earlier, resulting, inter alia, in Krasner's consensus definition. 
The critical points discussed at the 'summit' were the inclusion of implicit rules in 
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the consensus definition and the idea of taking a component of behaviour into the 
regime concept. According to the 'new consensus', regimes, in order to be identified, 
have to meet the following new criteria: rules are explicit only - thus removing 
implicit rules from Krasner's consensus definition (although Kratochwil (1995: 88- 
90) maintains the use of formal and informal rules). They also need prescriptive 
status so that actors refer to them regularly in order to characterise their own and 
others' behaviour (Rittberger, 1995: 11-12 cited Young, 1991). The formal inclusion 
of behaviour in the regime concept through the 'new consensus' does not mean, 
however, that the behavioural component had been unknown to that date. In Power 
and Interdependence of 197742, Keohane and Nye argued that regimes are 'networks 
of rules, norms, and procedures, that regularize behavior and control its effects' 
(Keohane and Nye, 1977 [1989]: 19). While the structure of the international system, 
defined as the distribution of power resources among states, affects the nature of the 
regime, the regime affects and may also govern political bargaining and decision- 
making within the system (Keohane and Nye, 1977 [1989): 21). 
With the behavioural. component added to the regime concept, a crucial 
difference between regimes and formal international agreements is that agreements 
often exist on paper only, while regimes exist in order to enable states to cooperate 
and thus produce a change in their behaviour. A regime is thus not only a set of 
principles, nonns, rules, and decision-making procedures, but it induces cooperation 
among states and influences their behaviour towards a conflicting issue through the 
existence of principles, nonns, rules, and decision-making procedures (Zimmerling, 
1996: 7-8 und Rittberger, 1995: 9). Norms, principles, rules and decision-making 
procedures here govern the behaviour of regime members (Haufler, 1995: 100). 
Consequently, Wolf and ZUm distinguish regimes from 'promises or 
contracts', to which members do not live up. They argue that a regime does not only 
need to incorporate Krasner's four elements, but it also needs to be effective 
(Rittberger, 1995: 9 cited Wolf and Zilm, 1986). Hence, instead of distinguishing 
between strong and weak regimes, or between declaratory, action-guiding and 
implemented regimes (Ropers; and Schlotter, 1989; Rittberger, 1995: 9 cited Ropers 
and Schlotter, 1990), norms and rules failing to impact upon the behaviour of actors 
42 The quotations ftom Poiver and Interdependence follow the second edition of 
1989. The text of the second edition is identical to that of the first edition of 
1977, except for a newly attached 'AfIerword, ' pp. 245-267. 
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make it impossible to predict behaviour and produce convergent expectations among 
the actors concerned. Such a situation, therefore, fails to 'indicate the existence of an 
institution' and as a consequence the formation of a regime (Rittberger, 1995: 9). 
Effectiveness of a regime refers to the 'extent that its members abide by its 
norrns and rules' (i. e. 'regime strength') and to the 'extent that it achieves certain 
objectives and fulfils certain purposes' (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997: 2; 
see also Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996). Consequently, regimes have a 
'civilising' effect on their members' behaviour in that they reduce the probability of 
members to resort to potentially violent self-help strategies to solve conflicts, by 
'insulating certain issue areas against a negative "spill-over" from tensions which 
have arisen between and among the same actors elsewhere' (Rittberger, 1995: 18- 
19). Robustness (or resilience) of a regime 'refers to the "staying power" of 
international institutions in the face of exogenous challenges and to the extent to 
which prior institutional choices constrain collective decisions and behaviour in later 
periods' (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997: 2; see also Hasenclever, Mayer 
and Rittberger, 1996; also Rittberger, 1995: 18: robustness follows the assumption 
that 'conflicts, once they have become regulated, will stay regulated. '). These two 
dimensions of a regime are 'conceptually independent' but 'may be correlated 
empirically. ' Therefore, in the face of regime change (which exhibits a regime 
lacking resilience), 'at least in principle [ ... ]a regime may turn out brittle, even 
though it continues to exhibit a high degree of effectiveness: compliance with the 
new norms and rules may be just as high as it was with the previous ones' 
(Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997: 2-3). In accordance with this argument, 
Otto argues that regimes can generate behaviour among regime participants different 
to that in the anarchic self-help system (Otto, 2000: 43). 
In the light of the discussion on effectiveness of regimes and behavioural 
changes of its members, the following categorisation of Levy, Young and Zam 
seems problematic: according to the authors, a regime includes two dimensions, of 
which one is 'the degree of forinalitY of the rules' and the other 'the degree to which 
the expectations of actors converge. ' The combination of both dimensions results in 
four categories of intcmational regimes: 
No regime: no formal agreements and no expectation that rules will be 
adhered to. 
Tacit regime: no formal rules, but expectation that the informal rules will be 
adhered to. The idea of informality bears similarities to the notion of social 
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nonns as basis for informal rules (see above). If rules are informal, the 
framework is informal, too, meaning a non-treaty-based regime, within 
which compliance is not achieved by sanctions but by the sole belief in the 
legitimacy of rules and the underlying norms, which prevents regime 
members from cheating. The development of social norms in opposition to 
legal norms is of necessity here, in order to instil in regime members a sense 
of legitimacy of the norms - and based on them the rules - to which they are 
asked to abide. Mfiller opposed this idea and argued that regimes are long- 
term arrangements through which members seek stable constellations of 
behaviour, deviations from which should be punished by administering 
sanctions (Mtiller, 1993: 26). 43 Here, compliance works through the 
introduction of binding legal norms. 
Dead-letter regime: formal rules, but no expectation that they will be adhered 
to. 
a Full-blown regime: formal rules and high expectation that they will be 
adhered to (Levy, Young and Ztim, 1995). 
The tacit and the dead-letter regimes pose problems. It can be argued that the 
non-adherence to rules means that the regime ceases to exist, because it firstly stops 
to influence the behaviour of its members, and secondly does not impact upon world 
affairs anymore (whereas an international organisation, which is characterised by a 
physical existence (Otto, 2000), may continue to exist as a 'dead-letter organisation' 
- if we adapt Levy, Young and ZOrn's phraseology). Rules, according to Otto, 
'translate the rather vague principles and norms into concrete stipulations. [ ... ] Rules 
must be formulated precisely and are binding upon all participants' (Otto, 2000: 44 
and 62, note 89). Rules also distinguish international organisations from 
international regimes, in that international organisations may continue to exist even 
if the rules are not adhered to (Otto, 2000: 46). The result of this reasoning is that 
43 'Regime sind Institutionen, d. h. dauerhafte Ordnungen für interpersonales 
Handeln und Kommunikation; sie bestehen aus einem Geflecht von Rollen, die 
durch Regelungen oder Konventionen zusammengehalten werden. Politiker, die 
im Rahmen von Regimen handeln, haben feste Erwartungen an das Verhalten 
ihrer Gegenüber. Diese Erwartungen beruhen auf der Existenz einer Ordnung, 
die zwischen den Regimemitgliedem vereinbart worden ist. Diese Ordnung 
enthält Klassen von Rechten und Ansprüchen und Klassen von 
Verhaltensvorschriften. Dadurch soll das erwünschte Verhalten der Teilnehmer 
auf Dauer gestellt, sollen Verstöße mit Sanktionen belegt werden. ' 
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regimes cease to exist when members fail to abide by their rules. Keohane and Nye 
argued that 'when there are no agreed norms and procedures or when the exceptions 
to the rules are more important than the instances of adherence, there is a nonregime 
situation' (Keohane and Nye, 1977 [1989]: 20). In this case, the regime has no 
means to enforce compliance and as a consequence looses significance in respect to 
the issue area for which it was established. The regime that was established by an 
informal or formal arrangement dies, leaving behind the arrangement and the 
implementing organisation (if such one exists) as empty shells. This is in accordance 
with Rittberger's argument that 'inoperative' norms and rules - even if they are 
explicit - do 'not indicate the existence of an institution' (Rittberger, 1995: 9). 
Mfiller (1993) defines principles, nonns, rules and procedures as follows: 
principles are the preconditions for detailed rules of behaviour. They provide the 
framework for cooperation, and interpret reality in that they provide descriptions of 
the current state, of objectives and of means-ends-relationS. 44 Only if principles can 
be agreed upon is a common denominator identified in order to shift a policy field 
from the self-help system into a structure of cooperation. Norrns lay down general 
guidelines for behaviour in the form of rights and duties, which may be contained in 
customs, practices and conventions and are applicable to a multitude of policy fields, 
such as reciproCity. 45 Rules are precise guidelines for behaviour, the compliance of 
which is important for the existence and evolution of the regime. The progression 
from norms to rules shows the willingness of regime members to alienate 
44'Prinzipien interpretieren die Wirklichkeit, die es kooperativ zu bearbeiten gilt. Sie 
enthalten Zustandsbeschreibungen, Zielvorstellungen und Zweck-Mittel- 
Relationen, über die die Akteure übereinstimmen. [ ... ] Sie enthalten außerdem 
Aussagen über den Sollzustand, der durch das fragliche Regime erreicht werden 
soll. Prinzipien sind die Voraussetzung jeglicher Institutionenbildung: 
zuallererst müssen sich die Parteien darüber klar werden, ob trotz der 
bestehenden Konfliktlage ein genügender Vorrat an gemeinsamen 
Wahmehmungen/Überzeugungen und an Zielsetzungen vorhanden ist, um einen 
Politikbereich aus der Selbsthilfe auszugrenzen und der Kooperation zu 
überantworten' (pp. 39-40). 
45 'Die Normen legen allgemeine Verhaltensrichtlinien für die Parteien fest, und 
zwar im Sinne von Rechten und Pflichten. [.. .] Die Regimekonstruktion 
kann 
bei dem Entwurf von Normen auf einen Vorrat von generalisierten Vorschriften 
zurückgreifen, die in Gewohnheiten, Praktiken und Konventionen enthalten und 
auf eine große Zahl von Politikfeldem anwendbar sind, zum Beispiel 
Reziprozität' (p. 40). 
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sovereignty and bear the costs of cooperation. 46 Procedures arrange decision-making 
processes: processes for a revision of the regime in the face of technological, 
demographic, societal and political changeS47' they arrange procedures of 
participation (who can be a member of the regime)48, of sanctions to maintain 
stability and refrain from unilateraliSM49, of conflict regulations5O, of routine 
processes (such as for the acceptance of new members, elections of chairmen, 
nominations of officials, decisions on the budget and investmentS)51, and procedures 
for consultation52 and verification (for example in proliferation control regimeS)53 in 
order to enable the flow of information (MUller, 1993: 39-42). 54 
Testing the regime concept on APEC, Otto points out that an international 
regime in a given issue-area 'represents an institutional make-up where independent 
collective actors (states) abide by established rules because they collectively expect 
specific benefits, which they would not gain otherwise. ' The structures of the regime 
consist of principles, nonns, rules and procedures. The regime 'establishes a stable 
46 'Da Regeln genaue Verhaltensvorschriften enthalten, wird an ihnen die Einhaltung 
oder Nichteinhaltung des Regimes deutlich. Diese Funktion, die für den 
Regimebestand, die Reputation der Teilnehmer, und somit für die 
Regimeevolution entscheidend wichtig ist, setzt eine klare Abgrenzung voraus. 
Gerade deshalb ist der Übergang von Prinzipen und Nonnen zur Festlegung von 
Regeln oft ein Stolperstein in der Regimeentstehung: an dieser Stelle müssen 
die Staaten Farbe bekennen, wie weit sie wirklich bereit sind, 
Souveränitätsverzichte einzugehen und die Kosten von Kooperation auf sich zu 
nelunen' (p. 41). 
47 'Revisionsprozeduren' (p. 42) 
48'Teilnahmeprozeduren' (p. 42) 
49 'Sanktionsprozeduren' (p. 42) 
50 'Konfliktregelungsprozeduren' (p. 42) 
51 'Routineprozeduren' (p. 42) 
52 'Konsultationsverfahren' (p. 42) 
53'Verifikationsverfahren' (p. 42) 
54 For these procedures see Table 6 in Chapter 5. 
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set of expectations', reduces transaction costs and produces information related to 
the issue-area: 'Only if these requirements are met can the regime effectively attain 
its goals: reduce uncertainty and produce reassurance among its participants' (Otto, 
2000: 41). This is based on Keohane, who argues that international regimes establish 
patterns of legal liability (resembling quasi-agreements, conventions and contracts), 
reduce transaction costs and reduce uncertainty by providing enhanced access to 
information for regime members (Keohane, 1984: 88-93). 
Otto concludes that the absence of rules in APEC nevertheless enables it to 
carry out regime-relevant functions. This makes APEC not a ftill-fledged regime, but 
a 'declaratory regime' (Otto, 2000: 62). Judging by the earlier reasoning in this 
chapter that a regime exists only when Krasner's four principles and the behavioural 
component are in effect, APEC cannot be regarded as a regime at all. Consequently, 
therefore, only those institutions should be regarded as a regime, in which all five 
components are firmly in place, instead of drawing up categories of regimes, which, 
as for instance in the cases of the tacit and the dead-letter regime, do not make an 
empirical difference to the consequences of regimes, and, therefore, to adapt Haas's 
words, do not matter. 
However, I will also consider the question if rules as basis for regime 
efficiency can be replaced by a gradually emerging system of intra-regime 
governance, for instance through committees or working groups, which can produce 
stable patterns of cooperation similar to those in rule-based regimes. This could be 
especially important in a region, which lacks strong institutional structures and 
seems to emphasise norms over rules when overcoming reservations to bi- and 
multilateral cooperation. The issue will be examined in Chapter Five. 
First, however, let us turn to the major explanatory paradigms for the 
emergence and maintenance of international regimes: Krasner's and Keohane's 
research programmes. 
3.3. Krasner's power-oriented research programme and Keohanels 
contractualism 
A clear distinction of hypotheses for regime formation was advanced by 
Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (1997), who divided the regime approach into 
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three branches of theorising: power-based, interest-based, and knowledge-based 
hypotheses. 55 This section concentrates on the first two branches, which are the 
dominant research programmes for the analysis of international regimes: Keohane's 
contractualism or functionalism as part of neoliberal institutionalism (which Mflller 
(1995) terms the neoliberal-utilitarian approach), which in turn constitutes an 
interest-based approach; and Krasner's power-oriented research programme as part 
of the realist school of thought. 
A concept crucial to the regime concept shall be explained here before delving 
deeper into theory: the Pareto frontier. 
Figure-2: The Pareto Frontier 
frontier 
Distributive move: 
Pareto-hnproving A is better off, B 
move: both A is worse off 
and B better 
off 
A 
Source: Prof Torben Iversen, Department of Government, Harvard University, 
http: //wxv%v. pcopIc. fas. harvard. edu/-iversen/gov9Oaunotes. htm. 
Traditional laissez faire economics claims that economies, when left alone, 
produce a Pareto optimal situation. Neoliberal institutionalists, however, argue that 
when market failure occurs, states may see benefits from cooperation in order to 
avoid suboptimal outcomes which have occurred from competition in an anarchic 
international system. The Pareto frontier was used originally to explain political 
economic processes, in which - to put it simply - two economic agents (A and B) 
combine their resources in order to reach a maximum output which makes them both 
better off until they reach a point where none of them can be made better off without 
making the other worse off. This point is defined as the Pareto optimum, which lies 
55 Young and Osherenko (1995) employ a fourth category of contextual factors. 
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in the middle of the above depicted Pareto frontier. In the words of Keohane, 'given 
the interests of the actors, there might be no more cooperative solution that would 
make all of them better off (Keohane, 1984: 65). At this point, the distribution of 
output along the Pareto frontier is the main problem between both agents, as both 
may agree on the means of how to reach the frontier and thus enter into cooperation, 
while they may disagree on how to distribute the output once the frontier is reached 
(for instance, when two political parties agree to form a coalition government but 
disagree on the allocation of ministries). The economic premises were carried over 
to international relations by Keohane. While neoliberals are concerned with 
cooperation in order to reach the frontier, realists believe that states are already 
operating on the frontier and that power determines where states end up on it. 
Distribution along the Pareto frontier may thus be a move away from the Pareto 
optimum, as one actor can increase its benefits and become better off while the other 
becomes worse off. A Pareto optimum on the frontier can therefore only be reached 
if benefits can be maximised for all the actors involved (for more details see below). 
3.3.1. Krasner 
Concisely defined, realism in contrast to neoliberal institutionalism 
focuses on power and distribution rather than information and joint 
gains. The basic issue is where states will end up on the Parcto frontier, 
not how to reach the frontier in the first place. Gains for one actor mean 
losses for another. International regimes are created to promote the 
interests of particular actors. Regime creation and maintenance are a 
function of the distribution of power and interests among states (Krasner, 
1995: 139-140). 
As a result, power and distributional issues determine whether states will move 
up or down the frontier. To escape this anarchical situation, coordination in a certain 
issue area is necessary in order to reach a mutually desired goal and to provide 
stability. Regimes come into existence. As a consequence, power can be used to 
influence the character of emerging or existing regimes. Coordination deals with the 
problem of which point on the Pareto frontier will be chosen when states negotiate 
- 91 - 
the rules of a regime, that is, who gets what and which state prevails. 56 Power 
(military, technological etc. ) is crucial here, since power in the sense of relative 
power capabilities (as opposed to absolute ones) detennines the outcome of 
negotiations and hence determines which point on the Pareto frontier becomes 
manifest as rules and outcome of a regime. Any decision is Pareto optimal, meaning 
that it is impossible to make all actors better off at the same time. Instead, as one 
actor becomes better off, the other becomes worse off. Distributional conflicts of 
who gets what are the prominent feature of negotiations. The result depends on the 
preferenceg of the most powerful state. And states or leaders, 'being rational egoists, 
will respond to the incentives and constraints provided by the environment in ways 
calculated to increase the wealth, security, and power of their states' (Keohane, 
1984: 66) in relation to others, that is, relative, not absolute gains, matter. Changes 
in power and relative bargaining power determine the outcome of disputes and can 
lead to new institutional arrangements. Regimes are thus 'necessary to resolve 
coordination problems and to establish stability. Without regimes, all parties would 
have been worse off. ' Therefore, 'distribution of national power capabilities' 
deten-nines the nature of institutional arrangements rather than market failure 
(Krasner, 1991: 337) (for more on this neoliberal institutionalist premise, see the 
next section on Keohane). 
The implication of this is that neoliberals maintain that states as rational 
egoists consider their own well-being and are therefore 'defensive positionalists', 
concerned with their relative power position within the international state system. 
Neoliberals regard cheating and uncertainty about others' adherence to agreements 
as the 'main systemic constraint on cooperation', while realists focus more on 'the 
fear of states that partners will gain more from common action' (Grieco, 1990: 217). 
Krasner (1991) argues that these underlying distributions of power capabilities 
can explain regime building more than cooperation to mitigate market failure: 
neoliberal institutionalists tend to 
56 However, the battle of sexes game, a coordination game, involves distributional 
conflicts, which have to be solved in order to reach the Pareto frontier. 
Distributive conflicts prevent the actors to move to the Pareto frontier. It is thus 
possible to assume that coordination may take place before a Pareto optimum is 
reached. 
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obscure issues of power because, given a Pareto suboptimal situation and 
a concern with absolute not just relative gains, it is possible to make at 
least one actor better off without making others worse off - an outcome 
that can be resolved through cleverness [i. e. commitment] rather than by 
resort to power, threat, and coercion (Krasner, 1991: 336). 57 
Power can be used in three ways: (1) to decide who is taking part in the 
bargaining processes and who is left out, (2) to influence the outcome of bargaining 
processes, and (3) to change the payoff structure in one's favour (Krasner, 1991: 
340). Power is therefore used in order to set up regimes with rules that work in the 
interests of the powerful state. Regimes are not used to overcome a Pareto 
suboptimal situation, since states are already operating on the Pareto frontier which 
in turn means that any outcome is Pareto optimal: no state can be made better off 
without making others worse off. In this respect, power can also be used to prevent 
the establishment of regimes (a current example is US resistance to the Kyoto 
protocol, which complicated the coming into force of the climate regime; and 
continued Chinese resistance to a binding code of conduct proposed by ASEAN to 
prevent military clashes over territorial claims to islands in the South China Sea). 
3.3.2. Keohane 
According to Keohane, regimes fulfil the following functions (Keohane, 1984: 
89-92,100-109,244-245; see also ZUrn, 1997: 49): 1) they provide mutual 
information not otherwise available and as a result reduce uncertainty; 2) thus, they 
stabilise mutual expectations with regard to future behaviour of other members of 
the regime; 3) they reduce transaction costs by linking issues and facilitating 
negotiations leading to mutual beneficial agreements; 4) they provide a frame of 
reference which guarantees that interactions repeat themselves frequently enough in 
order to generate a shadow of the future (iterated Prisoner's Dilemma). If a regime is 
created by governments and hence of transgovernmental nature, then, if effective, it 
'may lead to "transgovernmental" networks of acquaintance and friendship, which 
may make confidential documents mutually available or create 'coalitions of like- 
minded officials' for a common purpose (Keohane, 1984: 10 1). 
57 This notion by Krasner, rather endorsing than condemning a liberalist view, points 
into the direction of the section below regarding a combination of mainstream 
approaches in the regime approach. 
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Keohane and Nye's book on Poiver and Interdependence (1977) challenged 
the realist paradigm of international relations, which had been dominant since the 
Second World War, the ascendancy of which led to the dissolution of the League of 
Nations in 1946 and discredited the liberal paradigm as an explanatory strength for 
international politics. The new concept, which Keohane and Nye developed 
throughout the 1970s was the observation of 'complex interdependence' in world 
politics and paved the way for liberal explanations for the emergence of regimes. 
The concept of complex interdependence refers back to an earlier study by the same 
authors on Transnationalisin and Morld Politics, which systematically explored the 
ways in which non-state actors and governmental departments other than foreign 
offices involve themselves in international affairs (Keohane and Nye, 1972: ix-xxix). 
Keohane's most important contribution to international relations theory is probably 
his claim that power is not everything. While a hegemon might well be of use in the 
creation of a regime, the regime can then take on a life of its own and continue to 
exist because states find it worthwhile to keep (and develop) it. 
Keohane and Nye's concern was to show that the realist assertion of a 
dichotomy between 'low politics' (economic and social affairs) and 'high politics' 
(military security) is oversimplified and that high politics does not necessarily 
dominate low politics in international relations. Hocking argued that 'high politics', 
the sphere of national foreign policy, is no longer dominated by issues relating to 
military security (Hocking, 1993: 13). Keohane and Nye further set out to challenge 
the realist premises that states are the predominant actors in world politics, that they 
act as coherent units, and that the anarchical system - which lacks a central 
governing institution - inevitably leads to conflict and the use of military power as 
most effective means for conflict resolution (Keohane and Nye, 1977 [1989]: 23-24). 
Under complex interdependence, governments face the problem in their 
conduct of foreign affairs of how to engage in cooperation while retaining as much 
autonomy as possible. From the viewpoint of the international system, the problem 
is 'how to generate and maintain a mutually beneficial pattern of cooperation in the 
face of competing efforts by governments (and nongovernmental actors) to 
manipulate the system for their own benefit' (Keohane and Nye, 1977 [1989]: 249). 
This complicates regime formation. 
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Complex interdependence involves three main characteristics: firstly, 'multiple 
channels connect societies. ' These channels are interstate, transgoven-tmental and 
transnational relations. Interstate relations comprise state-to-state relations referred 
to by realists, that is, relations channelled and controlled through the foreign offices. 
The concept of transgovemmental relations relaxes the realist notion of the state as a 
coherent unit and involves state relations through governmental departments other 
than the foreign offices. Transnational relations relax the realist assumption that 
states are the only actors in world affairs. Transnational relations include non- 
governmental actors in the form of individuals or organisations and may or may not 
include governments (Keohane and Nye, 1977 [1989): 24-25). These insights paved 
the way for Hocking and his argument - mentioned in the previous chapter - that 
foreign policy has become 'localized' and evolved as a 'multilayered diplomacy', in 
which central governments have to take into account the interests of subnational and 
non-state actors (Hocking, 1993: 8-9,26-29 and 3 1). 
Secondly, complex interdependence is defined by an 'absence of hierarchy 
among issues' in interstate relations. Military security does not necessarily dominate 
the agenda of states. However, Keohane and Nye concede that 
military power dominates economic power in the sense that economic 
means alone are likely to be ineffective against the serious use of 
military force ... yet exercising more dominant forms of power brings 
higher costs. Thus, relative to cost, there is no guarantee that military 
means will be more effective than economic ones to achieve a given 
purpose (Keohane and Nye, 1977 [1989]: 250 top of page and 251 
bottom of page). 
The line between domestic and foreign policy becomes blurred and many 
issues are considered by several departments - not only by the foreign policy ones - 
and create issue-specific coalitions within and across governments (Keohane and 
Nye, 1977 [1989]: 25). Thus, complex interdependence looks both at the structure 
(that is, in the neorealist sense, 'distribution of [power] capabilities among units'), 
and at systemic processes (patterns of interaction between units, 'allocative or 
bargaining behavior within a power structure'), which are affected by structure and 
domestic politics. Regimes can hence be seen as intermediating factors between the 
power structure of the international system and the political bargaining, which takes 
place within it (Keohane and Nye, 1977 [1989]: 20-21 and 260-261). Herein lies the 
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relevance of complex interdependence for international regimes in that 
'[flelationships of interdependence often occur within, and may be affected by, 
networks of rules, norms and procedures that regularize behavior and control its 
effects. ' The 'governing arrangements that affect relationships of interdependence' 
are referred to as international regimes (Keohane and Nye, 1977 [1989]: 19). 
Keohane and Nye in a sense therefore foresaw both regime consensuses of Kranser's 
four points and the behavioural component of effectiveness: 
'From a theoretical standpoint, regimes can be viewed as intermediate factors, 
or "intervening variables, " between fundamental characteristics of world politics 
such as the international distribution of power on the one hand and the behavior of 
states and nonstate actors such as multinational corporations on the other. ' As 
structure impacts upon the nature of norms, rules and procedures, the regime in turn 
affects the political bargaining and decision-making within the international system 
(Keohane, 1984: 63-64; Keohane and Nye, 1977 [1989]: 21). 
Thirdly, military force is not used where complex interdependence prevails, 
such as in regional blocs or alliances, but can be an important tool to deal with 
governments outside this region (Keohane and Nye, 1977 [1989]: 25). 
Interdependence hence creates demand for international collaboration as cross- 
border interactions and collective action problems 'rise in parallel' (Ziirn, 1997: 49). 
Complex interdependence describes a situation, in which competition and military 
power alone cannot solve problems arising in international relations. For instance, 
Third World debts are negotiated within international agreements (Keohane and 
Nye, 1985: 149-152). A recent example is the agreement of the Paris Club58 with the 
post-Saddarn Hussein Republic of Iraq on 21 November 2004 for a debt reduction of 
80% in three phases on the request of the United States. Regimes are often used to 
pursue the self interest in an interdependent world, in particular on the side of the 
United States, which has established a number of regimes (GATT, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank) in its own interest and regularly returns to them. 
58 The Paris Club, an informal group of creditor countries, is a means for debt relief 
through postponement or reduction of debt service obligations. It was convened 
for the first time in 1956 on request of Argentina in order to discuss its debt 
situation with all creditor countries at the same time. 
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Regimes, essentially, do not substitute national interests with common interests. 
They do not establish a central government similar to the domestic law-making 
hierarchy, and they are unable to impose their will on actors, although they form 
constraints on domestic and international behaviour. Regimes, in this sense, 
'facilitate the cooperative pursuit of governments' objectives' (Keohane and Nye, 
1985: 149-152). Currently, after the failure to establish peace and stability in post- 
Saddam Hussein Iraq, the second Bush Administration of January 2005 can be seen 
to be returning to a modest multilateralism. Its standpoint on Iran's nuclear 
programme of enriching uranium is hesitant, not explicitly excluding military force 
but not explicitly taking it into account either. In the Middle East, the 'Road Map' of 
the quartet of United Nations, United States, European Union and Russia is pursued 
with the United States taking the lead. 
Kcohanc concedes that regimes are, in the realist fashion, shaped by their most 
powerful members, but asserts that they also can affect state interests as 
'[p]erceptions of self-interest depend both on actors' expectations of the likely 
consequences that will follow from particular actions and on their fundamental 
values. ' Therefore, 'the concept of international regimes is consistent with both the 
importance of differential power and with a sophisticated view of self-interest' 
(Keohane, 1984: 63). For realists, actors are rational egoists, that is, they pursue their 
own welfare and "'seek to maximize value across a set of consistently ordered 
objectives"' (Keohane, 1984: 66). 
The three main characteristics of complex interdependence mentioned above 
give rise to political processes, which translate the power resources into power 
defined as control over outcomes (Keohane and Nye, 1977 [1989]: 29-30). The table 
below shows the differences between political processes under ideal-type conditions 
of realism and under conditions of complex interdependence: 
Table 4: Political Processes under Conditions of Realism and Complex 
Interdependence 
Realism I Complex interdependence 
als of actors ilitary security will Goals of states will vary by issue 
be the dominant goal. area. Transgovernmental policies 
will make goals difficult to define. 
Transnational actors will pursue 
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ir own goals. 
Aruments of state Military force will be 
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and other instruments 
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er agendas. 
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in 
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ind the importance 
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ower resources specific to issue 
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the distribution of power 
3ources within issue areas; the 
itus of international regimes; 
anges in the importance of 
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4er issues and politizisation as a 
3ult of rising sensitivity 
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, ages by strong states will be 
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k states through international 
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I to mobilize votes will be an 
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Source: Keohane and Nye, 1917 [19891: 37, table 2.1. 
Under anarchy, states tend to compete rather than cooperate, and to cheat and 
defect from cooperation rather than sustain cooperation. However, when a mutual 
goal is discovered, contractual arrangements can be a way to facilitate cooperation 
through a network of rules which may help states to decide for and maintain 
cooperation and which prevents defection by implementing facilities to monitor state 
behaviour and administer punishment for defection. States, however, must be clear 
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about other states' intentions to cooperate before they are willing to engage in 
cooperation themselves. By cooperating, states move to the Pareto frontier and 
everyone is simultaneously better off. Hence, 
the basic challenge for states is to overcome market failure, the situation 
in which individual rational self-interested policies produce outcomes 
that leave each state worse off than it might otherwise have been. The 
challenge is to devise policies that make it possible to reach the Pareto 
frontier [ ... ]; everyone becomes better off at the same time; absolute 
rather than relative gains matter (Krasner, 1995: 139). 
Cooperation is possible, because 'world politics is not a homogeneous state of 
war: cooperation varies among issues and over time' (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985: 
226); but cooperation emerges only where states regard their policies as being in 
actual or potential conflict over the realisation of what is in fact a common interest 
(for instance, the peaceful and sustainable exploitation of a common resource, such 
as a river). As a result, states start to adjust their behaviour to each other. Hence, 
'intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by 
one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own 
objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination' (Keohane, 1984: 51-52). 
Adjustment of behaviour can emerge if actors can be assured of cooperative 
behaviour of others and if monitoring facilities make it possible to detect and punish 
cheating. Then states may create and maintain regimes which facilitate further 
cooperation in the issue-area for which they were established, because they can 
provide 'rules of thumb'59 as guidelines for actors, under bounded rationality6O, as 
well as for bargaining among classically rational actors (Keohane, 1984: 83-84). 
59 '[R]egimes can be incorporated into actors' rules of thumb for responding to 
others' actions' (Axelrod and Keohane, 285: 237). 
60 Maintenance also incorporates the idea that creation of new regimes can be easier 
if confidence was established through the creation of old regimes: regimes 'are 
built on one another. We should therefore think as much about the evolution of 
regimes as about their creation ex nihilo. This intricate connection between the 
operation of old regimes and the creation of new ones means that a functional 
analysis of regimes [ ... ] is crucial for understanding not only why regimes are 
created and maintained, but also how they evolve over time' (Keohane, 1984: 
79). 
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Three factors can explain cooperation or its failure: mutuality of interests, 
shadow of the future, and the number of actors (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985: 227). 
Firstly, mutuality of interests refers to the potential gains and losses of cooperation 
(Axelrod and Keohane, 1985: 228-229). Keohane concedes that, as sovereignty 
remains a 'constitutive principle' of world politiCS61, international regimes will 
certainly be shaped by the interest of the powerful members. While power 
distribution and interest do shape behaviour, engaging in cooperation may be 
necessary for the pursuit of the self-interest. 62 
Secondly, shadow of the future refers to the idea that concern about future 
payoffs influences state compliance, making 'repetitive cost-benefit analysis' 
(NIfiller, 1995: 363) a crucial issue. Shadow of the future is influenced by states' 
concern about 'long time horizons', 'regularity of stakes', 'reliability of information 
about the others' actions', and 'quick feedback about changes in the others' actions' 
(Axelrod and Keohane, 1985: 232). 
Thirdly, the number of actors is important for the element of reciprocity to 
encourage and persuade states to cooperate in an anarchical world system, which by 
nature encourages defection and competition. The problem posed here is the 
'sanctioning problem' within decentralised structures when cheating has occurred. 
There are three preconditions for reciprocity: 
9 defectors can be identified; 
retaliation can be focused on them. One means to prevent defection and to 
solve the sanctioning problem is 'privatization' or 'bilateralism', that is, to 
exclude others from collective benefits by narrowing the benefits to those 
who were willing to negotiate an issue -a means that may include unilateral 
action and focuses directly on the defectors (Keohane, 1984: 83-84 and 
Axelrod and Keohane, 1985: 236); 
61 The idea that sovereignty remains the overall principle in a decentralised and 
hence non-hierarchical international system is taken from Ruggie, John Gerald 
(1983), 'Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Towards a 
Neorealist Synthesis, ' in World Politics, Vol. 35, No. 2 (January), pp. 261-286. 
62 'To pursue self-interest does not require maximizing freedom of action' (Keohane, 
1984: 259). 
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0 incentives to punish defectors do exist. 
The first problem refers to the ability to quickly obtain sufficient amounts of 
reliable information (especially in the security field where betrayal is more likely63), 
and to effectively monitor actions for effective retaliation. Sanctioning problems 
'tend to be more severe on military-security than on political-economy issues, due to 
the high costs of punishing defections, the difficulties of monitoring behaviour, and 
the stringent demands for information that are imposed when successful defection 
can dramatically shorten the shadow of the future' (Axelrod and Keohanc, 1985: 
236). The second problem refers to the ability to punish responsible defectors, 
because in a case of unfocussed retaliation the situation may escalate. The third 
problem refers to the danger of participation of many actors, sonic of whom do not 
cooperate, while at the same time the remaining actors do not have sufficient 
incentives to punish them (Axelrod and Keohanc, 1985: 234-236). Hence, in the 
absence of a hegemon, 
[o]utcomes must be determined by a relatively small number of actors 
that can monitor each others' compliance with rules and practices and 
that follow strategies making other governments' welfare dependent on 
their continued compliance with agreements and understandings. Thus 
intensive interaction among a few players helps to substitute for, or to 
supplement, the actions of a hegemon. As a hegemon's power erodes, 
[ ... ] incentives to cooperate will depend not only on the 
hegemon's 
responses but on those of other sizeable states (Keohane, 1984: 78-79). 
A combination of 'reliability of action' and 'provision of high-quality 
infon-nation' is fundamental for maintained cooperation efforts. 'Both the value of a 
reputation for reliability and the gains to be made from providing high-quality 
infon-nation to others challenge the traditional Realpolitik ideal of the autonomous, 
hierarchical state that keeps its options open and its decisionmaking processes 
closed' (Keohane, 1984: 259) in the conduct of foreign affairs. 
63 The idea stems from Lipson, Charles (1984), 'International Cooperation in 
Economic and Security Affairs, ' in Morld Politics, Vol. 37, No. 1 (October), pp. 
1-23. 
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3.4. Conclusion 
Generally it can be said that while realism provides 'a barrier against wishful 
thinking [ ... ] it fails to take into account that states' conceptions of their interests, 
and of how their objectives should be pursued, depend not merely on national 
interests and the distribution of world power, but on the quantity, quality, and 
distribution of information' in order to reduce uncertainty. The mere existence of a 
common interest is not enough: institutions must create equal access to information 
and reduce uncertainty (Keohane, 1984: 12-13). 
In response to the realist focus on power and distribution, that is, relative (zero- 
sum) gains, and neoliberalism's focus on joint gains and information, that is, 
absolute gains, Keohane and Nye form a compromise: an exclusive interest in joint 
gains (as in the economic argument of comparative advantage and overall net 
benefits of undistorted free trade) obscures the problem of how joint gains are 
divided - who gets what. An increase in joint gains from a relationship, is not free of 
distributional conflict - as is the case with oil-exporting governments and 
multinational companies, who have a common interest in high prices but are in 
conflict over shares and profits. Rising interdependence hence does not necessarily 
create a conflict-free world. At the same time, for instance, traditional realist balance 
of power situations need not be zero-sum, if participants agree to maintain the status 
quo and as a result 'jointly gain' by maintaining the balance of power situation 
(Keohane and Nye, 1977 [1989]: 10-11). 
With the assumption of asymmetric interdependence, the concept of complex 
interdependence links realist concerns of power and liberal concerns of 
interdependence. For realism, military force is the most important power resource in 
world politics in order to ensure the survival of the state. Hence states try to maintain 
their relative position in the international system, even at high economic cost. 
Liberals take other groups into account, too, and focus on economic incentives for 
state interaction. Economic cooperation and interdependence prevents states from 
waging wars, thus reducing the role of force and the necessity to constantly review 
the relative power position within the international system. Referring to Karl 
Deutsch's work on pluralistic security communitiCS64 and Ernst Haas's research on 
64 'groups of states which developed reliable expectations of peaceful relations and 
thereby overcame the security dilemma that realists see as characterizing 
international politics' (quote from Keohane and Nye). Deutsch, Karl W. et. al. 
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post-war Europe and the transfori-nation of French-German hostility into 
cooperation65, Keohane and Nye maintain that increased transactions and institution- 
building helped to change attitudes through 'learning and the redefinition of national 
interests' (Keohane and Nye, 1977 [1989]: 247-248). 
In his review of the establishment of human rights regimes, Krasner 
acknowledges that neither realism nor liberal institutionalism alone can explain the 
'creation and implementation of human rights regimes', but that also 'domestic 
divisions [ ... ] can impact on the success of human rights regimes by creating 
transnational alliances' (Krasner, 1995: 167, also 141-142 for the emphasis on non- 
state actors). This goes together with knowledge-based approaches to the regime 
concept. One influential theorizing within knowledge-based approaches is the idea 
of epistemic communities and experts involved in regime formation (for instance 
Haas, 1989; Haftendorn, 2000). The influence of ideas of knowledge and learning as 
espoused by cognitivism and social constructivism were already indicated by 
Keohane and Nye in 1977, when they argued that apart from hegemonic stability, 
international institutions, domestic politics and learning by elites as well as shifts of 
relative power capabilities can also explain the nature of international regimes and 
changes within them (Keohane and Nye, 1977 [1989]: 257-258). In an earlier article, 
Krasner made a point for the compatibility of liberal institutionalism and realism, 
stating that '[i]t is illusory that this issue will be resolved on the basis of empirical 
studies. The literature now contains enough examples to suggest that both market 
failure and power-oriented research programs can present plausible analyses, often 
about the same issue' (Krasner, 1991: 364). Or, '[flesolution of the debate between 
liberal and realist perspectives is not likely to depend on which approach best 
explains the body of empirical data; rather it will depend on whether market failure 
or distributional issues best describe the range of issues involving international 
politics' (Krasner, 1995: 140). 
These theoretical layouts of regimes, their existence and maintenance will now 
be related to the practical purposes of regimes with relevance to the GMS. In 
particular, the next chapter will consider the application of regimes to water 
cooperation and traditional as well as human security considerations and discuss 
(1957), Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press). 
65 Haas, Ernst (195 8), The Uniting ofEurope (Stanford: Stanford University Press). 
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how these could find application in the GMS, how foreign policies of central 
governments relate to them, how foreign policy influences the building of regional 
institutions, and what the role of subnational units and non-state actors in building 
and maintaining the regional institution is. Chapters Five and Six will then apply 
these considerations to the GMS. 
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Chapter 4 
Water Cooperation, Security and International Regimes: An 
Analytical Framework for the GMS 
Based on the principles of the regime approach, which were discussed in the 
previous chapter, and on the issues in Chapter Two, this chapter works out a 
framework for the analysis of cooperation in the GMS. In a first step, the 
applicability of the concept to water cooperation and security is discussed, because 
the waters of the Mekong form the basis for subregional cooperation in the Mekong 
basin. Water cooperation is therefore of relevance for the strategic setting in the 
subregion and also forms a significant element in the realm of human and 
environmental security, which involves actors with different aims on the state, 
substate and non-state levels. In a next step, these actors are discussed with 
particular emphasis of the state and non-state levels and the implications for the 
foreign policies of central goven-iments. Lastly, the chapter revisits the research 
questions and the aims of this study, which were first discussed in Section One of 
Chapter One. 
4.1. Water cooperation, security and international regimes 
Coming to the practical purpose of regimes, they can be related to water 
cooperation as part of security policy. Economic cooperation centred on rivers 
includes the difficult task of water management. In 2000, Albrecht wrote that 'the 
emerging conflict about water resources culminates in regions which had already 
manifested a high incidence of war in the period after 1945' (Albrecht, 2000: 17). 
Wolf explicates that water conflicts occur at multiple scales, from individual 
irrigation to urban versus rural uses and international conflicts over the use of 
waterways, that is, conflict ranges from the subnational level to interstate violence 
(Wolf, 2004: 1 and 5). As a result, water conflicts, which are linked to the broader 
concept of human security, may have an impact on the political stability of a 
particular country. Water cooperation as part of security policy has been the target of 
regime theoreticians. As already mentioned, subregional cooperation in the Mekong 
region has been associated with bringing peace to a region through confidence- 
building (Black, 1969). And water cooperation, as well as the use of natural 
resources in general, has been recognised as being important for international 
relations in general and the regime concept in particular. The GMS - although it is 
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not a cooperation scheme with a mandate confined to the use of water resources (as 
is the Mekong River Commission) - focuses nevertheless on water as the central 
source of energy production, irrigation and transportation development. Water is 
hence a key ingredient of the region's economic development and thus a core 
problem of GMS Cooperation, in particular between upper and lower Mekong states. 
As Berman pointed out, at stake are Vietnam's efforts to raise productivity levels in 
the Mekong delta in a sustainable way: 
The fact that so many hopes for major development schemes are placed 
on the availability of water from the Lancang (Mekong) is both a cause 
for anxiety and a motivation to cooperate among the six GMS countries. 
Only China, controlling 50% of the river's headwaters, remains in a 
position to develop the river unilaterally (Berman, 1998: Chapter 
Ii. C. 1. ). 
Construction of dams, hydro-electric power plants and clearing of rapids affect 
the quality and the amount of water flowing through the lower Mekong countries, 
affecting especially Vietnam as the last in the line of Mekong countries. Haftendorn 
makes clear that 'freshwater resources are prone to international conflict if they cross 
national boundaries' (Haftendom, 2000: 51. The following paragraph see 
Haftendorn, 2000: 51-52 and 62-68). These conflicts are of different nature and fall 
into four categories: (1) 'conflict through use' (for example construction of dams for 
electrical and irrigation purposes); (2) 'conflict through pollution' affecting the water 
quality; (3) 'relative distribution conflict', if use of an abundant source is contested; 
(4) 'absolute distribution conflict', if there is not enough water to serve all the needs 
of the riparian countries. Haftendorn points out two ways to solve conflicts: 
The first solution is to change a situation, in which no cooperative solution is 
possible, into a dilemma situation, in which a solution is possible. The situation 
without a possible solution is the so-called rambo situation. Rambo games represent 
situations, which have a single equilibrium outcome, which 'satisfies only one actor 
and leaves the other aggrieved', that is, 'an instant of unrequited cooperation is the 
only stable outcome of the game' (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997: 51). 
Actors reach their preferred outcome by acting unilaterally. 'Self-interested 
"rambos... do not cooperate until they can be persuaded of their long-term interest in 
cooperation either through threats (can be executed credibly only if the rambo has a 
dominant strategy to cooperate) or promises. They may also cooperate if they find 
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that cooperation is important for the survival of their community, or if linkages with 
other issues can be constructed (ZOrn, 1997: 52; Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 
1997: 51-52). A successful persuasion changes the situation structure, and a 
dilemma situation may occur, which makes cooperation possible (Haftendom, 
2000). Regimes can be beneficial in this in that they 'may help states to arrange the 
side-payments necessary to secure the cooperation', and their principles and nonns 
'may foster and institutionalize the issue-linkage on which cooperation depends' 
(Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997: 52). 
Helpful for cooperation are the following situations: 
9 the level of interaction and the quality of the bilateral or multilateral 
relationships; 
0 arbitration, mediation, intervention; 
*a change in the international or domestic framework (such as the dissolution 
of the East-West conflict); 
improvement of infon-nation exchange and confidence building (Haftendom, 
2000). 
Haftendorn notes that '[a]ll running water conflicts are asymmetrical conflicts 
whereby there is a state or states that control a river's source or upper flow, 
placing the lower riparian states at a disadvantage. ' The upper states control the 
quality and quantity of the water flow. This could become a puzzle (or dilemma) 
situation 'in which the upper-lying state or states relinquish their position of power 
and come to a suitable agreement with the lower-lying riparian states [ ... ] in return 
for specific rewards or political and material side payments. ' This changes the 
'default condition' where a lack of cooperation leaves all parties worse off. The 
precondition to change a rambo situation into a dilemma situation, in which it is the 
desire of all states to cooper ate in order to solve an unsatisfying situation, is the 
linkage to other problems (global or regional) in the bilateral or multilateral 
relationship. Where there are, for instance, military, security or ethnic problems 
involved, the rambo situation could change into a dilemma situation, in which it is 
also the desire of the powerful state to come to a cooperative solution of the water 
conflict (Haftendorn, 2000: 51-52 and 62-68). 
The second solution has already been alluded to, namely the establishment of 
international institutions, such as international regimes. General water agreements of 
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international (UNO) and regional (EU/EC) organisations, such as the 1992 
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes (Helsinki Convention) and the 1997 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, have been 
less successful, due to their 'high degree of generality and non-binding global 
nonns. ' Moreover, 
[e]ach general regulation needs to be feasible or applicable to a number 
of differing conflict scenarios, as well as having to embody the general 
preferences of the participating states. The various conventions embody 
principles that act more as orientation markers. However, these are open 
to interpretation in the future and can serve as concrete guidelines. 
Specific conventions, however, have been considerably more successful and 
&many [ ... ] have led to regime building, that is, by embodying norms, principles and 
procedural roles, they have provided the means to build trust among states and to 
encourage the development of friendly relations. ' Water commissions 'have 
managed to keep problematic water issues on the agenda, to assist with and improve 
the transfer of information among members and to offer expert advice. In this 
manner they have eased the achievement of settlements. ' Sometimes, water regimes 
are a side product of economic integration processes, including consideration about 
the 'shadow of the future. ' Also, regimes can occur as modelled on other successful 
multilateral or bilateral settlements. On the whole, the role of international 
institutions 'has been most significant in the case of regional water regimes and as 
reactions to a specific conflict, whereby their integrative context motivated their 
continued existence. This in turn served to ease the settlement of new conflicts' 
(Haflendom, 2000: 52 and 62-68). 
I According to Wolf, a large number of actors involved in water conflicts makes 
it more difficult to come to a solution (Wolf, 2004: 3). This is in accordance with the 
above mentioned idea that the finding of a cooperative solution depends on the 
number of actors involved. Wolf holds that water can be both an 'irritant' - it 'can 
make good relations bad and bad relations worse' - and a 'unifier' in basins with 
crelatively strong institutions. ' Wolf argues that even bitter enemies have created 
water agreements followed by 'resilient' institutions, and that one example of this is 
the Mekong Committee of 1957, which carried on to exchange data during the 
Vietnam War (Wolf, 2004: 7-8) and rose again from the remnants in 1995 in the 
-108- 
form of today's Mekong River Commission. We will explore the history of Mekong 
cooperation at a later stage, but there seems to be truth in Wolf's argument in that 
the Mekong Committee, although largely dysfunctional during the Vietnam War, 
was never fully abandoned. A central premise of Wolf is that changes in river basins 
have to be accompanied by institution-building. Unilateral measures, such as dam- 
building, can erupt into conflicts and threaten regional stability, if they are carried 
out without regional cooperation. As a result, for instance, 'relations have shown to 
be significantly more cooperative in basins with treaties and high dam density than 
in similarly developed basins without treaties. ' A combination of institutional 
capacity and shared interests may thus prevent conflicts from erupting into violence 
(Wolf, 2004: 6-7 and 9). 
Albrecht points out that the development and regulation of conflicts over river 
waters 'depend in particular on whether a "drainage area" - the catchment area of a 
large river with its tributaries - comes to rest neatly within national boundaries, as in 
the case of the great rivers of China, or whether this kind of drainage' area takes in 
the territories of several states. ' While conflicts in the first case are negotiated in the 
national context, in the second case of border-crossing or border-forming rivers risk 
of conflicts over distribution is high, but does not follow automatically: 
Genuine constellations of political affairs come into play as an 
intervening variable. In countries with similar political structures and 
long-established political cultures (e. g. the countries bordering the 
Parana in South America like Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, or the 
drainage areas of the Amazon and the Orinoco) conflicts about water 
manifest a low escalation potential. Furthermore, few conflicts with 
serious escalation potential can be identified in regions which subsist 
below the threshold of strategically organised intensive utilisation of 
water reserves (e. g. Indo-China and the Mekong; see Schiffler, 1999: 9). 
One has to conclude that, parallel to natural facts like the unequal 
distribution of water, it is essentially political factors which come into 
play in rendering distribution conflicts into contentious themes of 
international politics (Albrecht, 2000: 13). 
As mentioned above, Haftendom noticed that '[a]ll running water conflicts are 
asymmetrical conflicts' (Haftendorn, 2000: 52). This notion bears similarity to 
Keohane and Nye's observation of asymmetrical interdependencies. Regime 
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building takes place when coordination problems between states occur and the 
distribution of power is relatively symmetrical, since otherwise states do what they 
want (Krasner, 1991: 337). Similarly, Albrecht argued: 
Because of the extremely asymmetrical distribution of power, a good 
many of the conflicts in the three continents of the developing world are 
considered to be unlikely to escalate into violence. The perfect historical 
example of this is the Colorado River, a massive fast-flowing river in the 
USA passing through magnificent canyons, the bed of which has long 
dried out in downstream Mexico because of extractions upstream in the 
USA. Mexico was never politically powerful enough to demand of the 
USA that the river be restored to the state in which it had flowed for 
thousands of years into the Gulf of Mexico. Weak states, like Bangla 
Desh or others in Africa, or indeed smaller communities with few means 
of exerting political pressure, like Indian reservations in America, fall 
into this category with their opposition to river regulation and dam 
projects (Albrecht, 2000: 15-16). 
Power in regional hydropolitics can - alongside the traditional means of 
military, politics and economics - refer to the riparian position of an upstream 
country and its control over water resources vis-A-vis a downstream country. 
However, projects that impact on a neighbouring country are usually implemented 
by regional powers defined in traditional terms regardless of their riparian position 
(Wolf, 2004: 9, note 4). We shall see later how this could apply to the GMS. 
One of the most frequent solutions of national water problems has been multi- 
purpose dam-building to prevent floods by artificially regulating rivers (such as 
along the Huanghe), to provide irrigation for agriculture projects, or to produce 
energy (such as the Three Gorges Dam at the Changiiang66). In the case of the 
Changjiang, the projects included massive resettlement programmes. In northern 
China, water scarcity poses problems for booming Beijing, and 'keeping the capital 
66 On its way from the source, the Changjiang changes its name: it originates as 
Tongtianhe from the confluence of several rivers in Qinghai. It then continues as 
Jinshajiang along the Tibetan-Sichuanese border, flows into Yunnan, and upon 
leaving Yunnan at Shuifu, continues as Changjiang. 
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well supplied is a top political priority' (Ae Economist, 19 June 2004). Conflicts 
erupted in 2003 between Beijing and the neighbouring province of Hebei about a 
project on the Juma river, which was finished in late 2004, in order to divert water to 
Yanshan Petrochemical in Beijing but which in the process would take water from 
Hebei's need for agricultural irrigation (77ie Economist, 19 June 2004). The quarrels 
between Beijing and Hebei over water resources have reached such a level that they 
are even acknowledged by the China Daily, the English edition of the Zhongglio 
Ribao (Zhonggt(o Ribao, 26 February 2004). In November 2004, reports surfaced 
that more than 20,000 farmers had protested for three days against re-settlement 
programmes and insufficient compensation in connection with the Pubugou dam 
project near Hanyuan in the province of Sichuan (Der Spiegel, 2004). 
Another dam is being planned at the so-called Tiger Leaping Gorge, where the 
Changjiang is called Jinshajiang and where it flows through Yunnan's north-westem 
minority areas. The main purpose of the project is to produce hydroenergy. In 
addition, the government in Kunming plans to divert water from the new reservoir 
into the polluted Dianchi Lake, the source of Kunming's drinking water. Also, it is 
hoped that the new dams will stop the downstream sedimentation at the Three 
Gorges Dam, thus mitigating environmental damages through new ones 
(Strittmatter, 2004). The project meets domestic opposition from environmental 
activists fighting against the Huaneng group, the energy company behind the project, 
which is led by Li Xiaopeng, son of former Prime Minister and President of the 
parliament Li Peng (Strittmatter, 2004). 67 
Among other ideas of how to solve problems of and regions are diversion 
projects. One of them was Stalin's idea of re-directing the rivers of northern Siberia 
to the USSR's and Asiatic zones, using atomic weapons in the process (Albrecht, 
2000: 16). Fascinatingly, the re-direction idea is still alive in China, where the 
nanshid-beidiao project is under consideration. Also still alive in China is the idea of 
the use of atomic weapons. Both points are raised by McCormack. The planned dam 
on the Yarlung river, which originates in Tibet and becomes the Brahmaputra in 
India and the Jamuna in Bangladesh, could theoretically exceed the Three Gorges 
Dam in energy production and 'would [ ... ] place China in a position to exercise 
influence over electricity markets in the subcontinent. ' Reportedly, nuclear 
61 For an assessment of dams see McCormack, 2001: 20-23. 
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explosions to blast a tunnel through Mount Namcha Barwa are under consideration 
plus a diversion of water from the reservoir at the foot of the Himalayas back along 
the Tibetan plateau to the dry regions of Xinjiang and Gansu (McConnack, 2001: 
18-19). As regards the water diversion of the nanshiti-beidiao from the water-rich 
south to the water-scarce north, water from the Changiiang and other water-rich 
rivers of the south is supposed to be transported to the Huanghe region. Three routes 
are under consideration, bringing 40 billion cubic litres per year to the north, one of 
them leading across the 'ecological fragile' Qinghai-Tibet plateau (more see 
McCormack, 2001: 19-20). The issues will be further discussed in Chapter Six. 
4.2. Actors in regimes: state, substate, non-state 
We have seen in the discussion of Keohane's and Krasner's frameworks that 
power and interest growing out of the system of nation states and the political and 
power-distributional constellations within the system inform decisions of states, that 
is, central goverriments in a nation state, whether or not to engage in multilateral 
cooperation. In addition, as Section Four of Chapter Three showed, this decision can 
be influenced by epistemic communities and experts in domestic or transnational 
coalitions, which can induce learning by elites and a redefinition of the national 
interest. This adds a domestic and social dimension to the character of an 
international regime. This multidimensional character of an international regime can 
be related to the multi-track framework by Louise Diamond and John W. McDonald, 
introduced in Chapter Two. The rising importance of growth areas has produced 
blurred distinctions between the domains of domestic and foreign policy. This 
development has put a multitude of actors on the international stage. As central 
governments are not the sole actors, the interest and power of central governments 
are not the only determinants of whether to engage in multilateral cooperation. The 
organisation of growth areas shows the diversity of actors, best represented by the 
multi-track concept. With foreign policy increasingly localised and central 
govenunents' attempts to reterritorialise spaces, their decisions to involve 
themselves in multilateral cooperation is informed not only by their own interests, 
but also by the interests of subnational units and non-state actors, ranging from 
track-three to track-nine dimensions. 
However, transnational concerns on the agenda of both state and non-state 
actors do not imply a policy consensus. Simply put, with relevance to international 
river basins, a central government might favour a dam on a cross-border river for 
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energy production, in order to ensure the country's energy security or develop 
landlocked provinces (such as China or Vietnam) in order to facilitate the country's 
integration into the subregion, thereby taking into account environmental damage. 
An NGO, however, might favour environmental protection over a type of economic 
development, which is harmful for the ecology of the respective area. Power here 
determines which way to go. It is not a power play between states, but a power play 
between state and non-state actors. Conflict over water may therefore occur between 
actors of one level, such as central governments of upstream and downstream 
countries, if the particular political constellation is prone to push distribution 
conflicts towards political conflicts (which should only be the case in basins with a 
symmetrical distribution of power: although conflicts in transboundary basins are 
asymmetrical, the overall distribution of power between countries in a basin 
determines whether this can lead to the outbreak of an actual conflict: Haftendorn, 
2000; Krasner, 1991: 337; Albrecht, 2000: 13); but conflict over water may also 
occur between different layers of actors. Hence, Wolf's notion of water as both an 
'irritant' and a 'unifier' (Wolf, 2004: 7-8) can apply to actors on one level, but can 
also unite or lead to conflict between actors on different levels. Alliances between 
several levels of actors might determine how the power play ends. For instance, 
NGOs often work with villagers, whose livelihoods depend on the river and whose 
opposition to dams are used by NGOs to develop public relations measures to make 
states (and firms, which build the dams) stop the endeavour. This cuts across several 
layers of the multi-track framework, introducing statist, institutionalist and social 
perspectives to the issue at hand. 
This increases the number of actors involved in establishing the regime. With 
regard to the GMS, six countries are involved, their governments in the form of 
several of their governmental departments, subnational units, regional and extra- 
regional firms, NGOs, and international organisations ývith different interests and 
policies, which will be addressed in the study, together with the question of whether 
this situation increases or decreases the robustness and effectiveness of the GMS. In 
a regime, these actors, once involved, become important for its maintenance: they 
provide a financial, educational and personnel resource base in order to fulfil the 
functions of the regime in question. This leads to an actor-oriented approach of 
international regimes, which involves multi-track initiatives from track-one to track- 
nine dimensions, thereby creating coalitions of interest between the public and 
private, sovereignty-bound and not sovereignty-bound actors. 
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Cooperation in transboundary river basins such as the Mekong provides a good 
test case for the willingness of countries to cooperate and the robustness and 
effectiveness of an institution. Transboundary rivers touch both traditional and non- 
traditional security. Both security concepts affect the issues of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. Often, river basins are regarded as closed basins, that is, the view 
of upstream countries to regard rivers as part of their territory without regard for the 
consequences of upstream development for downstream countries. Such a case is the 
Colorado river, which originates in the United States but is almost dried up when it 
enters Mexico. With a lack of water supply, the issue of human security comes into 
play and shows the transnational character of water-based cooperation. With regard 
to the Mekong, there has been a considerable development of the Mekong as a 
source of cooperation among riparian states in order to realise the economic 
development of a formerly conflict-ridden region, which encompasses the whole of 
mainland Southeast Asia. This needs favourable foreign policies, which are tuned to 
cooperation instead of conflict. Solution to issues such as the land and maritime 
boundaries between China and Vietnam, for instance, have only become possible 
through changes in the political landscape due to the end of the ideological 
competition. The change in the global political architecture was followed by moves 
to bring bilateral relations to a new quality, improve the exchange of information, 
the number of visits, move from working visits to high level exchanges of ministers 
and heads of states, and eventually to appoint specialised working groups in order to 
solve bilateral issues. In the same way, the multilateral exercise of regionalisation is 
dependent on the countries' foreign policy agendas. Foreign policy, therefore, will be 
viewed through the lens of transnational cooperation. As mainland Southeast Asia 
has become a significant policy factor in ASEAN, these countries may also work to 
improve relations between China and Southeast Asia. This factor will be explored 
throughout the study. 
Given the relatively short period of peace in mainland Southeast Asia after 
deep and multiple ideological divisions until the settlement of the Cambodia conflict 
in 1991, the history of multilateral cooperation in the Mekong basin is still relatively 
young. Antagonisms, which partly reach back to pre-colonial times, are still in place. 
I shall also argue that rule-governed cooperation cannot be realised in a situation, in 
which not only distrust in mainland Southeast Asia remains, but in which the future 
distribution of power in Southeast and Northeast Asia between China, Japan, the 
United States and the role of ASEAN is still unclear. This issue links directly with 
the function of GMS cooperation as a foreign policy tool in the hands of central 
governments. GMS cooperation, as will be sbown in this study, is not only designed 
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to tackle non-traditional subregional security issues, but is also a function of wider 
foreign policy concerns of both Vietnam and China. Broader foreign policy concerns 
convinced China and Vietnam to leave their previously isolated positions in East 
Asia and engage in Mekong basin cooperation. Mekong basin cooperation is 
therefore not only a means to deal with transnational problems of the subregion, but 
also to tackle foreign policy issues of global dimensions. As a result, there are two 
sides to Mekong cooperation: a local or regional, which deals with regional 
problems, and a global one, which sees GMS cooperation as a tool to attain globally- 
oriented foreign policy goals. This double character of GMS cooperation shows that 
the institution of the GMS is a governance organisation in a system characterised by 
Westphalian as well as post-Westphalian tendencies. Both sides of GMS cooperation 
will be discussed in this study by using China-Vietnam relations and their rationales 
for Mekong cooperation as examples. 
As indicated at the end of Section Two in Chapter Three, in this strategic 
situation, rules, which govern actions, may be replaced by something that, like rules, 
provides stable patterns of cooperation. The question here is if a regime can be 
effective without the necessity of rules. In this regard, the proliferation of multi-track 
processes might provide stable patterns of cooperation and work as trust-building 
mechanism in a region, which is still beset by distrust and threat perceptions. 
Although the proliferation of transnational relations can also produce new conflicts, 
as will be shown in the case of the dams built on the Mekong and its tributaries, it 
nevertheless appears that the stability, which in the traditional regime concept is to 
be provided by rules, has in the East Asian context been provided by a norm-guided 
evolutionary process of cooperation, which employs only basic formalities. The 
proliferation of transnational relations seems to have worked in order to make more 
information available to interested parties and to add some transparency and 
predictability to previously closed states such as China and Vietnam. The study will 
explore the possibility of the emergence of a system of committee governance as 
stabilising substructure, which may foster stability and consensual decision-making 
processes within and between countries. Such as system in a multi-track framework 
may establish procedures along the lines of Mfiller's aforementioned suggestions 
(MUller, 1993: 39-42), which facilitate confidence-building, stability, transparency, 
stable channels of information, and predictability. As for the GMS, working groups 
share information, non-state actors represent private interests in developing the 
subregion, subnational units represent the interests of localities in maintaining and 
developing the GMS. As will be shown, this is in particular true for cooperation in 
the Chinese-Vietnamese border regions, which are part of the GMS process. 
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4.3. Conclusion: questions and aims 
In conclusion it can be said that this study will explore these local-global 
dimensions of foreign relations within a multi-track framework of international 
regimes. The local and global dimensions will be viewed as interrelated spheres of 
foreign relations in a state system, which is still dominated by nation states, a 
situation, which is particularly relevant for the transnational relations of China and 
Vietnam. The GMS is therefore a state-sponsored undertaking, in which subnational 
units and non-state actors operate in a framework set by central government policies. 
The regime will be viewed as a system, in which a gradual and consultative 
approach of institutionalisation accounts for effectiveness and robustness. What this 
means for the stability and coherence in the case of the GMS and if and how this 
might be able to structure the bilateral relations between China and Vietnam on the 
local and global or on one level only is subject to the examination of this study. 
Research questions derived from these issues are as follows: 
How did Vietnam's and China's foreign policies change after the Cold War 
so that Mekong cooperation became possible again? In order to address this 
question, the study will explore the twists and turns in Hanoi's and Beijing's 
foreign policies with relevance to Cold War and post-Cold War history of the 
Mekong basin and its institutions. This is important, because both the Cold 
War failure and the post-Cold War resumption of Mekong cooperation 
cannot be seen detached from the ideological division between 'East' and 
'West', and between China, the Soviet Union and Vietnam. 
Did the change of the foreign policies of both countries result in compatible 
or contradictory foreign policies towards subregional cooperation? Do 
China's and Vietnam's foreign policies influence the structure and the 
agenda of the GMS? 
Do different actors on different levels have different aims, that is, are there 
differences between local non-state actors, subnational units and central 
governments in China and Vietnam and what are the differences between the 
local and global dimensions of Hanoi's and Beijing's foreign relations? Are 
there multiple dimensions of foreign policy through the involvement of 
several central government ministries in GMS cooperation? 
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" How does the double character of the GMS as Westphalian and post- 
Westphalian system influence the cooperation structure? 
" To what extent have actors on the national, subnational and transnational 
level proliferated and to what extent are actors on different levels connected? 
How influential is the non-state sector in the GMS, for instance in the 
envirom-nental field, given that central governments set the framework of 
cooperation? 
" Has the gradual process of institutionalisation in the GMS based on 
regularity and frequency of cooperation produced effectiveness and 
robustness of the GMS? 
Let us now move to the examination of how the foreign policies of China and 
Vietnam manifest themselves in policy approaches to the Greater Mekong 
Subregion. In a first step, in Chapter Five, Mekong cooperation will be viewed from 
a historical perspective until the end of the Cold War. The strategic relevance of the 
region will be discussed against the backdrop of a multiple ideological schism 
between East and West and within the so-called 'communist bloc. ' Then, the study 
moves to analyse the nature of GMS cooperation and, in Chapter Six, explores the 
foreign policies of Vietnam and China towards the GMS and the consequences for 
the structure of cooperation within the GMS framework. 
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Chapter 5 
Mekong Basin Cooperation: History and Current State of 
Development 
Regionalisation is set in motion by states 'through a more or less 
spontaneous or unintended convergence in terms of political regime, 
economic policy or security, but often one can identify a triggering 
political event, which sets the process in motion. Naturally, this political 
event is related to the main players in the region, the policy-makers, or 
regional great powers. The rise of regional powers is the other side of 
decline of hegemony' (Hettne, 1999b: xxiii). 
5.1. History of Mekong cooperation: from exclusion to inclusion via 
the China-Vietnam dichotomy 
Section One of this chapter is devoted to a history of the Mekong basin through 
the lens of the ideological China-Vietnam antagonism. The history of the institution 
of the Mekong Committee, the predecessor of the Mekong River Commission, will 
be looked at first in Section 5.1.1. It will then be put into historical perspective in a 
larger section (5.1.2. ) on the history of China-Vietnam relations as it has become 
manifest in the border area, which today is incorporated in the GMS framework. In 
particular, Section 5.1.2. will look at the situation of the Chinese-Vietnamese border 
during the ideological split between China, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, which 
influenced the strategic relations between China and the Indochinese states. Today, 
the Sino-Vietnamese border areas constitute busy, developing regions within the 
GMS framework. The history of Mekong basin cooperation, hence the possibility of 
the founding of the GMS, cannot be seen detached from the ideological division 
between Beijing and Hanoi. The first part of this chapter elaborates on these issues. 
The second part will then examine the development and current state of cooperation 
in the Greater Mekong Subregion since 1992. This includes an examination of the 
GMS structure along the lines of the concept of international regimes and of the 
issue of water cooperation, including a discussion of the relevance of non-state 
actors and subnational units in the cooperation structure. This chapter therefore will 
draw upon the concepts and ideas discussed in Chapters Two to Four. 
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5.1.1. Beginnings: the Mekong Committee 
The history of Mekong cooperation 'has hitherto been bedevilled by 
ideological differences, regional geopolitics and the absence of China in formal 
institutional arrangements' (Grundy-Warr, Peachey and Perry, 1999: 306). The first 
formal cooperation in the area dates back to French colonial rule, when treaties 
between Thailand and France were concluded to regulate the navigational use of the 
Mekong in the second half of the I 91h century and the first half of the 20'h century 
(Mya Than and George Abonyi, 2001: 130). Then, the region became torn between 
independence and civil wars and the overarching Cold War structure. As a result, 'it 
may thus be said that the non-navigational utilization of the transboundary water 
resources of the Mekong basin has been characterised throughout by a virtual 
absence of hard and fast rules derived from international law' (Mya Than and 
George Abonyi, 2001: 130 cited Prachoon Chomchi, 1995). 
The Mekong Committee, comprising Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and (South) 
Vietnam, was the first institutionalised cross-country cooperation in mainland 
Southeast Asia to emerge after the end of the Second World War. In 1951, the 
United Nations Economic Commission for the Far East (ECAFE, established in 
1947, the predecessor of the UN's Economic and Social Commission for Asia and 
the Pacific, ESCAP) began to explore opportunities for exploiting the resources of 
the lower Mekong basin, an area comprising Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and (South) 
Vietnam, for irrigation and energy production. In 1949, ECAFE had already created 
a subsidiary body, the Bureau for Flood Control (later the Bureau for Flood Control 
and Water Resources Development). In 195 1, ECAFE requested the bureau to carry 
out a 'study of technical problems of international rivers, defined as rivers passing 
through two or more countries or forming a common border' (Schaaf and Fifield, 
1963: 82-83). The resulting study of May 1952 - Prelintinary Report on Technical 
Problenis Relating to Flood Control and Water Resources, Developinent of the 
Mekong: an International River - triggered a series of events, which eventually led 
to the establishment of the Mekong Committee on 17 September 1957, formally set 
up by the Statute of the Coninzitteefor Co-ordination ofInvestigations of the Loiver 
Mekong Basin. 68 
68 For a detailed description of the steps leading to the establishment of the Mekong 
Committee see Schaaf and Fifield, 1963: 82-99. 
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When French Indochina was dissolved in 1954, Vietnam split into two parts: 
the southern Republic of Vietnam (ROV) and the northern Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam (DRV). While the ROV government was supported by the US, the DRV 
was supported by China and the Soviet Union (SU). 69 After the Geneva agreements, 
the Mekong region became busy with national and cross-national projects. Writing 
in 1963, Schaaf and Fifield list a variety of projects and organisations outside the 
scope of the Mekong Committee, although some of them were associated with it: the 
UN and its Specialised Agencies extend technical assistance to all of the four 
countries; the UN Special Fund supports projects 'in some of them'; all four 
countries are 'included within the work of enquiry and recommendation' of ECAFE; 
France 'operates a mission for economic and technical assistance in Laos, 
Cambodia, and South Vietnam'; the US extends technical cooperation to all of the 
four countries; Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom 
extend aid through the Colombo Plan; Belgium, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, 
Gennany, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and the USSR are involved in 
technical assistance 'in one or more of the riparian states'; the Philippines maintain 
the Operation Brotherhood in Laos; the Asia Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and 
Medico provide aid (Schaaf and Fifield, 1963: 73-74). The Mekong Project itself, 
however, 'although considerable funds have been pledged, and much work is now 
under way, [ ... ] is only beginning' (Schaaf and Fifield, 1963: 74). By the late 1950s, 
the region became subject to a run for influence between China and the USSR. At 
the ECAFE meeting in Kuala Lumpur in March 1958, both the USSR and China 
made trade offers to ECAFE countries to gain greater cooperation from them and 
expand their respective influence in the non-aligned countries. Apart from trade 
offers, the USSR also offered aid for the Mekong development plan. Channelling aid 
for Mekong development through ECAFE would have meant, however, that US- 
backed South Vietnam would have been among the beneficiaries, which is one of the 
reasons why the Soviet offer was imprecise (Far Eastern Econonzic Review, 1958). 
As mentioned above, both Moscow and Beijing channelled aid to individual 
countries, which was possible outside the central ECAFE framework. These moves 
by China and the Soviet Union put mainland Southeast Asia not only at the interface 
of competition between capitalist and socialist countries, but the area became also a 
69 Vietnam ceased to have a foreign policy when it became part of French Indochina 
in four steps: France conquered Cochin China in 1862 and 1867, Annam and 
Tongkin after the Franco-Chinese war of 1884-1885. In 1887, the three parts 
plus Cambodia - which the French had turned into a protectorate in 1863 - were 
formed into the Indochinese Union. Laos was added in 1893. 
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target for competition between the Soviet Union and China the more differences 
between Moscow and Beijing grew. 
The reason for the slow progress of the Mekong programme can safely be 
attributed to the instability of the region, a situation which continued after the 
Geneva Agreements. The Mekong Committee received an impetus from US 
President Lyndon B. Johnson's so-called 'peace initiative' of 7 April 1965 in an 
address at Johns Hopkins University - titled 'Peace Without Conquest. ' In his 
speech, Johnson elaborated on the idea to turn the Lower Mekong Valley from a 
battlefield into a busy developing region with the help of development aid. Johnson 
stated that 
[s]tability and peace do not come easily in such a land [Vietnam]. 
Neither independence nor human dignity will ever be won, though, by 
arms alone. It also requires the work of peace. The American, people 
have helped generously in times past in these works. Now there must be 
a much more massive effort to improve the life of man in that conflict- 
tom comer of our world (Johnson, 1965). 
Johnson's idea was to link up his programme with the ongoing work of the 
United Nations and to use the Mekong's waters for the provision of food, water and 
power. He also intended to introduce wide-spread medical care and schools 
(Johnson, 1965). The idea was to establish the region as a counterbalance to China 
and to use development as a tool of US foreign policy in that it should be an 
'example of a constructive, peaceful alternative to a military strategy in support of 
U. S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia' (Huddle, 1972: III-IV). The same language is 
found in Black (1969), the fon-ner World Bank President, whom Johnson thought to 
head 'a special team of outstanding, patriotic, distinguished Americans' in order to 
implement the programme in cooperation with the United Nations (Johnson, 1965). 
In a complete misunderstanding of the fact that communism provided the backdrop 
for Vietnamese nationalism, Johnson at the same time stepped up the war in order to 
force Hanoi into a settlement and accept US-led development of the region. 70 
70 For the background and the Nixon Doctrine of a lower US profile in the region see 
Huddle, 1972: 2-4,56-60. 
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5.1.2. China-Vietnam relations 
The US strategy famously failed. What happened instead was a successful 
takeover of governments by the communist parties in Indochina. At the same time, 
the Sino-Vietnamese alliance broke apart and the region became enmeshed not only 
in the Cold War antagonism, but was additionally torn between the ideological split 
between the communist contenders Beijing and Moscow. With the Vietnam War at 
an end, the Sino-Vietnam alliance disintegrated against the backdrop of this multiple 
ideological division: between 1954 and 1975, the government in Hanoi had 
depended ideologically, financially and militarily on China. Hanoi however, while 
receiving Chinese support, pursued a foreign policy independent of China according 
to its strategic and security conceptions, which ran counter to China's own ideas 
about the political course of Indochina. This, in hindsight, facilitated the fall out 
between China and Vietnam in the mid-1970s. During the colonial period and the 
independence wars until 1973, the national question, which was braced in 
communist ideology, superseded geopolitics at the time when there was still an 
enemy of colonial times that had to be fought. The common vision of freedom and 
the aim to put an end to the colonial and neo-colonial era obliterated deeper 
traditional and geopolitical considerations for the time being. When non-state actors 
became state actors, however, these deeper and older policies surfaced again and 
produced corresponding alignments within the divided communist camp. These were 
reinforced by a spectacular rapprochement between Beijing and Washington from 
the early 1970s. 
5.1.2.1. The years of alliance 
After Vietnam was partitioned in the Geneva agreements of 1954, China 
served as a gateway to the wider world and a transit country for aid (weaponry, food, 
medicine, military and economic advisors) for the DRV: when China was the first 
country to recognise the DRV in January 1950, this 'open[ed] the way for liaison 
between Vietnam and the (foriner) USSR, other socialist countries and the world in 
general, thereby creating an immense, rich, and powerful rear area for Vietnam' (Luu 
Van Loi, 2002: 69-71). This made the Vietnamese revolutionaries dependent on 
China for supply and international contacts. Luu Van Loi freely admits this, as he 
admits that the relations between the Chinese and Vietnamese communists were 
never free of difficulties as regards foreign policies and strategic objectives. The 
resulting dilemma was that 'Vietnam had to maintain its independent and sovereign 
policy [and) at the same to preserve its traditional solidarity with the Soviet Union, 
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China, and other socialist countries' (Luu Van Loi, 2002: 71), while it attempted to 
build an Indochinese alliance and secure the country against all possible aggressors. 
After its reunification in 1976, a move which was not welcomed in China, 
Vietnam came to rely increasingly on the Soviet Union while hostilities with China 
grew. In 1978, Vietnam and the USSR signed a friendship treaty, and Vietnam 
joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). In the same year, 
Vietnam invaded Cambodia, and in 1979 China sent a 'punishment expedition' 
across the border into Vietnam. Relations between China and Vietnam did not 
nonnalise until the end of the Cold War. 
With relevance to the Sino-Victnamese border regions, which became fully 
part of the GMS framework with the inclusion of Guangxi in GMS cooperation in 
2005, the Sino-Victnamese border became a hotbed of tension between China and 
Vietnam soon after the Vietnam War. Still, in 1973, China 'promised, to continue its 
aid for the next five years' on the level of 1973, while the Soviet Union continued its 
aid, too: 'Although the solidarity of the 1950s no longer existed and in spite of its 
dissidence, the socialist camp was still a prop for our country, at least during the first 
five years of liberation of South Vietnam' (Luu Van Loi, 2002: 25). Between 1975 
and mid-1978,2000 violations were reported on both sides of the border (Ross, 
1988: 202-203,216). Before the mid-1970s, the border had served as a strategic area 
for revolutionaries on both sides. During the time of the radicalising anti-French 
resistance from the late I 9th century, China's side of the border served as a base and 
refuge for Vietnamese activists, among them Ho Chi Minh. At the same time, 
Vietnam's borderlands served as a base for Chinese nationalists and their actions 
against the Qing government. For instance, Sun Yat-sen staged the attack on 
Zhen'nan Guan [at the Guangxi-Vietnam border, September 1907] and the abortive 
Hekou revolt [province of Yunnan, May 1908] (Chen, 1969: 14-16; Barlow, 2001) 
from Vietnam's side of the border. Sun's plan was to establish a base in Tongkin 
from which to fuel the existing unrest caused by rural distress in the notoriously 
unruly province of Guangxi by shipping arms from Tongkin into Guangxi in order to 
establish a base in Guangxi from where to conquer Canton: 'This plan was a shrewd 
one which had many precedents in earlier dynasties, and one which took advantage 
of the balance of forces in the south in an imaginative manner' (Barlow, 2001). In 
January 1908, Sun was expelled from Vietnam. 
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At the time of Chinese assistance to the Vietnamese communists, Vietnamese 
and Chinese communists famously became 'comrades and brothers. ' This phrase 
was not heard again until China's former Vice Premier Wu Xueqian stated at the end 
of the 1980s that China and Vietnam were 'still brothers and comrades' (Klintworth, 
1990: 6-7); and in November 2001, after more than a decade of rapprochement 
efforts, party Secretary-General Nong Duc Manh, on a visit to China described the 
bilateral relationship as one between 'comrades plus brothers. ' Cooperation during 
the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles turned the border areas of Guangxi 
into a region of intensive exchange between both communist parties. The Friendship 
Pass (Youyi Guan), which starts from Kafeng Village in Pingxiang County and then 
leads into Vietnam, was used as supply line in the 1950s and 1960s to support 
Vietnam's struggle against France and the US. The pass re-opened on I April 1992 
and has since developed into a busy commercial traffic road and tourist attraction. 
The friendship railway connecting Vietnam and Guangxi was built in 1952. During 
the anti-Japanese war, the 5h Division of the Itagiki Army occupied the Kunlun pass, 
a natural barrier 60 kilomctrcs east of Nanning. In December 1939, the 5"' Arrny of 
the Guomindang was able to defend the pass. A memorial remembers this event, 
indicating its strategic relevance. During the Chinese Civil War of 1945-1949, the 
border to French Indochina was one of the last regions to be 'liberated' from forces 
of nationalist China: as Chassin wrote, with December 1949 'came the complete 
collapse of coordinated resistance against the Communists. ' On II December 1949, 
Yunnan surrendered. On 14 December 1949, the Red Army reached the border at 
Mong Cai, 'sweeping before them 25,000 Nationalist troops who were disarmed and 
interned by the French authorities' (Chassin, 1965: 236-237). On 5 December 1949, 
Nanning surrendered. 
When the Cold War started to subside and Vietnam and China started attempts 
at rapprochement in the late 1980s, the border, which once unified Chinese and 
Vietnamese communists in anti-imperialist resistance, again served a unifying 
purpose, this time as part of a cooperation endeavour: to develop cross-border 
relations in the Mekong basin and to establish the area as a zone busy with economic 
activity. With the inclusion of Guangxi in the GMS in 2005, the complete Vietnam- 
China border became part of the subregional development guided by the ADB. The 
inauguration of the GMS put the emphasis on the economic development of the 
border regions for the benefit of both countries and changed an area characterised by 
the activities of military forces, revolutionaries and secret societies into one 
characterised by peaceful economic activities. 
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During the various phases of revolution, the traditional antagonism between 
Vietnam and China seems to have remained. Duiker argues that 'Western 
imperialism created a sense of mutual affinity as a result of the shared humiliation 
that both countries had suffered at the hands of the West. It also created a common 
challenge and a now cause for collaboration against the mutual enemy' (Duiker, 
1986: 8). Yet, as these revolutionary non-state actors became state actors and the 
cause was fulfilled, the new communist governments in Beijing and Hanoi displayed 
the same antagonism that had dominated the relations between China and Vietnam 
in the past. Deng Xiaoping's phrase of 1979, that he will 'teach Vietnam a lesson' 
bears similarity to the observations made by Vuving (2002) concerning the pre- 
colonial relationship, although it can be securely said that the comment was stripped 
of the old concepts of lianxia and de of a culturalist worldview (see below). Instead, 
it was designed to 'demonstrate the pen-nanence of the geopolitical relationship 
between China and Vietnam', regardless of the military outcome (Leifer, 1991). 
Historically, the Chinese-Vietnamese relationship seems more equal than is 
often depicted from a Chinese point of view. From III BC to 938 AD, Vietnam was 
a Chinese province ruled by a governor appointed by the Chinese government. 
During the autonomy period between 938 and 1874, according to Vuving, two 
divergent world views had to be combined under one administrative arrangement in 
order to please both the Vietnamese and the Chinese ruler and to accommodate their 
respective views on the order of the world: while China regarded itself as ruling 
tianxia (everything under heaven) based on Confucian values, 'Vietnam recognized 
Chinese suzerainty while at the same time maintained a bipolar world outlook' (for 
this paragraph see Vuving, 2002: 6-9). Vietnam's adoption of the Chinese principles 
of tianzi (son of heaven) and tianxia was combined with the idea of the world being 
naturally divided into a North and a South. Thus, the Vietnamese world had a 
geopolitical border line, north of which could be found the Chinese realm and south 
of which lay the Vietnamese sphere. Sino-Vietnamese relations were 'dually 
interpreted' by China and Vietnam, making accommodation of both world views a 
necessity. While China continued to regard Vietnam as a tributary state, Vietnam 
thought of itself as sovereign and on 'equal footing' with China and the two spheres 
separated by the border between North and South. For China's Confucian ideology, 
which at least partly served to justify realpolitik moves by wrapping them in official 
state ideology, the world was divided accordingly into a periphery and a centre, as 
seen from the position of the Chinese emperor. The world had a moral boundary, 
comprising the Chinese civilisation and the tributary nations. Outside were 
barbarians that could nevertheless be drawn into the sphere influenced by Chinese 
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morality through the application of hita, change. The emperor was at the apex of 
Chinese civilisation and thus embodied this morality. He ruled over lianxia, a term 
which cannot be defined geographically or ethnically. When a new Vietnamese ruler 
ascended the throne, he called himself emperor, establishing a rival tianzi to the 
Chinese emperor. The following action, however, was 'to try to receive investiture 
by the Chinese emperor, an investiture that accorded him the title "the King of the 
Pacified South". ' Thus, the Vietnamese ruler remained a tianzi for his subjects, but 
became a vassal for the Chinese emperor and had to pay tribute every three years. 
Another ritual was the perfon-nance of a 'transformed kowtow', which did not follow 
the Chinese court prescriptions and was therefore seen as 'successful act of 
resistance' on the Vietnamese side, while at the same time the symbol of deference 
seemed to satisfy the Chinese emperor. Another sign of accommodating the two 
world views was the practice of war. For China, war had two institutionalised goals: 
'to gain territories and to "teach lessons" about the order of the world', which meant 
that there was only one emperor who could rule the world. For Vietnam, war against 
the nor-them sphere was 'both an act of resistance and a demonstration of 
sovereignty. ' Except for the 1406-1407 war, all conflicts during the autonomy period 
ended with Chinese withdrawal, thus restoring the Chinese world vis-A-vis the 
unruly vassal, but also the Vietnamese world through withdrawal from Vietnam's 
territory. The Vietnamese emperor remained the tiami for his people and resumed 
payment of tributes to the Chinese emperor (Vuving, 2002: 6-9). 
Vuving's note that from China's point of view war had two institutionalised 
goals, namely 'to gain territories and to "teach lessons" about the order of the world' 
(Vuving, 2002: 8) has some relevance here, especially because Deng's rhetoric is 
reminiscent of the second of these goals. 
Nguyen Vu Tung generalises this point when he argues that in relations 
between socialist states the: 
common communist identity was characterized by an 'informal 
ideology' with a preference for a hierarchical mode of relations among 
socialist states. This suggests how relations between Vietnam and China 
deteriorated in the 1970s when the former found out that socialist 
principles did not prevent the latter from acting like a 'big brother'. The 
same line of argument can be used to explain the break-up of Sino- 
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Soviet and Vietnam-Cambodia relations in the 1960s-1980s (Nguyen Vu 
Tung, 2002: 112-113). 
This idea finds a follower in Zhai, who argues that the relationship between 
China and Vietnam was essentially guided by historical experience, and that socialist 
ideology worked only as a temporary bondage (Zhai, 2000: 211-215). 
The main interests of post-colonial Vietnam's foreign policy were, firstly, the 
expansion of Vietnamese influence in Indochina and, secondly, the avoidance of the 
expansion of Chinese influence in Indochina. Both complementary interests were 
based on power interests and historical threat perception of China (Strassner, 1991: 
123-124). A dominating role in Indochina was meant to shut off Chinese influence 
and thereby prevent a destabilisation of Vietnam from the west through a Chinese 
domination of Laos and Cambodia (Opitz, 1991: 155). As a reaction to the 
rapprochement between China and Japan and China the US in the 1970s, Vietnam 
approached the Soviet Union on 2 November 1978 (Strassner, 1991: 123). The 
conclusion of a friendship treaty between Moscow and Hanoi and Vietnam's earlier 
accession of the COMECON in July 1978 cemented Vietnam's attachment to the 
Soviet bloc in the areas of economy, foreign policy and military, and Vietnam 
became the closest ally of the USSR in Southeast Asia and in Moscow's conflict 
with Beijing (Strassner, 1991: 127-128 cited Kux, 1981: 79-81). 
Plans for a confederation Laos-Cambodia-Vietnam seemed to come into reality 
in two steps: on 18 July 1977, Laos and Vietnam signed a friendship treaty, a border 
treaty and a loan and assistance agreement for Laos; and in December 1978, with 
Soviet consent or at least toleration, Vietnam's army entered Cambodia, dislodged 
the Pol Pot regime and installed a Vietnam-fhendly government under Heng Samrin 
and Hun Sen. Additionally, as was done with Laos, a treaty of friendship, 
cooperation and mutual assistance was signed on 17 February 1978 (Engelbert, 
1998: 311). A border treaty was signed between Vietnam and Cambodia on 30 
December 1985. 
For a short while in the mid-1970s, relations with ASEAN seemed to flourish. 
In January 1976, the 12 th Conference of the DRV Foreign Service pronounced 'to 
strive for an independent, peaceful, neutral Southeast Asia having no troops and 
bases of imperialist powers, standing for solidarity and cooperation with nationalist 
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countries, primarily the non-aligned countries that actively oppose imperialism and 
colonialism' (Luu Van Loi, 2002: 28). This shows that Vietnam viewed with 
awkwardness China's rapprochement with the United States and indicated the later 
split and Vietnam's turn to the Soviet Union. Loi himself admits that the statement 
'proved that we did not fully understand the situation of Southeast Asian countries 
and were still imbued with the two-camp ideology of the cold war period' (Luu Van 
Loi, 2002: 28). On 5 July 1976, however, after unification 'on the State plane' was 
achieved, the tone positively changed: Nguyen Duy Trinb, Foreign Minister of the 
new Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), proposed a four-point policy7i towards 
Southeast Asia, which corresponded with ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAQ (=Bali Agreement) and proved to be the way for relations with 
Southeast Asian countries: foreign relations were established with the Philippines on 
12 July 1976 and with Thailand on 6 August 1976. Relations with Indonesia were 
already established in 1964 and with Malaysia and Singapore after the Paris 
Agreement of 1973 (Luu Van Loi, 2002: 28-29). Hanoi even strived for 
normalisation of relations with the United States. Before this could be achieved, 
however, the overall situation in Southeast Asia worsened. Both sides explored 
possibilities of normalisation of relations in March 1977. In May and December 
1977, negotiations to that end failed, while at the same time Washington said it 
would not oppose Hanoi's UN membership. From mid-1977, the Carter 
administration aimed at the establishment of strategic relations with China against 
the Soviet Union, and at the end of 1977, the US Senate passed a law against US aid 
to Vietnam (Luu Van Loi, 2002: 30). 
From then on, Vietnam viewed ASEAN largely as an organisation used by the 
US for its Cold War aims. The proposal of 'genuine independence' of 1976 pointed 
71 '1. Mutual respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity; 
non-aggression against each other; non-interference in each other's affairs; 
equality, mutual interest, and peaceful coexistence. 2. No permission to any 
country to use the territory of one country as base for direct or indirect 
aggression and intervention in another country or other countries in the region. 
3. Establishment of good neighbourly relations, economic cooperation and 
cultural exchange on the basis of equality and mutual interest. Settlement of 
disputes among the countries of the region through negotiations in a spirit of 
equality, understanding, and mutual respect. 4. Development of cooperation 
among countries of the region for the purpose of building prosperous nations in 
accordance with the specific conditions of each country, in the interest of real 
independence, peace, and neutrality in Southeast Asia, thereby contributing to 
world peace' (Luu Van Loi, 2002: 29). 
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in this direction: for Vietnam, it meant a criticism of ASEAN's dependence on 
European ex-colonial powers and the US superpower, notably regarding the defence 
agreements of individual ASEAN states with Europe and the United States. ASEAN, 
however, received Hanoi's proposal as an attempt to 'launch [ ... ]a "just struggle" 
against ASEAN' (Haacke, 2003: 66), presumably by enforcing communist 
insurgency movements in Southeast Asian countries, generously sponsored by 
China. Moreover, 'the perception by Hanoi of an ideological, and perhaps, military 
superiority, which led to a competition over state identities, and preferences over a 
hierarchical vision of a regional order favourable to Vietnam, had prevented 
Vietnam-ASEAN co-operation' (Nguyen Vu Tung, 2002: 113). 
5.1.2.2. Breakdown of the alliance and border war 
Johannes Kchnen, analysing historical propaganda between 1977 and 1980 
regarding Vietnam's patriotic celebration of the military battle at the Nhu Nguyet 
river of 1077 and the doctrine of pre-emptive strikes accompanying it, concludes in 
1980 that the causes of the Chinese-Vietnamese contradictions can only be explained 
in a historical-psychological mode. A rearrangement of the relationship can only be 
achieved if Vietnam abandons its attitude of fear and arrogance towards its northern 
neighbour and emancipates itself vis-A-vis China within a network of orderly 
relations with its Southeast Asian - and especially Indochinese - neighbours. On the 
other hand, China has to satisfactorily show that it abandons any varieties of vassal 
or satellite thinking towards Southeast Asia and especially Vietnam. At present, 
however, [at the time of writing in 1980] chances that current ways of thinking 
might change are minimal (Kehnen, 1980: 19). 
The notion of Vietnam's arrogance is somewhat repeated in the idea that 
Vietnam had to abandon its attitude of 'superiorness' against China: a decade afler 
Kelmen, Klintworth noted in 1990 that 
[flrom the long historical viewpoint, China has seen the Europeans 
returned to Europe. Japan has been inoculated against visions of an 
empire on the Chinese mainland. And from Moscow and Washington, 
Beijing has extracted acceptance as a great Asian-Pacific Power with the 
right to its own exclusive buffer border zone. All that remained was for 
Vietnam to recognise the reality of China's power. This Hanoi is now 
doing, though only after a decade of bitter resistance. [ ... ] Vietnam [ ... ) 
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has decided on a policy of equidistance from the great powers and 
deference to the proximity of China's great power (Klintworth, 1990: 5- 
6). 
On the occasion of China's invasion in 1979, Vietnam produced a white paper 
condemning the invasion. The invasion was received in parts of the communist field 
as imperialist aggression. In the words of the Communist Party of India (CPI), China 
had colluded with first the French, then with the American imperialists since the 
Geneva Agreements in 1954 and the Paris Agreements in 1973. By doing so, China 
had followed a 'big-nation expansionist and great-power hegemonistic strategy. ' The 
CPI further noted that, after 1973, abandoned by China in their cause to liberate and 
re-unify Vietnam, the Vietnamese people had taken matters into their own hands and 
liberated South Vietnam by themselves. Thus, they thwarted China's hegemonistic 
ambitions towards Southeast Asia by producing an independent and strong Vietnam 
that would not allow China to dominate it or Indochina. The Chinese invasion, the 
CPI further noted, was reminiscent of the occupation of Indian territory in 1962. The 
war of 1979 was hence an attempt to restore Chinese domination in Vietnam. 
China's 'double policy of helping, but also hampering the Vietnamese revolution' by 
compromising in 1954 and 1973, had the consequence that '[e]ach time Vietnam 
won victory over imperialists, they [the Chinese government] dealt and 
compromised with the latter against the interests of Vietnam' (Communist Party of 
India, 1980: 9-18). 
Parts of the Non-Aligned Movement responded in a similar way. A round table 
discussion' hosted by the Krishna Menon Society in New Delhi in 1979, with 
ambassadors and leading personalities of the non-aligned scene such as Indira 
Gandhi and the then Vietnamese ambassador to India, Nguyen Van Sinh, 
condemned the invasion as 'a modem example of imperialism' (Kaul, 1979), an 
'odious scheme to destroy and to undermine the cause of national reconstruction' 
(Nguyen Van Sinh, 1979: 18), which called back to mind the occupation of Indian 
territory since 1962. The invasion was judged as part of China's global hegemonic 
ambitions (Nguyen Van Sinh, 1979: 18). 
Sino-Vietnamese relations were beset with difficulties from early on, when in 
1956 China seized the eastern part of the Hoang Sa (Paracel) islands from the 
withdrawing French troops before it could be taken over by troops of the Saigon 
administration (Luu Van Loi, 2002: 72). Interestingly, although the DRV and ROV 
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were united in enmity, this dealt a blow to the relations between China and the DRV, 
as the Hoang Sa island group constituted a territorial question independent of the 
nature of the present government(s). Chinese support of the Pol Pot government in 
Cambodia (set up in 1975, toppled by Vietnam in 1979) and the border clashes 
between Cambodia and Vietnam accelerated the fall out between China and 
Vietnam. Simultaneously, China and the US moved to normalise relations in view of 
a potential alliance against the Soviet Union, a development which was regarded 
with suspicion in Vietnam. In May 1978, Jimmy Carter's national security advisor 
Brezinsky visited Beijing, and in December 1978 negotiations continued on the 
normalisation of relations. Vietnam responded to this simultaneous development in 
Beijing's relations to Phnom Penh and Washington with moving closer to the SU. 
Simultaneously, Vietnam tried to improve relations with ASEAN: in June 1978, 
State Minister Vo Dong Giang met ASEAN representatives in New York, Deputy 
Minister Phan Hien paid a visit to ASEAN countries, and in September 1978, Prime 
Minister Pham Van Dong made a tour through ASEAN countries. In response to the 
Vietnamese-Soviet treaty, China stepped up relations with Phnom Penh. From 5 
November 1978, Deng Xiaoping toured ASEAN countries to win their support 
against an assertive Vietnam and the enlargement of Soviet influence. In the course 
of this, he received pen-nission from Thailand for Chinese aircraft to use Thailand's 
airspace en route to Cambodia. From January 1979, Deng Xiaoping visited the US 
and won US approval of action against Vietnam (Luu Van Loi, 2002: 73-75). 
The situation in mid-December 1978 was that the US would approve an attack, 
ASEAN would 'at least not protest', the SU 'would protest but would not let the 
Soviet Navy intervene', and Vietnam would fall into an economic crisis, aggravated 
by the exodus of 200,000 ethnic Chinese and the loss of Chinese aid and specialists. 
The border war with Cambodia in December 1978 made the situation worse and 
produced a sensation of Vietnam 'strangled by two prongs at both ends. ' On 25 
December, Vietnam attacked Cambodia and marched into Cambodian territory, 
along with the Cambodian United Front of National Salvation (UFNS) (Luu Van 
Loi, 2002: 76-78). The UFNS was composed of Cambodian exiles in Vietnam and 
chaired by Hun Sen, who has survived the unlikely task of remaining Cambodia's 
prime minister to the present day. Many of Pol Pot's troops withdrew to the Thai- 
Cambodian border regions, turning Thailand effectively into a front state, which as a 
result had to manage a growing refugee community. This aggravated the traditional 
power competition between Vietnam and Thailand, but helped the rapprochement 
between Bangkok and Beijing to the detriment of Vietnam. 
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To summarise events, the fall out between China and Vietnam in the mid- 
1970s started when concerns grew in Vietnam about Beijing growing closer to 
Washington after 1972 and failing to support Vietnamese unification. The 
development was accelerated in 1977, when Hanoi's relations with Beijing and with 
Phnom Penh swiftly worsened. Eventually, China seemed to have lost patience with 
Vietnam's assertiveness towards an Indochinese Federation and feared Soviet 
encirclement - while Hanoi in turn felt awkward by Cambodia's repeated skirmishes 
along the border with Vietnam and the simultaneous support of China for the Pol Pot 
regime (thus a Chinese encirclement of Vietnam, to which during the heightening of 
tensions Chinese military deployment at the northern border was added). Keeping in 
mind that it is a piece of propaganda, the statement that the 'Peking administration 
used the Pol Pot-leng Sary counterrevolutionary clique as a tool to wage war along 
our country's southern border' in order to carry out its design of 'evil, criminal 
ambitions of big-nation expansionism' nevertheless shows Vietnamese sensitivities 
towards the nature and alliances of the Cambodian government. The quote stems 
from a commentary of the Hanoi home service of 15 February 1979 as quoted by the 
BBC Suniniary of World Broadcasts, 17 February 1979c: FE/6045/A3/7. Having lost 
patience, Beijing decided on a punitive expedition to 'teach Vietnam a lesson. ' The 
war was costly to China and did not result in Vietnam pulling out of Cambodia or 
cancelling its relations with the USSR; if a result can be measured in Vietnam, then 
it is that the war elevated the costs for Vietnam by having to direct financial funds 
towards the troops at the northern border, where China kept a force as well, forcing 
Vietnam to keep its forces alert to fend off continued Chinese provocations. 
Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia sparked a wave of propaganda in the official 
media of both Vietnam and China. Deng's 'punishment expedition', which lasted 
from 17 February 1979 to 18 March 1979, was preceded by repeated warnings on 
both sides. On 16 February, Xinhita (English version) published a despatch by 
China's Foreign'Ministry to Vietnam's embassy in Beijing, saying that between 8 
and 12 February, 'Vietnamese armed personnel encroached upon Chinese border 
areas on nearly 30 occasions in Fangcheng, Ningming, Longzhou, Jingxi and Napo 
Counties of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Funing, Maguan, Malipo, 
and Hckou Counties of Yunnan Province, killing or wounding 34 Chinese 
personnel' through Vietnamese mines and gunfire. 72 On 12 February, two trains 
72 Named here are provinces, counties, districts, cities and towns only; villages and 
hamlets are not mentioned. 
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running from Hekou to Kaiyuan were put under gunfire 'at a point 2.5km away from 
Hekou', and train service had to be terminated (BBC Sununaly of World Broadcasts, 
17 February 1979b: FE/6045/A3/4). On 16 February, Reninin Ribao, quoting 
Xinhua, reported that Vietnamese incursions into the counties of Napo, Jingxi, 
Daxin, Longzhou, Pingxing, Ningming and Fangcheng severely affected agricultural 
production by Vietnamese soldiers, who occupied farmland and killed and seized 
cattle, ultimately forcing commune members to abandon their land. Because of the 
military activities in the border regions, people were forced to leave their home and 
seek shelter in eaves and thatched sheds (Reninin Ribao, 16 February 1979: 4). In 
exactly the same fashion, on 15 February 1979, the Vietnainese News Agency 
(English service) reported Chinese atrocities, accusing the Chinese authorities of 
committing acts of aggression, entering Vietnamese localities, killing army 
personnel and innocent villagers and hindering agricultural production by seizing 
and killing cattle and occupying fan-nland. Incidents were reported in the following 
districts: Cao Loc and Loc Binh in the province of Lang Son; Thong Nong and Bao 
Lac in the province of Cao Bang; Bat Xat and Muong Khuong in the province of 
Hoang Lien Son73 and ambushes along the road from Lao Cai to Muong Khuong 
(BBC Suniniary of World Broadcasts, 17 February 1979a: FE/6045/A3/6). 
When Rennzin Ribao first reported on the war one day after its commencement, 
on 18 February 1979, it featured an article on the then Vice Premier Deng 
Xiaoping's visit to the US earlier in the same year in order to push ftiendly relations 
with Washington, and on the visit to Africa by Vice Premier Li Xiannian, who on 
that occasion 'strengthened the unified frontline for the international fight against 
hegemonism' (Reninin Ribao, English version, 18 February 1979a: 1). Only the 
following article talks about Vietnam, setting it against China-US and China-Africa 
relations and expressing the need 'to rise vigorously' against the encroachments of 
'the Vietnamese reactionaries' and 'aggressors', after having driven the frontier 
guards 'beyond endurance' (Reninin Ribao, 18 February 1979b: 1). 
While Beijing fired accusations of aggression, counter-revolution and 
reactionarism at Hanoi, Hanoi did the same, when, on 17 February 1979, the 
Vietnainese Neivs Agency (English service) published a governmental statement 
73 In the early 1990s, the province of Hoang Lien Son split into the provinces of Lao 
Cai and Yan Bai. Today, Bat Xat and Muong Khuong are both in the province 
of Lao Cai. 
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made public earlier the same day during a press conference of the Foreign Ministry. 
The statement accused Beijing of having 'opposed the whole socialist system and the 
national liberation movement' by invading Vietnam, and having sacrificed peace and 
stability in Southeast Asia for the sake of big-powcr expansionism and hegemonism, 
forcing the country to fight back the armed aggression after continued Chinese 
provocations at the border and extended self-restraint on the side of Vietnam. The 
statement went further to say that Beijing's designs of hegemonism and aggression 
crun counter to the interests of the Chinese people and seriously undermined the 
traditional friendship between the peoples of Vietnam and China' (BBC Sulninary of 
World Broadcasts, 19 February 1979d: FE/6046/A3/2). This was mirrored by 
Xinhua (English service) of 17 February 1979, accusing the 'Hanoi reactionaries' 
(Zhi, 1979: 5) in a 'statement authorized by the Chinese government' not to 
represent the Vietnamese people: 
The Chinese and Vietnamese people, sympathizing with and supporting 
each other in their long revolutionary struggles, have forged a profound 
friendship. Today's grave anned conflict between China and Vietnam is 
wholly the making of Vietnamese authorities acting contrary to the will 
of the Chinese and Vietnamese peoples (BBC Suniniary of World 
Broadcasts, 19 February 1979a: FE/6046/A3/4). 
Furthermore, not only having forced 'hundreds of thousands' of overseas 
Chinese to return home, the Vietnamese authorities caused up to ten million 
Vietnamese 'to wander about destitute abroad' (Zhi, 1979: 5), a reference to the 
Vietnamese refugees who have fled Vietnam since the unification took place without 
China's approval. 
The localities that were reported to be attacked or affected by attacks on 17 
February 1979 were: 
in Vietnam: province of Lai Chau: Phong Tho, Ma Li Pho, Cao Sin Chai and 
west of Highway 12; province of Quang Ninh: town of Mong Cai and district 
of Binh Lieu; province of Lang Son: Ban Chat in Dinh Lap district, Loc Binh 
district, Ba San in Cao, Loc district, Dong Dang in Van Lang district and 
district of Trang Dinh; province of Hoang Lien Son: towns of Muong 
Khuong and Lao Cai and the district of Bat Xat; province of Cao Bang: 
Quang Hoa, Ha Quang, Trung Khanh and Tra Linh. Later in February, the 
actual district and some provincial capitals, such as Lang Son, Cao Bang, 
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Lao Cai, Cam Duong were seriously damaged (BBC Suniniary of World 
Broadcasts, 19 February 1979b: FE/6046/A3/1; BBC Sinninary of World 
Broadcasts, 19 February 1979d, FE/6046/A3/2; Luu Van Loi, 2002: 78-79); 
in China: the areas of Longzhou and Jingxi in the province of Guangxi, and 
Hekou and Jinping in the province of Yunnan (Reninin Ribao, 18 February 
1979b: 1). 
Incidents were also reported in the Gulf of Tongkin, for instance, on 17 
February 1979, by Xhilitta (English service) between Chinese fishermen and 
Vietnamese naval forces (BBC Sionniary of World Broadcasts, 19 February 
1979c: FE/6046/A3/8). 
After the attacks had stopped, negotiations were agreed upon and started in 
Hanoi on 18 April 1979 on the deputy foreign minister level. A second round was 
held in Beijing on 8 June 1979 (Luu Van Loi, 2002: 81). The second round was 
deadlocked and a third round was cancelled due to the impossibility to find common 
ground. Many of the issues discussed back then are still the same issues which 
divide China and Vietnam today: Vietnam put forward a three-point proposal to end 
hostilities, demilitarise the border region, restore normal communications and 
transport, regulate territorial conflicts based on the land border and the demarcation 
of the Gulf of Tongkin agreed upon between France and China in 1887 and 1895. 
Against the Vietnamese proposal, China put an eight-point proposal: recognition of 
Hoang Sa (Paracels, Chinese: Xisha Qundao) and Truong Sa (Spratlys, Chinese: 
Nansha Qundao) as Chinese territory; withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Truong 
Sa; return of members of the Chinese minority to Vietnam; no hegemonic ambitions 
in Indochina; repatriation of foreign troops; change of Vietnam's policy towards 
Laos and Cambodia and settlement of the Cambodia question; also Vietnam should 
not join military alliances or allow foreign countries to use its military bases and vice 
versa (Luu Van Loi, 2002: 81-82). According to Nguyen Manh Hung, after the 
border war, China did not withdraw completely, but retained stretches of land 
between 200 and 3000 metres deep within Vietnamese territory. These stretches 
were subject to controversy during the negotiations on the demarcation of the land 
border and the Gulf of Tongkin (Nguyen Manh Hung, 2002) after relations were 
normalised in November 1991. 
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5.1.2.3. The end of ideological competition and the end of isolation 
The land and maritime borders continued to be an insecure place throughout 
the 1980s until Vietnam announced that it would withdraw its troops from 
Cambodia. The announcement came in 1985. The initial date for the withdrawal was 
1990, later changed to 30 August 1989. A late border incident was reported on 31 
December 1988 by Hongkong's Zhongguo Tongmin She in the areas of Ningming, 
Longzhou, Pingxiang, Fangcheng and Jingxi of Guangxi (BBC Suninzary of World 
Broadcasts, 4 January 1989: FE/0349/A3/4). Finally, on 6 January 1989, Vietnam's 
foreign minister announced Vietnam would completely withdraw its troops from 
Cambodia by September 1989. The 1985 announcement came in timely coordination 
with events in the USSR: Gorbachev assumed office in March 1985, and, as 
mentioned in Chapter Two, he held his speech in Vladivostok in July 1986, in which 
he initiated rapprochement with China. Behind Gorbachev's strategy was to seek 
rapprochement with China as part of a new peaceful foreign policy layout - in the 
wake of which the Cambodia conflict would have to be resolved - and to end the 
two-fold burden of Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia: firstly, the economic burden 
through rising costs of Vietnam's military presence in Cambodia; secondly, the 
political burden, which arose from the wide international rejection of Vietnam's 
presence in Cambodia (Opitz, 1991: 157-159; Liese, 1996: 70). Sino-Soviet 
consultations on Cambodia started in October 1986. In March and August 1988, 
further consultations were held. Deng Xiaoping's linking of a solution of the 
Cambodian problem to Gorbachev's request for a summit meeting, and Beijing's 
moving away from its demand of a complete withdrawal before a political solution 
was to be found, helped the negotiations (Opitz, 1991: 160). The summit eventually 
took place in May 1989, coinciding with the student-led demonstrations on 
Tiananmen square in Beijing between 15 April 1989 and 4 June 1989. 
The changes in Soviet policy forced Vietnam into economic and foreign policy 
reforms, because the changes not only constituted fundamental changes in regional 
power relations, but also changes in the global Cold War structure. Economically, 
Vietnam lost Soviet spending on Vietnam's occupation in Cambodia. Strategically, 
it lost the anti-China coalition. Furthermore, the loss of Soviet supply for the 
domestic economy as well as the breakdown of the COMECON made it necessary to 
work on a new economic development programme of a diversification of financial 
and economic sources, and in the wake of this on a new foreign policy programme in 
order to sustain the economic policy, with the aim to find a multilateral framework 
for an independent development of the economy and foreign policy. Vietnam's 
return to the international community since the end of the 1980s signalled a 'turning 
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back of the clock to 1976-77 when Vietnam-Southeast Asia relations were at an all 
time high' (Thayer, 1999: 4). 
Doi inoi, renovation, was initiated on the 6 th Party Congress in December 1986. 
In 1987, the politburo adopted Resolution No 2 to initiate a 'strategic readjustment 
in Vietnam's security policy': withdrawal from Cambodia and Laos and reduction of 
the standing army (Thayer, 1999: 2). To sustain doi inoi, a multi-directional foreign 
policy was adopted in the politburo resolution No 13 of May 1988. This policy was 
changed on the 7h Party Congress in June 1991 to a policy of 'making friends with 
all countries. ' The congress adopted a policy of diversifying and multilateralising 
foreign economic relations (da phtiong hoa va da dang hoa quan he kinh te doi 
ngoai) with all countries and economic organisations. Initiated two years after doi 
nzoi had been put in place, the new foreign policy resulted in a rapid expansion of 
foreign economic relations. This development can be regarded as a result of the 
maintained diplomatic and economic offensive for economic and political 
engagement in the region and beyond since the late 1980s: with regard to China, 
these efforts meant that virtually 'constant travel by Vietnamese party, state, 
technical, trade, military, and friendship delegations to Beijing and southern China 
went on [ ... ], and Chinese agencies organized return visits' (Sidel, 1998: 88). 74 
The new foreign policy is certainly not easily practiced: in 1999, the visit of 
the then US Secretary of Defence William Cohen was twice cancelled (scheduled for 
January and for 30 September), whereas Madeleine Albright, then Secretary of State, 
was admitted to a visit on 6 September. On 25 July 1999, Hanoi and Washington 
reached an agreement in principle on trade exchange (Chanda, 1999: 24-25), which 
was fon-nalised on 13 July 2000, a few months before the Clinton visit on 16-19 
November 2000. Saich mentions that one reason for Vietnam to sign the trade 
agreement with the United States on 13 July 2000 was a concern over a trade 
agreement between the United States and China: Vietnam along with Indonesia and 
Thailand 'are more likely to run into competition with China through their own 
production of textiles, light manufacturing and basic consumer goods' (Saich, 2004: 
319). Still in 1999, party Secretary-General Le Kha Phieu's March visit to China was 
one of the high-level visits exchanged between China and Vietnam that year. This 
shows 'fundamental policy dilemmas besetting Hanoi', shifting between 
74 For a list of bilateral visits see the table in the Appendix. 
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rapprochement with industrialised countries to improve national security including 
military ties and securing FDI for the economic reforms - and at the same time 
keeping China friendly and protecting one-party rule. Hence it seems that the 
symbolism of US state visits to Vietnam is not to outshine the symbolism of 
Vietnam-China state visits, in particular since Beijing's relations with Washington 
experienced a significant downturn after the NATO bombing of the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade on 7 May 1999 and US support for Taiwan. Having watched 
the events in Kosovo, 'military analysts have warned against Kosovo-like U. S. 
intervention in southern Vietnam. ' The shifting between China and the US is also a 
mirror of divergent views among the leadership between those in the military and 
security administration, who point to China as the last remaining socialist friend, and 
the Foreign Ministry and many academics, who argue that China could pose a 
significant threat regarding its military build-up. While conservatives in China and 
Vietnam worry about the menace of peaceful evolution, they are joined by the 
managers of the state-owned enterprises, who fear expanding marketisation and 
greater foreign competition (Chanda, 1999: 24-25). It was also their group along 
with political conservatives, who opposed the trade deal with the United States. 
Combined with Beijing's advice to delay the signature under the agreement (and 
with the China-leaning Le Kha Phieu) in power, Vietnam did not sign before Beijing 
had signed a similar trade agreement with Washington in November 1999 (Chanda, 
2000: 32; Nguyen Manh Hung, 2002). Peaceful evolution is a phenomenon of 
multiple dimensions: it influences foreign policy making in that the socialist political 
system provides common bonds between China and Vietnam, but it also reflects the 
conflict between the opening of the economic sector and increasing foreign contacts 
to secure a stable economic development, and the aim to maintain one-party rule. 
The rule of the communist party, however, can only be maintained if it delivers a 
continued economic development to avoid growing social unrest, which eventually 
may threaten its rule (Gu, 2004: 11; Nguyen Manh Hung, 2002). 
The conservative approach of the security branch as opposed to an often more 
practical outward-oriented foreign policy elite was already acknowledged in a report 
in April 1982 by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress for 
the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations regarding purges in the Vietnamese 
Communist Party during the split with China in the second half of the 1970s. The 
purges, designed to oust individuals critical of the pro-Soviet and anti-China policy 
of the leadership under Le Duan, pursued a new recruiting of younger members, 
often from the military. This resulted in a strengthened role of the military in the 
party, supposed to consolidate Le Duan's power and to support the effort to 
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consolidate Vietnam's control over Cambodia after 1979 and to promote the alliance 
with the Soviet Union: 
the military bloc can be expected to support current policies and perhaps 
press for intensification of measures to achieve policy objectives. The 
military seems likely to advocate a close association with the Soviet 
Union because of its strong ties with the Soviet armed forces and its 
reliance on sophisticated Soviet arms. It undoubtedly would favor a 
permanent SRV military presence in Laos and Kampuchea and the 
maintenance of powerful conventional military forces. 
Interestingly, a ten-nination of Soviet aid was perceived as a means to change 
the direction of Vietnamese foreign policy (Congressional Research Service, Library 
of Congress, 1982: 7-9). 
Consequently, Vietnam's post-Cold War China perception appears Janus- 
faced: the socialist political system provides a bond at a time of international and 
domestic communist decline ('comrades plus brothers') and the common concern to 
fend off the threat of 'peaceful evolution. ' China is also a model for economic and 
political reform. China and Vietnam pursue close cooperation in both of these fields. 
Four conferences have been held jointly by the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) 
and the CCP in the field of ideological cooperation in Beijing (June 2000, June 2002 
and 2004) and Hanoi (November 2000 and February 2004). The conferences dealt 
with the problems of how to combine socialism and market economy, and how to 
secure party rule in times of economic opening (Gu, 2004: 3). Furthennore 
comparative studies of the Chinese and Vietnamese reform experiences have been 
published in recent years (Gu, 2004: 3). It is in this context that a rare positive 
statement in my interviews with senior Vietnamese scholars and goverrimental 
advisors in Hanoi in summer 2004 was made, namely that 'many countries think that 
the economic strength of China is a problem for smaller less developed countries, 
but that's not the case. They can benefit and follow in the wake of China. ' Added to 
this, however, is a legacy of mistrust stemming from historical experience of 
Chinese domination, current hostilities and unresolved border disputes. The omni- 
directional foreign policy was designed to meet this challenge and to cope with 
China's highly flexible foreign policy (Will, 1999: 307). 
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Vietnam's manoeuvring in foreign policy between China and the US could 
also be seen in the debates over the fature of Cam Ranh Bay, a military base 
constructed by the United States in 1965 and used by the USSR from the late 1970s 
for Moscow's projection of military influence in the South China Sea: the US, 
Russia, and China expressed interest in taking over the naval base and the adjoining 
air force base from Russia in 2004, either for military or commercial purposes. 
While Vietnam and the United States have discussed the possibility of handing the 
base over to Washington, Hanoi is anxious not to alienate China. At the same time, 
while conservative leaders 'want to avoid any entanglement with the United States', 
they want the US 'to be active in the region as a stabilizing power. ' Simultaneously, 
'reflecting the normalization between Beijing and Hanoi', a Chinese naval 
delegation visited Vietnam's Military Regions Five and Seven in November 2000: 
the 'particularly sensitive' Region Seven includes Cam Ranh Bay and the Spratly 
Islands (Chanda, 2000/2001: 21-23). On I July 2002, the Russian navy left the base, 
two years before the expiration of the lease, and the Russian defence minister 
affinned that a Russian military presence in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean 
would be henceforth an unrealistic idea (Nguyen Manh Hung, 2002). Relations 
between Russia and Vietnam have seen an upturn since the presidency of Vladimir 
Putin (including expansion of trade relations - building of oil refineries etc. -, a 
military cooperation agreement of 2 July 2000, an agreement of September 2000 
settling Vietnam's debts, and the elevation of relations to a 'strategic partnership' in 
February 2001, when Putin became the first high-ranking Russian leader to visit 
Vietnam). The inability of Russia to project military power to Southeast Asia and a 
low level of trade however make it unlikely that Russia can help Vietnam to balance 
China (Nguyen Manh Hung, 2002). Eventually, on 19 May 2004, Vietnam Airlines 
took over the base for commercial flights as a replacement for Nha Trang, which had 
become too small to serve the increasing demand for domestic flights and the bigger 
planes that are increasingly in use. Daily flights now connect Cam Ranh with Hanoi, 
Ho Chi Minh City and Da Nang (Viet Nain Neivs, 20 May 2004b: 15). 
Important symbols in the bilateral realtions between Vietnam and the United 
States are annual visits by US navy ships to Vietnam. The first of these ships was the 
navy frigate USS Vandegrift sailing up the Saigon river from Vung Tau and docking 
at Saigon Port on 19-22 November 2003. The ship was greeted by a low-key 
delegation led by Assistant Foreign Minister Nguyen Due Hung (Reuters, 14 
November 2003a; Christina Toh-Pantin for Reuters, 19 and 20 November 2003). In 
July 2004, a second US naval ship arrived in Vietnam, and a third one, the USS 
Gary, arrived in Ho Chi Minh City on 29 March 2005 to mark the I 01h anniversary of 
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diplomatic relations between Vietnam and the USA. The naval ship visits are 
expected to happen annually. 
In June 2005, Vietnam's Prime Minister Phan Van Khai visited the United 
States. It was the first visit by a Vietnamese prime minister since the end of the 
Vietnam War. When asked what he expected from the United States, Khai 
mentioned help for the victims of Agent Orange as 5 th item on a list, whereas a long- 
term cooperation with the United States, economic cooperation and military 
collaboration came first. During his six-day visit, he met US President George W. 
Bush and Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on 21 June 2005. Apart from these 
high-level visits, Khai's agenda also contained an agreement with Bill Gates on 
computer technology and a visit to Harvard. The visit could turn the tide in Vietnam- 
US relations in Vietnam's favour, especially as regards Washington's search for 
strategic partners in the region in order to counter China's growing influence. On the 
economic side, trade rose from US$ 451 million in 1995 - the year relations were 
normalised - to US$ 6.4 billion in 2004. During the visit, Bush supported Vietnam's 
application for WTO membership. On the military side, while concerns about 
religious persecution and human rights continued to be raised in the US Congress, 
military cooperation was intensified under an agreement with Donald Rumsfeld. The 
agreement stipulates that Vietnamese officers 'will attend senior defence colleges 
[ ... ] for training' along with plans for meetings of defence officials in order to 
cooperate on security. The plans seem to be targeted at China. In the light of a 
growing military budget in China, good relations with a ... significant and capable" 
armed force on China's border could be useful' for US plans to deter China in the 
future (Perras, 2005: 4; The Ecoiioynist, 25 June 2005: 60). 
Difficulties, however, remain. Concerning international terrorism, the Iraq 
conflict (the war officially lasted from 20 March 2003-1 May 2003) and Agent 
Orange, Vietnam's prime minister, in an interview with Der Spiegel, referred to the 
importance of international organisations in handling the issues: 'We believe that the 
UN Charter and international law provide the suitable frame to settle disputes 
between sovereign nations. [ ... ) We do not agree with those who use the war against 
international terrorism for their own advantage or as a pretext to interfere in the 
internal affairs of other states' (Ihlau and Kremb, 2002: 137-138). This position is 
identical to China's position. Differences lie in the fact that as opposed to Vietnam 
China could take advantage from the fight against Islamic terrorism by declaring 
crackdowns in the unruly Muslim province of Xinjiang as part of the 'war on 
terrorism', and that Vietnam looked to China to see how Beijing would react to a 
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situation, which the Vietnamese government has not been very knowledgeable about 
(Raszelenberg, 2002). In addition to the UN charter, the 2001 ASEAN Declaration 
oil Joint Action to Counter Terrorisin of 5 November 2001 (ASEAN, 2001), the 
ASEAN-United States of Ainerica Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Conibat 
International Terrorisin of I August 2002 (ASEAN, 2002a), and the Declaration oil 
Terrorisin b the 8 th ASEAN Sunnnit (ASEAN, 2002b), adopted in Phnom Penh on 3 y 
November 2002, provide the framework for working against international terrorism 
within which Vietnam acts. On the Agent Orange issue, a sensitive political issue on 
both sides, Khai said: 
We do not use the word compensation here. But the US should feel a 
moral and humanitarian obligation to help Vietnam cope with the long- 
term effects of the war. The long-terrn effects of Agent Orange form an 
extraordinary burden for Vietnam for the next generations to come. 
However, in order not to put the relations between our countries at risk, 
we have brought this problem forward in a manner that can be accepted 
by both sides (Ihlau and Kremb, 2002: 138). 
Thus, the downfall of communist ideology from the mid- I 980s onwards forced 
Vietnam to leave alliance-building behind and to embark on an onmi-directional 
foreign policy in order to 1) make up for the loss of capital and goods supplied by 
the Soviet camp and 2) escape the now virtually complete political and economic 
isolation. The 'driving force behind Vietnam's foreign policy [ ... ] has been to open 
the economy and attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and the normalization of 
relations has been seen as a major ingredient for success' (Goodman, 1996: 594 
cited Gates, 1995). The worldwide breakdown of socialism 'was a great disruption 
in the sources of capital, materials, and markets [ ... ] forcing Vietnam to take more 
resolute and daring steps toward renovation in search of ways to join the regional 
and world economy' (Goodman, 1996: 594-595 cited Tuan Anh, 1994: 193). 
Economic growth, in turn, is seen as a way to provide Vietnam with national 
security, since Vietnam is regarded as living 'in a region surrounded by tigers and a 
dragon; the continued backwardness of the country is the biggest security threat to 
the nation' (Goodman, 1996: 596). In other words: a poor country is not a strong 
country (Hoang Anh Tuan, 1994). Or, as former Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen 
Manh Cam put it: 'Vietnam's external policy must be carried out "in close 
association with economic development and national and defense consolidation"' 
(Nguyen Manh Hung, 2002). 
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Accordingly, the new economic and foreign policies have materialised not only in 
Vietnam's engagement in regional organisations, but also in a multitude of 
subregional cooperation schemes in the Mekong basin. In the wake of the changes in 
the global and regional strategic settings, the Mekong Committee, which had been in 
a dormant state since it had turned into an Interim Committee, received new 
attention in the wake of Vietnam's foreign policy reorientation. Major steps taken on 
this way were the non-nalisation of diplomatic relations with China in 1991, the 
normalisation. of diplomatic relations with the United States during the Clinton 
presidency in 1995, the joining of ASEAN in 1995, of AFTA in 1996 and the 
admission to APEC in 1997 - the earlier application received concerted ASEAN 
support (Womack, 1997: 80). The bilateral trade agreement with the United States, 
signed on 13 July 2000 and passed by the US Senate on 3 October 2001, marked 'an 
important step toward WTO accession' (International Monetary Fund, January 2002: 
38). In 2003, the US emerged as Vietnam's biggest export market. 
WTO membership in the view of Vietnam's leadership is the last in a series of 
steps towards world wide recognition. ASEAN and AFTA are viewed by 
Vietnamese scholars and politicians as stepping stones for a future Vietnamese 
success in global economic competition (Le Quoc-Phuong, 2003; Bussey, Vatikiotis, 
Chua and Cohen, 2003: 16). Haacke (2003: 69) argues similarly that ASEAN is a 
stepping'stone towards APEC. And taking into account the connection between 
economic growth and national security, that could suggest that the GMS, too, is a 
stepping stone towards full national security. A document published by the 
government's National Centre for Scientific and Technological Information and 
Documentation in 1998 viewed admission to APEC as culmination of a series of 
integrative successes in that 'APEC will strengthen its [Vietnam's] economic 
position in the region and the world as well' (Vietnam Information for Science and 
Technology Advance, 1998). 
The document conveys direct strategic importance to the GMS for the 
attaim-nent of Vietnam's foreign policy goals by linking Vietnam's concern about the 
build up of the domestic economy and the maintenance of economic growth with the 
integration of the economy in regional economic cooperation schemes. The aim of 
this is to attract investment from a diversity of sources as opposed to the times of 
alliance-building, throughout which Vietnam relied on a particular group of 
countries depending on Hanoi's ideological orientation. This issue goes hand in hand 
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with the establishment of performance legitimacy in times of post-socialist policies, 
that is, the justification of the rule of the communist party rests on its ability to 
provide stable economic growth and ensure the attainment and maintenance of 
human security, of which the eradication of poverty as potentially destabilising 
societal force is one of the most serious challenges. By linking poverty reduction to 
economic growth, the problem becomes internationalised in the sense that its 
achievement depends to some extent on the steady flow of foreign investment. 
Therefore, Vietnam's economic integration in the region is an indispensable tool to 
attain both foreign and domestic policy goals, thereby transnationalising domestic 
policy and in the process linking it to foreign policy. The discussion will be 
deepened in the course of this and the following chapter. 
The following table summarises the major events in the history of the Mekong 
basin. I 
Table 5: Geopolitics and Mekong Basin Development 
Year Geopolitics Mekong Basin Development 
1953 Independence of Laos and 
Cambodia 
1954 Fall of Dien Bien Phu, 
independence of Vietnam 
1956 Partition of Vietnam 
1957 Formation of the Mekong 
Committee (MC) 
1964 Tongkin Incident 
1965 US commit ground troops in 
Vietnam. Johnson's speech at 
Johns Hopkins University 
1967 ASEAN established 
1970 End of Cambodia's neutrality Indicative Basin Plan 
1971 Nam Ngum Dam completed 
1973 US withdrawal from Vietnam 
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1975 Communist regimes take power in Cambodia withdraws from the MC 
Cambodia, Laos and South 
Vietnam 
1977 Laos, Thailand and Vietnam adopt 
now statute as basis for the Interim 
Mekong Committee 
1978 Vietnam despatches troops to Interim Mekong Committee 
Cambodia established with Laos, Thailand 
and Vietnam 
1979 Khmer Rouge toppled, border war 
between Vietnam and China 
1986 Vietnam commences doi moi 
1987 Revised Indicative Basin Plan 
1988 Thailand's 'battle field to market 
place' call. Change of regime in 
Myanmar. Border conflict between 
Vietnam and Thailand. Vietnam 
adopts multi-directional foreign 
policy 
1991 Paris Peace Accord on Cambodia Cambodiajoins Interim Mekong 
Committee 
1992 UNTAC peacekeepers send to ADB commences GMS initiative 
Cambodia 
1993 Elections in Cambodia, end of 
China's support for the Khmer 
Rouge 
1995 Vietnam joins ASEAN Mekong River Commission 
(MRC) established 
1996 Revised work plan for the MRC. 
First dialogue session held 
between the MRC and China and 
Myanmar 
1997 Laos and Myanmarjoin ASEAN 
Source: The table structure is taken from Mya Than and George Abonyi, 2001: 131. Content from 
Mya Than and George Abonyi, 2001: 131-132 and own additions. 
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5.2. Institutional arrangements in the Mekong area 
5.2.1. The Mekong River Commission 
The Mekong Committee managed to survive the Cold War cataclysms and was 
'revived' after the solution of the Cambodian conflict in October 1991. Although 
hostilities quickly came up through Thailand's plan to dam the river upstream, on 5 
February 1993 a joint communiqu6 was signed between the four riparian states for 
continued cooperation over the Mekong and to establish a Mekong Working Group 
in order to draw up a framework agreement for future utilisation of the Mekong's 
waters. The resulting agreement, the Agreenient on the Cooperation for the 
Sustainable Developinent of the Mekong River Basin, was concluded in Thailand in 
April 1995 and inaugurated today's Mekong River Commission to replace the 
Interim Committee. A key role in promoting the cooperative endeavour has been 
played by the United Nations Development Programme. 
The institutional build-up reflects the highly organised structure of the Mekong 
Committee. In terms of institutionalisation, the MRC of 1995 has not even retained a 
minimum of the diversified organisation. Also, in tenns of scope, the MRC clearly 
does not reflect the large work programme of the Mekong Committee. As opposed 
to the former Mekong Committee and its successors, the MRC is not concerned with 
major economic development projects, but rather with environmental monitoring 
and a sustainable use of the Mekong's waters. This can be seen, for instance, in the 
notion of Mya Than and George Abonyi, that the Nam Ngum Dam in Laos 'is the 
only significant hydroelectric project of the MRC today' (Mya Than and George 
Abonyi, 2001: 132). Especially hydropower development meets considerable 
cautiousness on the side of the MRC as opposed to the actual member states, who in 
general see hydropower as a promising development strategy. The MRC 
Hydropoiver Developnient Strategy of 2001 takes a relatively wary approach to 
hydropower, distancing itself explicitly from the strong emphasis on hydropower of 
the predecessor institutions (Mekong River Commission, MRC Water Resources 
and Hydrology Programme, 2001: passim). Although from an organisational and 
historical point of view, the MRC is the successor of the Mekong Committee, the 
economic agenda of the Mekong Committee changed to one of environmental 
sensibility. It could thus be argued that regarding the agenda, the real successor of 
the Mekong Committee is not the MRC but the GMS. 
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As regards cooperation with China and Myanmar, the Mekong Secretariat 
acknowledged the need to coordinate downstream activities with upstream 
development. The secretariat 'initiated' contacts with Myanmar and China, 'initially 
to improve the exchange of technical data and information' (Mekong Secretariat, 
1992: xi). A Strategy Study on the Developnient of Upper Mekong Navigation 
(Basinivide), W. P. code: 1.1.09/92, MKG/R. 91049 (to be found in Mekong 
Secretariat, 1992: 4) had already investigated the possibility of navigation on the 
Mekong from Jinghong to Luang Prabang in order to avoid bottlenecks for the 
growing economies of China, Vietnam and Laos. The same argument is brought up 
in the strategy study Role of Southern Lao Transport Corridor in the Mekong 
Regional Cooperation (Basinivide), W. P. code: 1.1.14/93, MKG/R. 92046 (to be 
found in Mekong Secretariat, 1992: 7). 75 At last, in 1995, an agreement was reached 
for a dialogue mechanism of Myanmar and China with the newly established MRC. 
The first dialogue session was held in July 1996 in Bangkok (Mya Than and George 
Abonyi, 2001: 132). On 26 August 2004, on the event of the 9h Dialogue Meeting 
held in Vientiane, the Mekong River Commission announced it would increase 
cooperation with China and Myanmar. Since the April 2002 technical cooperation 
agreement between the MRC and China, implemented in 2003, China has been 
sending 24-hourly water level and 12-hourly rainfall data to the MRC to help in 
forecasting floods. On China's side of the river, a result of the cooperation was the 
establishment of a Data Centre at the Provincial Bureau of Hydrology and Water 
Resources in Kunming, and the improvement of the two hydrological stations in 
Yunnan. In addition, Myanmar has signalled its willingness to share hydrological 
data from its own station on the Mekong (Mekong River Commission, 2004). 
This development is an indicator of China's changed attitudes towards 
cooperation with Southeast Asian countries since the end of the Cold War. Part of 
this strategy of pursuing amicable relations with Southeast Asia, according to a 
Vietnamese governmental advisor interviewed by the author in June 2004, is done 
with the aim to build a buffer zone vis-A-vis Japan and the United States in order to 
develop its domestic economy and ensure domestic stability, and to win support for 
its Taiwan policy of reunification by either peaceful or forceful means. In the same 
interview, the interviewee remarked that if China wants development, it has to take 
into account other countries' interests. One result of that is that before the 
75 For the work programme and an explanation of the code see Appendix. 
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premiership of Wen Jiabao, Vietnam had to pay for meteorological data for the Red 
River, which flows from China to Vietnam. Now it doesn't have to pay anymore to 
get those data. So if China wants to succeed in its power struggle vis-A-vis the 
United States and to win the support of its neighbours for its domestic and foreign 
policy goals, Beijing has to cultivate relations with its neighbours. Importantly, also, 
since the end of the Cold War, the different opinions of the various Mekong 
countries have started to converge in the sense that there should be a plan for 
sustainable continuous development as opposed to the interruptions during the Cold 
War era. This is a clear statement for regime-building prospects, namely that 
expectations of actors willing to cooperate and to abide by cooperation once agreed, 
start to converge. We also clearly see in this statement the blurred lines between 
foreign and domestic policy, namely that demands of domestic development may 
inform foreign policy decisions. The interviewee's remark of how domestic and 
foreign goals are intertwined indicates the strategic dimension of cooperation in 
transboundary river basins (here: the Red River and the Mekong), of the subregional 
countries and subregional institutions for China's foreign policy. The study will later 
elaborate on this point in detail. 
5.2.2. The Greater Mekong Subregion 
Three years prior to the foundation of the MRC, all of the Mekong countries 
fonned another subregional cooperation scheme: the economically oriented Greater 
Mekong Subregion. The GMS was established in October 1992 on the initiative of 
the ADB. The ADB has the central role in the GMS's negotiation processes. As 
mentioned earlier, Tongzon's remark of the importance of a catalyst, such as a 
multilateral institution (Tongzon, 2002: 91), now comes into reality. According to 
the ADB's charter, a crucial function is 'to utilize the resources at its disposal for 
financing development of the developing member countries in the region, giving 
priority to those regional, sub-regional as well as national projects and programmes 
which will contribute most effectively to the harmonious growth of the region as a 
whole' (ADB, 1966: article 2). 
5.2.2.1. The nature of the GMS 
The GMS is one of the so-called 'growth areas', which emerged in Northeast 
and Southeast Asia after the Cold War. The emergence of growth areas showed the 
opportunity of returning to prc-Cold War patterns of trade. In this . sense, the 
rationale for subrcgional cooperation was to govern the natural increase in trade 
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between neighbouring countries after the Cold War. For the GMS, the ADB 
facilitates the 'natural process of integration within the subregion as countries rise 
above subsistence levels and begin to benefit form rapid growth and success in 
trade' (ADB, February 1993: 4-5). But willingness to move from a resumption of 
trade patterns to the forination of institutions also showed the necessity of some 
countries to find other sources of economic and political authority. In this sense, 
looking at Vietnam, the GMS is not only a new chance for Vietnam, but also an 
essential and even vital part of Vietnam's new economic, political and security 
outlook, after supply from the Soviet Union had collapsed and the East-West as well 
as the East-East schism had been overcome. Subregional cooperation in the GMS 
offers Vietnam the chance to even out political and economic differences with its 
immediate neighbour countries, especially China, and to make up for the loss of 
Soviet strategic and material support by integrating its economy into the subregion 
and becoming politically more reliable and economically more attractive. 
As shown in Chapter Two, of the characteristics attributed to subregions, 
different sets of characteristics apply to different regions. Regarding the Greater 
Mekong Subregion, the six Mekong countries share borders and resources, and they 
are connected through the Mekong, hence they form a natural economic area (ADB, 
February 1993: 7). The result is that the 'main objective is to jointly develop natural 
resources and infrastructure by exploiting geopolitical interest and geographical 
proximity' (Mya Than and George Abonyi, 2001: 128). The ADB's 1993 report 
(ADB, 1993), which contains the proceedings of the first GMS ministerial 
conference, identifies common interests with reference to the Mekong, pertaining to 
agriculture, fishing, energy production, forestry and transportation. With the 
exception of Thailand, the countries are in a stage of economic liberalisation and are 
turning from inward-looking to outward-oriented trade policies. The subregion is 
resource-rich and has a competitive advantage in labour-intensive industries. It is 
thus complementary to the faster growing economies in Northeast and Southeast 
Asia. Intra-regional trade is developing fast, a good amount of which is, however, 
unofficial cross-border trade equalling or exceeding official trade. A poor state of 
infrastructure as well as the land-locked character of Laos and Yunnan form 
common interests to overcome this situation. Coordinated efforts to synchronise 
development efforts in the subregion could attract private investors to the subregion 
to finance the development endeavour. Cultural commonalities of ethnicity and 
language along shared borders (such as between parts of Thailand and Yunnan) can 
facilitate the growing together of the subregion (ADB, February 1993: 8-10). 
Interestingly, in the seven-page long account, the environment receives 6V2 lines of 
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attention. The problem makes its first appearance well hidden at the end of a list of 
issues to be tackled in the GMS, saying that deforestation and drought have to be 
prevented in the development of forestry and hydropower sectors of the GMS 
programme (ADB, February 1993: 6-7); at least, the environmental problem is 
acknowledged as a transnational issue that 'cannot be resolved on a country-by- 
country basis' (p. 7). Environmental concerns then re-appear as simple afterthought 
to the development of the Mekong as key source of energy, forestry, fishing, 
agriculture and transportation development (ADB, February 1993: 8-9). Although 
the environment has received more attention in the course of events - adoption of a 
new environment policy by the ADB in November 2002, formation of a working 
group on the environment and launch of the GMS Biodiversity Conservation 
Corridors Initiative on 17 February 2005 (see the project and documents on the 
ADB web site at http: //Nv-vvNv. adb. orv, /Proiects/GMS-biodiversitý/deLa It )- q! Lasp 
pronouncements to tackle environmental degradation seem to be little more than a 
sop thrown to Western observers, the more so since the environmental problems 
associated with economic development are clear to policy-makers in the region, but 
are sidelined in favour of an unrestrained development of the economy (mining, 
hydropower etc. ). This indicates the predominance of the national interests in the 
form of uninhibited economic development, thereby restricting cross-border 
cooperation and multi-level governance (most importantly cooperation of state 
agencies with affected river communities and NGOs active in these fields) to a 
minimum within a policy framework set and controlled by central governments. This 
is despite the expansion of the GMS to nine sectors of cooperation (see below), 
including non-traditional security issues of transnational nature, such as drug 
trafficking and spread of diseases (HIV/AIDS etc. ) (Stanway, 2005; Dore, 2003). 
As is characteristic for Southeast Asian cooperation designs, the GMS follows 
a simple structure. The annual high-level meeting functions as apex body. Various 
subregional coordinating committees, working groups and fora in the nine 
cooperation areas (for the areas see below) form the substructure. Funding bodies 
consist of international organisations such as the ADB, the World Bank as well as 
the private sector and other governmental and non-govemmental sources. Among 
them are the Mekong Fund, the Mekong Development Bank, Thailand's Indochina 
Fund and the Mekong Development Research Network initiated by the International 
Development and Research Centre (IDRC). The ADB's main task is the 
coordination between governments and the private sector, and the running of the 
GMS Business Forum (GMS-BF), a body inaugurated to provide a platforin for 
private business interests and investment opportunities in the subregion. GMS-BF 
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has published economic data and related laws and regulations for each of the 
member countries, providing access to relevant economic information. Among the 
organisations populating the GMS are relief organisations such as the United 
Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking in the Greater Mekong Sub- 
region76; UNAIDS, the United Nations Development Programme, the United 
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, and the United 
Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) are working for a greater awareness of 
the spread of HIV/AIDS; educational organisations, such as the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), which pursues 
projects for distance education and in particular endeavours to establish a GMS 
Virtual University focussed on tourism, Mekong studies and infon-nation technology; 
economic institutions such as the first GMS Trade Fair from 4-7 March 2004 in 
Hanoi, organised by the GMS Business Forum and supported by the national 
chambers of commerce as well as UNESCAP (which is, incidentally, also involved 
in the Mekong River Commission - an organisation wary of economic power at the 
expense of natural resources). This diversity of concerns, with which the GMS is 
concerned, and the involvement of transnational organisations are expressions of the 
already discussed phenomenon of the new regionalism and the transnational issues, 
with which national governments have come to concern themselves in the process of 
a localisation of foreign policy as described by Hocking (1993). 
5.2.2.2. Institutional set-up and the transnational dimension 
Regarding the process of institution-building, the GMS countries have adopted 
a four-phased approach: 
Phase 1: Confidence-building (1991-1994): establish operational principles, 
sectors of cooperation, and broad institutional mechanisms, a roundtable 
conference to discuss results of phase I and to plan phase 2. The process 
started with initial consultations in November and December 1991 between 
the ADB and the six countries involved, followed by a two-phase Technical 
Assistance of the ADB (first phase June 1992-February 1993, second phase 
approved by the ADB's Board of Directors on 10 June 1993 for 13 months) 
covering bilateral consultations between ADB and governments, constitution 
of a Bank Study Team to prepare a framework report through bilateral 
consultations held July-Scptember 1992 (first phase) and June-August 1993 
76 The Inter-Agency Project can be found at wmv. no-trafficking. org. 
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(second phase), a round table conference in October 1992 (first phase), 
August 1993 and April 1994 (second phase). These activities show well the 
primary task of the ADB within the GMS structure, namely to form 
consensus among member states and to prepare common ground for a 
development, which is conflict free or develops mechanisms to ensure a 
quick containment of conflicts should they emerge and break open. 
Phase 2: Framework of cooperation (1994-1996): establish eight priority 
sectors (expanded to nine at the I lth Ministerial Conference in Phnom Penh 
in 2002, see table below) plus their respecting working groups, and establish 
priority projects within the sectors of cooperation; establishment of a two-tier 
institutional arrangement in 1995 (see table below). 
Phase 3: Project preparation (1996-2000): feasibility studies and/or 
commencement of project implementation for high-priority projects; resource 
mobilisation from international donors and private investors; regular 
convening of Sectoral. Forums and Ministerial Conferences; Asian crisis 
delays implementation efforts. 
Phase 4: Full implementation (since 2000): high-priority projects either 
conceptualised or in implementation stage; strategic framework for GMS 
cooperation; mechanisms for better coordination with other cooperation 
initiatives actively pursued. 
The informal nature of GMS cooperation can be found across Southeast Asia. 
ASEAN's invention of a 'soft regionalism' with the rejection of legally-binding 
obligations and formal treaties by countries of historical, economic and cultural 
diversity and the emphasis on 'socializing influences' (Ravenhill, 1998: 260-266; 
Krongkaew, 2000: 38-41), have now also been transferred to the Mekong basin. 
Also, APEC's 'concerted unilateralism', modelled on ASEAN procedures, by which 
countries can take individual actions on a voluntary basis, is applied to the GMS 
with the 'two plus' principle: the 'two plus' principle enables member states to 
pursue initiatives without the consent of all of the six members (ADB, 2002a: 3). 
The principles of the ASEAN way concerning conflict settlement can be found in the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) of 1976 and the amending protocol of 
1987. The three decisive points of the treaty are the principles of (1) non- 
interference, (2) peaceful settlement of disputes through 'friendly negotiations' and 
in the case of failure through 'good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation' of the 
high council if the parties involved 'agree to their application, and (3) the 
refrainment of the threat or use of force (ASEAN, 1976: articles 2,13-16; ASEAN, 
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1987). The Kuching Consensus of 1990 transferred ASEAN's soft regionalism to 
APEC, since Kuching formed the condition posed by ASEAN members to become 
members of APEC. 77 According to Manuel Roxas of the Philippines, 
[t]hc beauty of the Asean process is that there is a structure allowing for 
differences while we move forward (Manuel A. Roxas H, former Trade 
and Industry Secretary of the PhilippineS78, as quoted by The Manila 
Thnes, 7 October 2003). 
77 ASEAN posed six conditions: 'One is that ASEAN's identity and cohesion 
should not be eroded and all its cooperative efforts be preserved. Second, as APEC 
includes developing and developed countries, it should be based on the principle of 
equality, equity and mutual benefit. Third is that APEC should not be an inward 
looking trade bloc but serve to strengthen the multilateral economic and trading 
system instead. In this context, a fourth consideration is for APEC to be a forum for 
consultations and constructive discussions of economic issues through dialogues 
rather than through unilateral or -bilateral measures. As a self reliant process, a fifth 
point envisaged by ASEAN for APEC is for it to enhance individual and collective 
capacity of participants and articulate them in multilateral forums. Finally, a gradual 
and pragmatic approach with regard to its eventual institutional structure and 
membership problems is recommended' (Tan Kong Yam, Toh Mun Heng and Linda 
Low, 1992: 324-235). 
78 Manuel A. Roxas H was the Philippines' Trade and Industry Secretary. After the 
elections of May 2004, he became senator-elect. 
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Figure 3: GMS Program Institutional ArrangeMentS79 
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The beginnings of cooperation under the GMS programme focussed on basic 
infrastructure concerning transportation and energy to link the region and set up a 
resource base for further cooperation (for the following paragraph see Sakai, 2000: 
15-16). Initial targets under this early programme were 
the 210 MW Theun Hinboun hydropower plant in Laos in order to export 
power to Thailand, already completed. Since 1988, Laos had been selling 
hydropower to Thailand from its Xeset hydro-electric dam (Handley, 1993d: 
72); 
* the Phnom Penh-Ho Chi Minh City Highway Project; 
e the East West Corridor Project linking Northeast Thailand, the province of 
Savanakhet in Laos and central Vietnam. 
These infrastructure projects, plus the planned telecommunications loops to 
connect subregional centres, serve as 'building-blocks' (an important one is the GMS 
Cross-Border Transport Agreeinent discussed below), but also 'for resolving policy, 
regulatory and other non-physical barriers to cross-border traffic', such as 'mutual 
recognition of vehicle registration, driver's license, coverage of third party liability 
insurance, visas for truck drivers and handling of transit goods' (Sakai, 2000: 15-16). 
79 The eight sectors mentioned are already expanded to nine. 
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The central document laying out the working priorities of the six members is 
the 10-year strategic framework concluded at the IO'h Ministerial Conference on 29 
November 2001 in Yangon. The framework is officially known as Building on 
Success: A Strategic Frameivorkfor the Next Teti Years of the Greater Mekong 
Subregion Econoinic Cooperation Program, published by the ADB in 2002 after the 
l't GMS summit had taken place (ADB, 2002a). The Framework established ten so- 
called flagship projects, later expanded into eleven: 
" North South Economic Corridor 
" East West Corridor 
" Southern Economic Corridor 
" Telecommunications Backbone 
" Regional Power Interconnection and Trading Arrangement 
" Facilitating Cross-Border Trade and Investment 
" Enhancing Private Sector Participation and Competitiveness 
" Developing Human Resources and Skills Competencies 
" Strategic Environment Framework 
" Flood Control and Water Resources Management 
" Tourism Development (I I th flagship programme added at the I Ith Ministerial 
Conference in Phnom Penh in 2002). 
The eleven projects are overarched by five so-called 'strategic thrusts': 
" infrastructure linkages 
" cross-border trade and investment 
" private sector participation and competitiveness 
human resources and skills competencies 
environmental protection and sustainable use of natural resources. 
The following table shows the development of the work programme and the 
structures of cooperation of the GMS in detail. The GMS structure is explored along 
the lines of the regime approach. 
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Table 6: Institution alisation Processes in the GMS 1991-200580 
The table is based on the Ministerial Conferences. The conferences form the 
decision-making body. In 2002, a first GMS Summit was held in addition to 
the Ministerial Conference. The next summit was held in Kunming from 4-5 
July 2005. Incorporated into the table are items referring to the overall GMS 
project. Not included are therefore decisions referring to the individual sectors. 
Empty fields indicate that either no decisions were taken or no new elements 
were added to prior items. 
Country consultations 1991-1992 and I st Conference at ADB 
headquarters, Manila, 21-22 October 1992 
Principles enhance regional economic cooperation through confidence- 
building and pragmatic approaches and informality of institutions; 
no desire to form a trade bloc but to facilitate the natural flow of 
goods and services without impinging on economic relations with 
other countries: regional cooperation arrangements are a way of 
adjusting to the growing integration of markets in the context of 
globalisation. While the process of adjustment has taken the form 
of formalised agreements (such as EU, NAFTA, APEC), the GMS 
does not attempt 'to lay a basis for any forinal economic grouping. 
Rather, the purpose is to encourage greater economic cooperation 
and coordination within the framework of existing relationships 
among countries'; 
cooperation shall work with consideration to differences in 
development and small-big country differences; 
strong role of the private sector and accordingly adjustments of the 
legal frameworks; 
FDI essential to help jump start development 
Norms six sectors of cooperation established through country consultation 
between ADB Bank Study Team and country governments: 
transportation infrastructure; telecommunications, energy 
development, environmental management, human resources 
development, trade and investment; 
informal identification of projects (the '1992 list'); 
infrastructure as necessary but not sufficient condition; inclusion of 
80 See the description of MillIer's procedures in Chapter Three, Section Two. 
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tariff and non-tariff issues (pricing policies, foreign exchange 
controls, procurement policies; role of state-owned enterprises; 
trading monopolies); 
Rules 
Procedures the preliminary phase saw country consultations and meetings with 
agencies involved or potentially involved in Mekong cooperation, 
most importantly UNESCAP, LJNDP, the Mekong Secretariat of 
the then still Interim Committee; coordination with involved 
agencies to be maintained; 
projects do not need to involve all six countries; 
decisions will be taken by the respective governments as and when 
they wish; 
create and coordinate national and subregional plans; 
establishment of country coordinating committees to liaise with the 
ADB; 
institutional set up to review others' proposals for mutual 
adaptation and incorporation 
national steering committees headed by a senior minister; 
hold a ministerial meeting at least once a year; 
2nd Conference: ADB headquarters, Manila, 30-31 August 1993 
Principles priority given to improvement and rehabilitation of existing 
facilities over construction of new ones; 
no need for participation of all six countries in a project. Priority 
given to those where there is already agreement among the 
countries concerned; 
design of projects should give priority to trade generation; 
transport projects to be implemented in stretches or sections to 
facilitate project implementation and provide immediate benefits; 
due to financial constraints, projects of subregional (v. national) 
character of a project and the financial resources available; 
Norms establishment of preliminary priority projects for each of the six 
sectors based on the '1992 list' (telecommunication vanishes from 
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the list, instead, tourism is added) 
establishment of a list of impediments to work on 
Rules 
Procedures appointment of Inter-Ministerial Committees and a National 
Research Coordinator (NRC) in each country to assist in 
implementing phase 2 of the Study (names see Appendix C in the 
conference report (ADB, November 1993)). Responsibilities of the 
NRC: '(i) liaising with the government agencies concerned to 
obtain infon-nation and inputs for studies to be conducted under the 
TA [technical assistance], including arranging meetings between 
such agencies and local experts and/or internationally recruited 
consultants; (ii) making the necessary arrangements for the conduct 
of a national consultative workshop; (iii) helping to identify and/or 
making available the services of local experts who will serve as 
research associates for the studies on trade and investment, 
environment, human resource development and tourism; and (iv) 
providing office facilities and support staff for the local experts and 
the internally recruited consultants. ' 
3rd Conference: Hanoi, 20-23 April 1994 
Principles moving from the conceptual to the implementation phase, transition 
from consultation and background studies to feasibility assessments 
and implementation; 
facilitate sustainable economic growth and improve the standard of 
living of the people in the subregion, projects should reflect a 
balance among economic growth, human resources development, 
poverty reduction and environmental protection; 
bilateral arrangements should be considered to be the building 
blocks of multilateral cooperation; 
recognise linkages among sectors such as those involving 
infrastructure, environment and human resource development; 
active cooperation of donors and private sectors due to resource 
constraints; 
regular meetings to sustain momentum; 
strengthening institutional cooperation among key institutions in 
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each country in each of the sectors of cooperation 
Norms senior officials propose a fixed list of priority projects (no 
telecommunications but tourism) 
Rules 
Procedures first 2-part conference: ministerial meeting paralleled by senior 
officials' meeting concerned with the sectors of cooperation. Senior 
officials propose to ministers for approval 
proposition of sectoral working groups and forums for transport, 
power, trade, investment promotion, and tourism 
4th Conference: Chiang Mai, 15-16 September 1994 
Principles creation of a structure to provide continuity to consultation and 
consensus-building, to indicate seriousness of the undertaking to 
national, regional and international interests to help mobilise 
human and financial resources, to provide greater assurance to 
investors and donors of the continuity of policies and programmes, 
i. e. a more stable climate for investment, to facilitate successful 
implementation, to support identification and preparation of new 
projects; structure must: be consistent with principle of pragmatism 
and result-oriented; have minimal complexity; be consistent with 
other bi- and multilateral relationships of the six countries; be 
consistent with the requirements and conditions of each of the 
countries 
Norms institutionalisation of information/communication linkages: data 
base (basic data, key policies/legislative frameworks, inventory of 
projects, inventory of enterprises, inventory of key-governmental 
institutions, inventory of supporting organisations) and publications 
(project profiles, key developments) 
preliminary intermodal ranking of proposed transport projects 
including the criteria and approach to project prioritisation 
generating support of the international donor community for 
priority transport and energy projects: mechanisms on the national 
and international level to ensure broad support 
Rules 
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Procedures I ministerial level for policy guidance, in particular to oversee 
activities of the energy and transportation forums and other areas of 
interest and to give direction regarding priorities and new 
initiatives, sector working groups for the operational level to 
facilitate and monitor implementation. Participants in the forums 
will have the delegated authority of the respective governments. 
ADB to draft a detailed paper for the 5th Conference. 
5th Conference: ADB headquarters, Manila, 9-10 November 1995 
Principles attention shifls towards soft aspects of cooperation: non-physical 
barriers to the movement of goods, vehicles and people. Moving 
towards the regulatory framework 
Norms seven priority sectors: transport, energy, telecommunications, 
environment, human resources development, trade and investment, 
tourism. Endorsement for priority projects within these sectors 
Interests for private sector (ADB, June 1996: 8-9): I)projects that 
could generate a revenue stream, 2)commercial investments and 
production/distribution activities, 3)commercial/business 
opportunities in agro-industry, tourism and related services (more 
details on financing can be found in the report) 
Rules 
Procedures In 1995, the two-level institutional arrangement was introduced, 
consisting of a policy level, that is, a ministerial conference, which 
coordinates the processes; and an operational level, at which sector- 
specific forums and working groups elaborate approaches towards 
implementation. The ADB is above both layers of cooperation, 
facilitating the integration processes through the provision of 
technical, administrative and logistical support. It also plays a 
coordinating role 'on behalf of GMS countries. ' 
6th Conference: 28-30 August 1996, Kunming 
Principles 
Nonns more effective involvement of the private sector to meet resource 
challenges: public-private-partnerships, non-traditional sources of 
funding, linking up with ASEAN 
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coordination of activities in the Mekong area as such to avoid 
duplicity and enhance complementarity; 
approval for a '2020 study' as long-term strategic framework to 
focus better on public and private investment and more effectively 
realise development goals 
Rules 
Procedures ADB to prioritise projects due to limits of funding; 
initiation of consultation processes through ADB with NGOs to 
meet funding and coordination needs 
I 17th Conference: 7-11 April 1997, ADB headquarters, Manila I 
Principles 
Norms 
Rules 
I Procedures I establishment of a GMS Business Forum (GMS-BF) I 
8th Conference: 2 October 1998, ADB headquarters, Manila 
Principles reaction to Asian crisis: produce a strategy and work programme 
that is responsive to changed economic and social realities in the 
region, strengthen regional activity and competitiveness 
Norms GMS Indicative Work Program (1998-2000): i) early 
implementation of priority projects to lay the foundation for 
resumed growth and integration; ii) elimination of policy and 
regulatory impediments to cross-border movements of goods and 
people; iii) integrated approach to regional cooperation initiatives 
through economic corridors linking improvements in infrastructure 
with policy improvements for facilitating trans-border production 
and trade, thus linking production, trade and infrastructure; iv) 
project-specific resource mobilisation through partnership with the 
private sector 
linking up with ASEM and APEC as financial sources, which could 
broaden the sources and involve the private sector more strongly 
more attention for trade and investment issues, as infrastructure 
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projects have the basic aim to facilitate trade and investment flows: 
exchange of trade information, facilitation of customs procedures, 
facilitation of cross-border movements, thereby operationalising 
ASEAN agreements at the level of border transactions 
the GMS programme has been broadened to address social issues 
(in labour, health, education); cross-border issues (in environment 
and in the transport of goods and people); and in areas of common 
need (such as training) 
new areas of cooperation: drug eradication, agriculture. ADB to 
develop ideas for integration of both into the GMS framework 
economic corridor concept: five potential corridors, two of which 
could serve as pilot projects, as they are already existing as priority 
projects under the GMS programme (accelerating the need to 
address cross-sectoral work and related coordination between the 
countries concerned, linkage of social and environmental concerns 
to economic development): East-West Corridor and Phnom Penh- 
Ho Chi Minh City project 
separation of trade and investment make it 8 sectors of cooperation 
Rules 
Procedures promoting national and subregional programme linkages, 
implementation of a project monitoring and tracking system and 
information dissemination; all the eight sectors are involved with 
the specific working groups 
9th Conference: 11-13 January 2000, ADB headquarters, Manila 
Principles 
Norms update GMS Work Program for 2000-2002 
strategic thrusts: economic corridors, poverty reduction, 
environmental strategy, opening borders for free movement of 
goods and people 
Rules 
Procedures Cross-Border Transport Agreement between Laos, Thailand and 
Vietnam, to be implemented in all GMS by 2005; it can 
complement AFTA and ASEAN-China FTA 
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1 Oth Conference: 27-29 November 200 1, Yangon 
Principles 
Norms endorsement of a strategic framework for the next ten years (10- 
year strategic framework): ten flagship projects (North South 
Economic Corridor, East West Corridor, Southern Economic 
Corridor, Telecommunications Backbone, Regional Power 
Interconnection and Trading Arrangement, Facilitating Cross- 
Border Trade and Investment, Enhancing Private Sector 
Participation and Competitiveness, Developing Human Resources 
and Skills Competencies, Strategic Envirorunent Framework, Flood 
Control and Water Resources Management) and five strategic 
thrusts (infrastructure linkages, cross-border trade and investment, 
private sector participation and competitiveness, human resources 
and skills competencies, environmental protection and sustainable 
use of natural resources) 
Rules 
Procedures pilot-testing of single-stop customs inspection at selected border 
crossings along the East-West Corridor and the Bangkok-Phnom 
Penh Highway; to be expanded over the next years; aim: joint 
control by adjacent countries' customs authorities through shared 
facilities or mutual recognition of harmonised customs inspection 
procedures 
strengthen institutional arrangements: strengthening Senior 
Officials' Meeting, national secretariats and working 
groups/forums; establishment of a Mekong Regional Department in 
the ADB 
Cambodia's accession to the Cross-Border Agreement 
I Ith Conference: 23-25 September 2002, Phnom Penh 
Principles 
Norms development matrix: consultation process towards the matrix 
would include ASEAN, ASEAN+3 and development partners. 
Idea: expand participation in the GMS programme. A planning and 
information tool to generate direct investment 
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Mekong Project Development Facility (MPDF) and business 
support center 
expansion of 8 sectors to 9: agriculture 
GMS Tourism Development as I Ith flagship programme 
Rules 
Procedures meeting with development partners as part of the conference 
(ASEAN, UNESCAP, European Commission, Japan, MRC, 
UNDP, UNDCP, UNEP, WB), encouraged to join the working 
groups, in order to implement the flagship programmes 
lst GMS Summit: 3 November 2002, Phnom Penh 
Principles 
Norms 
Rules 
Procedures Framework Agreement for the Facilitation of Cross-Border 
Movement of Goods and People (the work to address border 
crossing problems was started in 1996). Intergovernmental 
Agreement on Regional Power Trade (IGA): creation of a high- 
level body (Regional Power Trade Coordinating Committee, 
RPTCC) to coordinate and implement regional power trade 
agreements, draft a Regional Power Trade Operating Agreement 
(PTOA) that will establish rules for power trade. Phnom Penh Plan 
for Development Management (Phnom Penh Plan, PPP) in order to 
train middle and senior level officials in strategic planning, 
management, implementation, evaluation and other skills central to 
development management and good governance. China's accession 
to the Cross-Border Agreement. 
12th Conference: 17-19 September 2003, Dali 
Principles Three Cs: enhanced connectivity, improved competitiveness, 
creation of a greater sense of community 
Norms preparation of action plans by the private sector to support activities 
in the nine sectors, greater role for GMS-BF in promoting private 
sector involvement 
-164- 
a road map consisting of three building blocks: connectivity, 
competitiveness, community 
ASEAN-China FTA as means to achieve prosperity in GMS 
accelerate implementation of regulatory reform in the power and 
telecommunication sectors to pave the way for investments 
put in place of a Regional Power Trade Operating Agreement for 
guidelines for technical cooperation, cross-border transmission 
pricing, institutional framework and operational aspects in order to 
implement the summit's Intergovernmental Agreement on Power 
Trade to be worked on by the SOs 
Action Plan on trade and investment facilitation to be worked on by 
the SOs 
strengthen health monitoring and surveillance for disease control 
Rules 
Procedures first time that private sector was invited to the development 
partners meeting. Decision to convene a high-level public-private 
sector consultation in 2004 
strengthening SOMs: become a platform for exchanging views and 
coordinating national and regional policies, plans and programmes, 
forging joint approaches to common concerns, setting clear, 
strategic directions for each of the nine sectors. Meet at least twice 
a year. Also strengthen links between working groups and SOMs 
and enhance role of the national coordinating mechanisms 
Myanmar's accession to the Cross-Border Agreement 
13th Conference: 14-16 December 2004, Vientiane 
Principles Three Cs plus a commitment to sustainable development (= '4 Cs') 
Norms strengthening of dialogue with development partners and the 
private sector. Establish greater collaboration and convergence 
among the development partners in the subregion (read: more 
coordination between the various programs in the GMS, including 
the ACMECS - see procedures). Focus on transboundary 
transmission of SARS, HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis B, Avian Flu, 
environmental sustainability, narrowing income gaps. Four 
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priorities: mobilisation of financial resources from better-off 
member countries and the private sector from within and outside 
the subregion, improving the environment for private sector 
activities (freer flow of capital, goods and information), more 
inclusiveness (let the poor segments of society benefit from GMS 
cooperation in order to reduce poverty), strengthen links and 
synergies with other regional programmes. 
Rules 
Procedures adoption of a time-bound Action Plan for the nine sectors of 
cooperation in order to enhance the Three Cs. Signature of Stage 2 
Annexes of the GMS Cross-Border Transport Agreement. 
Signature of a Memorandum of Understanding between Laos and 
Vietnam on the initial implementation of the GMS Cross-Border 
Transport Agreement at the Dansavanh-Lao Bao border crossing. 
Continue the initiated Public Private Sector Consultation Meetings 
(PPCM) and Mekong Development Forums (MDF). Strengthen 
cooperation and coordination between the GMS and the recently 
established Ayeyawadi-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic 
Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS). 
2nd GMS Summit: 4-5 July 2005, Kunming 
Principles 
Norms 
Rules 
Procedures participants agreed to complete signing of all remaining annexes 
and protocols of the GMS Cross-Border Transport Agreement by 
the end of 2005 for the agreement to come into force in 2006. Third 
summit to be held in Laos in 2008. 
Source: ADB, February 1993, November 1993, July 1994, December 1994, June 1996, March 1997, 
1998,2000,2001,2002b, 2002c, 2003,2004,2005. 
We see from this table that practice followed principle, with no rules 
established at all. Instead, a practice-oriented approach arises, which seems to 
depend more on principles and norms than on rules. From the traditional viewpoint 
of the regime concept, therefore, the GMS would not qualify as a regime. However, 
it would be unjust to deny the GMS any progress at all. This is especially the case, 
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when we recall the bitterly fought three Indochina wars in combination with the deep 
ideological division between communist and non-communist camps and within the 
communist camp during the Cold War. To paraphrase Krasner, the GMS was 
'created to promote the interests' of its members, and power determines the outcome 
of the negotiations leading to the regime (Krasner, 1995: 139-149). Once created, a 
regime provides stability in (formerly) contentious areas. At the same time, the 
decision to enter into cooperation is a result of the self-interest of the future regime 
members (Keohane, 1984: 63 and 66). The GMS certainly promotes the agenda of 
the actors involved, and the decisiveness of power can be seen, for instance, in the 
problems of dam-building between China and Vietnam and Vietnam and Cambodia 
(for the issue of dam-building see later in this study). Judging from results instead of 
the application of abstract analytical categories, we see the steady constitution of an 
increasingly diversified structure of negotiation and confidence-building platforms, 
cutting across several layers of state and non-state - hence sovereignty-bound and 
not sovereignty-bound - actors. This recalls the argument of Chapter Four, Sections 
Two and Three that a regime will be viewed as a system, in which a gradual and 
consultative approach of institutionalisation accounts for effectiveness and 
robustness, thereby relaxing the notion that only hard rules can foster effectiveness 
and robustness of multilateral institutions. Aided by ADB envoys throughout the 
four phases described above (the phases of confidence-building, structuring the 
framework of cooperation, project preparation, and full implementation), interests 
and cooperation expectations converged. A gradual process was unfolded, which 
regularised and enhanced the frequency of specialised sector meetings and general 
ministerial meetings, leading to stable patterns of cooperation, which are not rule- 
based, but are based on general principles, norms and procedural guidelines. 
Through this, an effective cooperation mechanism was established, from which 
emerged a system of committee governance, which facilitated important inter- 
governmental agreements such as the Cross-Border Transport Agreenient. The 
expert working groups of the nine working sectors of the GMS programme, which 
include, among others, representatives of national ministries, form an integral part of 
GMS governance, deliberation and mutual learning processes. The involvement of 
national ministries allows consensus decision-making during the annual ministerial 
meetings. The working groups ensure coordination of national policies in a 
cooperative structure, which does not involve supra-national decision-making 
bodies. The frequency and regularity of exchanges in the working groups also 
provide a regular exchange of information and a certain transparency and 
predictability of policies and priorities of member states. The involvement of 
national governments in the expert committees and the membership of often more 
than one ministry in a particular working group facilitate implementation of the non- 
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binding agreements, which characterise GMS cooperation. This lends weight to 
Sakai's statement that due to its structure, the GMS is able to unfold stronger 
problem-solving capacities and economic dynamism than ASEAN: 
a project-oriented approach in the GMS brings about 'immediate tangible 
results rather than setting up rules or agreements'; 
'when rules or agreements are needed, the starting point is again a project', 
showing an immediate result and usage for a new rule; 
due to the splitting of projects among various sets of member countries, 
consensus of all six GMS countries is not needed. Implementation of projects 
'can be initiated by two or more interested countries', while 'the overall 
strategy and prioritisation of projects are discussed by the six countries in 
ministerial and sectoral forums' (Sakai, 2000: 19). 
Indeed, a down-to-earth project-oriented approach sounds promising. 
Voluntary membership however hampers projects which have to be endorsed by the 
majority of member countries in order to unfold their economic value for the whole 
of the GMS. This holds true, for instance, for the navigability of the Mekong, an 
undertaking long pushed by China, but which Laos, for instance, endorsed only after 
a long delay. This fact also lays bare the very difficulty to accommodate the six 
countries concerned, their strategies and interests. Moreover, it shows the distrust of 
the smaller countries concerning the political and economic power of China and the 
fear of sliding into an irreversible political and economic dependence. The 
navigability of the Mekong carries another problem, namely that of the destruction 
of the river's ecology and the devastation of the livelihoods of local downstream 
communities, who depend on the river for irrigation and fishing, by blasting reefs in 
order to allow heavier ships to use the Mekong in order to increase trade and 
commerce between the Mekong countries. So far, around twenty reefs have been 
blasted, among them those on the borders of Laos and Myanmar and Laos and 
Thailand (Son, 2005). For more on these issues see later in this study. 
Positive signs are that pragmatic thinking is continuously superimposing old 
patterns of behaviour and deep mutual distrust. Mya Than and George Abonyi, too, 
argue that 'economic development has become a priority, replacing ideology' (Mya 
Than and George Abonyi, 2001: 159). The Bagan Declaration (for more see AKP 
News, 11 November 2003, and the list below) and the announcement of Cambodia 
and Thailand to further open their border only a few months after the sudden 
outbreak and the toilsome containment of mutual hostilities in 2003, show that the 
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informal cooperation is the only way at this point to ensure successful long-term 
cooperation. Importantly, during the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, 
China acted as mediator behind the scenes (Huxley, 2005). Even though pragmatism 
cannot yet fully replace foe images in foreign and security policy, the countries in the 
region make efforts to overcome political differences. Not least, with China and 
Vietnam, two influential countries view regional security as a prerequisite for 
national security and thus domestic stability. Therefore, diplomatic action has largely 
replaced fighting. Economic development and political stability - not however 
political cohesion, but more and more economic cohesion - may be achieved in the 
not too distant future. 
Steps forward in the endeavour of regionalisation - as mentioned in Chapter 
Two, regionalisation in times of the new regionalism does not necessarily include 
integration as ultimate goal - can be seen when noting that cooperation within the 
GMS has made information mutually available through the annual meetings of 
ministers and senior officials and the regular sessions of the numerous sector 
working groups. The GMS Development Matrix is accessible via the ADB website 
and hence available to the public. The Development Matrix provides regularly 
updated data on major projects and activities which are grouped under the eleven 
flagship programmes. And for the Chinese-Vietnamese border regions, as will be 
shown later, multilingual web pages inform the interested parties about legal 
developments and investment opportunities. The transgoverninental nature of the 
GMS and the gradual processes of informal confidence-building have created 
relationships, which resemble Keohane's 'networks of acquaintance and friendship' 
(Keohane, 1984: 101). Bearing in mind that in 1991 with the conclusion of the 
Cambodia conflict, countries in the Mekong basin emerged from decades and 
centuries of conflict and mistrust, the inauguration of the GMS project in 1992 was a 
sensitive endeavour. It is against this background that on the occasion of the second 
GMS Summit in Kunming on 4-5 July 2005, Jean Pierre Verbiest, director of the 
Thailand mission of the ADB, said that at the first meeting of GMS officials in 1992, 
"'even at coffee breaks it was difficult to get the officials to talk to each other"' 
(Son, 2005). Consequently, in this regard the ASEAN way, which rules out rules, is 
a success, resulting in stable patterns of cooperation supported by favourable 
governmental policies and aided by the mediating activities of the Asian 
Development Bank in the GMS. These processes and cooperation patterns reduce 
transaction costs and reduce uncertainty by providing enhanced access to 
information for regime members (Keohane, 1984: 88-93). 
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As the institutionalisation table shows, the sectors of cooperation were 
successively expanded from six to nine: 
" transportation infrastructre 
" telecommunications 
" energy development 
" environmental management 
" human resources development 
" trade facilitation 
" investment 
" tourism 
" agriculture 
The work programme indicates a considerable development of the 
transnational character of non-traditional security by GMS member countries and a 
diversified view of what foreign relations need to deal with: a mixture of high and 
low politics, which transcends the borderline between domestic and foreign policy. 
The first two tables below show details of the persons in charge for the GMS as a 
whole in the six member countries. The third table lists the organisations and 
persons involved in the environmental sector. With regard to the first two tables on 
the principle actors in the GMS, the high ranks of the respective persons show the 
significance that is attributed to the GMS by member countries. It also has to be 
noted that despite Yunnan's and Guangxi's participation in the GMS, all persons in 
charge in China are central government members, while in the ministerial meetings, 
participants comprise representatives from all relevant central government ministries 
and also include members of the provincial governments. 
It has to be noted that the actors shown in the tables are only the official actors 
involved in the formal GMS structures approved by the annual ministerial meetings. 
However, other actors and other factors drive the GMS agenda, too, such as trading 
networks or national and local mentalities. Discussion of these processes would go 
beyond the scope and the concern of the present study. Here, further research of 
future studies into these substructures is necessary in order to complement the 
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picture with economic, societal and cultural or identity processes in the GMS, which 
take place outside the official structures. 
Table 7: Principle Actors in the GMS I 
(as of 8 April 2005). Where more than one person is named, the first is the 
principle coordinator 
National Coordinator Chairperson 
Interministerial Committee 
Yunnan, Ju Kuflin Li Yong 
Guangxi/China Deputy Director General Vice Minister 
International Department Ministry of Finance 
Ministry of Finance 
Vietnam Hoang Viet Khang Vo Hong Phuc 
Deputy Director General Minister of Planning and 
GMS National Coordinator Investment 
Ministry of Planning and 
Investment 
Nguyen Thi Thu Hien 
GMS National Secretariat 
Laos Somchith Inthamith Somphong Mongkhonvilay 
Director-General Minister to Prime Minister 
Department of Economic Affairs Office 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs President of the Lao National 
Mekong River Commission 
Chairman of Lao National 
Heuan Chanphana Mekong Committee 
Director 
VathouniYorn Doungmala 
Senior Official 
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Cambodia Sok Chenda Sophea Khy Taing Lim 
Sccretary-General Senior Minister 
National Coordinator and Head of Royal Government of 
the GMS Secretariat Cambodia 
Council for the Development of Minister of GMS 
Cambodia (CDC) 
Kakda Chav 
Consultant 
Thailand Arkhom Termpittayapaisith Wissanu Krea-ngam 
Deputy Secretary-General Deputy Prime Minister 
Office of the National Economic & Office of the Prime Minister 
Social Development Board 
(NESDB) 
Chompunuch Ramanvongse 
Policy & Plan Analyst 
Myanmar Daw Myo Nwe U Soe Tha 
Director General Minister 
Foreign Economic Relations Ministry of National Planning 
Department and Economic Development 
Ministry of National Planning and 
Economic Development 
Source: ADB, Ministry of Finance (China) 
Table 8: Principle Actors in the GMS 11 
(the table shows the names and positions of the participants of the 13 th 
Ministerial Conference, held in Vientiane from 14-16 December 2004) 
Ministerial-level Conference 
Yunnan, Liao Xiaojun 
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Guangxi/China Vice Minister 
Ministry of Finance 
Vietnam Tran Dinh Khien 
Vice Minister of Planning and 
Investment 
Laos Somphong Mongkhonvilay 
Minister to Prime Minister Office 
President of the Lao National 
Mekong River Commission 
Chairman of Lao the National 
Mekong Committee 
Cambodia Khy Taing Lim 
Senior Minister 
Royal Government of Cambodia 
Minister of GMS 
Thailand Wissanu Krea-ngarn 
Deputy Prime Minister 
Office of the Prime Minister 
Myamnar U Soe Tha 
Minister 
Ministry of National Planning and 
Economic Development 
Source: ADB 
Table 9: State and Non-State Members of the Subregional Working Group on 
Environment 
Subregional Working Group on Environment, 1 Ith Meeting, 15-16 March 2005, 
Siem Reap, Cambodia 
National participants 
Yunnan, Mr. Dingding Tang 
Guangxi/China Deputy Director General 
Department of International Cooperation 
State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) 
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Ms. Li Fang 
Deputy Director, Department of International Cooperation, SEPA 
Mr. Gaolai Luo 
Deputy Director General, Foreign Economic Cooperation Office, 
SEPA 
Vietnam Dr. Nguyen Van Tai 
Deputy Director General, 
Department of Environment, Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment 
Mr. Tran Ngoc Lan 
Official, Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) 
Laos Mrs. Keobang Keola 
Deputy Director General of Cabinet, 
Science Technology & Enviroriment Agency (STEA), Prime 
Minister Office 
Mr. Bovonethat Douangchak 
Senior Official, 
Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Cambodia H. E. Dr. Mok Mareth 
Senior Minister and Minister of the Environment 
H. E. Tan Vutha 
Secretary of State, Ministry of Environment 
Mr. Chuon Chanrithy 
Director, Department of Natural Resources Assessment and 
Enviromnental Data Management, Ministry of Envirom-nent 
Dr. Lonh Heal 
Director-General in charge of Technical Affairs, Ministry of 
Environment 
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Mr. Sy Ramony 
Chief of National Park and Wildlife Office, 
Office of the Protected Areas, Ministry of Environment 
Thailand Mr. Pongpisit Viseshakul 
Director of Natural Resource, 
Environment, Science and Technology Office, 
National Economic & Social Development Board (NESDB) 
Ms. Udomlak Sritusnee 
Forest Geneticist, Department of National Parks Wildlife and Plants 
Ms. Suchitra Changtragoon 
Specialist, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment 
Ms. Wantane Petchampai 
Environmental Specialist, Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment 
Mr. Montri Nathananan 
Second Secretary, Department of International Economic Affairs, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Ms. Sasithorn Plaichaiyapoom 
Policy and Planning Analyst, Spatial Development Office, National 
Economic and Social Development Board 
Myanmar Daw Htwe Nyo Nyo 
Deputy Director, National Commission for Environmental Affairs 
(NCEA), Ministry of Foreign Affairs Complex 
DaNv Khin Than Win 
Assistant Director, Foreign Economic Relations Department, 
Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development 
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Bilateral and Multilateral Agencies 
Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) 
Mr. Mogens Laumand Christensen 
Minister counsellor of the Danish Embassy-Development Cooperation Section, 
Danish Embassy in Phnom Penh 
IUCN-The World Conservation 
Mr. Prom Nga, Project Manager 
Mr. Mao Kosai, Liaison Officer 
IUCN Office in Cambodia 
Mekong River Commission (MRC) 
Mr. Hans Guttman 
Envirom-nent Programme Coordinator of Environment Division 
SEI-A 
Mr. Vikrom Mathur 
Research Fellow, SEI-A Centre at Bangkok 
Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) 
Mr. Christer Holtsberg 
Director of Swedish Environmental Secretariat for Asia, SIDA Regional Office 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
Mr. Surendra Shrestha, Director 
Dr. Yuwaree In-Na, Sr. Program Officer 
Mr. Tin Aung Moo, Program Specialist 
Regional Resource Centre for Asia and the Pacific 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) 
Mr. Nguyen Khac; Tiep 
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UNIDO Regional Office in Bangkok for Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar 
and Thailand 
Mr. Nguon Narin, National Project Coordinator 
UNIDO Phnom Penh Office 
U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
Mr. Winston Bowman 
US-AEP Regional Coordinator, USAID Regional Development Mission/Asia 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 
Mr. Eric Coull 
Representative, WWF Indochina Programme Office in Viet Nam 
Ms. Angie Woo, GMS Initiative Coordinator 
GMS Initiative in Thailand 
ADB Consultants 
Source: ADB 
The tables show a diversity of actors cutting across the various dimensions of 
the multi-track framework introduced in Chapter Two. The sectors of cooperation 
involve several government agencies and in some countries involve several 
ministries, showing the non-unitary character of central governments, their 
cooperation with local actors (both local firms and local governments), and the 
involvement of transnational NGOs and bilateral and multilateral organisations in 
the deliberating processes. 81 This calls to mind Keohane and Nye's remark when 
elaborating on 'complex interdependence', namely that foreign relations involve 
several government agencies and not only foreign offices (Keohane and Nye, 1977 
[1989]: 24-25). Foreign policy even in relatively unitary states such as China has 
become more complex and involves more actors than the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. This development diversifies actors on the central government level in that 
specialised ministries become involved in issues related to their expertise. In the 
case of environmental cooperation, the SEPA represents China's environmental 
81 For detailed infonnation see the individual GMS sector pages on the ADB web 
site at http: //www. adb. org/GMS/updates. asp. 
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policy, but Vietnam is present with two ministries, the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment and the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI). 
This shows that the environment issue is a transnational problem, which has more 
than one dimension: in the case of the Mekong river as an international river basin 
central to the economic development of the GMS, the needs for environmental 
protection and the protection of the livelihood of river-side communities are in 
contention with the need for economic development. This then involves several 
ministries concerned with environment and trade, with opposing agendas and aims 
and often differing views if not outright conflict about their respective 
responsibilities. As a result, the multi-dimensional phenomenon of transnationalism, 
pertaining to Mekong development, produces contending sets and views of actors 
not only on the central government level, but also between central government actors 
and environmental NGOs. Looking at the Subregional Electric Power Forum, for 
instance, we find an even more diversified set of local and central actors, and with 
regard to China a set of central ministries in Beijing and energy producers in 
Guangxi and Yunnan. This constellation highlights not only the cooperation between 
central and local state units within one country but also the strategic relevance the 
central government in Beijing attaches to its influence on the development of the 
subregional energy market. 
The multi-track processes, which reach from traditional diplomacy to activism, 
state and non-state actors, and intra-governmental cooperation within a central 
government, hence provide a dense network of cooperative platforms. The levels of 
actors involve heads of state and government (state level), government ministries 
(state level), provinces, cities, counties (subnational level), experts (state and 
epistemic community level), NGOs as well as firms organised in the GMS-BF (non- 
state sector). Also, as will be discussed later, trade fairs in cities on both sides of the 
China-Vietnam border were established on a regular basis. This involves the 
business community of the private and state sectors. However, the problem seems to 
be that the state and non-state levels are not sufficiently connected, which is 
especially true for the environment sector, in which NGOs oppose the high-flying 
plans of governments to pursue economic policies with negative outcomes for the 
environment. It thus seems that environmental NGOs had only limited success so far 
to influence decisions and attitudes in central governments or subnational units. This 
shows that the GMS is an essentially state-guided endeavour, in which the scope of 
action for non-state actors is set by what central governments perceive to be in their 
interest. The influence of environmental NGOs on the shape of governmental 
interests has to date not been very successful. The issue is particularly prominent 
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with regard to dam-building in the GMS countries (details will be discussed later). 
However, the fact that in January 2005 China decided to halt 30 power projects, 
because they failed to carry out environmental assessments, may spark hopes that 
China's environmental ministry, the State Environmental Protection Administration 
(SEPA) gains importance within the Chinese administration and in conflicts with the 
more powerful trade and economy related ministries. Among the dams temporarily 
stopped were the Xiluodu dam at the Jinshajiang in Yunnan and a dam at the Nu (or 
Salween), which runs parallel to the Mekong in Yunnan and together with the 
Jinshajiang forms the UN world heritage site of the Three Parallel Rivers (BBC, 19 
January 2005 and 2 February 2005a+b). This could be a positive signal that 
increasing popular opposition to a free wheeling economic development might lead 
to greater concern of the central government with regard to human security 
considerations. The principle of yi ren wei ben, people-centred policies, mentioned 
in Chapter Two, and the fresh water crisis in Harbin due to the seating off of the city 
in November/December 2005 as result of the benzene leak into the Songhua river at 
Jilin, might lead the government to consider the human security element more 
carefully than it used to do, especially since Beijing is increasingly conscious about 
the escalating protests against its economic policy. 
5.2.2.3. Aims and problems of the GMS 
Regarding the overall aim of the institution of the GMS, it is seen as a reaction 
to the globalisation processes, thereby adjusting the region to the demands of 
globalisation and at the same time being part of the global phenomenon of 
regionalisation in the face of globalisation. This is in accordance with the nature of 
the new regionalism. The GMS is also supposed to foster peace, stability and 
cooperation within the wider region. According to Nguyen Manh Cam, Vietnam's 
Foreign Minister from 1991-2000 and Deputy Prime Minister in charge of foreign 
affairs from 1997-2002, the ASEAN membership of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, 
Myanmar and Thailand is the basis for a potential future success of the Greater 
Mekong Subregion (Nguyen Manh Cam, 2000: 22-24). He, however, does not say 
how this can be possible. Often it seems that assumptions such as these remain 
phrases. ASEAN seems to react but not to shape the integration processes in the 
growth areas: the Basic Framework of ASEAN-Mekong Basin Development 
Cooperation (ASEAN-MB) was not founded until 1996, seven years after the 
establishment of SIJORI, four years after the GMS and one year after the MRC. 
ASEAN-MB 'complements cooperation initiatives currently undertaken by the 
Mekong River Commission, donor countries and other multilateral agencies' and 
'mobilises the participation of the private sector' (ASEAN, 1996a). Mechanisms of 
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cooperation are ministerial meetings, Joint Ministerial Meetings with the ASEAN 
foreign and economic ministers, and specialised ministerial meetings; a Steering 
Committee consisting of senior officials and a representative of the ASEAN 
Secretariat. The meetings are convened prior to the ASEAN Summits or ASEAN 
Informal Summits (ASEAN, 1996a and b). 
ASEAN-MB was established 'based on a Malaysian idea' (Chongkittavom, 
2000: 27). At the inauguration meeting, a special working group was set up, chaired 
by Malaysia, which initiated the trans-ASEAN (or trans-Asia) railway project, in 
order to explore the possibility of a rail link between Singapore and Kunming 
(ASEAN, 1996b), linking ASEAN and non-ASEAN countries. The trans-Asia 
railway project was proposed by Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahatir Mohamad in 
December 1995 at the Fifth ASEAN Summit in Bangkok from 14-15 December 
1995. The aim was to 'transcend the boundaries of the Mekong region' and connect 
Singapore at the southern tip of the Malay peninsula with Kunming through 
Malaysia, Thailand and the Indochinese states (Yang, 2003: 118). The summit also 
saw the admission of Vietnam to ASEAN as seventh member and the granting of 
observer status to Laos and Cambodia. It therefore prepared the inclusion of the 
formerly war-torn continental - and hence the Mekong - region into the association 
(ASEAN, 1995). In March 1996, at the First ASEM Meeting, held in Bangkok from 
1-2 March 1996, Mahatir proposed cooperation with Europe in developing the 
Mekong basin and to establish the trans-Asia railway as an international railway 
network, which would ultimately connect mainland Southeast Asian railways with 
Chinese railway networks and link them up with Europe through the Asia-Europe 
Continental Bridge in order to facilitate trade, investment and the movement of 
people (Yang, 2003: 118). At the First ASEM Meeting it was announced that 
Malaysia would coordinate studies for a trans-Asia railway network - 'commencing 
initially with the railway project of the Mekong Basin Development' - and a 
possible integration with the trans-European railway network (ASEM, 1996). The 
latest meeting on the project - the 26h ASEAN Railway General Manager's 
Conference - was held in Phnom Penh on 2 November 2004 in order to attract 15 
Million USD in funding from foreign donors for a 48-kilometre track from Sisophon 
to Poipet in the province of Banteay Meanchey, which would connect Cambodia's 
rail system and economy to Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. The planned rail 
track is a missing link in the ASEAN railway project. Also discussed was another 
missing link which needs to attract 500 Million USD in funding for a 305-kilometre 
stretch from Phnom Penh to the province of Loc Minh in Vietnam. The link would 
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allow goods and travellers to go by train from Cambodia through Vietnam and into 
Kunming in China's province of Yunnan (AKP News, 20 October 2004). 
A major road project resembling in scope the trans-ASEAN railway is the 
ASEAN highway, the creation of which is coordinated by ASEAN senior transport 
officials and involves upgrading of national routes up until 2020 (ASEAN, 1999). 
Myanmar, which faces difficulties integrating into the subregion due to unsettled 
difficulties with its minorities, who live in the border areas, reported in 2004 that 
work on two sections of the ASEAN highway in Myarunar had started: one section 
in the southern Mon state, the Mwlamyine-Mudon-Thanbyuzayat section, will be 
upgraded by South Korea under an ASEAN+3 aid programme. The second section 
of Thaton-Pya An-Kawkareik-Myawaddi in the south-eastem Kayin state will be 
implemented with Thai cooperation (Viet Nam News, 19 June 2004: 7). To date, the 
government of Myanmar is unable to participate in the GMS on a larger basis as the 
conflicts between the government and minority forces cause disruptions to 
integration efforts in the border areas (interview with a Burmese researcher in Hanoi 
in May 2004). Burma's minority problem represents a left-over of historical patterns 
of sovereignties and loyalties, which were replaced by modem post-colonial nation 
states with clear cut boundaries; but the new post-colonial national governments 
have not always managed to expand their control 'over all of their supposedly 
64sovereign" spaces', that is, to expand the control of a majority population over the 
now minority populations, which in addition often have 'kin and kith networks' 
across the newly established borders (Grundy-Warr, 2002: 220-221). The difficulty 
of the goverm-nent in Yangon is exemplary for the problematic cross-border 
integration in the GMS, which, as remarked earlier, is a region in which cooperation 
predates national and Cold War boundaries. National borders are a contentious issue, 
and the precise lines of borders are still a matter of controversy in bilateral relations 
between GMS countries (interview with a Burmese researcher in Hanoi in May 
2004). Already in 1997, Forney remarked that the 'Burmese junta's recent offensive 
against the Karen minority could straighten out a huge question mark along the Thai 
border, but the inherent volatility in the region means political solutions must 
precede economic ones. Until then, private capital will shy away from the region' 
(Forney, 1997: 57). 
One of the infrastructural 'building-blocks' mentioned earlier in this chapter is 
the GMS Cross-Border Transport Agreenzent, a central road project, which 
exemplifies the ASEANisation of the Mekong basin. The physical backbone of any 
integration effort in the Mekong region lies in advanced transportation networks and 
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transport regulations. Transportation in the Mekong area by road becomes difficult 
as soon as one wishes to cross the Mekong by means other than ferry. As of October 
2004, the following bridges (limited to international bridges or bridges as part of the 
GMS programme) had either been already built or were under construction 
(Auswdrtiges Amt, October 2004: 12-13): 
In April 1994, the Friendship Bridge between Nongkhai (Laos) and Vientiane 
(Laos) was opened. The bridge was the first international Mekong Bridge. 
The so-called Second International Mekong Bridge links Mukdahan 
(Thailand) with Xeno, province of Savannakhet, in Laos. It is part of the 
East-West-Corridor. The Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIQ 
extended a loan of USD 72.9m for the construction. Construction started in 
2003 and is planned to be finished by the beginning of 2007. Including the 
new Savannakhet. airport, the bridge is supposed to open Thailand's northeast 
via Khon Kaen. 
A bridge over the Thanlwin in Myarimar financed by the government of 
Myanmar is part of the East-West-Corridor. Construction was planned to be 
finished in December 2004. 
A bridge over the Mae Sai 4 km east of the existing bridge was built in order 
to enhance the link between Chiang Rai in Thailand and Myanmar and 
extend the transport network between Thailand and its neighbours. The 
bridge was finished in April 2004. Thailand and Myamnar have agreed to 
build yet another bridge over the Mae Sai. Thailand wants to support 
construction. 
The Thai Transport Ministry plans to extend aid to Laos to build a bridge 
over the Hueng river, in order to facilitate trade and tourism in the province 
of Loni (Laos). The bridge will link the village of Tha Li in Loei (Thailand) 
with Kantao in Sayaburi (Laos). Construction was started at the beginning of 
2004 and was planned to be finished in August 2004. 
The Operation Plan of the ADB of 2004-2006 plans a bridge at Chieng 
Khong in Laos as part of the East-West Economic Corridor. The exact place 
for the bridge is not yet determined. Of the USD 30m, USD 10m will be 
financed by the ADB. Thailand and China are interested in the project. 
Thailand plans to cover 50 percent of the costs. 
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The slow proliferation of international bridges shows the hesitation with which 
GMS countries remove obstacles to cross-border transport. A considerable milestone 
in this regard is the GMS Cross-Border Transport Agreenient. Its purpose is 
to streamline regulations and reduce nonphysical barriers in the GMS. It 
incorporates the principles of bilateral or multilateral action, and 
flexibility in recognition of differences in procedures in each of the GMS 
countries www. adb. org. /GMS/agreement. asp). 
The agreement is formally known as The Agreement between and aniong the 
Governments of the Kingdom of Cambodia, the People's Republic of China, the Lao 
People's Democi-atic Republic, the Union of Myawnar, the Kingdom of Thailand, 
and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nanijbi- Facilitation of O-oss-Border Transport of 
Goods and People. 82 It originated as an agreement between Laos, Thailand and 
Vietnam, signed in Vientiane on 26 November 1999. The agreement. then saw the 
accession of Cambodia (29 November 2001), China (3 November 2002) and 
Myanmar (19 September 2003). The GMS members are thus all members of the 
agreement. The 17 annexes and 3 protocols to the agreement were to be negotiated 
in three stages until December 2004, the date of the 13 th GMS Ministerial Meeting. 
Specifically, the agreement's provisions deal with the issues of border crossing 
fon-nalities, cross-border transport of goods and people, requirements for the 
admittance of road vehicles for cross-border traffic, exchange of commercial traffic 
rights, and infrastructure (Parts II-VII). Regarding an institutional framework, 
member states 'will each establish a permanent National Transport Facilitation 
Committee chaired by a Minister or vice Minister or its equivalent. ' The respective 
committees' representatives will form a Joint Committee, which in turn 'will 
monitor and assess the functioning of the Agreement. It will serve as a platform for 
discussion, a forum for amicable settlement of disputes, and it may address advice to 
the Contracting Parties and fon-nulate proposals for amendment of the Agreement' 
(Part VHI, Art. 28 and 29). 
82 For a map of the agreement see Appendix. 
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The provisions of the agreement indicate the ASEANisation of the GMS by 
settling disputes 'amicably' and introducing 'flexibility' in carrying out the 
agreement. Non-binding commitments and voluntary participation in GMS projects, 
according to political will and/or sufficient national capabilities mark a subregion of 
different integrational. speed. It appears that this form of cooperation, which leaves 
countries space and time for development and political decisions, is the only way for 
GMS countries to cooperate given the hist ory of the area shown in Section One of 
this chapter. The committee governance mentioned above helps creating trust and 
consensus about the working programme, and it accommodates diverging views of 
development in a pragmatic fashion of cooperation in which form follows principle. 
We shall see in the next chapter how China and Vietnam cooperate in the GMS 
despite diverging foreign policy interests, guided by a system of consultation, which 
resembles the committee governance in the GMS. It should be noted, however, that 
the ASEAN way was stirred in 2003, when Thailand and Singapore moved to use 
EU-style peer pressure to speed up integration: the two goverm-nents 'skirted 
traditional consensus-driven decision-making by forging bilateral trade agreements 
and launching bold unilateral measures that they hope will pull the rest of Ascan 
along in their wake' in order to stem growing competition from China and India. The 
idea is to '[i]mplement their own trade liberalization measures that don't need 
approval by all 10 members of Asean, then invite everyone else to sign on' before 
AFTA can take effect in 2020. The 'two plus x' model has already taken shape in the 
field of air cargo, with the Philippines, Cambodia and Brunei having expressed 
interest in joining Singapore and Thailand. Furthermore, Singapore reached a 
landmark deal with the US in 2003. Thailand has just concluded a free-trade 
agreement with India and is in the process of negotiating similar agreements with 
China and the United States to make up for slow tariff-cutting within ASEAN 
(Vatikiotis and McBeth, 2003: 16). 83 
Apart from voluntary implementation of projects, the GMS is subdivided by 
rivalling cooperation schemes, a situation which mirrors ASEAN's 
subregionalisation. The essential nature of them is their small-scale character: they 
have, apart from ASEAN-MB, fewer members than the GMS. They consist ofi. 
* the ASEAN-led ASEAN-Mekong Basin Development Cooperation 
(ASEAN-MB); 
83 For more on the Thai-US negotiations see Agence France-Press, 14 October 2003 
and US-ASEANBusiness Council, 23 March 2004. 
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the ESCAP-oriented Mekong River Commission (MRC) of Vietnam, Laos, 
Cambodia and Thailand; 
the Japanese-initiated Forum for Comprehensive Development in Indochina 
(FCDI); 
the Quadripartite Economic Cooperation (QEC) or Golden Quadrangle of 
China, Myanmar, Thailand and Laos; the QEC ran into trouble when 
Thailand announced in April 2003, that it would suspend participation from 
the project, which involves blasting of rapids, after the Thai military had 
warned that a faster flowing Mekong might alter the border between Laos 
and Thailand (Wain, 26 August 2004a); and in 2004, the Chinese side 
indicated that it would not continue with plans of clearing the Mekong 
between Chiang Saen and Luang Prabang due to heavy criticism and 
increasing hostilities of Thai villagers and increasing concerns voiced 
diplomatically in Cambodia and Vietnam about the impacts of changes to the 
Mekong (ibid. ); 
the Japan-ASEAN-led AEM-MITI/METI Working Group on Economic 
Cooperation in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar; 
the Ayeyawadi-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy 
(ACMECS) of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Myanmar, first announced on 
29 April 2003 by Thailand's Premier Thaksin Shinawatra and formally 
established in Bagan, Myanmar (Bagan Declaration) on 12 November 2003 
(Vietnam joined the group on 10 May 2004); 
the Emerald Triangle Cooperation Framework on Tourism (Thailand, Laos, 
Cambodia), established in Pakse, Laos, on 2 August 2003; the founding 
document is the Pakýe Declaration on Tourisin Cooperation in the Einerald 
Triangle). 
Table 10: Institutional Arrangements in the Mekong Basin 
GMS ASEAN-: i MRC FcDI 
A Qic QEc AUI- AGS46M 
MM, ; 
Emerdd 
waftzic 
Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam 
Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia 
Laos Laos Laos Laos Laos Laos Laos Laos 
Thailand Thailand Thailand Thailand Thailand Thailand 
- 185- 
Myarunar Myanmar Myanmar Myanmar Myarimar 
China China China 
The division of ASEAN into growth triangles is thus repeated in the division 
of the GMS into further subregions. Medhi Krongkaew used the plural to describe 
the GMS as 'growth areas' (Krongkaew, 2000: 49), displaying the difficult nature of 
cooperation in the Greater Mekong Subregion. However, a positive development in 
this regard is that the splitting of the GMS in small regions could spark hopes in that 
the subregion will be built from below which could improve economic and political 
cohesion. As of now, however, the name 'subregion' is misleading in that it pretends 
to be economically and politically a single entity, which in fact does not exist. The 
GMS is split into a range of small projects which scrape home under the name of 
GMS under the roof of the ADB. Furthermore, subregional initiatives link Mekong 
countries to South Asia through natural phenomena such as a common coastline or a 
river, a development which calls to mind Scalapino's 'natural economic territories' 
(Scalapino, 1991/92: 20-21) and Ohmae's rather extreme and unrealistic statement 
(given the countries' economic, political and cultural differences) of a 'borderless 
world' (Ohmae, 1996: 80): the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical 
and Economic Cooperation, BIMSTEC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand; established in Bangkok on 6 June 1997); and the Mekong-Ganga 
Cooperation (Thailand, Myamar, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, India; established in 
Vientiane on 10 November 2000). Another cooperation is the Indian Ocean Rim 
Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), but of the Mekong countries only 
Thailand is involved. 
The result is that the GMS is split into smaller entities in two ways: firstly, 
GMS projects - due to their flexibility in implementation - have varying 
participants; and, secondly, after the GMS was established in 1992, independent 
organisations have joined the Mekong area with overlapping membership. 
Coordination among these organisations is virtually impossible (interview with a 
Burmese researcher in Hanoi in May 2004). These independent organisations have 
different donors and different lead countries or organisations. Therefore, they 
embody different interests and goals, and hence carry the danger of a clash of 
interests (Wcatherbee, 1997), such as the QEC and the MRC (Kristensen, 2001c). As 
Mya Than and George Abonyi emphasised, more coordination is necessary (Mya 
Than and George Abonyi, 2001: 133) in order to 'minimize duplication [of funding] 
and maximize investment' (Weatherbee 1997: 172). External actors hence contribute 
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not only positively, but also negatively to the development of the Mekong basin in 
general and the Greater Mekong Subregion in particular. Lack of coordination 
occurs despite mutual observer status. The GMS, MRC, ASEAN-MB, FCDI and 
AEM-MITI already track and watch each other to explore possibilities for 
programmatic and other cooperation. As a result, the decision was made to 'broaden 
participation in deliberations through observer status': at the 6 th GMS Ministerial 
Meeting in August 1996, the non-riparian ASEAN states attended, as did observers 
from the Japanese government, the AEM-MITI Working Group, and the Mekong 
River Commission, that is, 'all of the parties directly involved in Mekong River 
Basin development' (Weatherbee 1997: 172). The arrangement remained the case 
during the following GMS Ministerial Meetings. This development shows that the 
GMS has to go a long way before it can be regarded as a coherent economic group. 
This gives rise to a situation, in which Vietnam will not be able to tie China's 
foreign policy in a multilateral forum. Although with regard to China's regional 
orientation, Beijing seeks long-term cooperation in the subregion, and the work 
programme of the GMS provides a list of items on which China. is willing to 
cooperate; yet Beijing does not seem willing to alienate sovereignty on these issues. 
The globally-oriented foreign policy, however, seeks to keep a free hand and views 
regional cooperation bodies as vehicle to achieve broader foreign policy goals, 
among which the repelling of US influence is high on China's agenda. In this way, 
loosely knit cooperative bodies serve China's regional and global aims. The issue 
will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
Coming back to coordination between the various cooperation projects in the 
subregion, it seems that the effort to grant mutual observer status was not enough: in 
the light of the QEC's 2001 Agreement on Commercial Navigation on the Lancang- 
Mekong River, and the resulting diverging interests between the environmentally 
more sensitive Mekong River Conu-nission and the economically oriented QEC, 
Joern Kristensen, the then chief executive of the Mekong River Commission, put 
forward the following request: 
With many new developments in the Greater Mekong Sub-region on the 
drawing table, in the pipeline or already under way, and with a Mekong 
region knit closer by its growing economic links with China, the time is 
ripe for all parties involved - the Asian Development Bank, United 
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 
Mekong River Commission, World Bank, United Nations Development 
Programme, a large group of bilateral donor agencies and civil society 
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groups - to sit down with the six countries sharing the river, in 
recognition of existing conventions and agreements, and discuss due 
process for Mekong-related natural resource planning. The challenge, as 
always, is to find ways to manage the development so that the benefits 
are shared equally and hann to the environment is minimized. The 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations could lend its weight to support 
such a process (Kristensen, 2001b). 
The QEC's agreement was seen as a direct challenge to the MRC's 1995 
inaugural Agreenient on Cooperation for the Sustainable Developinent of the 
Mekong River Basin, 'which has the status of an international treaty' (Kristensen, 
2001c), and was described as 'a perfect example of the real demands on the 
resources of the Mekong, the drive for development in the Mekong Region and the 
pressures that cooperation and development bring' (Kristensen, 2001 a). The purpose 
of the QEC agreement is to open a major shipping route from Simao in the province 
of Yunnan via Luang Prabang in Laos and into the Northeast of Thailand (see also 
Do Van Bach, 2000: 151-152). This indicates Lao interest in subregional. Mekong 
cooperation, namely to become a transhipment place for transportation between its 
four neighbours China, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, and to boost its 
hydropower earnings by forging close relationships with its neighbouring countries. 
Here, again, domestic policy demands inform the conduct of foreign affairs. 
5.3. Conclusion 
The historical events examined in Section One of this chapter can be seen as 
preconditions to the situation analYsed in Section Two. The development of an 
interest in cooperation on the side of China's and Vietnam's governments, 
Vietnam's acknowledgement of China's powerful economic and political position, 
and both countries' interests in stable relations with Southeast Asian countries 
(although for partially different purposes: see Chapter Six) all made Mekong 
cooperation possible. 
Helped by the ADB as independent mediator, the Mekong, most of the time 
until the early 1990s a division line, to some extent mirrored the development in the 
Sino-Vietnamese border areas in that it became increasingly regarded as potential 
means of cooperation in order to realise national interests as countries returned from 
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ideology to pragmatism and central governments, subnational units and individuals 
picked up pre-colonial and pre-Cold War trade routes. Realisation of the national 
interest and the awareness of the transnationality of issues of non-traditional security 
as part of the national interest helped to forward the idea of multilateral cooperation, 
blurred the lines between the domains of foreign and domestic policy and mixed 
high and low politics in times of the 'new regionalism' in the form of 'growth areas' 
in Northeast and Southeast Asia. Issues of non-traditional security oflen materialised 
as issues involving several central ministries as well as border localities (such as in 
cases of smuggling or transboundary rivers). Subnational units and central 
governments saw their interests at stake over the same issues, while non-state actors 
involved themselves in searching for solutions to transnational issues (NGOs, UN 
agencies) or to advance local business agendas (firms), thereby forming a system of 
multi-track processes. In this system, decision-making and institution-building may 
become more complex as more actors become involved, which form links across the 
three layers of state, substate and non-state and which represent diverse interests (see 
for instance in Chapter 6.1.2. the World Bank consultations in the planning phase of 
the Nam Theun 2 Dam). Yet, for the GMS, states are the dominant decision-making 
authorities, with NGOs, UN agencies, firms and subnational units acting within the 
constraints of a framework set by central governments. This is especially true for the 
still relatively unitary states of China and Vietnam. 
Despite the convergence of expectations of cooperation among the six member 
countries, it remains difficult to coordinate the policies of the six countries involved. 
The GMS work programme represents the lowest common denominator of the six 
riparian states. This is also a reason why other cooperation projects with fewer 
members have joined the GMS in the Mekong region. They seem to give evidence to - 
the idea that cooperation becomes more difficult the more actors are involved. 
Having emerged from the devastations of the Cold War, the structural design 
that was developed for the GMS followed ASEAN patterns of a 'soft regionalism. ' 
Since the new regionalism did not anymore automatically put integration in a supra- 
national state on the agenda of states, cooperation in the GMS started in a rather 
relaxed atmosphere with no clear deadlines and no legally binding rules. This way 
cooperation also gave birth to the 'two plus' principle of the GMS, under which two 
members can pursue activities within the GMS framework, which do not need the 
participation or consent of all of the six GMS members. Regularised meetings of an 
array of specialised and general meetings established trust between former 
adversaries and led to stable patterns of cooperation in a system of committee 
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governance, which is based on general principles, norms and procedural guidelines. 
More transparency followed in the wake through extensive infon-nation exchanges in 
the working groups and ministerial meetings. 
While cooperating in a loose structure, the GMS is turned into a region, which 
is being prepared for globalisation with the introduction and expansion of 
substructures such as infrastructure, human resources development and streamlined 
border crossing regulations. By doing so, in accordance with the phenomenon of the 
new regionalism, the GMS is developed as a region in a process of regionalisation, 
which at the same time prepares it for globalisation. China and Vietnam, as well as 
the other four GMS countries, use it for various purposes, among them partially 
diverging globally-oriented foreign policy purposes, but also for the development of 
their national or local economies, for the alleviation of poverty, the eradication of 
cross-border crime and other non-traditional and human security issues, which 
challenge the authority and problem-solving capacity of national governments. 
Domestic policy thus informs the interest of central governments in multilateral 
cooperation. 
Chapter Six will now explore this pattern in relation to Vietnam's and China's 
foreign affairs and the relevance for cooperation in the Greater Mekong Subregion. 
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Chapter 6 
The GMS and Foreign Policy: The China-Vietnam Dimension 
This chapter is devoted to the exploration and examination of Vietnam's and 
China's foreign policies as they become manifest in cooperation in the Greater 
Mekong Subregion. The local and global dimensions of these foreign policies will be 
analysed, hence the potential dual character of the foreign policies mentioned in the 
research questions at the end of Section One of Chapter One, and the effects this has 
on GMS cooperation. Water cooperation will be of relevance again, especially in the 
sections on Vietnam and the issues this constitutes for Vietnam's relations with 
China. 
In a first step, Vietnam's general foreign policy layout will be discussed and 
then related to Vietnam's foreign policy designs in the Greater Mekong Subregion 
and the goals Vietnam's foreign policy aims to attain with particular relevance to 
China. In a next step, the same method will be applied to China: first, Beijing's 
general foreign policy will be discussed, followed by an analysis of Beijing's 
strategies towards GMS cooperation. 
The last section of this chapter examines cooperation in the Sino-Vietnamese 
border regions, which are part of the GMS framework. The section accordingly 
focuses on the role and actions of subnational units, namely the border provinces 
north and south of the Chinese-Vietnamese border. 
6.1. Vietnam and the GMS 
6.1.1. General remarks: the relevance of Southeast Asia for Vietnam's 
post-Cold War foreign policy 
Vietnam's re-orientation in foreign policy and the interest in joining Southeast 
Asian cooperation schemes not only reflected Vietnam's need to escape the virtually 
complete diplomatic and economic isolation after Gorbachev's reforms, but also 
represented 'a Vietnamese quest to find a niche for itself other than being an 
appendage of China's or being the odd man out between China and ASEAN' 
(Klintworth, 1990: 11). Hanoi's accession to ASEAN in July 1995, after having 
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signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and having acquired observer status in 
July 1992, is generally seen as a major achievement of Vietnam as regards 
accomplished national security and enhanced political weight. 
Vietnamese governmental advisors and foreign policy analysts, the author 
interviewed in Hanoi in summer 2004, explained the global changes as follows: 
prior to the mid-1970s, when China and Vietnam were 'lips and teeth', China 
supported Vietnam's struggle for independence. Then, it was critically noted, 
Vietnam amended the constitution in which China was explicitly called a threat and 
short-term enemy, while the US was the long-term enemy. In 1988, in response to 
Soviet policy changes and domestic economic difficulties, Vietnam changed its 
foreign policy and the sentence in the constitution referring to China and the US was 
erased. 
This change in foreign policy brought about a new security perception, which 
marked a change from a Vietnam which viewed itself as part of the socialist bloc, to 
doi inoi as new guideline according to which foreign policy was adjusted. In 
addition, the security concept changed from traditional security to the achievement 
of comprehensive security, which adds the transnational dimension of human 
security to the security agenda of states. Vietnam set out to achieve good relations 
with all countries, and in particular the major powers (Japan, China, the United 
States and the EU), in order to diversify its foreign relations and investment and 
back up the reforms of doi inoi. In these considerations of diversifying investment 
sources and balancing the influence on China in Vietnam, China is seen as a 
neighbour and a great power, a fact which 'Vietnam sometimes forgets. ' China's 
power is something that has to be acknowledged, its influence and rise is inevitable. 
Although it was explicitly said during the inter-views with senior Vietnamese foreign 
policy analysts in Hanoi in summer 2004 that there is no common interest in the 
foreign policy objectives between Vietnam and China, both countries nevertheless 
have to cooperate to ensure a peaceful environment. To achieve this, there must be a 
balance of influence in the region between the EU, India, Russia, the US and China. 
With Vietnam being 'a ball in the game between the great powers', the balance of 
power is very important for Vietnam in order to ensure the attainment of Vietnam's 
domestic reform and foreign policy goals. 
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The relationship between Vietnam and China is of a mixed character, they are 
partners as well as competitors. Regarding economics, Vietnam - as most of 
ASEAN - sees China's growth as both a challenge and an opportunity. 
The opportunities are threefold: 
1) ASEAN countries can take advantage of the Chinese market, such as selling 
agricultural goods to China at a high price; 
2) China's growth is the opportunity to renovate Vietnam's economic 
management and technology in the face of Chinese competition; 
3) in terms of security, a poor China is much more dangerous that a prosperous 
China. A wealthy China can ensure the security in the region better than a 
poor China, because economic integration restraints China and makes it 
consider the cost of leading a war in the region. Apart from the challenges, 
China's expanding economy can provide benefits, and an economic 
expansion reduces China's ambitions to expand its influence through military 
means. 
However, this constructive or even positive view of China's role in the 
bilateral relations between China and Vietnam was only rarely mentioned in the 
interviews with foreign policy analysts in Hanoi in summer 2004. In most of the 
interviews, attitudes regarding security policy were explicitly negative: the view 
emerged that China 'cannot go east' because it would interfere with Japanese and 
Korean interests and US military protection of both countries. It 'cannot go north' 
because there is Russia. So it 'goes south' with the aim to get Taiwan back, 
potentially through economic domination of mainland Chinese investment in 
Taiwan, and then after this problem is solved to exert pressure on Vietnam for a 
solution of the Paracel problem and further contending claims in the South China 
Sea. Frustration in Vietnam about Beijing's conduct of foreign affairs seems to sit 
deep. In this picture, China's embrace of the TAC appears as a largely cosmetic 
alteration of Beijing's assertive foreign policy behaviour and foreign policy goals. 
This frustration is voiced in the statement that 'deep in our hearts, we do not want to 
deal with China. Regardless of all official pronouncements, China is a threat and it is 
not clear where it is heading to. But we cannot but acknowledge China's presence. ' 
The result of the challenge posed by Vietnam's Janus-faced view of China is a 
balancing act in particular between China and the United States. The carefully 
elaborated foreign policy was temporarily upset under Secretary-General Le Kha 
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Phieu84 in favour of an explicit pro-China policy. Fundamentally, Phieu acted 
outside the constraints of the collective leadership principle and was sharply attacked 
for pursuing a policy that emphasised relations with socialist and neighbouring states 
but neglected the US and ASEAN (Abuza, 2002: 139-141). Nevertheless, the China- 
tilt of Phieu shows a fundamental issue, namely that China is Vietnam's ally in 
fending off the threat of peaceful evolution and a model in sustaining one-party rule 
while further liberalising the economy in order to maintain political stability, and, 
hence, one-party rule. In 2000, while heading a VCP delegation to China for the 
occasion of one of the conferences mentioned above on combining ideology, one- 
party rule and economic reform, Phieu went so far as to pronounce that 'if China 
succeeds in its reform, then we'll succeed. If China fails, we'll fail' (Chanda, 
2000: 32). 
Despite the eagerness, with which the foreign policy administration in Hanoi 
tries to improve relations with the United States, there is considerable uneasiness 
about US policy on the side of Vietnam: it was repeatedly voiced during the 
interviews that the United States is reluctant to see closer East Asian cooperation 
arise - something Vietnam itself wishes to see to make China's foreign policy 
predictable: US influence on Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines could shrink in 
a close East Asian cooperation scheme. Hence, the US is reluctant to see a closer 
integrated Southeast Asia emerging. This holds also true for China, which exerts 
influence through bilateral relations in Myanmar, and Japan, which has formidable 
relations with Thailand and Singapore. In the view of the interviewees, the efforts 
with which Japan and the US sign bilateral free-trade agreements with individual 
ASEAN countries mean that cooperation within ASEAN is not only made more 
difficult, but that Washington and Tokyo have no desire of letting Northeast and 
Southeast Asia become a more integrated institution, which might eventually fall 
under the influence of an emerging China. This view was mirrored in a paper 
published in 2004 in Vietnam's main Southeast Asian studies journal Ngllidn clýll 
D6ng Nain 4 (Southeast Asian Studies). In the paper, Hoang Khac Nam expressed 
the opinion that it would be unacceptable for the US to let Southeast Asian countries 
come under the influence of an assertive China while the influence of the US is in 
decline, especially against the prospect that a regional cooperation under ASEAN+3 
could further reduce the role of the United States in East Asia (Hoang Khac Nam, 
84 Le Kha Phieu was elected at the 4 th Plenum of the 8"' Central Committee, 26 
December 1997, and voted out of office at the 91h Party Congress in April 2001. 
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2004: 79). Furthermore, Hoang Khac Nam points out that security in East Asia 
cannot be achieved by regional bodies alone but relies on participation from outside 
the region: all security mechanisms, be it the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences, 
the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty, the CSCAP, 
the Japan-US security treaty, the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, the 
Quadripartite Party Meetings (US, China, North Korea and South Korea), the party 
meetings of the US, Japan and North Korea, or the ARF include powers from 
outside the region (Hoang Khac Nam, 2004: 79). Nam's notion that the ARF does 
not wield real power but is 'simply a consultative platform' (Hoang Khac Nam, 
2004: 78) expresses disappointment and conveys Vietnam's wish to turn Southeast 
Asia into a closer integrated region. In the light of post-Cold War antagonisms 
China-US and China-Japan, and the unresolved issues of Taiwan, North Korea and 
the South China Sea - all of them having the potential of leading to violent conflict 
-, attempts to increase ASEAN's influence in the creation of security have failed 
altogether (Hoang Khac Nam, 2004: 78). In the same vein, Nguyen Manh Hung 
criticised ASEAN as being 'unable to address key regional security issues as 
evidenced by the failure of the Asian Regional Forum to adopt a code of conduct in 
the South China Sea in July 2001' (Nguyen Manh Hung, 2002). 85 
The US role was also an important issue in the discussions on the East Asian 
Economic Caucus, an idea floated at the beginning of the 1990s by Malaysia but 
opposed by the US for its exclusiveness, which would have left Washington out. 
After the failure of EAEC, the new concept of an East Asian Community (EAQ 
emerged from the ASEAN summit of November 2004 in Vientiane. The EAC (the 
first summit is to be hosted by Malaysia in 2005) has the goal of forming a cohesive 
East Asian economic and security region (The Econoinist, 11 December 2004: 62). 
China, Japan, South Korea and Pakistan have signed ASEAN's TAC, and free-trade 
deals with ASEAN are in the making in all three of the countries. Similar difficulties 
have arisen for the envisaged ASEAN Security Community (ASQ, which is planned 
along with the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) and the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC). The three pillars of a future closer integrated region 
by 2020 were agreed at the Bali summit in October 2003. Indonesia already fears 
that the EAC might overshadow ASEAN. Moreover, the competition between China 
and Japan is a serious obstacle to the attainment of an East Asian bloc (The 
85 For a critique of the Declaration on the Conduct ofParties in the South China Sea 
(ASEAN, 2002c), signed on the 8h ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh in 
November 2002, see Wain, 2002: 26. 
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Econoinist, II December 2004: 62). The exclusion of the US would rob Washington 
of influence in the region, as it is included in many of the current discussion 
platfonns, such as APEC and the ARE Taking into account China's military and 
economic ascendancy, the EAC 'will give China an unrivalled chance to shine' (The 
Econondst, II December 2004: 62), thereby skipping the balance of power between 
Japan, China, the US and possibly India, and thus a balance, which Vietnam hopes 
will detain Chinese influence. 
According to Klintworth's 1990 analysis, Vietnam's security had already been 
assured since the late 1980s: in the course of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, 
Vietnam 'isolated the Khmer Rouge internationally and [ ... ] crippled them militarily 
at least insofar as Vietnam's border security is concerned. ' Regarding its second 
border problem in the north, Vietnam 'has demonstrated a substantial defence 
capability on the Sino/Vietnamese border and shown that it is prepared to bear a 
disproportionate cost to protect its independence. Begrudged though it may be, 
China respects Vietnam's military power. ' Importantly, Beijing started a moderated 
Indochina policy in early 1989, but was halted by the Tiananmen incident. The 
changes were a result of Chinese policy advisors recommending a 'less vindictive 
Chinese policy towards Hanoi. ' Former Vice Premier Wu Xueqian stated that China 
and Vietnam are 'still brothers and comrades', a hint that China also wanted to 
restore relations. This aim was visible in China giving up support for the Khmer 
Rouge (Klintworth, 1990: 6-7), albeit only after the US had stopped supporting them 
and China remained the only. country doing so. Having achieved its national security 
early on, Vietnam, from the late 1980s onwards, was thus able to concentrate on 
domestic reform (Klintworth, 1990: 6). A crucial factor, however, was Soviet 
support between the late 1970s and 1980s, showing that Vietnam essentially relied 
on alliance building to ensure its national security. 
6.1.2. Vietnam in the GMS 
Having left alliance building behind, Vietnam needed the support of regional 
organisations in the post-Cold War world. This is expressed in the desire that 
Southeast Asian cooperation schemes become more integrated towards the style of 
the European Union (personal interviews with Vietnamese researchers and 
goverm-nental advisors in Hanoi in summer 2004). The particular problem here is 
that only with China's participation are cooperation projects in the Mekong area a 
worthwhile undertaking. For instance, the Mekong River Commission needs China's 
cooperation if not actual membership as China controls the Mekong's source; and 
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the GMS has the Mekong river as unifying element and central source for energy 
production, irrigation and transportation development. Berman, as mentioned earlier 
in this study, pointed out: 
The fact that so many hopes for major development schemes are placed 
on the availability of water from the Lancang (Mekong) is both a cause 
for anxiety and a motivation to cooperate among the six GMS countries. 
Only China, controlling 50% of the river's headwaters, remains in a 
position to develop the river unilaterally (Berman, 1998: Chapter 
II. C. 1. ). 
These constellations of power and interest convey direct importance on the 
GMS and point out a similar dilemma for the Mekong states, which has already 
beset ASEAN countries: China is viewed as both an opportunity and a threat. 
Vietnam, having joined ASEAN, employs a strategy that focuses on extending 
the dialogue with China while trying to strengthen the mutual economic tiCS86; being 
economically attractive to other countries as well, such as Russia and Japan, 
increases Hanoi's international stand and economic strength and, as a consequence, 
could provide it with the ability to assert itself politically vis-A-vis its big neighbour 
(Will, 1999: 305-306). GMS cooperation is an important stepping stone to serve this 
purpose. As mentioned earlier, the GMS is the only subregional cooperation scheme 
in the Mekong basin that includes all Mekong riparian states and unites them in a 
common purpose; and at the same time, the GMS is the only subregional 
cooperation endeavour, which includes both China and Vietnam. Steps towards 
economic cooperation were taken quickly in the wake of Vietnam's above 
mentioned announcement of 6 January 1989 to withdraw from Cambodia by 
September 1989: the border was re-opened in February 1989, air traffic was resumed 
in 1992, clearing of the 120 minefields started in 1993 and direct mail service 
between Lang Son and Guangxi was established in 1999.87 
86 For statistical data on economic relations see Nguyen Duy Quy, 2000: p. 14. The 
data used by Nguyen Duy Quy was published by Nguyen The Tang, Director of 
the Center for Researches on China. 
87 For more details see the table on Sino-Vietnamese visits in the Appendix. 
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China's economic and political power position and its - from Vietnam's point 
of vieNv - problematic strategy of 1) building strong ties with Southeast Asia and 2) 
using Southeast Asia as a large market for exports from Yunnan and Guangxi (for 
more see section 4) produces an element of dependence for Vietnam on China. The 
differences over the East Sea (South China Sea), especially the use of Truong Sa 
(Spratly) and Hoang Sa (Paracel) islands and export competition in the international 
market, especially after China's accession to WTO, all pose problems. As a result, 
the ultimate goal of Hanoi's foreign policy is to remain independent of China in 
economic and political affairs by 'expanding its economic potential' and developing 
good relations with the US, Japan and the EU (Nguyen Than Duc, 2002: 4-5), and - 
recently - India. This is the application of the foreign policy of diversifying and 
multilateralising foreign economic relations of 1991, a consequence of doi inoi. In 
discussion with scholars in Vietnam, the importance of the presence of the great 
non-Asian powers in Northeast and Southeast Asia in order to create a balance of 
power situation was repeatedly emphasised. Apart from the usual countries and 
regions - the EU, US and Japan - the government takes particular notice of the rise 
of India. In summer 2004, the Foreign Ministry's ASEAN department was preparing 
a workshop on India-ASEAN relations. This also shows the importance Hanoi 
attaches to a multilateral expansion of ASEAN's foreign relations. It additionally 
shows that the government views itself as an actor within ASEAN and the 
significance the government attaches to Vietnam's position in the grouping. So far, 
however, the strategy has been of limited successfulness. This is apparent in the fact 
that there is a deep frustration in Vietnam about Beijing's conduct of foreign affairs, 
expressed in the repeated - and already mentioned - statement that 'deep in our 
hearts, we do not want to deal with China. Regardless of all official 
pronouncements, China is a threat and it is not clear where it is heading to. But we 
cannot but acknowledge China's presence. ' Specific to the GMS is the situation that 
Vietnam's position as last in the line of Mekong countries produces dependence on 
cooperation with upstream countries and especially with China, the most beneficial 
of which would be a cohesive region with legally binding provisions. 
The Greater Mekong Subregion is of importance to Vietnam in the following 
aspects (the bullet points are personal interviews with senior academics and foreign 
policy advisors in Hanoi in summer 2004): 
maritime borders: Gulf of Tongkin, South China Sea. Solutions to these 
conflicts will take time as they involve the alienation of territorial 
sovereignty. Vietnam recently sent a tourist group to the Spratlys, which 
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according to the interviewees did not violate territorial sovereignty of China 
or other countries. Rather on the contrary: one interviewee plainly stated that 
'it is only normal. ' The South China Sea is not only a Vietnam-China issue 
but involves the whole region. It therefore needs a multilateral approach. The 
South China Sea issue is the 'most complicated' issue in Vietnam-China and 
ASEAN-China relations. 'Only if there are good relations in the GMS will 
there be good relations in the South China Sea. ' The contending claims for 
gas and oil fields are furthermore not merely of territorial nature, but involve 
the issue of energy security and the ability to maintain economic growth; 
China is setting up alliance circles within ASEAN to buffer against the 
United States, which means that both the region and individual countries are 
important for China. Therefore, it is in the strategic interest of China to 
cultivate relations with regional countries, which at the same time carries the 
danger of Chinese domination of the countries in the buffer zone; 
secure water resources; 
use of water resources: dam-building and irrigation: China's dam-building 
activities are of concern in Vietnam as regards the ecology of the agricultural 
intensive Mekong delta. There is, however, no bilateral framework for these 
problems between Vietnam and China, but (only) an 'emerging multilateral 
framework' within the GMS. However, there are no clear norms and 
institutions for problem-solving within the GMS. There is no 
institutionalisation, but only an 'upgrade of cooperation', which makes it 
difficult for Vietnam to exert pressure on China's policies towards the 
subregion through the structure of the GMS (for the dam issue see later in 
this chapter); 
transnational crime (human and drug trafficking, smuggling): the government 
has to control border trade. The amount of illegal or at least informal trade is 
higher than the legal trade. There is, however, 'no effective way to stop 
illegal trade. ' Measures to be taken are related to an improvement of border 
control, for instance the introduction of border crossing formalities such as 
visas, vehicle registration, and one-stop controls; 
Vietnam's investment in China is very low, which results in a growing trade 
imbalance. Vietnam's focus since the end of the Cold War is its economic 
development, since lagging behind economically is the greatest threat to 
Vietnam's security. To develop economically, Vietnam needs to a stable and 
peaceful envirom-nent. The northern part of the country, which borders 
China, can acquire security only through the settlement of territorial disputes 
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with China (land border and demarcation of the Gulf of Tongkin) and the 
boost of economic ties between both countries, which is not only important 
for peaceful relations with China, but also for Vietnam's integration in the 
world and its attractiveness for international investors; 
* border trade: low-price Chinese products enter Vietnam, which endangers the 
local economy and skips the trade balance further in China's favour; 
'push Vietnam's relations with Thailand and China' and 'enhance intra- 
ASEAN relations through GMS cooperation. ' Since the end of the Cold War, 
the region has experienced increasing regionalisation and bilateral as well as 
multilateral activities. The GMS can help improving these trends in the 
region by enhancing the relations between China and Vietnam and eliminate 
bilateral threats to comprehensive security. However, the national interests 
between China and Vietnam differ, leading to differences in foreign policy. 
Therefore, 'good-will is important to advance cooperation. ' As a common 
denominator, Vietnam and China share a border and a culture, and both 
countries need peace and stability, which makes war undesirable but not 
impossible. Based on this, a modus vivendi between China and Vietnam can 
be established in order to advance relations bilaterally and within the GMS. 
The challenges ahead are that the GMS includes China, but China is not an 
ASEAN country, a situation in which China has managed not to tic itself into 
binding commitments towards Southeast Asian countries. Therefore, 'the 
biggest question for Vietnam is how to deal with China? ' It is a powerful 
country that controls the Mekong's source, and combined with its economic 
and political power is able to develop the river unilaterally without 
consideration for the concerns of downstream countries. The 'GMS should 
promote cooperation between ASEAN and China in a spill-over process. ' 
The overlapping membership is a chance to narrow the gap between ASEAN 
countries. Development within the GMS is the central cooperation endeavour 
for the enhancement of relations in ASEAN; 
e floods affect the ecology and agriculture of the Mekong delta: floods become 
worse each year, especially affecting Vietnam's Mekong delta and 
Cambodia's Tonle Sap. A particular problem in this regard is the Lancang 
Cascade in Yunnan (see below). 'Cambodia, Laos and southern Vietnam are 
agriculturally very intensive', and 'out of ordinary flooding has severe 
impacts on the agricultural output. ' 'Trade and environmental protection 
have to be harmonised. ' Therefore, in order to raise awareness for these 
problems, Vietnam 'would like to encourage scholarship in the scientific 
community of how to better harmonize people and the environment', since 
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there is already the awareness that national interest and sole profit-seeking 
behaviour is not beneficial for developing the Mekong and that cooperation 
is necessary. The general problem here is that 'upstream countries put the 
emphasis more on trade, while downstream countries put the emphasis not 
only on trade but also on environmental protection. ' Cooperation on both 
issues should prevail in the future, not only the 'pushing of the national 
interest by the powerful upstream countries' in a situation, in which Vietnam 
is the last in the line of Mekong countries. 
The above list indicates that Vietnam attaches relevance to the GMS in issues 
that go beyond the direct scope of the subregion. Indeed, the interviews on GMS 
issues always revealed problems, which extend beyond the subregion and mostly 
involve China directly or indirectly. This highlights the strategic importance of the 
GMS in the foreign policy framework of Vietnam in general and Hanoi's relations 
with Beijing in particular. The GMS therefore has both regional and global 
implications for the leadership in Hanoi (the subnational units of the border 
localities will be discussed later in this chapter). In particular, during the interviews, 
hopes were voiced that GMS cooperation aside from its direct subregional tasks 
could also indirectly influence the following issues: 
solve the South China Sea problem through a 'spill-over process' and in 'a 
multilateral approach'; 
'enhance Vietnam's low investment in China': by enhancing investment in 
China, Vietnam is directly competing with Thailand for shares in the Chinese 
market. At the same time, Thailand and Vietnam are 'in competition' for a 
leading position within the GMS. Therefore, cross-border infrastructure 
development is of high importance, which puts the development of the 
border localities high on the agenda of both Vietnam and Thailand (for 
details on this see Section Three in this chapter); 
o border trade: low-price products entering Vietnam from China (see above); 
competition for FDI: by using mainland Southeast Asia as a gateway to the 
wider ASEAN region, China has an interest in using Thailand, Laos and 
Vietnam as transhipment centres to export its products of the landlocked 
south-western provinces. Here, again, Vietnam is in competition with 
Thailand (and Laos) for Chinese FDI. However, Vietnam does not only seek 
Chinese FDI, but also FDI from the major economic powers Japan, the 
United States and the European Union in order to diversify its sources of 
economic growth and not be dependent on China. We see here, however, that 
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China is an 'unavoidable player', calling to mind the above quote that China 
is simply there and Vietnam cannot but acknowledge China's presence: 
Consequently, Vietnam tries to diversify its political and economic support 
as far as possible; 
soften potential threats of China's military build-up by binding China into the 
subregion through a proliferation of transnational linkages; 
ASEAN: ASEAN is a loose grouping, the current formula for implementing 
decisions is '10-x. ' ASEAN cannot act as a coherent grouping, because the 
economic, cultural and strategic differences between all of the members are 
too strong. As a result, 'everybody is on the same boat, but the dreams are 
different. ' Moreover, the US and China have 'a bit of an incentive to keep 
this status quo. ' 'China has good relations with Myanmar, the US has good 
relations with Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines, Japan has good 
relations with Thailand and Singapore. ' So as a result, there are 'internal 
problems as well as external problems of generating support for building a 
stronger community. ' 
For enhancement of Vietnam's low investment in China, Vietnam's concerns 
regarding the trade balance in China's favour and a resulting Chinese domination of 
Vietnam's economy are acknowledged by Chinese scholar Gu Xiaosong. He argued 
that, at the national level, China and Vietnam 'have emphasized the normalization of 
political ties rather than economic exchange' (Gu, 2003: 2). Indeed, the majority of 
joint statements, pronouncements and announcements as well as official press 
coverage by the Chinese and Vietnamese media concern the improvement of 
political party-to-party and state-to-state relations with particular emphasis on the 
land and maritime borders; official press coverage of the economic side of the 
bilateral relations is relatively recent and has increased parallel to the decrease of the 
conflict over the maritime and land borders. 88 Still, however, focus on the economic 
side of bilateral relations is mostly confined to the sub-national level of border trade 
between Yunnan and Guangxi on the one side and Cao Bang, Lang Son, Quang 
Ninh, Ha Giang, Lao Cai and Lai Chau on the other side. 
88 For details see the table on high-level visits between 1990 and 2005 between 
China and Vietnam in the Appendix. 
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The feeling of the trade balance in China's favour is aggravated at a time when 
Chinese business people increasingly invest abroad, but also at a time of a 
prevalence of Japanese products in the region, for example Indonesia, which China's 
products pose competition to. In addition, the opening up of Cambodia after 
Vietnam's withdrawal opened a new market for China while Vietnam and Laos lost 
one (personal interview with a Japanese researcher in Hanoi in June 2004). 
A prime concern of Vietnam specific to the GMS is Chinese dam-building at 
the upper flow of the Mekong, which has the Chinese name of Lancangjiang. A 
major concern related to this problem is salinisation of the Mekong delta. This point 
is raised by Nguyen Than Duc: the benefits of the Mekong delta for rice production, 
navigation, irrigation, fishing, hydro-electric power and tourism, give Vietnam an 
almost natural interest in the well-being of the Mekong. The ecological issues 
concerning Vietnam are deforestation, erosion, salt intrusion due to declining water 
inflows, pollution and a loss of biodiversity. Floods are increasingly affecting 
agricultural development. To tackle the issues, Vietnam needs the cooperation of the 
upper Mekong countries. The reduction of water resources due to dams, power 
plants and irrigation of the upper Mekong countries, is becoming increasingly 
difficult and is a major problem in Vietnam's relations to China and raises the issue 
of future water conflicts. While GMS cooperation in other fields is promising, 
cooperation regarding water resources remains difficult, in particular as economic 
competition grows. Enhanced cross-border cooperation, the development of the 
East-West Corridor and the Forum for the Comprehensive Development of 
Indochina are designed to tackle the problems. Also, it is hoped that subregional 
cooperation will diminish the differences in economic development among ASEAN 
member states. With ASEAN facing financial constraints, resources from donors 
other than ASEAN have to be mobilised. It is hoped that subregional cooperation 
will fulfil this task and will even out economic differences (Nguyen Than Duc, 
2002: 1-2 and 2005: 119-120. For the environmental issues and arising conflicts see 
also Osbome, 2000). 
The environmental problems mentioned by Duc can be found roughly ten years 
earlier in the Mekong Mork Progrannne 1993 of the Interim Committee. The 
envisaged study Siltation and Channel Maintenance at the Mekong Entries (Viet 
Nanz), W. P. code: 3.6.16/86 (former 3.7.03/86), MKG/R. 86044/Rev. 3 (to be found 
in Mekong Secretariat, 1992: 123) addressed exactly Vietnam's concern about the 
Mekong delta and was explicitly related to the 'Mekong delta master plan', namely 
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soil erosion, basin-wide sedimentation and flash floods hazards, water pollution and 
salinisation of the delta. 
Table 11: Chinese Goals and Others' Worries 
ProJect/Date Of Chinese Perspective Perspective of Downstream Countries 
Implementation 
Dam at successful provision of reduced water flows during dry 
Manwan/ 1986 hydro-electric power for season in Laos 
(completed the area around 
1993) Kunming 
Dam at 
Dachaoshan/ 
1996 
(operational 
since 2001) 
Dam at reservoir (active storage 1. will increase water flow in dry 
Xiaowan/ capacity of 990 million season 
construction cubic metres and a 2. diverting water to Thailand's 
between 1999- waterhead of 248 northeast for irrigation and 
2012 metres), will dam back agricultural development 
the river for 169 krn 
Dam upstream 
from Jinghong/ 
construction 
between 2006- 
2013 
overall purpose of dams: 1. reduced fish catches (also 
1. 'clean' hydropower through overfishing and dam 
for Yunnan and projects 
in the Lower Mekong 
neighbouring provinces, countries 
Thailand and Cambodia) 
also for sale to Laos, 2. reduced wet season flow and 
Thailand, Myanmar and increased dry season flow 
Burma, with the result 3. evening out of flows has impact 
that 
on water levels of Cambodia's 
2. deforestation for fuel Tonle Sap as breeding ground for 
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Project/Date of 
Implementation 
Chinese Perspective Perspective of Downsaum Countries 
is reduced, and fish as less water comes in from the 
I emission of carbon 
Mekong during wet season - 60 per 
and sulphur dioxide is cent of 
the lake's flood level is 
reduced, too, thus 
thanks to the Mekong (plus 
positively affecting 
droughts and deforestation of areas 
global warming around 
the lake subject to flooding: 
fish-breeding cycle took place in 
4. evening out of water the flooded forests; decline of 
flow through cascade of woodland and increase in the 
eight dams between high amount of settlement in marginal 
and low levels according agricultural areas around the lake 
to seasons, i. e. increased will increase unwanted 
dry season flow and sedimentation, thus changing the 
reducing peak flow lake's depth) 
during flood season 
4. impact on subsistence agriculture 
5. greening of China for communities relying on 
6. minimizing of horticultural planting at the 
sediment Mekong banks as the waters 
7. facilitation of subside at 
the end of the wet season 
navigation 5. sediment discharge is a benefit to 
8. inundation of less 
Lower Mekong countries 
agricultural or bio- 
diverse forest only with 
the result that 
9. only a small 
population has to be 
resettled, result: 
10. protection of 
Southeast Asian forests; 
11. irrigation water 
provided for the dry 
Northeast of Thailand 
12. salinity in the 
Mekong delta held at 
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Project/Date of Chinese Perspective Perspective of DownWearn Countries 
Implementation 
bay through increased 
dry-season flow 
irrigation 1. reduced flsh catches, connected 
with 
2. decline in water flows 
clearing the river ship more and heavier 1. increased river flow and with it 
for better load to increase export erosion 
shipping (rocks, ability; increase the 2. pollution 
sandbars, maximum of ship weight 
rapids)/ under from 120 tonnes to 150, 
3. decline in fish catches 
way in Yunnan 300 and eventually 500 4. negative effect on tourism 
since 2001 tonnes through alteration of natural sites 
(e. g. river gorges) in Laos 
Vietnam's Mekong delta: 
produces 40 per cent of Vietnam's 
agricultural output and exports over 
a million and a half tonnes of rice 
annually 
1. deforestation during Second 
Indochina War in the Plain of 
Reeds to deny its being used by the 
communist forces => acid soils that 
wash out during the wet season into 
the delta with impacts on 
agriculture and fishing 
2. increasing salinity with an 
expanding population and 
increasing irrigation; salination is 
now stretching sixty kilometres 
upstream from the coastline; 
salination is also rising as the tidal 
effects reach further up the delta 
3. substantial unemployment and 
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Project/Date of 
Implementation 
Chinese Perspective Perspective of Downstream Countries 
growing incidence of poverty 
4. fertiliser run-off, increased 
irrigation and increasing salination. 
affect fish catch 
overall result: 
silt is no longer adding to the 
extension of the delta's coastline, 
which is suggestive of serious 
changes to the river's ecology 
Source: Osborne, 2000: 223-237; McConnack, 2001; Wain, 26 August 2004a and c. 
McCormack shows that in breaking away from the idea that engineering can 
solve the problem of water supply, energy production and agricultural irrigation, 
industrialised countries have been moving away from water resource management 
towards sustainability and accommodation, a process that was primarily set in 
motion with the 1992 Rio summit. Bruce Babbit, Secretary of the Interior under the 
Clinton administration, summariscd the new thinking: 
Occasionally, [ ... ] rivers overflow their 
banks and abandon old channels 
to create a new course, a process known to hydrologists as avulsion. Our 
national water resource policy is now undergoing an avulsive change, 
breaking from the past and heading into new channels. Traditional 
national water policy was characterized by large water diversion 
projects, typically with a massive dam as the centerpiece. [ ... ] We are 
now finding new and better ways to meet water needs without destroying 
fish runs, flooding prime agricultural lands, displacing local 
communities and drying up and polluting downstream wetlands. Our 
new water policy takes account of these ecological costs and seeks to 
wean policymakers from an addiction to dam building (McCormack, 
2001: 5-6 cited Babbit, 2000: 10-11). 
As shown above, Joern Kristensen, former CEO of the Mekong River 
Commission, represented an environmentalist view of the MRC, which the 
institution itself has been rather reluctant to follow. One problem is its institutional 
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weakness: according to a governmental official, Joem Kristensen stepped down from 
his post as CEO when he fell out with the member states due to his opposition of the 
successful and efficient secretariat moving from Phnom Penh to Vientiane (personal 
inter-view with a European senior official in Bonn in July 2003). Joern Kristensen 
left his post at the end of September 2003. The secretariat officially re-opened in 
Vientiane on 1 July 2004. Olivier Cogels was appointed new CEO on 9 August 
2004. The incident shows the institutional weakness of the MRC, which is 
dependent on the policies of the member states but cannot exert influence on 
members out of its institutional structure. Furthermore, during a conversation with a 
researcher at a water conference in Paris in December 2005, the issue was raised that 
with the new CEO in place, the belief has returned to the commission that 
technological solutions can provide the solution to whatever problem mankind is 
facing. It was this faith in technology that dominated the programme of the Mekong 
Committee of 1957. 
The province of Yunnan is said to have a potential of producing more than 
90,000 MW of electricity. A cascade of dams on the Mekong, the Lancang Cascade, 
is directly affecting the parts of the Mekong flowing into downstream countries. The 
cascade, when finished, will encompass eight dams, using a 700-metre drop in the 
750-km stretch in the middle and lower Lancang (McCormack, 2001: 15-18). The 
cascade is part of China's 'West-East Power Transmission' project, within which 
Yunnan already supplies the booming province of Guangdong with electricity 
(Stanway, 2005). 
Table 12: The Lancang Cascade89 
Gongguo- 
qiao 
Xiao- 
wan 
Man- 
wan 
Dachao- 
shan 
Nuozha- 
du 
Jing- 
hong 
Ganla- 
ba 
Meng- 
song 
Elevation 1,319 1,240 994 899 812 602 533 519 
Reservoir 
volume 
5.10 151.32 10.60 8.84 223.68 12.33 n. a. n. a. 
Installed 710 4,200 1,500 1,350 5,500 1,500 150 600 
89 The table including the notes are taken from McCormack, 2001: 16. 
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power 
Annual 
output 
40.60 188.90 78.05 67.00 237.77 80.59 7.80 33.80 
Wall 13090 292 126 110 254103 118 n. a. n. a. 
Status design 2002- 
2012 
1986- 
1996 
1996- 
2003 
pre fs. 2006- 
2013 
design design 
Notes: The dams listed (left to right) run from north to south. 1. Elevation is level of the dam's 
reservoir in meters above sea level. 2. Volume is reservoir holding capacity in hundred million cubic 
meters. 3. Installed power is installed power capacity in megawatts. 4. Annual output is annual 
electrical power output in hundred million kilowatt hours. 5. Wall is the height in meters of the main 
dam wall. 6. Status indicators are: already built; under construction (with years); feasibility stage 
(fs. ); pre-feasibility stage (pre f. s. ); or design stage. Table source: Hayao Adachi's website: 
http: //%vww. adachi. net/hgyao/Lancan102. jpp- (the site is not available anymore). See also David 
Plinston and He Darning, 'Water Resources and Hydropower in the Lancang River Basin, ' AD13 TA 
3139, Landcare Research New Zealand, May 2000,241-42 (figures differ slightly from those given 
by Hayao Adachi). 
McCormack points out that firstly the 'environmental consequences of the 
Cascade for the Lancang cannot be accurately predicted'; and, secondly, difficulties 
between China and downstream countries lie here, since 'China shows no interest in 
membership in the MRC, and little interest in consulting with its neighbors about its 
plans. ' Furthermore, 'although China decided in 1999 to go ahead with the 
construction of Xiaowan, the decision was not even mentioned during the World 
Commission on Dams meetings in Hanoi in February 2000' (McCormack, 2001: 17- 
18). When asked during a conference, if the irrigation and dam building issues are 
discussed at all between China and Vietnam, a leading Vietnamese scholar in Hanoi, 
tilting his head towards his Chinese colleague, said: 'The answer is always 
diplomatic' (personal interview with a Vietnamese senior academic in Hanoi in May 
2004). This shows that usage of the Mekong's waters by upstream countries has not 
yet been moderated. The GMS is of importance here as a subregional scheme that 
Vietnam hopes will firstly help to solve problems associated with Mekong 
cooperation directly, the most important of which is the regulation of the use of the 
Mekong's waters as China sits at the source and Vietnam at the delta; and, secondly, 
90 Heights for Gongguoqiao and Nuozhadu stem from Liu, 1996: 5 (figures in Liu 
for reservoir volume, installed power and wall heights differ occasionally and 
slightly from those in the above table). 
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in a spill-over fashion regulate overall China-Vietnam relations, especially with 
regard to the South China Sea. 
Table II shows that Thailand in particular expects benefits from China's 
Lancang Cascade in order to spur development in the Northeast. The construction of 
dams is hence not entirely rejected in the lower Mekong countries. As Osborne 
emphasises, Cambodia has revived the idea of the Prek Thnot Dam on the Prek 
Thnot river, a contentious undertaking that dates back as far as 1969 but was 
interrupted by war. In 2003, Japan's Maeda Corporation, the company which started 
construction in 1969, announced to have completed the dam (Maeda Corporation, 
2003: 2; Mekong Watch). At the same time, Cambodia opposes a Thai project, the 
Kok-Ing-Nan Water Diversion Project, a plan to dam these three rivers which are 
tributaries of the Mekong in order to divert water to the Chao Phraya river that 
passes Bangkok (Osborne, 2000: 240-246). Construction of the diversion project 
started in 2000 and is supposed to run for eight years in order to solve the problem of 
dry season water shortages (Kajandar, 2000: 25-26). Thailand has already had a 
negative experience with an earlier project, the Pak Mun Dam on the Mun river (a 
tributary of the Mekong), funded by the World Bank to generate electricity, which 
resulted in sharp declines in dry season flow and fish catches below and above the 
dam of up to 70 per cent and 'the impossibility of using the Mun River for water 
transport below the dam for much of the year' (Osborne, 2000: 240-246). Also, the 
Pak Mun Dam is generating only less than a third of its prognosticated capacity 
(Ghosh, 2005). Accordingly, Thailand announced in 1995 that it would not build 
additional dams for generating electricity. Since the 1970s, however, it has been 
receiving hydropower from Laos, a country which sees its future in selling 
hydropower as a way of earning foreign exchange and to develop alternative energy 
sources to coal for cheap electricity. In the face of difficult economic circumstances, 
'[a]gainst all discussion of alternatives, the point has to be made that from the Lao 
government's perspective there is little reason to consider other possibilities unless 
these can produce foreign exchange. ' In the case of the construction of the Theun 
Hinboun Dam, which was completed at the end of 1998, environmental groups put 
the ADB under fire for not having acknowledged environmental concerns which 
now become manifest in the rapid decline of fish catch and loss of agricultural land, 
forcing the bank to re-assess its highly positive conclusion on the dam's 
environmental impacts (Osborne, 2000: 240-246). In addition, the governinent of 
Laos has been pressing China to continue its investment in hydropower stations 
throughout the Greater Mekong Subregion (Stanway, 2005). 
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Given the conflicts between Vietnam and China over the Lancang Cascade and 
Vietnam's concerns over its Mekong delta, one would assume that Vietnam has 
serious environmental worries when it comes to the construction of dams. A general 
opposition to dams, however, does not seem to be the case. A conflicting issue 
between Cambodia and Vietnam is the Yali hydro-electric power station on the 
Sesan flowing from Vietnam to Cambodia. The station has been operational since 
1991 and has caused fluctuations in the river's flow, significantly affecting 
Cambodia's downstream ecosystems. Floods damaged crops, periods of low flow 
have threatened fish stock, and an uneven flow increased turbidity and made the 
water less suitable for drinking. The Mekong River Commission has created a 
bilateral panel to discuss such issues (Economist Intelligence Unit, April 2003: 15; 
Son, 2005). However, in the current state of development, the MRC does not seem 
to wield any power independent of governmental interests. The disputes with 
Cambodia notwithstanding, Vietnam started construction of a second dam on the 
Sesan, the Sesan 3 Dam, 18 kilometres from the Yali Dam, causing considerable 
anger among Cambodian villagers (Mekong Watch) and within the Cambodian 
government. The reason for this is that Vietnam failed to abide by MRC regulations, 
which stipulate that downstream countries have to be consulted before going ahead 
with the construction of dams (Wain, 26 August 2004b). Regarding the Yali station 
and the Lancang dams, so far, 'no regional or bilateral mechanism has been able to 
clarify or discuss the issue openly between China and the other countries. ' 
Furthermore, the dam issue was not discussed during the second GMS summit in 
Kunming in July 2005, but was the topic of two meetings held parallel to the summit 
by local communities and NGOs in Chiang Rai and Ubon Ratchathani (Son, 2005; 
see also Liebman, 2005). 
Ironically, Vietnam, one of the harshest critiques of the Lancang Cascade, is 
receiving hydropower from Yunnan along with Thailand, which has also been 
complaining to China about negative impacts on the ecology of its rivers and the 
livelihood of downstream communities, but buys energy generated by stations on the 
Lancang; Thailand is also one of the investors in the Jinghong station (Stanway, 
2005). Stanway also said that in the first five months of 2005, China exported 87.2 
mln kWh to the GMS. The power transmission capacity increased after the second 
power grid connecting Vietnam with Yunnan became operational in June 2005. At 
the end of the 11 th Five Year Plan (2006-2010), Yunnan is supposed to be able 'to 
dedicate 3 mln kW of capacity to Thailand alone' (Stanway, 2005). Although 
Chinese researchers and politicians recognise the potential effects on downstream 
ecologies and the lives of local communities, who depend on the river water for 
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irrigation and fishing, enviromnental concerns are being sidelined in favour of rapid 
industrialisation of China's south-westem regions (Stanway, 2005). 
Vietnam is also reported to be helping Laos with the construction of three new 
dams (Yhe Econondst, 9 April 2005: 5 1). Furthermore, the World Bank has returned 
to finance dam projects after some time of abstention. In Laos, the Bank has agreed 
to co-finance with the ADB and private investors the Nam Theun 2 (NT2) hydro- 
electric project through loans to the government in Vientiane. Construction is due to 
start in June 2005. The dam is expected to earn the government 150 million USD per 
year by selling much of the anticipated energy to Thailand. While the Bank argues it 
has learned its lessons from the Pak Mun Dam and has promised to provide money 
for resettlement, restocking of the affected rivers with fish and creation of a wildlife 
reserve nine times bigger than the area flooded by the dam - Vientiane has promised 
in addition to use parts of the revenue for health, education, and rural development - 
the project has sparked angry protests of environmental activists and Thai fishermen, 
who had been affected by the Pak Mun Dam, in front of the World Bank's offices in 
Bangkok. Ahead of the loan agreements of 31 March 2005 (World Bank) and 4 
April 2005 (ADB), the World Bank conducted local consultations with affected 
communities from May-August 2004 and held a series of international workshops in 
September 2004 (World Bank, 2005; Ghosh, 2005; Ybe Econondst, 9 April 2005: 
51). 91 Indeed, the disclosure of an immense amount of information on the project 
and the extensiveness of discussions seem unprecedented in the World Bank's 
endeavours to build dams, and at least seem to show a ne-%v seriousness to take into 
account warnings about social unrest caused by community break-ups, loss of 
income and food and environmental degradation. It is yet to be seen, however, 
whether the NT2 yields better results than its predecessors and can live up to the 
environmental and social standards the bank has promised to stick to. In a fatalistic 
manner, a German senior member of a foreign policy think tank, interviewed in 
H6chst, Germany, in 2005, remarked that attitudes to Chinese dams by downstream 
countries change once the downstream country becomes an upstream country. 
Consequently, as long as the environmental degradation produced dams and the 
potentially disruptive nature of a destruction of a river's ecology and the livelihood 
91 For detailed infonuation see the following web sites, which contain extensive 
infonnation on the NT2 project: w,, vw. worldbank. org_/Iao, 
www. worldbank. org/laont2, www. namtheun2. com and 
http: //w,, vw. adb. org/ProjectsfNamtheun2/default. asp. 
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of river-based communities is not taken seriously, the pattern of upstream dam- 
building and downstream opposition is unlikely to change. 
Regarding the importance Vietnam attaches to a balance of power, external 
actors have an important role for Vietnam's economic development and 
diversification of sources for economic supply in order to prevent dependence on 
one country or a group of countries. Le Van Sang identifies three groups of external 
actors in the GMS: 1) international organisations to support financially, supervise 
and coordinate the processes in the GMS and ensure their sustainability: United 
Nations, World Bank, IMF and ADB; 2) big powers for investment and to ensure a 
balance of power in the subregion and beyond as the GMS is part of the wider 
regional economy: China, Japan, the US and the EU; 3) transnational companies and 
non-goverrimental organisations (Le Van Sang, 2004: 143-145). According to 
Nguyen Than Due, Vietnam pursues three foreign policy purposes in subregional 
cooperation: to 'diversify foreign relations in a new global environment; improve 
relations with former adversaries (especially Vietnam-China relations); [and] 
demonstrate trustworthiness in international relations in order to reach long-term 
goals such as WTO membership' (Nguyen Than Due, 2005: 123). International 
cooperation, and especially subregional cooperation, is seen as a vehicle to realise 
the goals, as political and economic relations with China started a process of 
nonnalisation in the early 1990s. Actions of China and Vietnam are hoped to be 
coordinated in subregional forums, the more so since China is already a dialogue 
partner of ASEAN and a member of the ARF. The resulting hope of Vietnam is to 
further develop ties with China in Vietnam's favour, while there is also fear, at the 
same time, of becoming increasingly dependent on China the more markets are 
opened and the more China can succeed in realising its aims: these aims concern 
firstly the use of the Mekong's upstream waters, and secondly the opening of new 
markets in Southeast Asia, which might expand China's economic potential to the 
detriment of Vietnam (see also Do Van Bach, 2000: 151-152). 
The idea of taming China by engaging it might not be working. Although 
military conflicts are not an option, the two summits in Phnom Penh in November 
2002 - the 8 th ASEAN summit and the 1" GMS summit - show that China is 
seeking to keep a free han ' 
d. The series of agreements signed at the ASEAN summit 
included a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (ASEAN, 
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2002c). 92 Although this represents a milestone in the relations between China and 
ASEAN, Wain observed that this declaration represents a 'classic political deal 
designed to end an embarrassing stand-off (Wain, 2002: 26), since China did not 
accede to ASEAN wishes and could avoid the conclusion of a proper multilateral 
Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. While Beijing had not 'modified its view 
that China has sovereignty over almost the entire area, a view that isn't open to 
negotiation', China and ASEAN merely agreed 'to abide by international law, avoid 
the threat or use of force and refrain from action that might "complicate or escalate 
disputes and affect peace and stability". ' In addition, confidence-building measures 
are planned, as well as cooperation in research and search and rescue missions. 
Contrary to what ASEAN wished, the declaration does not contain any geographical 
names, not the Paracels as sought by Vietnam (claimed by Vietnam but controlled by 
China), the Spratlys as sought by Malaysia (Malaysia indeed proposed to name the 
Spratlys only), nor a ban on the erection of structures on islands in the sea, as sought 
by Manila (Manila is in conflict with China over Mischief Reef, on which China 
built military structures). With Manila, a compromise was found, namely to insert 
the vague formulation of 'prohibition against "inhabiting presently uninhabited" 
locations. ' While China still accepts a general Code of Conduct as the ultimate goal 
to replace the newly concluded political declaration, Beijing built 'its own loophole' 
for such a code, 'requiring consensus to work toward such a code, which presumably 
will let Beijing avoid that commitment if it so desires. ' According to a senior 
ASEAN official, 'Asean and China went out of their way to compromise on the 
agreement in an effort to promote closer relations that are visibly obstacle-free - so 
aid, trade and investment can flow more freely' (Wain, 2002: 26; for the agreement 
see ASEAN, 2002c). ASEAN's soft regionalism has won. 
Soft regionalism, however, has two sides: the gradual approach, as seen for the 
GMS, has produced stable cooperation patterns and common ground for a work 
programme that deals with both economic development and transnational crime. As 
for ASEAN, China has repeatedly voiced the opinion that conflicts in the South 
China Sea should be settled peacefully - even though, as explained earlier, these 
statements are met with suspicion in Vietnam. This is because Beijing's globally 
92 The other agreements are a framework agreement to establish a China-ASEAN 
Free Trade Area by 2010, a declaration on non-traditional security issues such 
as terrorism, cyber crime and people-smuggling, an agricultural pact with the 
ASEAN secretariat and a China-announced new aid programme for Cambodia 
while writing off Cambodia's debts. 
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oriented foreign policy looks at the region as a tool for conducting foreign relations 
with the aim to repel US influence and seek regional support for reunification with 
Taiwan. Soft regionalism has been unable to find answers to what constitutes a 
problem from Vietnam's point of view. It seems therefore helpful to see the 
achievements and shortcomings of the ASEAN way in the light of countries local 
and global policy designs. 
In a discussion with a Chinese scholar, however, the view emerged that for the 
first time China has abandoned its strict stance on bilateral discussion and has dealt 
with ASEAN as a region in tackling the problem (personal interview with a Chinese 
researcher in Hanoi in May 2004). Yet, whether this can be regarded as a major 
strategic shift or not, remains to be seen. Consequently, suspicion remains. The 
Philippines initially refrained from the 'early harvest programme' (EHP) with China. 
And while the ASEAN-China FTA, signed in 2002, was pushed forward at the 
ASEAN summit of November 2004 in Vientiane, Indonesia's newly elected 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and Malaysia's Prime Minister, AbdulIah 
Ahmad Badawi, emphasised the challenge of China and India and the need to deepen 
integration within ASEAN to prepare for free trade with powerful neighbours 
(Blume, 2004). Those misgivings, however, will not prevent the free trade area, as 
China currently attracts the double amount of FDI as the whole of ASEAN and could 
soon replace the United States as ASEAN's most important trading partner. Thus, 
the ASEAN-China FTA could be more of an 'enforced embrace' of China by 
ASEAN (Blume, 2004), a marriage of economic necessity instead of love. 
More necessity than love also applies to the GMS. In border cooperation, 
Vietnam is hesitant to allow closer integration, fearing the dominance of China. 
Vietnam's government is opposing moves for special economic zones and thus 
closer integration with China's border provinces. A Japanese scholar, who was 
involved in a broad research project on economic cooperation in the Chinese- 
Vietnamese border areas, specifies two reasons for Hanoi's cautiousness: 
1) The economic reason is that Chinese products are cheaper than Vietnamese 
products. The provincial authorities therefore would like to buy Chinese products. 
Vietnam has not yet found a way to make its products cheaper. Moreover, the trade 
balance is in favour of China, and a special economic zone with China would 
reinforce the imbalance. Apart from that, the economic strength of the province of 
Guangxi equals that of the whole of Vietnam, which is also due to the size of 
Guangxi, and political power follows economic power. In addition, the Chinese 
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provinces gained substantial control from the central government in Beijing as 
opposed to Vietnam's provinces. 93 
2) The political reason is that Hanoi is aware of history, that is, the 1979 war 
and a thousand years of battling China, and thus attempts to control the attitude of 
the provincial authorities. History makes Hanoi cautious when it comes to loosening 
control over the border provinces. 
6.2. China and the GMS 
6.2.1. General remarks: the relevance of Southeast Asia for China's post- 
Cold War foreign policy 
Chinese policy towards Southeast Asia along with Beijing's interpretation of 
US action in the Asian Pacific region has experienced a change with the end of the 
Cold War. As Michael Yahuda summed up, 
for the first forty years of its existence, the PRC treated its security 
problems within the region as a function of its relations with the two 
superpowers. The predominance of the two superpowers in the Chinese 
perspective necessarily gave China's regional concerns a global 
orientation. [ ... ] It is only since the end of the 
Cold War that China's 
leaders have developed policies which recognize that the future security 
and prosperity of their country requires the cultivation of close relations 
with the Asia-Pacific as a whole (Yahuda, 1996: 186; see also Saich, 
2004: 318). 
While turning the changes within the international system to good use, China 
became able to shift the focus towards the economic dimensions of its foreign policy 
by developing an 'omni-directional' strategy 'with a strong regional bias towards the 
Asia-Pacific' (Yahuda, 1993: 704). 94 Interestingly, as shown, Vietnam also has 
developed an omni-directional foreign policy, which, however, seems to compete 
93 For more on China's provinces see below. 
94 For a short account on Beijing's Cold War strategy see Godwin, 1998: 172-173. 
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with China's omni-directional strategy as the goals of each of them are incompatible. 
Yahuda also mentions that the focus on domestic issues was made possible through 
the removal of the direct strategic threat posed by Soviet troops surrounding China 
and the end of the strategic triangle, in which China balanced the United States and 
the Soviet Union and functioned as a 'quasi-strategic partner' of the United States. 
At the same time, the quick success of the United States-led troops in the Gulf War 
demonstrated Washington's political leadership and superior military power; thus, 
from Beijing's point of view, the Cold War ended with the USA as the 'sole 
superpower' (Godwin, 1998: 173). In addition, taking into account the sanctions 
imposed on China as a response to the Tiananmen incident, Beijing perceived its 
relationship with Washington as being transfonned from Cold War cooperation to 
post-Cold War contention. Furthermore, arms sales to Taiwan in autumn 1992 were 
seen 'as a signal of Washington's intent to use its new status in the world to seek 
"hegemony" through "power politics... (Godwin, 1998: 173; Saich, 2004: 305). 
In interviews in February and March 2004, conducted in New York with 
researchers and senior members of international organisations, it was pointed out 
that China's moderated approach towards Southeast Asia marks a considerable 
change from the former Chinese position. China has gained a better understanding of 
Southeast Asian countries, and, moreover, trade ties are very deep. The changes 
towards an accommodating foreign policy towards Southeast Asia, which are kept 
under the new leadership of Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao, have already begun under 
Jiang Zemin and in fact go back to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of 
the Cold War. Hence, the changes are due to alterations in the structure of the 
international system, and not due to changes in the leadership. Specifically, the 
interviewees mentioned the following particularities: 
11 September 2001: China has been cooperating in the war on terror, which 
means that it does not openly object to the increased US presence in 
Southeast Asia and Central Asia; 
Beijing accepted the war on terror, but continues to limit US unilateralism 
through the Security Council, international law etc. (as could be seen in the 
case of the Iraq war), and it continues to diminish military tensions anywhere 
apart from Taiwan; 
foreign trade and investment are growing too fast [so China is in fact too 
much integrated in the regional and global economy to be able to afford a 
war]; 
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China has an energy policy now: it is no longer energy-independent, but 
imports a lot of gas and oil, through which China has a stake in the stability 
in Southeast Asia: for instance, it invests in oil exploitations in Indonesia, 
and it has a stake in Middle East oil. 
A Vietnamese governmental advisor, interviewed in Hanoi in June 2004, cited 
his conversation with Chinese scholars saying that before the attacks of II 
September 2001, Washington's approach to deal with China was by competition. 
Since the attacks this has changed as terrorism was found as a common interest 
between Beijing and Washington. However, terrorism is only a short-term problem, 
on which a common strategic perspective between the US and China cannot grow. 
The problem thus is how to develop relations past the issue of terrorism. The US 
used terror to implement itself in Southeast Asia. In this way, using the North Korea 
problem, the US has good reason to keep a military presence in the region and at the 
same time keep a check on China. This strategic knot has helped to create an 
impasse over the North Korea issue. The situation is aggravated by the fact that after 
the Cold War, Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia have taken different paths of 
development: while in Northeast Asia, the Cold War structure is still relatively intact 
(the Japan-US alliance, the problems of North Korea and Taiwan), in Southeast 
Asia, the Cold War structure has dissolved. Countries once engaged in the security 
alliance of SEATO have established an economically-oriented ASEAN. While in 
Southeast Asia cultural differences and terrorism prevail as problems, on the whole, 
Southeast Asia is much more stable and more peaceful that Northeast Asia. 
Looking at the strategy towards ASEAN, China has acknowledged the 
necessity of good neighbourly relations and is eager to produce a politically peaceful 
environment which facilitates not only economic growth at home, but also regional 
and subregional economic integration, through which Beijing can increase regional 
trade links and Chinese exports to the region. This in turn helps China's businesses 
grow. A buzzing economic environment 'provides China with much needed leverage 
to increase its influence in world affairs' (You and Jia, 1998: 128). In addition, the 
strategy of approaching ASEAN nations is part of a larger strategy to counterbalance 
the United States for a multipolar world. For the Chinese leadership, multipolarity 
means 'that the US should not dominate the post-Cold War world; it means that all 
major powers should have a say on international issues; and more importantly, it 
means that China should be given a proper major power status in the world system' 
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(You and Jia, 1998: 127). 95 The strategy derived from this view means '[flo put 
things right in the backyard in order to consolidate [... China's] footing, and to play 
multipolarity in order to balance the major powers. ' This indicates both a regional 
and global orientation of Chinese foreign policy (You and Jia, 1998: 12796). 
The white papers on National Defense mirror a policy, which mixes domestic 
and foreign policy concerns. The white papers offer good insights into the world 
view of the Chinese elite and the changes in the perception of the strategic 
environment, within which the government in Beijing acts. It would be therefore too 
easy to simply dismiss them as pure rhetoric. A peaceful environment is needed in 
order to carry out the economic reforms without disturbances. Therefore, the 
settlement of the Chinese border disputes and the solving of the problems in the 
South China Sea are of the utmost importance to pacify the immediate 
neighbourhood and to establish good relations with its neighbours including the 
ASEAN nations. In terms of actual security policy, the white paper says, China is 
'determined to safeguard its state sovereignty', 'national unity', 'territorial integrity' 
and '[national] security' (China's National Defense in 2000, Foreword). Ecotiomic 
development, maintenance of a peaceful environment and the defence of territorial 
rights are the goals of the Chinese leadership with regard to foreign relations. Zheng 
Yongnian put it in this fonn: 
A collective consensus among major leaders has been forined; that is, a 
prerequisite for China to promote its national interest internationally is 
continuous economic growth and modernization. [ ... ] Whatever changes 
have occurred to the international system, China does not need to change 
its domestic priority. [ ... ] [W]ithout continuous economic growth, 
China's national interests cannot be served internationally (Zheng, 1999: 
122-123). 
95 For more on the genesis of the Chinese concept of multipolarity see for example 
Zheng, 1999: 125. 
96 You and Jia quoted Liu Shan, President of the Foreign Affairs College of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing (Waijiao Xueyuan Yuanzhang). 
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The wording used in the white paper of 2000 displays the impact of history. 
The vocabulary reflects a still ongoing obsession with the humiliating period of 
colonialism: words such as 'neo-interventionism', 'neo-gunboat diplomacy', and 
gneo-economic colonialism' clearly indicate this phenomenon (Chilla's National 
Defense in 2000, Chapter One) and show China's wariness vis-A-vis the US military 
presence in Southeast and Northeast Asia and Washington's defence relations with 
Japan and Taiwan. 
Interestingly, much of the neo-colonial rhetoric was dropped in the white paper 
of 2002. Instead, the threat of international terrorism since II September 2001 is 
emphasised, and the word 'transnational' with regard to non-traditional security 
problems such as transnational crime, environmental degradation and drug 
trafficking is explicitly mentioned (China'S National Defense in 2002, Chapter One). 
Importantly, cooperation in the Mekong valley is explicitly mentioned, too, implying 
a connection between the resolution of non-traditional, transnational security issues, 
which have an impact on the capacity and authority of the central government and 
impact upon its performance legitimacy, and cooperation in the Mekong basin. This 
development underlines the blurred lines between foreign and domestic policies. 
Regarding Taiwan, Beijing adheres to the use of force under the circumstances 
of Taiwan declaring independence, foreign intervention in Taiwan's internal affairs, 
Taiwan's acquisition of nuclear weapons and internal unrest in Taiwan. In addition, 
'indefinite delays' of the Taiwan question could justify the use of force: 
These statements, and the PRC's ambitious military modernization 
program, may reflect an increasing willingness to consider the use of 
force to achieve unification or, at a minimum, to demonstrate an 
upgraded military capability in hopes of deterring Taiwan from moving 
further towards independence. [ ... 
] We estimate that Beijing's objectives 
in any Taiwan-related crisis would be (1) to compel Taiwan authorities 
to enter into negotiations on Beijing's terms and (2) to undertake military 
operations as required with enough speed to preclude third-party 
intervention (Report to Congress, 2003: 43). 97 
97 For more details on ths US view of China's military build-up compare the 2000 
Foreign Affairs article by Condoleeezza Rice (Rice, 2000) and her views on 
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Although economic development is the focus of the leadership's policies, 
military upgrading is regarded as necessary to protect the domestic development 
programme and to ensure the attainment of the foreign policy goals. This view is in 
accordance with the already cited opinion of a senior Vietnamese scholar, with 
whom the author conducted an interview in Hanoi in summer 2004, namely that the 
strategy of presenting itself in a peaceful manner to Southeast Asian countries also 
means to build support for reunification with Taiwan under peaceful auspices or 
military means, if no peaceful reunification is possible. The military modernisation 
in this respect is designed to project power fast and efficiently. 
Consequently, despite Beijing's reiteration of the peaceful nature of China's 
rise, in an inter-view conducted in Hanoi in June 2004, a senior Vietnamese scholar, 
when asked about the implications of China's plans to build a blue water navy, 
raised the issue that China's pronouncements of a 'peaceful rise' is a surface level 
reaction to the development of the China threat concept by US scholars, which was 
also adopted by Southeast Asian countries. China's new security concept designed to 
present itself as peaceful and beneficial to Southeast Asian countries to push back 
the influence of the United States is meant to use the surrounding countries as buffer 
to take care of China's internal issues. 
These intemal issues are: 
1) developing the domestic economy 
2) building support for reunification with Taiwan under the I country 2 systems 
approach and peaceful reunification. If no peaceful reunification is possible, 
there have to be non-peaceful means to do so. The navy is necessary to do 
that. Destroyers have been bought from the SU, ships run through the whole 
gulf from north to south, military exercises are carried out along the whole 
coast. 
China voiced during her speech given at Sophia University in Tokyo on 19 
March 2005 (Rice, 2005). See also the testimony of Porter J. Goss before the 
United States Senate Committee on Armed Services on 17 March 2005 (Goss, 
2005). 
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The fear in Vietnam is that this military build up is not only used for Taiwan, 
but once the Taiwan issue is settled, it is used to settle the South China Sea issues. It 
is a relatively new idea in China that development is not constrained to the mainland 
but has to be projected past the coast itself to the Philippines etc. It is a strategy of 
cone arrow, two objectives' (to kill two birds with one stone): the navy is first used 
for Taiwan, and after that for the South China Sea. 
In the interviews, it was further stated that 'an often heard strategy of China is: 
build roads, cross the sea, attack Taiwan. ' 'Via Jim-nen and Mazhu, it would need 
three days to get people from China into Taiwan. ' The 'major problems' of China 
are 
'how to provide reinforcements' (= logistics) via the navy, air force and 
artillery 
'how to minimize the time. ' 
China is developing not only a navy, but also information systems, especially 
regarding the issue of how to 'block Taiwan's military information system. ' Once 
this problem is settled, the South China Sea will be dealt with. The relevance of the 
South China Sea is oil, which is currently a very important commodity for China. 
'Hu Jintao recently visited African countries, Russia and other countries in order to 
diversify oil resources', especially against the background of the US having 
destabilised Iraq. 
While China has denounced the use of military force with the sole exception of 
Taiwan, there is a conviction in scholarly circles in Vietnam that after China has 
dealt with Taiwan militarily, it might move to solve the disputes in the South China 
Sea through military action, too (personal interviews with senior Vietnamese foreign 
policy analysts). Although China has been pursuing a non-confrontational approach 
to ASEAN, 
this does not mean that China gives up its hardline attitude on some 
issues. In a way, hawkish reactions to external pressures are mixed with 
expedient and flexible considerations. The bottom-line of the strategy is 
to maintain a low profile diplomacy in order to create a larger space for 
manoeuvring. In other words, it is a clever design of buying space with 
time (You and Jia, 1998: 152). 
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Or, as the former Foreign Minister Qian Qichen put it: 'We should let things 
evolve' (Hurtzig and Sandschneider, 2000: 227 cited Beying Review, 9-15 August 
1993). 
The evolution could be what Vatikiotis and Murphy called the 'Birth of a 
Trading Empire' of China by extending and consolidating its economic influence in 
Southeast Asia - 'armed with a vibrant economy and a new stealth weapon of 
concessionary trade' - while 'the United States and Europe are distracted by the 
Middle East' (Vatikiotis and Murphy, 2003: 26). 
In courting Southeast Asian states, 'Beijing has deliberately avoided the sort of 
sweeping statements about cheap labour and unbeatable economics of scale it uses 
when urging foreign investors to come to China' (Vatikiotis and Murphy, 2003: 27). 
According to G. P. Deshpande from the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal 
Nehru University in New Delhi, China's foreign policy is 'still conducted on a 
bilateral basis' while economic policy is increasingly multilateral and 'essentially 
regional' (Vatikiotis and Murphy, 2003: 28). China only slowly warms to the idea of 
solving bilateral foreign policy issues (such as those with Japan) through multilateral 
mechanisms (Lu, 2005). 
As mentioned, China has offered an 'early harvest programme' under the 
China-ASEAN FTA agreement of trade liberalisation over a three-year period 
starting from I January 2004 until January 2006, before the China-ASEAN FTA 
comes into effect by 2010 for the six founding members of ASEAN and by 2015 for 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. The early harvest programme is a measure 
of tariff harmonisation before the actual FTA can take effect, Interestingly, in India, 
the agreement is also regarded as a measure of building economic confidence and as 
strengthening economic interdependence bet-ween India and ASEAN, giving India a 
greater access to Southeast Asia during the process. The early harvest programme 
between ASEAN and India will come into effect in January 2005. India has already 
signed a separate early harvest scheme with Thailand, before an FTA between the 
two countries will come into effect in 2010 (The Econonfic Thnes, 7 and 20 
September 2004). The Philippines were initially cautious to take part in this and only 
recently agreed to participate from I January 2005 onwards after an agreement with 
China that includes only 50 per cent of the total agricultural tariff lines, meaning a 
total of 208 items out of the total 417 tariff lines under Chapters 1-8 of the Tariff and 
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Customs Code (The Manila Bulletin, 13 September 2004). Thailand was especially 
eager to join the EHP under the Thailand-China FTA agreement. The Thai-Chinese 
EHP started on I October 2003. Also, Thailand, together with Singapore, moved to 
introduce a 'two plus x' model in order to implement small-scale trade liberalisation 
before AFTA can take effect in 2020. In November 2002, former Prime Minister 
Zhu Rongji 'floated the idea of a free-trade zone' with South Korea and Japan. 
China's increased willingness to cooperate with Northeast and Southeast Asian 
countries comes at a time 'when the U. S. and Europe are increasingly distracted by 
concerns about security and war in the Middle East. Forecasts Indonesian minister 
Dorodjatun Kunljoro-Jakti: "If the situation in the Middle East is not stabilized, you 
will see closer ties in East Asia and the major beneficiary will be China.. (Vatikiotis 
and Murphy, 2003: 28). Japan's ambitions in the region pose a major obstacle to 
China's ambitions in the region. Both countries are mutually suspicious of each 
other but have both 'embraced the pan-Asian forum defined by the Asean-plus-three 
grouping whose leaders now meet annually', indicating the need to accommodate 
each other (Mitchell and Vatikiotis, 2000: 22). 
Underlying the Chinese-Southeast Asian rapprochement is a 'new security 
concept' of China designed to challenge the US position in the region, 'which 
typically sees political and economic reform as a prerequisite for amicable relations' 
(Mitchell and Vatikiotis, 2000: 22). On the occasion of an official visit to Jakarta 
from 22-25 July 2000, then Vice President Hu Jintao condemned 'Cold War 
mentality', 'hegemonism' and 'power politics. ' He argued for closer regional 
economic cooperation (in this context, the GMS has strategic relevance) and 
declared that the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the Ten Principles of the 
Bandung Conference and the United Nations Charter 'formed the foundation for 
international norms in state-to-state relations. ' The new security concept reads as 
follows: 
A new security concept that embraces the principles of equality, 
dialogue, trust and cooperation, and a new security order should be 
established to ensure genuine mutual respect, mutual cooperation, 
consensus through consultation and peaceful settlement of disputes, 
rather than bullying, confrontation and imposition of one's own will 
upon others. Only in that way can countries coexist in amity and secure 
their development (Reninin Ribao, English edition, 24 July 2000; 
Thayer, 2000). 
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The policy has proved to be successftil, for instance in China's relations with 
Cambodia: China took a soft stance towards the handling of the Khmer Rouge and 
Hun Sen's coup in 1997, and it provides military training. 'While China has long 
inferred as much, Hu's speech marked the first time that the message was framed as 
a formal policy. ' While the case of Cambodia is easy to handle for China, there 
seems to be a rift in Vientiane, dividing pro-Beijing and pro-Hanoi leaders. Beijing 
particularly endeavours to counterbalance Vietnam's influence on the government in 
Vientiane. However, during Vietnam's Prime Minister Phan Van Khai's visit to 
Beijing at the end of September 2000, recognising a common interest with regard to 
the socialist political system of Laos, Beijing and Hanoi agreed to work together to 
solve the problem of a division in Vientiane so as to prevent that Laos might 'fall 
prey to a brewing pro-democracy movement': 
Shortly before the trip, according to the centre for Strategic and 
International Studies in Washington, Vietnamese Public Security 
Minister Le Minh Huong criticized 'American imperialism and its 
lackeys[ ... I who have not given up their evil intention of sabotaging the 
peaceful life of our people. ' Such language may be no surprise coming 
from a communist official. But similar things are being said in formerly 
pro-American places like Indonesia and Thailand, where no less than 
three new political parties have adopted a nationalist platform ahead of 
the January elections (Mitchell and Vatikiotis, 2000: 22). 
At the same time, ASEAN governments forge security relations with Australia, 
Japan and India, and welcome the balancing role of the United States in Southeast 
Asia, while there is also a 'growing appreciation [ ... ] that US influence is declining 
as China's grows. ' The 'd6tente' between Washington and China during the 'war on 
terrorism' has enabled ASEAN states to enjoy good relations with Washington and 
Beijing without having to choose between both sides, unless a possible confrontation 
over Taiwan might force ASEAN to take sides or stay neutral, in the wake of which 
the balance of power between China and the US might tilt in China's favour and 
possibly alienate Southeast Asian states should China use its military to settle 
conflicts (Huxley, 2005; Roy, 2005). 
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6.2.2. China in the GMS 
China's 'strong regional bias towards the Asia-Pacific' (Yahuda, 1993: 704) 
has put the Mekong region high on the agenda of Chinese foreign and economic 
policy makers. The GMS officially acquired strategic importance in the relations 
between China and ASEAN at the Second Informal ASEAN Summit in Kuala 
Lumpur from 14-16 December 1997, during which ASEAN's heads of 
state/government met separately with Japan's Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, 
South Korea's Prime Minister Koh Kun, and China's President Jiang Zemin in order 
to strengthen cooperation in the 21't century. In the Joint Statement of 16 December 
between China and ASEAN, both sides not only acknowledged the UN Charter, 
ASEAN's TAC, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and international law as 
guidelines for mutual relations, but also 'reaffirmed their common interest in 
developing the Mekong Basin and pledged to strengthen their support for the 
riparian countries by promoting activities in the areas of trade, tourism and transport' 
(Joint Statenient of the Meeting of Heads of StatelGoverninent of the Meniber States 
of ASEAN and the President of the People's Republic of China, 16 December 1997: 
paragraphs 2 and 6). 
On the occasion of the Fourth ASEAN Informal Summit from 22-25 
November 2000 in Singapore, China's Prime Minister Zhu Rongji made extensive 
reference to Mekong basin cooperation. Zhu said that China was ready to increase its 
input for development along the river. In particular, he mentioned the Quadripartite 
Economic Cooperation of April 2000 between China, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand 
on commercial navigation on the Mekong and pledged to help financing the 
development of the stretches in Laos and Myamnar to open the Mekong for 
navigation. The second major project he mentioned was the Kumning-Bangkok 
Road to link up China and ASEAN in general and generate closer links with 
mainland Southeast Asia in particular. In order to finish construction early, Zhu 
declared China's eagerness to finance the Lao stretch of the road in cooperation with 
Laos, Thailand and the ADB. The third project that Zhu made reference to was the 
trans-Asia railway, which, when finished, could link up to the Asia-Europe (or 
Eurasian) Continental Bridge (Renniin Ribao, 26 November 2000a). The 
development of the bridge, a rail link dubbed the 'new silk road', was launched in 
1992. It starts in China's coastal city of Lianyungang, runs through northern China 
and Central Asia into Europe and ends in Rotterdam. Due to the difficulties of 
border-crossing formalities and taxation, air links have been suggested in order to 
complement the rail link. UNDP, ASEM and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
are involved in the planning (Fu, 2004). 
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Transportation links with neighbouring countries have featured prominently on 
Yunnan's development agenda. Already in 1996, Liu mentioned air links: the 
already opened link from Kunming to Yangon, plus links to be established from 
Kunming to Bangkok, Kunming to Hanoi, Kunming to Vientiane, and Kunming to 
Singapore (Liu, 1996: 5). From 8 May to 7 June 1990, China and Laos surveyed the 
river in order to open the 701-kilometre stretch of the Mekong between Jinghong 
and Luang Prabang for navigation. From 14 October to 18 November 1990, both 
countries carried out flood seasonal transport of goods on the 1181-kilometre stretch 
between Jinghong and Vientiane (Liu, 1996: 5). From 27 February to 10 May 1993, 
China, Laos, Thailand and Myanmar - the later QEC countries - surveyed the 
Mekong starting from Simao in order to collect data for dry season flow and discuss 
the possibilities of cooperation (Foreign Broadcast Infiannation Service, 18 May 
1993: 15; Liu, 1996: 5). 
China's interests in the Mekong region can roughly be divided into two realms 
of importance: the domestic and the foreign policy one. The GMS agenda provides a 
fine blueprint for the willingness of China to cooperate and for the areas in which 
China is willing to do so. As with the issues concerning Vietnam (smuggling, dam- 
building), many of these fields have transnational character and defy governmental 
control. The nine sectors of GMS cooperation show the fields of work in which 
China is willing to cooperate (and possibly give away sovereignty, although none of 
these issues have reached a stage of institutionalisation. where that would be 
necessary). This is not for altruistic purposes but for the sake of gaining control over 
the border areas where drug and human trafficking bloom as well as smuggling of 
manufactured goods - lost revenue for the govenunent - and the spread of 
HIV/AlIDS is a rising concern. In the GMS, China is able to participate in creating a 
subregional cooperation framework and detennine its nature. Not only do these 
transnational issues need China's cooperation, but China shows the willingness to 
cooperate. By cooperating in the GMS, the central government also responds to a 
trend under the 'new regionalism' of a localisation. of foreign policy and a 
deterritorialisation of the nation state - as discussed in Chapter Two - in order to try 
to regain control over areas that increasingly defy central control. But the GMS 
agenda not only covers the issues over which China is willing to cooperate within 
multilateral networks in the subregion; it also shows where that willingness comes to 
an end. None of these issues imply the alienation of sovereignty. Where subregional 
issues need a certain alienation of sovereignty and its submission to an institution or 
organisation, China's cooperation largely fails. This is the case of the Mekong River 
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Commission. The commission is exemplary and at the same time unique to 
Southeast Asia in that it is an international institution with an organisational 
framework based on an international treaty. Admittedly, the commission is tom 
between firstly the knowledge that without China's cooperation the institution 
cannot work effectively to enhance sustainable development of the Mekong; and 
secondly, it fears that China might attempt and succeed to dominate its agenda 
should Beijing - or Yunnan - decide to join (more see later in this section). 
However, interviews with Chinese senior scholars and advisors have shown that 
China itself is cautious about joining the MRC as it entails the submission of 
sovereignty to a multinational institution over the development of the Mekong 
(inter-view with a senior Chinese scholar in Hanoi in May 2004). China's unilateral 
measures along the upper flow of the Mekong might come under serious scrutiny 
should it decide to join. The standard line of argument is that China has to carefully 
analyse, how its sovereignty will be affected through membership in the Mekong 
River Commission. 
More detailed, the domestic interest consists in the development of China's 
western landlocked provinces and the promotion of border trade with the adjoining 
countries Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam as well as with Thailand through Laos (for 
example Suo, 1997: 9). Although Suo does not mention Vietnam, the country has 
acquired particular importance for Yunnan's and Guangxi's links with the ASEAN 
region. This is discussed further below. Another domestic interest consists in 
narrowing the gap between the ethnic Chinese Han population and ethnic minorities 
by promoting the development of minority areas through tourism and economic 
development (Suo, 1997: 8). And, lastly, an economically emerging West shall 
reduce the internal migration from western China to the booming coastal cities (for 
instance, Liu, 1996: 6). To expand trade and investment, the government of Yunnan 
wishes for a greater connectivity of China with South and Southeast Asia in order to 
challenge competition with 1) Japan, which since the 1980s has developed great 
interest in the subregion in general and in Indochina in particular and under whose 
aegis was established the Forum for the Comprehensive Development of Indochina; 
and 2) the United States, which has already shown its interest in the subregion prior 
to the 1970s (Yang, 2003: 119; Yunnan Foreign Relations Administration, 2005). 
This already leads us to the realm of foreign policy, which consists in the 
development of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, and in the support of 
international anti-narcotic efforts (for example Yang, 2003: 119) in a region that 
includes the infamous Golden Triangle, in which the newly built highways, 
-228- 
according to Fomey, make that Golden Triangle opium now 'passes most efficiently 
through the province [of Yunnan ... ] on its way to the veins of European and 
American junkies' (Forney, 1997: 56). 98 And, lastly and probably most importantly, 
Beijing seeks to heave its relations with Southeast Asia on amicable grounds in 
order to counter-balance US influence in the region. 
The foreign policy interest in the subregion translates in policies towards the 
GMS as part of a general foreign policy strategy to create a multipolar world not 
dominated by the United States (You and Jia, 1998: 127-128; Zheng, 1999: 125). A 
strong focus is placed on the Asia-Pacific in order to create peace in the region and 
to be able to carry out the domestic reform programme without disturbances 
(China'S National Defense in 2000: Foreword). Economic power is thus being 
turned into more regional and global leverage (You and Jia, 1998: 128), mostly at 
the expense of the US. The strategy for the Mekong region is what Liu called the 
promotion of friendship between the countries on the basis of economic cooperation 
(Liu, 1996: 4), with the aim to strengthen intra-regional cooperation and in the wake 
of it to increase the importance of the regional economies in the process of 
globalisation. 
The development of the subregion involves what Handley has called 'Asia's 
biggest political long-term game: the future balance of power between Japan and 
China, with Indochina in between. ' The GMS shows on a subregional level the 
regional rivalry between China and Japan for influence in the states of fon-ner 
Indochina. Relations with Japan show a mixed picture. While on the one hand, 
China has replaced the US as Japan's largest trading partner in 2004 (Blustein, 2005: 
E01), competition between both is growing stronger as regards maritime borders: the 
Japan Times reported on 17 January 2005 that Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. and 
Teikoku Oil Co. 'are in talks' with the Japanese government to drill for natural gas 
in the East China Sea near areas claimed by both China and Japan. At the same time, 
a Chinese consortium was carrying out natural gas well tests on the Chinese side of 
an area close to Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Tokyo, however, suspected 
the tests to cut into Japan's EEZ. Rows arise from differences over EEZs, of which 
China says that its EEZ 'is bigger than Japan recognizes. ' The reason for this is that 
Japan claims its EEZ to be 200 nautical miles or 370 kilometres, while China claims 
98 For more on the illicit trade in drugs etc. and the minority problem in Burma see 
Robertson, 1995: 82 and 84. 
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its EEZ based on its continental shelf, which reaches deep into the EEZ claimed by 
Japan. As a result, both EEZs overlap (BBC, 30 September 2005). The controversial 
fields, in which China started drilling activities in 2003, are the Chunxiao and 
Tianwaitian fields. Both are in uncontroversial areas, which are however close to the 
EEZ, which Japan claims. The result is that Japan fears that China could suck off gas 
from the area claimed by Japan (BBC, 10 August 2005 and 20 September 2005). 
Tokyo's funds for researching natural resources in the East China Sea have risen 
from 3.8 billion Yen to 12.9 billion Yen in the fiscal year 2005 budget (Japan Thnes, 
17 January 2005). On 9 February 2005, the Japanese government placed a lighthouse 
under state control built in 1988 by Japanese right-wing activists on Uotsuri-jima, 
the largest of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands (Agence France-Press, 10 February 
2005). The island group is claimed by China, Taiwan and Japan. This added to the 
tensions when, on 10 November 2004, a Chinese nuclear submarine was found 
travelling submerged through Japanese territorial waters. In December 2004, the 
guidelines for the US-Japan security treaty were revised, mentioning China as a 
threat, and in the same month, China published its latest white paper on national 
defence. 
Added to this is the general anger concerning the traditional visits of the 
Japanese prime minister to the Yasukuni Shrine and new outbursts of anti-Japanese 
sentiments in April 2005 over one of eight new Japanese textbooks to be used at 
junior high schools from April 2006. The textbooks were approved on 5 April 2005 
and are accused of whitewashing Japan's behaviour during the Second World War 
(they are supposed to lack and distort details in particular in connection with the 
Nanjing massacre of 1937), while at the same time the year 2005 marked the 60 th 
anniversary of the end of the Second World War. Relations with Japan have 
experienced a constant downturn since Jiang Zemin's visit to Japan in 1998, during 
which he reminded his hosts of Japanese atrocities committed during the Second 
World War (Ching, 2005; Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Japan, 6 
April 2005; BBC, 5 April 2005). 
By engaging in Mekong cooperation, the smaller countries in continental 
Southeast Asia hope for enhanced mutual understanding of the respective needs and 
building of trust. Their aim is to prevent Chinese military expansionism as seen in 
Burma and the South China Sea plus a negative outcome of China's economic 
power in the form of cheap products flooding their markets and increasing their trade 
deficits with China. Japan would like to counter growing Chinese influence in 
ASEAN through intensification of its links with the region and strong linkages 
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between Southeast Asian countries. Balancing China in Southeast Asia would also 
protect Tokyo's economic interests, which are to a considerable part channelled 
through the ADB, of which Japan is the largest shareholder. The ADB's plans for 
developing the Greater Mekong Subregion thus fits into Tokyo's strategic thinking 
(Handley, 1993b: 70). Japan's use of international organisations to push national 
interests was exasperatedly explained by a senior member of an international 
organisation as Japan's use of the organisation as 'deposit account' (interview 
conducted in New York in March 2004). An interesting episode shows Japan's link 
to, for instance, Cambodia, of which Japan is the largest provider of donor aid. At 
the 13 th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which took place in 
Bangkok from 2-14 October 2004, Cambodia voted in favour of an eventually 
defeated Japanese bid to ease restrictions on whaling (AKP News, 18 October 2004, 
AKP/04), even though Cambodia has neither a whaling industry, nor has it whales in 
its waters. As regards Bun-na, the relations with Burma are crucial for security 
reasons with access to the Bay of Bengal (Chinese-made radar was installed by the 
Burmese military off the Burmese coast). Therefore, the 'broader the province's 
[Yunnan's] economic links with Burma [ ... ] the more secure Beijing feels. ' To help 
establishing the links, more authority has been given to Yunnan. For example, until 
April 1997, Chengdu, the capital of the province of Sichuan, had the oversight over 
all freight leaving Kunming (Forney, 1997: 55). In 1988, Burma and China signed a 
trade pact for cheap consumer goods and machinery going to Burma and timber, 
jade, rubies, rice, corn, fruit and seafood going to China (Lintner, 1997: 57). Beside 
China's growing economic influence in Laos and Burma, military cooperation is 
increasing with Laos and Myanmar: China supplies both countries with military 
hardware and concluded a military cooperation agreement with Myanmar in 1996 
(Lintner, 1997: 58). 
In 1985, the Beying Revieiv published an 'expert opinion' on the possibilities 
of opening a second development front in China's western provinces parallel to the 
development activities in the eastern coastal provinces - instead of connecting 
China's west with the eastern modemisation through a gradual development from 
east to west. The article was based on a survey of the provinces of Guizhou, 
Guangxi, Yunnan and Sichuan to link up the landlocked parts not only with the east 
and south coasts through river and land transportation, but also with continental 
Southeast Asia through Myanmar (Pan, 1985: 22-23), the only neighbouring country 
of the region with which China had good relations at that time. Exports of natural 
resources and tourists were the focus of the article. Proposed routes were a highway 
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from the mining area of Tengchong westwards to Myitkyina and from there use the 
existent railroad to the sea; another highway south to Lashio, where there is also a 
railway station; and between those two, a road to Bhamo, situated on the Irrawady; 
an international airport at Mangshi in western Yunnan for potential air access to 
Hong Kong, Guangzhou, Rangoon, Bangkok and Singapore (Pan, 1985: 23). 
The opening of the southern provinces started with the Eighth Five-Year Plan 
(1991-1995) and supplemented the coastal development strategy of the 1980s with 
the development of the interior provinces. Deng Xiaoping's southern tour gave this 
development an additional boost, and - among other localities - Yunnan and 
Guangxi were allowed to have 'open cities' with 'preferential treatment in foreign 
trade and investment akin to that enjoyed by the coastal areas' (Cheung and Tang, 
2001: 97-98). While Beijing encourages the opening of the southern border 
provinces, it 'is concerned that other fast-growing border areas increasingly 
disregard Beijing' (Forney, 1997: 55). This displayes traditional concerns of China's 
central government about the behaviour of far-away provinces, concerns, which have 
increased since the decentralisation measure started and in particular the border 
provinces' engagement in forging foreign relations. Yang enthusiastically regards the 
GMS's 'new regionalism' in the wake of the concurrent post-Cold War 
developments of globalisation and regionalisation as a strong motor for and key to 
the economic development in the GMS and a 'hot spot' for economic development, 
trade and investment. For China, the GMS acquires importance as part of the China- 
ASEAN FTA. The extended ASEAN region is an incentive for GMS cooperation as 
the GMS becomes part of the overarching framework of the ASEAN-China FTA 
and benefits from a boost in the cooperation between China and the ASEAN 
countries as the subregion moves towards political stability and as India, Pakistan 
and Japan develop an interest in the economic potential of the subregion, which 
connects the GMS with South Asia and Northeast Asia (Yang, 2003: 117) (Yang 
especially - and somewhat cynically - mentions the settlements the government of 
Myanmar reached with the internal 'guerilla forces', which, however, have proved to 
be on shaky ground). Interestingly, Yang mentions the existence of MRC and 
ASEAN-MB as two other important cooperation schemes within the Mekong basin 
(Yang, 2003: 118), but fails to comment on what their importance actually consists 
of. Instead, he continues to talk about the GMS without conceptually connecting 
MRC and ASEAN-MB to the GMS. This hints to the relative irrelevance of both 
cooperation endeavours from the Chinese perspective in comparison with the GMS. 
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This relative irrelevance of the MRC in contrast to the GMS was confirmed in 
an interview with a Chinese academic from Yunnan in Hanoi in May 2004, who said 
that the commission is currently a low-profile one only, also due to the disruptive 
move of its secretariat from Bangkok to Vientiane on 1 July 2004. Admittedly, 
without China and Myanmar, the commission is not viable. However, China has not 
yet joined any international river commission. This is due to a legal problem: China 
is in the process of approaching international law afler having been a closed-off 
country. Approaching international law is part of the opening process. In this 
opening process, China could become a member of the MRC. 'Careful analysis' of 
the laws has to be done, because due to the previous closure, China did not deal with 
international law. International law also affects China's sovereignty, a serious 
problem, which has to be explored before China can join the Mekong River 
Commission. 
When the author talked to Vietnamese foreign policy analysts in Hanoi during 
summer 2004 about why China should join the MRC and what benefits China could 
expect, the answers were as follows: 
Faced with the knowledge that China is needed in the MRC as it controls the 
source of the Mekong, and the fear that, once joined, China might move to control 
the organisation, the author's Vietnamese interviewees voiced the opinion that for 
the latter reason, the MRC does not want China to get involved, and if involved, 
China would want to set up a China-led mechanism. Although China can be of 
assistance in the development of trade, tourism, financial cooperation and human 
resources development and therefore create a mutually beneficial cooperation 
environment - issues which are problematic as China is by far the most powerful 
country in the subregion - the real gain for China should it decide to join the MRC is 
the control of the development of hydropower in the Mekong basin. Apart from that, 
China endeavours to set up a tourist agenda in the subregion and is not interested in 
sustainable development of the Mekong - an agenda which the Mekong River 
Commission tries to pursue. In order to sustain its growing economy, China has to 
control the markets of the subregion, and in particular hydropower development and 
thus exert control over the energy production in the other member countries as 
hydropower fuels the economic development of the subregion. Japan and South 
Korea have already started to get involved, and have opened a field for competition 
with China. China's need of natural resources makes it necessary to maintain good 
relations with its neighbours outside the MRC, and to reaffirm its traditional 
influence through good relations. 
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The refusal to join the Mekong River Commission by using international law 
as prime reason sounds unreasonable given the fact that China joined the WTO in 
2001, which meant the alienation of sovereignty and the submission to international 
laws. Here, however, a neoliberal institutionalist view seems to emerge, namely that 
joining international organisations or signing international treaties and thereby 
alienating sovereignty can in fact help to realise a certain goal and national interest 
(Keohane, 1984): by joining the WTO and abiding by international economic laws, 
China is bound into a network of rules, but is a member of the group that determines 
the rules of global trade. By conveying sovereignty to the bodies of the WTO, China 
gains the ability to participate in the future shaping of the regulations for the global 
economy and negotiate policies beneficial to its own concerns, especially in the face 
of the Doha round that was upcoming then and is still negotiating agriculture and 
trade in services (for example Saich, 2004: 306). In contrast, there are no such gains 
for China, should it join the MRC, because a domination of subregional markets and 
hydropower production does not seem to depend on a membership in the MRC. In 
contrast, should the MRC be able to enforce an ecological agenda, something that 
seems unlikely at the current state of development, China might find itself restricted 
by the need to adjust economic development to meet the ecological needs of the 
Mekong basin. Interestingly enough, during the interviews, the Vietnamese 
interviewees quickly switched from the Mekong River Commission as 
conversational topic to issues concerning the Greater Mekong Subregion rather than 
the MRC. This indicates the relative insignificance of the environmentally sensitive 
Mekong River Commission vis-A-vis the Greater Mekong Subregion not only for the 
majority of Chinese policy makers, but also for the majority of Vietnam's policy 
makers. 
6.3. Cooperation in the border regions: the case of the Chinese- 
Vietnamese border 
We have seen above in this chapter that the GMS is divided into 1) projects 
with voluntary participation, and 2) subregions of its own, making governance of the 
projects in the Mekong area a difficult under-taking and hampering a potential 
cohesiveness of the subregion, which rather deserves the plural, as in practice it is 
many subregions. Even smaller cooperation schemes emerge in border regions. One 
that showcases this development, is the economic collaboration along the Sino- 
Vietnamese border, in particular involving the provinces of Lao Cai-Yunnan, and 
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Guangxi-Lang Son-Quang Ninh-Cao Bang. The aim is the integration of the 
Vietnamese and Chinese border localities. 
Roughly half way between the Sino-Vietnamese secret summit in September 
1990 in Chengdu and the official normalisation of relations in November 1991, 
Guangxi's authorities showed interest in investing in Vietnam, in particular in 
building a glass factory in the central province of Nghe Tinh99; and at a trade 
exhibition in the town of Lang Son, Chinese companies displayed their products 
amid still strained relations between China and Vietnam (Far Easteni Econonlic 
Revieiv, 1991: 59). On 27 March 1992, the central governments of both countries 
decided to gradually open 21 border gates for citizens with valid visas to pass 
through and pursue small-scale trade. Initially, seven gates were opened on I April 
1992, among them Huu Nghi and Dong Dang (province of Lang Son, includes the 
Friendship Gate, which is situated 200 metres within Chinese territory'00), Mong Cai 
and Lao Cai (BBC Stanniary of World Broadcasts, 3 April 1992: FE/1346/A3/1). 
Between May and July 1992, clashes occurred on Highway No. I near the friendship 
gate when a Chinese military unit planted a border marker 400m inside Vietnamese 
territory (Vietnamese Canadian Federation, 2002: 10). On 14 February 1996, railway 
service from Hekou to Lao Cai and from Pingxiang to Dong Dang was resumed (Gu, 
2004: 4). On 13 December 1996, a cargo rail link was established directly 
connecting Shanghai with Da Nang. On 8 April 1997, a passenger railway service 
from Kunming to Hanoi was started (Gu, 2004: 4). On 19 April 1997, joint border 
controls were discussed (BBC Suniniary of World Broadcasts, 22 April 1997a: 
FE/2899/B/3). On 3 June 1997, China's Vice Transport Minister Hong Shanxiang 
and his Vietnamese counterpart Bui Van Suong signed a protocol on automobile 
transportation (cars, trucks, luggage and passengers) through the land border (BBC 
Stuninary of World Broadcasts, 5 June 1997: FE/2937/B/4; BBC Stuninary of World 
Broadcasts, 6 June 1997: FE/2938/B/3). By then, air, railway and road links had 
been re-established (BBC Sunnnary of Morld Broadcasts, 6 June 1997: 
FE/2938/13/3). During the visit of the Vice Premier in charge of economic affairs, 
99 In the early 1990, Nghe Tinh province split into Nghe An and Ha Tinh. 
100 For the negotiations on the demarcations of the land border and the Gulf of 
Tongkin, the specific land areas demarcated and the conflicts which erupted in 
the VCP and among Vietnamese intellectuals against the distribution of the 
contested areas see Nguyen Manh Hung, 2002 (land border section and note 
xxi). 
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Wu Bangguo, to Vietnam from 23-26 October 1997, where he met his counterpart, 
Secretary-General Do Muoi as well as President Tran Duc Luong and Premier Phan 
Van Khai, it was, among other things, agreed that border trade was to be expanded 
'in a healthy and stable way, reducing negative phenomena detrimental to both sides' 
(BBC Sunnnary of World Broadcasts, 25 October 1997: FE/3059/B/6). The 'negative 
phenomena' refer to smuggling activities across the border into both countries, 
which already flourished throughout the 1980s across the officially closed border. To 
the present day, smuggling of manufactured goods, heroin, amphetamines and 
human trafficking continues to pose a challenge to statecraft and political 
sovereignty, and is also one of the main problems of the QEC countries (Grundy- 
Warr, 2002: 221). Negotiations on cross-border trade and the opening of the border 
in general can also be regarded as a means to curb smuggling activities in a bilateral 
way (Amer, 1999: 113-114). Wu's visit was the first visit of a Chinese vice premier 
in charge of economic affairs to Vietnam since both countries had officially 
normalised their relations in 1991 (BBC Sunnnary of World Broadcasts, 25 October 
1997: FE/3059/B/6). Over the years, existing roads were upgraded, train services 
resumed, a coach service was established between Lao Cai and Yunnan, and border 
crossings were opened for individuals. In 1999, cruising ships were allowed to 
operate in Halong Bay (Gu, 2004: 4). On 18 January 2000, commercial bus services 
were opened from Fangchenggang to Tian An, Pingxiang to Dong Dang, and from 
Longzhou to Cao Bang (Gu, 2004: 4). On 15 August 2000, a new border bridge to 
link Hekou with the province of Lao Cai was opened (Coniparative Connections, 
2000). Air connections are available between Beijing-Nanning-Hanoi, Guangzhou- 
Hanoi-Ho Chi Minh City, and Kunming-Hanoi (Gu, 2004: 4). In combination with 
improved ASEAN-China cooperation and the establishment of the China-ASEAN 
FTA, Vietnam's border provinces have emerged as important trading stations for 
China to ship and sell goods to ASEAN countries. Furthermore, because the border 
areas of Yunnan and Guangxi are incorporated in the GMS, they benefit from 
funding channelled through the ADB. 
Border trade benefits from the border agreement. The twelve months between 
December 1999 and December 2000 proved particularly busy in China-Vietnam 
border relations. The year 1999 drew to a close with the signing of a land border 
treaty in Hanoi on 30 December 1999; both parliaments ratified the treaty in April 
(China's NPC Standing Committee) and June (Vietnam's National Assembly) 2000 
(Reninin Ribao, 7 July 2000). Constant discussions on the Gulf of Tongkin, after 
having largely removed the problem of the land border, ended in August 2000 in the 
opening of a sea tourist route from Ha Long to Fangcheng (Renniin Ribao, in 
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English, 14 August 2000). In December 2000, an agreement on the Gulf of Tongkin 
was signed. In October 2005, both sides agreed to joint military patrols of the Gulf 
of Tongkin (BBC, I November 2005). In mid-2000, some months before the agree- 
mcnt on the Gulf of Tongkin, Nguyen Duy Quy noted that already nine rounds of 
talks on that problem had been conducted since March 1994 (Nguyen Duy Quy, 
2000: 14). Even earlier, in October 1993, both sides signed an agreement on basic 
principles for the solution of the territorial questions. 
Unlike the disputes over the Tongkin Gulf and the land border, the bilateral 
discussions between China and Vietnam over the economically and strategically far 
more important Paracels and Spratlys that are in place since August 1994 and the 
multilateral approaches via the ARF have virtually not produced any concrete 
outcome (Guan, 1998: 1128-1130; M61ler, 1999: 281-283). Gu Xiaosong, referring 
to the Nansha problem, even remarked that 'future armed conflict may be inevitable' 
(Gu, 2003: 4). Instead, bilateral offers for negotiations are welcomed by the 
respective countries, thus weakening ASEAN's bargaining position as a body for 
defending the interests of its member states (M61ler, 1999: 284) towards the 
militarily superior China. 
The expansion of Yunnan's economy was the economic reason for China to 
decide to engage in Mekong cooperation. Contacts between Yunnan and Lao Cai 
started to take off, when in February 1992, He Zhiqiang, Yunnan's governor from 
1985 to 1993, led a high-ranking delegation in order to pay an official visit to the 
province of Lao Cai. On the occasion, the chairman of Lao Cai's People's 
Committee and Yunnan's governor signed a memorandum of cooperation (Yang, 
2002: 3 1). On 18 May 1993, the Hekou-Lao Cai port was officially opened after 14 
years of blockade (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 18 May 1993: 14-15), 
followed by other cross-border rail, road and telecommunication links. The moves 
re-established the traditional links and markets in the Yunnan-Lao Cai border region 
(Yang, 2002: 32). Until the 1980s, Yunnan's development was carried out by 
Beijing independently of the subregion, with which political contacts existed on a 
very limited scale. From the 1950s, Yunnan offered mostly agricultural products for 
the local markets, such as rubber, sugar cane and spices, bananas, mangos and other 
fruit. Mineral resources were found as well, such as zinc, lead, strontium, thallium 
and cadmium (Liu, 1996: 4-5). The first border crossings that opened were the city 
of Wanting and the county of Ruili at the border with Myamnar in the first half of 
the 1980s. Border trade re-developed and Yunnan had the chance to connect its own 
development with that of Southeast Asia (Liu, 1996: 5). As a tucked away, poor 
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province, the Mekong countries offer markets for Yunnan products (minerals, 
machinery, agricultural products). The river itself provides a means of transportation 
to bring the products via Thai transhipment centres to the targeted consumers of 
continental Southeast Asia and to the sea for access to world markets. This all offers 
China's west the chance to enhance economic development in a neglected region 
while the coastal provinces have long since been booming (Handley, 1993a: 69 and 
1993c: 71). China's wishes to make the Mekong navigable for heavy commercial 
traffic in order to increase exports of Yunnan's products makes it necessary to blow 
rapids along the stretch that divides Myamnar and Laos (Handley, 1993a: 69). The 
undertaking is heavily criticised for its ecological problems. Since the political 
rapprochements in the Mekong area started in the beginning of the 1990s, a good 
deal of the rapidly increasing trade is of illegal provenance, however. Estimates for 
the area of the Golden Quadrangle for 1993 place the amount of illegal trade 
6 conservatively' at between USD 240m and USD 280m. According to a Chiang Rai 
Province Commission report on the Golden Quadrangle that trade has increased to 
around $400m in 1994 as a result of the re-opening of cross-border trade and a 
simultaneous existence of high tariffs and a lack of formal border crossings with 
customs and immigration services. This is a situation, which is 'handicapping trade 
to such an extent that smuggling and illegal trade has become a necessity in order for 
the region to survive' (Robertson, 1995: 82; Handley, 1993a: 69). The Golden 
Quadrangle states are engaged in the joint planning of roads and railways following 
a decision to regularise economic relations (Handley, 1993c: 71). The GMS Cross- 
Border Transport Agreement can be seen in this light. On 13 April 2005, Xinhita 
(English) reported that 27 Chinese, who were caught smuggling Diesel oil from 
Vietnam to sell in China, went on trial in Guangxi. They were accused of smuggling 
more than 5.7 tons of oil, worth 43 million Yuan (or 5.18 million USD) of tax. The 
smugglers were said to own a group of ships and trucks and a gas station in the 
Tongkin Gulf (Beibu Gulo region (Xinhua, 13 April 2005). 
In the course of years since border trade between China and Vietnam re- 
opened, mutual trade has expanded and regular trade fairs have been organised. In 
2002, several ideas surfaced for a special economic region to encompass large areas 
of Vietnam's border provinces of Ha Giang, Lao Cai and Lai Chau to be closely 
integrated with Yunnan. In 2003, the creation of a data base by the People's 
Committee of Lao Cai in coordination with the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry was announced to contain information about south-eastem China in order to 
aid trade and investment promotion in Lao Cai, adding cooperative structures to the 
rotational trade fairs held regularly in Lao Cai and Hekou (Ministry of Foreign 
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Affairs of Vietnam, 10 November 2003; Vietnam News Agency, 28 October 2002). 
This binds China's southwest into the region through genuine economic interest in 
developing China's land-locked western provinces and tapping new markets for 
Sichuan's, Yunnan's and Guangxi's products. 
In mid-August 2004, the leaders of the cities of Hanoi and Haiphong and of the 
provinces of Lao Cai and Quang Ninh met to discuss closer cooperation in 
infrastructure and customs procedures for goods entering and leaving Vietnam from 
and to China (Vietnain Business Forum, 24 August 2004). In early September 2004 
delegations of the same localities met with a delegation from Yunnan to discuss the 
construction of an economic corridor from Kunming through the Lao Cai-Hekou 
border crossing into the four localities to boost transport, trade, tourism and 
investment. The delegations were led by Yunnan's Governer Xu Rongkai and the 
chairmen of the people's committees of the four Vietnamese provinces and cities. 
The plans include an economic corridor from Nanning in Guangxi through Lang Son 
and Hanoi to Haiphong at the Gulf of Tongkin. The aim is to strengthen cooperation 
between northern provinces and municipalities to manage border trade with China. 
and construct the economic corridor of Kunming-Lao Cai-Hanoi-Haiphong-Quang 
Ninh. To realise this, the Lao Cai-Hanoi-Quang Ninh road has to be upgraded, and 
the Hekou-Lao Cai-Hanoi-Haiphong railway needs either to be upgraded, too, or 
replaced with a new rail link for increased demand in cargo transport from the 
Haiphong and Cai Lan seaports in the province of Quang Ninh through the Lao Cai- 
Hekou gate into China (Kunming) and vice versa. An airport is planned in Lao Cai. 
The construction of the airport would complete the modes of transport at the Lao 
Cai-Hekou border gate: river, rail, road and air. According to Bui Quang Vinh, 
Chairman of Lao Cai's People's Committee, Yunnan and Lao Cai authorities are 
working on regulations to let automobiles with passengers, fresh vegetables and 
frozen seafood pass deep into the territory of the other province in order to cut costs 
for enterprises and visitors. He also said that the Lao Cai-Hekou gate is the most 
important buffer zone in a China-ASEAN FTA. In Lao Cai, a container depot is 
being planned, and the Vietnamese Ministry of Trade is said to be strengthening 
trade at the Lao Cai-Hekou border gate through the establishment of trade centres 
and supermarkets in adjacent border areas, fairs, forums and exhibitions, and the 
exchange of trade information. Furthermore, the September meeting agreed to 
simplify customs and entry-exit procedures by introducing one-time inspections of 
goods to be carried out jointly by Vietnamese and Chinese customs officials. Since 
December 2005, Chinese vehicles carrying goods and passengers are allowed 
multiple entries to the Lao Cai Border Economic Zone for one month to replace 
-239- 
single entry licensing. This measure is supposed to speed up import-export 
operations of Chinese and Vietnamese firms for the Lao Cai Border Economic Zone. 
For the year 2005, Lao Cai plans to introduce an electronic customs declaration and 
to allow customs clearance after 10 o'clock pm, the time at which Lao Cai's customs 
officials stop working. On 24 November 2004, Lao Cai inaugurated the Center for 
Managing the Lao Cai International Border Gate. This is in accordance with the 
GMS Cross-Border Transport Agreenient. 
The main goods entering China from Vietnam include seafood, fruit grown in 
the northern and southern river deltas (the Red River and the Mekong respectively), 
consumer goods such as detergents, plastic wares, footwear, confectioneries, 
processed coffee and tea, materials such as latex, unprocessed cashew nuts and dried 
cassava. From China's southwest, products going to Vietnam include machines, 
equipment, metal tools, chemicals, clinker and agricultural strains such as potatoes, 
hybrid rice, flowers and fruit (Xinhua, 15 September 2004; Vietnam Busilless 
Fortaii, 24 August 2004 and 18 November 2004). A recent measure in, order to ease 
tourism in Vietnam is a conditioned visa exemption for tourists from China since 12 
September 2005. Visa exemptions had already been in place for tourists from Korea, 
Japan and six ASEAN countries (Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Laos). The regulation, supported by local travel agencies and the 
National Tourism Administration, is supposed to bring Chinese tourists in greater 
numbers to Vietnam (the government hopes for an increase of up to one million 
Chinese tourists per year) by issuing tourist cards with a validity for one month. 
While conditioned visa exemptions were in place for Chinese tourists for seven 
northern Vietnamese localities only (Quang Ninh, Lang Son, Ha Giang, Cao Bang, 
Lao Cai, Haiphong and Hanoi), the measure was extended to the whole of Vietnam 
(Vietizain Business Fonwi, 16 September 2004). 
The province of Lao Cai has four major economic zones: the Lao Cai 
International Border Gate Area, the Kim Thanh Trade Area and the two industrial 
complexes at Bac Duyen Hai and Dong Pho Moi. These zones offer tax incentives to 
investors and exempt them from land rentals (Vietnain Business Fortan, 24 August 
2004). This development, and especially the expansion of the Lao Cai International 
Border Gate Area into a transit station for Yunnanese goods to Vietnam and the 
wider ASEAN region and from ASEAN via Vietnam to Yunnan (an economic 
corridor stretching from Kunming via Hekou-Lao Cai to Hanoi and Haiphong) of 
course happens with the approval of the government in Hanoi and is the 
development of what Nguyen Than Duc called the 'open economic zone' (Nguyen 
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Than Due, 2005: 124). As regards infrastructure, the national highway No. 70 from 
Lao Cai to Doan Hung (province of Phu Tho) will be upgraded with four lanes 
between 2005 and late 2008 in order to link Kunming with Haiphong via Hekou 
(Vietnam Business Fonan, 12 January 2005). As part of the GMS programme, the 
ADB extends loans for the construction of the Kunming-Haiphong corridor and the 
upgrading of the Hanoi-Lao Cai railway. The Vietnam Business Forian explains that 
the Lao Cai gate is the 'most efficient and shortest' way for Yunnan to export its 
products: the railway route from Kunming to Haiphong is only 850 kilometres long, 
whereas the alternative route from Kunming to the sea ports of Guangxi is 1,800 
kilometres long. Involved in the development of Lao Cai are the provincial 
government and the central ministries of Planning and Investment, of Transport, of 
Foreign Affairs, of Defence and of Public Security (Vietnam Business Fortall, 29 
July 2004). The last three show the security significance the central government 
allocates to cross-border cooperation and the capacity, with which it tries to control 
border provinces and border trade. It is also an attempt to curb smuggling activities, 
enhance the competitiveness of Vietnamese enterprises and protect Vietnamese 
industry vis-A-vis China. At the same time it shows the willingness to exploit a 
potential of Vietnam as transit station of China-ASEAN trade, a position in which 
Laos and Thailand are interested, too. This interest comes at a time when Chinese 
business people are investing abroad. While Japan and Taiwan are still the biggest 
sources of FDI in the region, Southeast Asia is experiencing 'a small but rapidly 
growing flow of outward direct investment from China as both state-owned and 
private Chinese companies start to see benefits in investing abroad' at a time when 
'China grows and competition intensifies' and protectionism in the United States 
against Chinese goods grows. 'The earliest beneficiaries of this new exploration will 
probably be China's neighbours - the very Southeast Asian countries that were 
recently lamenting how China was sucking up FDI at their expense. ' In this strategy 
of China's entrepreneurs, Thailand shall function as gateway to ASEAN markets 
(Vatikiotis, 2004). As a result, Thailand and Vietnam are competitors in the Chinese 
market and for Chinese FDI. China is hence in a comfortable position, while 
Vietnam's government seems squashed between fears of China's economic strength 
and a race with Thailand for shares of China's domestic market. In particular, as 
highlighted by Vietnam's trade counsellor in Kunming, Nguyen Duy Luat, the 
Vietnamese side looks at Thailand's air links with China and the much enhanced 
navigability of the Mekong between Thailand and China. The competition is the 
more severe, as Thai and Vietnamese export products to China both focus on 
seafood, fruit and vegetables, and are both destined for China's western provinces. 
In the light of this, Vietnam's Trade Minister Truong Dinh Tuyen argued that if 
Vietnam failed to boost exports to China, the China-ASEAN FTA and the early 
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harvest programme would have less effect on Vietnam's economic development 
(Vietnam Business Forum, 7 April 2005). Seen from this point of view, Vietnam's 
efforts of subregional integration in the GMS not only aim at becoming 
economically more important to outside countries (a goal which is supposed to make 
Vietnam economically more independent from China); but they also aim at using 
GMS agreements - here in particular the simplification of customs procedures, the 
expansion of air links and the development of the Mekong for better navigation - in 
order to draw even with Thailand in its exports to China for the development of the 
economy of its northern provinces. 
Apart from the planned corridor from Nanning to Haiphong, the construction 
of an expressway ftom Nanning to Vietnam through the Friendship Gate is being 
carried out. The expressway is expected to open in 2006 and to cut the eight-hour 
drive from Nanning to Hanoi to four hours (Xinhua, II August 2004). Guangxi 
borders the provinces of Quang Ninh and Lang Son and has already emerged as key 
trading station for China-ASEAN trade. Cooperation started to take off in the early 
1990s, when the border between Lang Son and Guangxi was re-opened at the 
Friendship Gate on I April 1992. The opening allowed trucks to resume transport of 
goods, and train service resumed later in April. The exact location of the border was 
still unclear at the time of the official opening, as China claimed the border to be 300 
metres deeper inside Vietnamese territory than the point that was accepted until 
1979 (Far Eastern Ecoiiondc Revieiv, 1992: 14). Although the border was officially 
closed during the 1980s, the amount of smuggled goods entering Vietnam from 
China 'was a major preoccupation' in Vietnam and had adverse effects on Vietnam's 
economic development (Amer, 1999: 76). The issue was consistently raised during 
the negotiations on the land border. 
From 25-26 April 2000, a Joint Investment Trade Conference was held in 
Hanoi between Guangxi and Vietnam's Ministry of Industry. It was attended by 
Wang Hamning, Guangxi's Vice Chairman, and Vietnam's vice minister of industry 
(Reninin Ribao, in English, 29 April 2000). While trade is still strictly controlled, 
Rejunin Ribao reported further that in 2000 eight border towns and counties with 12 
border ports were approved by the state to open up, plus 25 visiting spots for border 
residents (Reninin Ribao, in English, 29 April 2000). Later in the same year, from 
23-27 September 2000, a border trade fair was held by the city of Fangcheng in the 
town of Dongxing, which directly borders Quang Ninh (Reninin Ribao, 10 August 
2000). As a result, of all ASEAN countries, Vietnam has become Guangxi's most 
important trading partner, owing to the fact that Vietnam is the direct export-import 
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route for goods in China-Southeast Asia trade (Ministry of Commerce of China, 6 
January 2004). The importance of border trade with Guangxi has restored 
importance to the respective cities on each side of the border: Lang Son and 
Shuikou, and Mong Cai and Fangcheng. Trade fairs and industrial exhibitions mirror 
the exchanges between Yunnan and Lao Cai. It seems only as a consequence that 
Vietnam's consul general of Guangzhou expressed interest in the establishment of a 
consulate in Guangxi's capital Nanning (Ministry of Commerce of China, 19 
February 2004). The consulate was opened in May 2004 in addition to Vietnam's 
consulates in Guangzhou and Kunming (Gu, 2004: 15). This seems the more 
important as Nanning hosted the first China-ASEAN trade and investment summit 
from 3-9 November 2004. The summit ran parallel to and as a part of the China- 
ASEAN trade fair, which is to be held annually in the same city, as was concluded 
on the 7 th China-ASEAN leadership meeting in October 2003 (Ministry of 
Commerce of China, Special Commissioner's Office in Nanning, 16 February 2004). 
The next China-ASEAN trade fair was due in Nanning from 19-22 October 2005. 
Before moving to China, however, a pure ASEAN Trade Fair was held in Hanoi in 
mid-October 2004 in order to promote exchange among ASEAN countries 
themselves (AKP News, 18 October 2004, AKP/03). The China-ASEAN trade fairs 
in Nanning are supposed to work as a booster for Guangxi-Vietnam border 
cooperation and as a supplement to local trade conferences and Guangxi-ASEAN 
cooperation meetings. On 13 April 2005, Guangxi and Vietnamese border localities 
held a local conference in order to arrange the organisation of trade fairs, exhibitions 
and inforination exchanges as well as infrastructure projects, such as the upgrading 
of road and railway networks, construction of seaports, opening of new border gates 
and improvement of old ones (Xinhua, 14 April 2005). Another result of the 
enhanced cooperation is a bilingual web site on China-Vietnam trade, the China- 
Vietnam Economy and Trade Information Network (Zhong-Yue jingji maoyi 
xinxiwang, www. cvtrade. com. cn), maintained by the 
Guangxi provincial government (Nvww. gxi. gov. cn) and the Vietnamese Trade 
Ministry. The site contains information about government policies, enterprises and 
market conditions. Yet another website is trilingual (English, Vietnamese, Chinese), 
and features the Sino-Vietnam Trade Network, Zhong-Yue keji maoyi wang, rPkL1f4 
Jk9'ýRviVA], (www. sinoviet. com, the Vietnamese page is on Nv,. v-vv. vn. sinoviet. com, 
the English page is , v-vv-vv. en. sinoviet. com . The Network, according to its self- 
portrayal a 'sub-network of Guangxi Scientific and Technological Information 
Networks (, ww,. v. gxsti. net. cn), is devoted to the excavating and transmitting of Sino- 
Vietnam science and technology commercial inforination in three languages' and 
provides information on trade, investment, companies, regulations and geography. 
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When Prime Minister Wen Jiabao met his counterpart Phan Van Khai in 
Vietnam in October 2004, they agreed to cooperate on the 'Two Corridors One 
Circle' plan: the corridors are Nanning-Lang Son-Hanoi-Haiphong-Quang Ninh, and 
Kunming-Lao Cai-Hanoi-Haiphong. The circle is the Gulf of Tongkin. The plan is 
supposed to further link the economics of the northern Vietnamese and the southern 
Chinese provinces and to 'provide a bridge to facilitate China-ASEAN cooperation' 
(Gu, 2004: 14). 
Table 13: Guangxi's Major Import-Export Markets (in 2002) 
Import markets Export markets 
country 
(region) 
amount 
(in 10,000 
USD) 
annual 
percentage 
change 
country 
(region) 
amount (in 
10.000 
USD) 
annual 
percentage 
change 
Brazil 15519 853.8 Vietnam 34058 98.1 
Vietnam 14558 25.6 Hong Kong 25745 41.3 
USA 11378 120.3 USA 15722 4.4 
Japan 6481 63.4 Japan 12072 4.9 
Taiwan 6034 68.0 Taiwan 6329 10.8 
Australia 3674 23.3 Netherlands 5729 -46.4 
Germany 3093 66.6 South Korea 3977 19.8 
South 
Africa 
2901 50.9 Italy 3522 12.6 
South 
Korea 
2803 -17.2 Germany 3350 -12.2 
France 2400 345.3 Spain 2970 -9.1 
Gabon 2240 36.7 UK 2940 10.7 
Canada 1794 397.0 Thailand 2622 32.7 
Austria 1484 1313.3 France 2346 6.3 
Hong Kong 1440 -24.4 Malaysia 2343 19.8 
Finland 1428 -15.1 Indonesia 1982 -21.6 
Thailand 1423 -20.1 India 1950 40.2 
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UK 1272 -1.8 Austria 1694 -9.2 
Malaysia 1269 7.5 Singapore 1633 3.5 
Italy 1144 -23.3 Philippines 1218 79.1 
Iran 1100 186.5 Belgium 1163 12.2 
Source: Guangxi niaiyian 2003 (Guangxi Yearbook 2003), p. 209. 
Table 14: Guangxi's Major Small Border Trade Import-Export Products 
Export Import 
product quantity amount (in product quantity amount (in 
name 10,000 name 10,000 
Yuan) Yuan) 
fruit 93320 20779 rubber 37839 tons 11998 
tons 
traditional 21135 14598 fresh 43761 tons 9013 
medicine tons longans 
knitted and 4700000 15364 cassava 96900 tons 8950 
cotton items (med. ) 
clothes 
glass 4060000 9913 dried lychees 16738 tons 6467 
sqm 
garlic 48223 8618 coal 411094 6064 
tons tons 
mung 28507 8398 glutamic 11291 tons 4768 
beans tons acid sodium 
(med. ) 
toys 54209 4324 cashew nuts 2690 tons 4550 
items 
soybeans 18530 3713 water 251315 4432 
tons melons tons 
machinery 5572 tons 3214 dried 25177 tons 3878 
and power- longans 
generating 
fittings 
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machinery 4613 2355 iron ore 228451 3679 
items tons 
Source: Guangxi nianjian 2003 (Guangxi Yearbook 2003), p. 2 10. 
Both provinces, Guangxi and Yunnan, understand their role in the relations 
between China and Southeast Asia as a gateway for Chinese products to Southeast 
Asia and vice versa. In 1981, Beijing moved to establish provincial foreign affairs 
offices in order to 'implement the principles and policies of the central government 
in foreign affairs under the dual leadership' of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the provincial governments (Cheung and Tang, 2001: 99). In the meantime the 
provinces 'now also conduct external relations in order to enhance their own 
international images and pursue their own economic interests' (Cheung and Tang, 
2001: 104). 101 Accordingly, for instance, the government of Yunnan 
www. vn. gov. c and its foreign affairs office (the Yunnan sheng reninin zhengfu 
waishi bangongshi, www. yfao. gov. c ) created a 
GMS leading group (Yunnan Lancangjiang-Meigonghe ciquyu jingji hezuo zhudao 
xiaozu bangongshi 
The GMS leading group deals with the province's relations with South and 
Southeast Asia in general including relations with international organisations such as 
the ADB. 
The activities of Yunnan and Guangxi in border trade mirror the discussion in 
Chapter Two: that through decentralisation measures since 1979 and the 
contemporaneous process of globalisation, subnational (border) units increasingly 
form international contacts. This at the same time is not only an expression of 
globalisation, but shows how through the lifting of the Cold War structure border 
units form cooperative areas, subregions - or what Sasuga (2004) called micro- 
regions -, over which the central govenu-nent finds it difficult to exercise control. 
This is what was referred to in Chapter Two as 'deterritorialization' and 
'reterritorialization' (Sasuga, 2004). Hence the reactions of, for instance, the 
Vietnamese government as mentioned above, to attempt to reign into efforts by 
border provinces to create special economic regions, which would further diminish 
101 See pp. 98-119 in Cheung and Tang for a good overview over the activities of the 
provinces in external relations (including cooperation between research 
institutes and the hosting of consulates). For a history of Guangxi's external 
links until the early 1990s see Hendrischke, 1997. 
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central control over border units. These measures by the central government can be 
seen as what was described in Chapter Two as attempts towards 'deglobalization' 
(Robertson, 1992). Regionalism here is an answer to globalisation, while at the same 
time the region is linked to the streams of global trade. 
The ADB aides this integration by facilitating regional transportation networks 
within the GMS framework. Regarding Vietnam, the Bank gives priority to the 
upgrading of transport corridors that are simultaneously beneficial to subregional 
linkages. Particular targets in this respect are the road between Hanoi and Lang Son 
on the Vietnamese-Chinese border, the Ho Chi Minh City-Phnom Penh-Bangkok 
Highway, and the East-West Corridor connecting Laos, northeast Thailand and 
central Vietnam. The opening of the East-West Corridor would be of particular 
importance for central Vietnam, because it is a region that lacks a natural hinterland 
within Vietnam. Another possible subregional corridor would be the road and rail 
route from Hanoi to Lao Cai. 102 In terms of energy production, cross-border power 
exchange is seen as having a potential for development - as mentioned, Vietnam 
buys hydropower from Yunnan -, as well as a subregional gas pipeline network. 
Private sector interest can be found in the development of coal-fired power plants in 
northern Vietnam, which would serve both the domestic market and could be used to 
export power to China. Other areas, where the ADB sees development potential with 
effects for the GMS as a whole is human development (especially with regard to the 
health sector, malaria and AIDS) and the environment (ADB, 1995: 44). According 
to Handley, Mekong cooperation would enable Vietnam to expand the sales of 
consumer items, natural-resource products and farm goods to Laos, Cambodia and 
Thailand through the East-West Corridor based on its Highway No. 9. The economic 
corridor system would open a hinterland for the port of Da Nang for tourists and 
products and increase chances to attract international aid in. order to improve its 
facilities (Handley, 1993a: 70). It should be noted that FDI in the northern border 
provinces is relatively low compared with the southern provinces. Only Quang Ninh, 
bordering not only China's province of Guangxi but also the sea, can be found in the 
102 see specifically: RETA (Regional Technical Assistance) 5535: Promoting 
Subregional Cooperation Among Cambodia, People's Republic of China, Lao 
PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Viet Nam for $4.0 million , approved on 10 July 
1993. RETA 5649: Greater Mekong Subregion Infrastructure Improvement: Ho 
Chi Minh to Phnom Penh Highway, for $3.0 million, approved on 9 November 
1995. RETA 5566: Study of the Lao-Thailand-Viet Nam-East-West Transport 
Corridor for $1.0 million, approved on 18 July 1994. This TA is financed by 
France with the Bank acting as the Executing Agency. 
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upper half of Vietnam's FDI-attracting localities, followed by Lang Son and Lao Cai 
in the lower half of the statistics (see Appendix). While this integrates Vietnam's 
and China's economies in the subregion and links them with each other ever more 
closely, and while it also diversifies growth away from the centres of economic 
activity in China (the coastal regions) and in Vietnam (the urban centres of Hanoi 
and Ho Chi Minh City and the deltas of the Red and Mekong rivers), an enhanced 
transport and infrastructure network may produce the opposite result of what 
Vietnam hopes for, namely an increase in Chinese exports to Southeast Asia and a 
trade balance further tilting in China's favour. 
6.4. Conclusion 
The gradual approach of building a system of committee governance we 
observed in the GMS in the previous chapter, interestingly, resembles the bilateral 
cooperation between China and Vietnam since 1989 (for the following analysis see 
the table High-level Meetings Between Vietnain and China 1989-2005 in the 
Appendix). What we see in the table is a steadily improved and intensified bilateral 
conversation, negotiation and bargaining situation between several layers of actors in 
China and Vietnam. Bilateral visits have increased greatly along different layers of 
actors. This went hand in hand with a convergence of interests and cooperation 
expectations on both sides. A gradual process was unfolded, based on post-Cold War 
pragmatism, through which emerged a regularity and continuously enhanced 
frequency of exchanges on multiple levels, supported by governmental policies, 
leading from general discussion of the issues in hand to specificities. Eventually, this 
process with governmental pressure pushing it forward, led to a conclusion of a 
series of treaties. Particularly noteworthy are the treaties for the land border and the 
maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Tongkin. The boundary treaties met with 
criticism in Vietnam on the side of intellectuals, who accused the government of 
having made too many concessions to the Chinese side. 103 Overall, a conflict 
resolution ranking emerges from the table: first, normalisation of relations and a 
number of confidcnce-building exercises; second, the least contentious issue in the 
form of the land border was solved; third, the second least contentious issue, the 
Gulf of Tongkin, was tackled. Now remaining is the South China Sea, which would 
involve the need for a multilateral negotiation forum, something China is 
103 Nguyen Manh Hung, 2002 (land border section and note xxi). 
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approaching only very hesitantly. Still, however, the gradual approach and the steady 
expansion of confidence-building platforms on various levels (see next paragraph) 
eventually facilitated cooperation on sensitive issues such as liberalising visa 
regulations between both countries. These events and the emerging cooperative 
structure in the GMS highlight that the first multilateral exercise in East Asia in the 
form of SEATO was essentially a concept of multilateral cooperation unknown to 
the region, which consequently could not gain any ground. Instead, ASEAN emerged 
as a gradual, confidence-based cooperation mechanism. 
The levels of actors involved in the exchanges between China and Vietnam 
encompass: heads of state and government (state level), government ministries (state 
level), communist party organs (party level), provinces, cities, counties (subnational 
level), experts (state and epistemic community level) and parliamentary exchanges 
(state level). The topics range from coordination in foreign and security policy at the 
governmental level, ideological discussions of how to develop the economy without 
losing power, to cultural and educational exchanges between border localities and 
local party committees. In addition, on both sides of the China-Vietnam border, trade 
fairs were established on a regular basis, involving the business community of the 
private and state sectors. 
In particular the activities and announcements of 20 May 2004 and October 
2004 (see the same table in the Appendix) show that setting the framework for GMS 
cooperation in general and border cooperation in particular (the border localities in 
question were not all part of the GMS framework in 2004 but became so in summer 
2005 with the inclusion of Guangxi in the subregional cooperation structure) lies in 
the hands of the central governments in Hanoi and Beijing. Implementation, then, 
occurs through border provinces and smaller localities at the Sino-Vietnamese 
border, that is, subnational units ranging from province down to county levels. 
The fact that the central goverm-nents of China and Vietnam concern 
themselves with building and upgrading of infrastructure shows the concerns of both 
countries to engage in border and subregional cooperation and use the opportunities 
for economic development to develop the domestic economies (especially China's 
landlocked west and Vietnam's landlocked north). The involvement of central 
government ministries also shows the strategic relevance Beijing and Hanoi attach to 
border and GMS cooperation. The involvement of Vietnam's central ministries of 
Foreign Affairs, of Defence and of Public Security in developing economic links of 
-249- 
Lao Cai with Chinese localities across the border (Vietnain Business Forum, 29 July 
2004) highlights this security issue and the attempts of the central government to 
control actions and foreign relations of border localities with China. As for China, 
Mekong basin cooperation was explicitly mentioned in China's National Defense 
white paper of 2002; and at the Fourth ASEAN Informal Summit from 22-25 
November 2000 in Singapore, then Prime Minister Zhu Rongji made extensive 
reference to Mekong cooperation and stated China's readiness to increase its 
financial contribution for the enhancement of roads and the navigability of the 
Mekong in order to lay the foundation for swifter and closer integrated economic 
development of the subregion (Reninin Ribao, 26 November 2000a). The 
fundamental idea behind this is to enhance Beijing's position in Southeast Asia (not 
least the statement was made during the important ASEAN Infonnal Summit) and to 
turn the expected economic advantages to good use for its domestic economy. 
Consequently, the lines between foreign and domestic policy are not clearly 
distinguishable anymore. The development also makes clear that border and 
subregional cooperation is a strategic asset for both governments and therefore worth 
not only to engage in, but also to discuss and publicly announce it during high-level 
governmental exchanges. It furthermore indicates attempts by both central 
governments to control the development in their respective border areas. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion: China's and Vietnam's Foreign Policies and 
Subregionalism in the Greater Mekong Subregion 
This study was concerned with two broad thematic categories: subregionalism 
and institution-building in the GMS (using the regime approach and the concept of 
committee governance), and the foreign policies of China and Vietnam towards each 
other and towards the GMS. The study further set out to examine how these two 
thematic categories influence each other. Grouped into these two thematic blocks, 
this chapter will recall the research questions developed in Chapter One, Section 
One and Chapter Four, Section Three and link them to the conceptual framework in 
Chapter Four (including the remarks in Chapter Two, Section Three and the 
discussion of international regimes in Chapter Three) concerning their mutual 
influence and dependence. 
Let us first consider Vietnam-China relations and the manifestation of both 
countries' foreign policies in the GMS. The relevant research questions were as 
follows: How did Vietnam's and China's foreign policies change afler the Cold War 
so that Mekong cooperation became possible again? How do China and Vietnam 
perceive each other and how do these views shape the foreign policies of both 
countries towards the GMS? What roles have Vietnam and China allocated to the 
GMS? Is GMS cooperation a means to attain foreign policy goals, or is it an end in 
itself (such as integrating the economy into the subregion), or is it both a means and 
an end? Did the change of the foreign policies of both countries result in compatible 
or contradictory foreign policies towards subregional cooperation? Are there dual 
Chinese and Vietnamese strategies in foreign policy and economic policy towards 
the GMS? 
The regime approach, as we have seen in Chapter Three, argues that regimes 
can come into being where unilateral action in the anarchic self-help system 
produces Pareto deficient, sub-optimal outcomes. Actors need to find common 
interests to cooperate. Cooperation emerges where states regard (or are forced to 
regard - in our case due to changes in the global security structure, which led to a 
realignment of foreign policies) their policies as being in actual or potential conflict 
over the realisation of a common interest; and it happens only when the conflict is 
not asymmetrical (the asymmetry between China and mainland Southeast Asian 
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countries is the reason why China's Lancang Cascade is not discussed: see below). 
Chapter Five in particular examined the historical evolution of cooperation and 
showed the current state of GMS cooperation. The common interest of GMS 
countries to turn from Cold War contention to cooperation is manifested in the 
peaceful and sustainable exploitation of the Mekong's waters as a common resource 
for irrigation, food, electricity production and transport. The notion of the Mekong 
turning into a source of cooperation is especially important when going through the 
history of Mekong cooperation, which was time and again hampered by the outbreak 
of violent conflict. Looking at Vietnam-China relations, further mutual goals and 
gains can be observed in the development of China's western and Vietnam's 
northern provinces with the aim to diversify growth away from the centres of 
economic activity in both countries to mountainous areas, which are difficult to 
access -a goal which is generally shared between the respective provinces and the 
central govenu-nents in Hanoi and Beijing. As these regions border each other, the 
common goal of their development almost inevitably produces their growing 
interdependence and as a result a growing interdependence of the economies of 
China and Vietnam. Cooperation and the development of a foreign policy that 
creates means to settle disputes without recourse to military force are therefore 
necessary for the realisation of the national interest (for the provinces as the 
subnational units see also below). 
Keohane's mentioning of 'a reputation for reliability' and the 'provision of 
high-quality information' to others as prerequisites for maintained cooperation 
(Keohane, 1984: 259) are important with regard to Vietnam's foreign policy in the 
GMS: Nguyen Than Due of the Academy of Social Sciences in Hanoi emphasises 
that Vietnam, by engaging in subregional cooperation, wants to 'demonstrate 
trustworthiness in international relations in order to reach long-term goals such as 
WTO membership' (Nguyen Than Due, 2005: 123). With regard to China, being 
viewed as a friendly power helps to increase Chinese influence in Southeast Asia at 
the expense of the United States. But global goals and regional goals are intertwined: 
the expansion and future sustainability of cross-border trade along the Chinese- 
Vietnamese border has made it necessary to compile information systematically and 
make it accessible to interested parties. Furthermore, Vietnam's concerns about the 
ecology of the Mekong delta needs continuous information exchange of hydrological 
data and dam-building activities with upstream Mekong countries, in particular with 
China as the country at the river's source. The Mekong delta is vital for Vietnam's 
agriculture and fishing industry. Salt intrusion and floods threaten its ecology. 
Therefore what is done in the upper reaches of the Mekong, most notably at the 
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source in China, is of importance down in the delta. The old rivalry between China 
and Vietnam is reinforced by a new conflict; but Mekong cooperation was taken as a 
potential means to divert attention from contention to cooperation in order to realise 
the common goal of peaceful and long-term use of the Mekong's waters. As a major 
source for electricity and energy production, irrigation and transportation 
development, the Mekong is of importance for all of the countries in the Mekong 
basin. Being thus a source of potential contention, it had to be turned into a source of 
cooperation in order to achieve mutual gains. This also constitutes a 'shadow of the 
future' (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985: 232) on the side of Vietnam due to Vietnam's 
position at the end of the Mekong and the importance of the Mekong delta for 
agricultural production, and due to its position at the border of a big China. Vietnam 
therefore needs 'reliability of information' about China's current and future policies 
and 'quick feedback about changes' in China's policies. Hence Vietnam's wish to 
engage China in the subregion and make its policies predictable, because the 
Mekong region is vital for Vietnam's security outlook. Cooperation over 
transboundary rivers is thus brought to the attention of security policy. 
The asymmetric power situation we have observed between China and 
Vietnam in Chapters Five and Six is aggravated by a contradictoriness of Beijing's 
and Vietnam's wider foreign policy goals as they find expression in the divergent 
approaches to the Greater Mekong Subregion. Although both China and Vietnam 
have created onmidirectional foreign policies after the Cold War, they pursue 
opposing aims, which result in incompatible foreign policy interests. Both countries 
have turned their attention to Southeast Asia, but use the region and its institutions 
for different purposes: China in order to gain influence in Southeast Asia, Vietnam 
in order to bind China into the subregion and gain stature vis-A-vis China in 
international affairs. While Beijing pursues an aggressive approach, Vietnam's 
approach is cautious, needing to balance cooperation with China on the one hand 
and the US on the other hand. In this regard, Vietnam has so far managed to send 
subtle signals to China. that it might be prepared and able to balance China with US 
help: the visits of US navy ships in 2003,2004 and 2005, which are to be repeated 
annually, point in this direction. And the US strategy of gaining footholds in 
individual countries in order to make them comply with US wishes and to use this 
influence vis-A-vis assertive countries (here: China) (personal inter-view with a US- 
based foreign policy analyst in New York in March 2004) might in the future aid 
Vietnam in asserting itself in conflicts with China. At the same time China acts 
against this strategy with its 'new security concept', the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, and specifically in its relations to Vietnam with the Five-Point Proposal 
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of 2002104 and the 16-Character Principle (long-term stability, future-oriented, good- 
neighbourly and all-round cooperative bilateral relations) of 1999105 (see also the 
table in the Appendix on High-level Meetings Between Vietnain and China 1989- 
2005). So far, however, Vietnam seems to be trapped by Beijing's perception of 
Washington and has to adjust its US policy accordingly to avoid yet another 
alienation of Beijing. The careful approaches to Washington are balanced by 
assuring China that they are not directed against its security interests. While Vietnam 
needs good relations with China in order to create a secure environment, Beijing 
pressures Hanoi not to seek too close relations with Washington. On the other hand, 
China is the closest ideological ally, a fact that produces a common perception of the 
US strategy of 'peaceful evolution' in Vietnam and China of conveying Western 
104 The 5-point proposal reads as follows: 
'Firstly, to carry on the good tradition of high-level exchanges between the two 
parties and two countries and maintain frequent contact and meetings of their 
leaders so as to frankly and extensively exchange opinions on issues of common 
concern from time to time. 
Secondly, to continuously expand and deepen trade and economic cooperation 
between China and Vietnam, consolidate the material foundation of friendly 
bilateral relations, keep improving the efficiency and quality of cooperation and 
substantially lift bilateral trade and economic cooperation to a new level. 
Thirdly, to educate the people, especially young people of the two countries, with the 
spirit of long-term ffiendship. To further strengthen exchanges among the young 
people in various forms so as to foster and bring up millions of successors of the 
cause of Sino-Vietnamese friendship. 
Fourthly, to strengthen bilateral cooperation on the issue of borders, accelerat& the 
process of various follow-up work of the land boundary and the delimitation of 
the Beibu Bay territorial sea and build the borders between China and Vietnam 
into borders of long-term peace, stability and friendship. 
Fifthly, to deepen the share of the experience between the parties and governments 
of the two countries and strengthen their consultation, cooperation and 
coordination on international issues so as to facilitate and try to create a better 
external environment for the construction and development of both countries' 
(Xinhua, 27 February 2002). 
105 Shiliu zi fangzhen: 'Changqi wending, mianxiang weilai, mulin youhao, 
quanmian hezuo' 
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political ideas to the Vietnamese and Chinese citizens, which eventually might grow 
and develop a domestic force that topples the communist regimes in both countries 
in favour of a liberal pluralist democracy. Consequently, 'peaceful evolution' 
constitutes yet another 'shadow of the future', which pushes Vietnam into close 
cooperation with China. 
To summarise the importance of the GMS for Vietnam and China, we can 
observe the following constellations of interest: 
For Vietnam: 
to multilateralise and diversify foreign economic relations and to integrate 
the economy in successive steps: the subregion, the ASEAN region, inter- 
regionally (APEC) and globally (WTO). The strategy aims at sustaining doi 
nzoi, avoiding dependence on China, and gaining stature in international 
politics. The trade deficit with China - also in border trade - is troubling 
Vietnamese authorities the closer China integrates with Southeast Asian 
economies. The reiteration by Vietnamese scholars and governmental 
advisors of avoiding a dependence of Vietnam on China does suggest that 
Vietnam's position despite Hanoi's membership in ASEAN, APEC and 
AFTA, is not as bright as is often publicly demonstrated (see for example the 
statement of Chile, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, 29 January 
2004). Voicing his personal opinion of how the change of the US presidency 
from Clinton to Bush and the attacks of 11 September 2001 had influenced 
the relations between Hanoi and Washington, a Vietnamese senior scholar 
interviewed in Hanoi in June 2004 argued that relations between Vietnam 
and the United States were very good during the Clinton years (normalisation 
of relations, trade pact), and that during the following Bush administration, 
except for a downturn at the start, the relations quickly developed regarding 
economics, trade and military relations. 'The US doesn't want to see 
Vietnam to increasingly rely on China. ' At the same time, the relations 
between the US and Vietnam 'have historical differences. ' Therefore, 'some 
members of the US Congress' are cautious to develop ties with Vietnam. 
However, seeing Vietnam-US relations in a critical light 'is not the 
mainstream opinion' in US or Vietnamese governmental circles. Vietnam 
'did not do well to cultivate relations' with and rely one-sidedly on the Soviet 
Union. The 1979 border war between China and Vietnam 'was in fact a war 
between the Soviet Union, China and the US, a collusion between the US 
and China to contain the Soviet Union. ' After the Cold War, Hanoi aimed at 
'developing itself within ASEAN', and it became a 'strategic ally' of 
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Washington. Conclusions drawn from the Cold War experience are that 
'Vietnam should not rely' on a particular country only and 'has to prepare for 
potential alliances against its national security', as happened in 1979 between 
China and the United States. Therefore, in order to ensure national security, 
'the best is to diversify relations'; 
to mitigate the China-threat perception by engaging China in cooperative 
networks. While Vietnam has again acknowledged China's political and 
economic power, it has not a clear idea of how to deal with it. Interestingly, 
China's foreign policy is as well still in a state of post-Cold War flux, 
waiting for concretisation in a new post-Cold War order which has as yet to 
emerge. In Vietnam, China's embrace of the TAC is often regarded as a 
largely cosmetic alteration of Beijing's assertive foreign policy behaviour 
and foreign policy goals (personal interviews with Vietnamese foreign policy 
analysts in Hanoi in summer 2004). There are positive signs, however: so far 
successes in having pacified the region seem to be prevalent. The ongoing 
demarcation of the land border and the efforts to implement a fishing 
agreement between China and Vietnam regarding the Gulf of Tongkin (for 
information see Economic Intelligence Unit, 2004) seem to confirm 
optimistic prognostications. However, both processes are met with 
considerable suspicion in Vietnam Nguyen Manh Hung, 2002 (land border 
section and note xxi); 
the GMS is vital for Vietnam's economy in order to sustain the economic 
reform process and economic growth, and to become an important 
investment country in order to diversify the sources of this economic growth 
(Japan, the United States, India and the European Union). In this regard, 
relations with Japan are a major achievement: since 1990, Japan has climbed 
from 4 th largest investor after France, Britain and Belgium (Kiintworth, 1990: 
9) to third position after Singapore and Taiwan, and it is Vietnam's largest 
donor. In addition, the bilateral investment treaty'06 has assigned Japan a 
major role in developing the Vietnamese economy (Reuters, 14 November 
2003b). A buzzing economy is part of Vietnam's security perceptions, an 
idea which brings into play the concept of human security as prerequisite for 
national security and political stability. Therefore, a good regional economic 
envirom-nent and the integration into this environment are vital for the 
106 Agreement between Japan and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam for the 
Liberalization, Promotion andProtection ofInvestment. 
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sustainability of the economic reform programme with repercussions for the 
survival of the political status quo in Vietnam, that is, the stability of the 
political system and the economic reform process. 
For China: 
China's GMS strategy is on the one hand a long-term cooperation to help 
Yunnan's (and since summer 2005 Guangxi's) economy taking-off and 
diversify economic growth away from the coastal belt to the landlocked 
interior regions, thus helping the domestic reform programme as a whole (for 
the role of the subnational units - the provinces - see below). This is a purely 
economic concern and does not fall into the realm of foreign policy; 
on the other hand, where economic policy falls into the realm of foreign 
policy, China instrumentalises the GMS to gain leverage against the US. 
Beijing has given itself a ftiendly image (in particular by pronouncing the 
gnew security concept' in Jakarta in 2000, which is meant to be a 
straightforward alternative to security cooperation with the United States, 
which is potentially directed against China); and it has repeatedly pledged 
that its rise is peaceful. One of the latest of these statements was made by Hu 
Jintao on his visit to Vietnam from 31 October 2005 to 2 November 2005. 
This thwarts Vietnam's intentions of engaging China in legally binding long- 
term commitments. The two summits in Phnom Penh in November 2002 - 
the 8"' ASEAN Summit and the I" GMS Summit - and the 2nd GMS Summit 
in Kunming in July 2005 showed that China seeks to keep a free hand: with 
regard to the question of how to solve the disputes in the South China Sea, 
no Code of Conduct was concluded during the ASEAN summit. And during 
both GMS summits, ASEAN's soft regionalism prevailed by avoiding the 
contentious dam-building issue which divides China and the lower Mekong 
countries. This last point shows that cooperation happens only in non- 
controversial areas, a situation which generally results in deep frustration and 
uneasiness in Vietnam about China's foreign policy behaviour. 
These constellations give rise to a situation, which regime theoreticians have 
termed 'rambo situation. ' As for the GMS, this is best exemplified in cooperation 
over transboundary water resources, which mirrors the distribution of power in the 
subregion and resembles Dore's argument that 'regional governance in the Mekong 
- if "environment and development" governance is any indication - in many ways is 
lagging, unable to approach governance ideals, and inadequate to equitably or 
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sensibly govern far-reaching regional change', a development which is hindered by 
'[m]isplaced and ultimately problematic interpretations of "authority to rule" and 
sovereignty' (Dore, 2003: 1). 
The unequal distribution of power in fon-n of the rambo situation can be 
observed on three levels, seen from a central government's perspective: water use, 
economic/domestic policy, and foreign policy. The difficulty of GMS cooperation 
happens against the backdrop of China's powerful position on all three of the levels: 
water use (China occupies the source of the Mekong), domestic/economic policy 
(development of the Chinese hinterland through increased exports to Southeast Asia, 
thereby further tilting the trade balance in China's favour), and foreign policy 
(increasing China's influence in the subregion at the expense of the United States 
and Japan). 
Vietnam pursues opposing interests on all of the three levels: water use 
(Vietnam as last in the line of riparian states feels particularly affected by dam- 
building activities at the Mekong's upper flow, the Lancang Cascade), 
domestic/economic policy (Vietnam tries to gain more economic and thus political 
weight through GMS cooperation and to soften the strong Chinese position; and it 
wants to develop the northern provinces), and foreign policy (Vietnam wants to gain 
more freedom of action vis-&vis China in particular in its relations with the United 
States. A solid cooperation in the GMS shall restrict China's assertive foreign policy 
and make it transparent and predictable). 
It is important to note that the Vietnamese interest appears contradictory. 
Border integration between China and Vietnam has improved Vietnam's economic 
importance to China and has played an important role in connecting Yunnan and 
Guangxi to mainland Southeast Asia and in developing the economies of Vietnam's 
border localities. An elaborate transport system is crucial in order to maintain this 
situation, and the GMS Cross-Border Transport Agreentent is an important step in 
this direction. The development of these links can in turn only be facilitated by a 
favourable foreign policy environment, which resolves problems by non-military 
means. This shows, however, that enhanced economic integration coincides with an 
enhanced infrastructure. This also helps Chinese exports to Southeast Asia. There is 
thus a mutuality of interests between China and Vietnam, which may result in an 
undesired outcome on the side of Vietnam. And the economic development of 
Vietnam's northern provinces increases the linkage of this region to China. Alarmed 
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by this development, the central government in Hanoi keeps a close eye on the 
development in the northern provinces in order to keep control of the economic 
development in a fashion of reterritorialisation versus deterritorialisation (Sasuga, 
2004), and deglobalisation (Hocking, 1993). 
Let us now turn to the second block of research questions, which can be 
grouped into three subthemes: 1) the structure of the GMS, 2) the influence of the 
above described foreign policy strategies on the cooperation structure in the GMS, 
and 3) the potential influences of the GMS on members' foreign policies, in the case 
of this study the foreign policies of China and Vietnam. In particular, the following 
issues were set out for examination: identification of the actors on the three levels of 
state, substate and non-state, their converging or diverging aims, the extent of their 
proliferation and the connections between these levels; the influence of the non-state 
sector in the GMS vis-A-vis central governments; differences between the local and 
global dimensions of Hanoi's and Beijing's foreign policies and the role and 
relevance of subnational and non-state actors in them; potential conflicts of interest 
and competencies between central ministries; the structure in which GMS 
cooperation takes place, the potential influence of China's and Vietnam's foreign 
policies on this structure and vice versa; potential influences of the double character 
of the GMS as Westphalian and post-Westphalian system on the cooperation 
structure; a potential evolution of effectiveness and robustness of the GMS through 
the regularity and frequency of cooperation in the form of committee governance. In 
addition to these issues, the following pages will be devoted to the overall aim of the 
study: the link between subregionalism and institution-building in the GMS and 
China's and Vietnam foreign policies. 
Let us start by recalling the notion of Wolf (2004: 6-9) quoted in Chapter Four 
that water can be an 'irritant' and a 'unifier. ' This finds mixed application in the 
GMS: it is a unifier between governments, when it comes to using the Mekong for 
the common goal of economic development. It is an irritant between governments as 
well as between governments, NGOs and local river communities, when it comes to 
the building of dams and the blasting of rapids, which in turn change the amount of 
water flowing through downstream sections and affect both the irrigation of riverside 
fields and the fish catch in these sections, hence the livelihood of river-based 
communities. Recalling Haftendorn's four categories of water conflicts from 
Chapter Four (Haftendom, 2000), it appears that contention over water resources in 
the GMS is essentially a conflict through use by dams for electrical and irrigation 
purposes. These conflicts occur on one level of actors, and they occur between 
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different levels of actors. The lack of cooperation between, for instance, the national 
level and the NGO (transnational) level in the environmental sector is a signal that 
the GMS is a state-guided endeavour, in which non-state actors and in particular 
NGOs have only limited scope of action and influence when they espouse policies, 
which run counter to what central governments perceive to be in their interest. This 
interest seems to lie almost exclusively in the field of unrestrained economic 
development. The importance, central governments of the GMS attach to private 
firms organised in the GMS-BF as opposed to the difficulties envirom-nental NGOs 
have to make their voice heard, seems to indicate this gap between both realms of 
interest, the environment and the economy. Accordingly, connections between 
central government actors and transnational environmental actors are not very 
strong, whereas the proliferation and diversification of state, substate and non-state 
actors and the connections between them in working groups pertaining to economic 
development (in particular trade, energy) are far more advanced. Consequently, as a 
direct outcome of the rambo situation, no institution so far, including the Mekong 
River Commission or the World Commission on Dams, has managed to solve the 
conflicts about China's dams as Beijing refuses to compromise on this issue. This 
also shows that the agenda of Mekong cooperation is dominated by China, as it can 
refuse the discussion of issues or to make compromises in relation to concerns of 
smaller countries if it so desires. The GMS, along with the MRC, misses levers, 
which would force the powerful countries into compromises with smaller ones. To 
add, however, a positive note, which marks a rare occasion, it should be mentioned 
that, as discussed in Section Two of Chapter Five, China's environmental ministry, 
SEPA, in a conflict with the trade and economy related ministries, was backed by the 
government in a conflict with China Three Gorges Project Corp., the company that 
runs the Three Gorges dam, over environmental assessment studies. SEPA 
eventually managed to force the firm to halt construction of an underground power 
station on the Three Gorges Dam and the construction of the Xiluodu Dam at the 
Jinshajiang (BBC, 2 February 2005a+b). Furthermore, the fate of the QEC is 
undecided due to strong opposition by Thailand to Chinese shoal blasting activities 
(see Chapter Five, Section Two). 
Given the seeming dominance of central governments in setting the policy 
frameworks within which subnational units and non-governmental actors can act and 
shape cross-border cooperation, transboundary cooperation schemes 'have tended to 
be forms of functional integration managed by states. ' The GTs, including the GMS, 
are 'forms of regional development [which] tend to involve powerful agencies 
setting policy agendas, with little or no direct involvement of the communities most 
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directly impacted by the projects' (Grundy-Warr, 2002: 219, see also p. 217; also 
Wain, 26 August 2004a, b, c). As for the post-Westphalian system, states and state- 
centred geopolitics are still dominant, although they are increasingly mixed with 
subnational and non-state activities in a region, which is linked by pre-colonial trade 
routes, such as those between northern Vietnam and southern China (which, as 
shown in the historical introduction of Section One in Chapter Five were often 
difficult to control by central governments and therefore provided a central area for 
the preparation and execution of revolutionary activities). In addition, these areas 
had fluid boundaries before the treaties between China and France established a firm 
border between Vietnam and China, a development which reflected Europe's 
concept of nation-states. Today, this border, although not transcended, is 
experiencing the emergence of a net of multiple layers of national and cross-border 
relations between central and subnational (provincial and local) units in combination 
with transnational networks of NGOs and private firms. For the whole of the GMS, 
the participation of subnational units, NGOs, the UN and its Specialised Agencies 
and the private business sector shows at least the growing understanding that issues 
are transnational and can only be solved through transnational and multi-level 
governance along the lines of the multi-track framework introduced in Section One 
of Chapter Two. 
As argued in Section Four of Chapter Two as well as in Chapter Four, this 
understanding has evolved together with the prominence and insight into the issues 
and the nature of human or non-traditional security. This has increasingly blurred the 
lines between foreign and domestic policies and has contributed to what Hocking 
called the localisation of foreign policy (Hocking, 1993). A deglobalisation of the 
space (Robertson, 1992) by cooperating in subregional multilateral frameworks 
evolved as an interest of central governments and put regional issues such as cross- 
border crime on the foreign policy agendas of states, but also national issues such as 
poverty alleviation, which is to be solved partly by developing local economies 
through cross-border integration. This development not only blurred the distinction 
between high and low politics, but also the domains of foreign and domestic policy 
in that domestic policy demands informed foreign policy moves in order to regain 
lost capacity of the central government for the solution of problems. In the process, 
central governments also tried to regain authority vis-A-vis subnational units, non- 
state actors and the sections of society, which feel increasingly negatively affected 
by the post-socialist economic development, and who moved to challenge or at least 
demonstrate against the sole decision-making authority of the central state. 
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As a result, with the GMS an institution emerges, which functions as a 
platform for its members' local and global policies. Within the GMS structure, a 
system, which might be best circumscribed as a system of committee governance, 
works as a confidence-building mechanism and ensures stability of cooperation and 
a certain degree of policy transparency and predictability, which in turn makes 
agreements such as the GMS Cross-Border Transport Agreement and its politically 
sensitive streamlining of border-crossing regulations possible. This shows that in the 
GMS a structure of a gradual and consultative approach of institutionalisation has 
evolved that accounts for effectiveness and robustness in the face of still underlying 
hostilities between Mekong states (such as the outbreak of hostilities between 
Cambodia and Thailand in 2003), even though it does not incorporate rules as basis 
for effectiveness and robustness as advocated by the traditional regime approach. 
The GMS carries clear functions of a regime: committee governance seems to 
account for Keohane's propositions (see Chapter 3.3.2. ) of what an institution must 
do in order to be a regime (Keohane, 1984: 89-92,100-109,244-245): it provides 
mutual information and as a result reduces uncertainty; as a result, it stabilises 
regime members' expectations regarding other members' posture towards future 
cooperation; it reduces transaction costs in that it facilitates negotiations leading to 
mutual beneficial agreements, as the GMS Cross-Border Transport Agreement 
shows; also, as shown in Chapter Five, Section Two, it leads to the evolution of a 
situation reminiscent of the 'networks of acquaintance and friendship' in the form of 
'coalitions of like-minded officials' working for a common purpose (Keohane, 1984: 
101). 
But does the GMS affect foreign policies of states? As discussed in Section 
Two of Chapter Three, this is an element, which needs to be clearly present in order 
for the institution to qualify as a regime. The fact that hostilities between Cambodia 
and Thailand in 2003 were contained relatively quickly despite their aggressive 
character, might lead to the assumption that the GMS has at least an indirect 
influence on countries behaviour by creating a network of close cooperation and 
consultation, which creates growing trust and as a result decreases the likelihood of a 
deployment of military forces in a conflict. Let us examine this element in the next 
paragraphs until the end with relevance to China-Vietnam relations. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the rise of the GMS and the 
convergence of cooperation interests were only possible through the vanishing of the 
Cold War structure and its embedded multiple ideological schism of mainland 
Southeast Asia, which was reflected in outright conflict between Vietnam, China, 
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the Soviet Union and Cambodia and also involved Thailand and Laos. The 
fori-nation of the GMS was only possible with the breakdown of these conflict 
patterns. As mentioned as well, China refuses, or is at least hesitant, to discuss 
bilateral issues in a multilateral forum. Consequently, issues of land and maritime 
(Gulf of Tongkin, Paracels) borders have been discussed outside the GMS 
framework, although Yunnan's (and since summer 2005 Guangxi's) stretch of the 
land border is included in the area of the GMS, and local infrastructure projects are 
aided by ADB finance; for the same reason, the dam problem is not included in 
GMS negotiations, even though it is of concern to all of the GMS member states and 
would therefore appropriately be negotiated within the GMS structure. Border and 
South China Sea issues are thus kept out of GMS cooperation and are discussed 
bilaterally as part of a foreign policy process, without the GMS having authority over 
these issues. At the same time, negotiation of GMS agreements is the domain of the 
central governments in Hanoi and Beijing. Bilateral issues and multilateral GMS 
issues are allocated to different sets of actors and negotiation processes. As a result, 
the provincial governments of Yunnan and Guangxi (which take part in the GMS 
process and the representative of which are members of the working groups) have no 
authority to discuss border problems, because the directions of foreign policy are 
determined in Beijing (for details see the table High-level Meetings Between 
Vietnain and China 1989-2005 in the Appendix). 
This highlights another point: while foreign policy is set in Beijing and Hanoi 
and all major GMS and border agreements are centrally negotiated and signed (see 
the tables on actors in Chapter Five: all senior actors on China's side are from within 
the central goverm-nent, although the provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi are the 
actual member units), subnational units are set to implement them and act within the 
centrally circumscribed framework. As for China, the provinces play a supportive 
role within the foreign policy frameworks set by Beijing. The same can be argued for 
Vietnam, where the border provinces locally implement the 1991 policy of 
diversifying and multilateralising foreign economic relations. The process is closely 
watched by the central government in Hanoi, which interfered with plans of the 
provinces to create special economic zones with the Chinese provinces on the other 
side of the border (personal interviews with Vietnamese governmental advisors and 
a Japanese scholar in Hanoi in June 2004). 
With regard to the strategic relevance of the GMS in China-Vietnam relations, 
it can be argued that the conditions under which Vietnam has achieved the 
diversification of foreign economic relations does not allow a cohesive subregion to 
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evolve: the conditions are a strong US role in Northeast Asia, an influential Japan 
that contests China's designs on dominating the subregion, and a range of bilateral 
agreements of GMS and ASEAN members with non-member countries that run 
counter to the idea of letting cohesiveness evolve. As ASEAN members conclude 
bilateral agreements with outside countries, GMS members act similarly. Vietnam 
thus finds itself in a situation, in which a diversification of foreign relations does not 
allow cohesive regional bodies to emerge. The diversification has happened against 
the backdrop of a post-Cold War region that has not yet found a final security 
arrangement and sees regional and non-regional powers vying for influence, thus 
torpedoing economic as well as political cohesiveness of regional groupings 
(personal interviews with Vietnamese foreign policy advisors in Hanoi in summer 
2004). As Vietnam regards balance of power in the Asian Pacific as important for 
ASEAN, so is balance of power in the GMS. In addition, the cooperation formula for 
ASEAN is '10-x' (personal interview with a Vietnamese senior scholar and 
governmental advisor in Hanoi in June 2004). Considering the similarities between 
ASEAN and the GMS, the formula for the GMS could be 6-x. Ironically, therefore, 
while the break-down of the Cold War structure produced a multipolarity, which 
made subregionalism. possible, the same events thwart closer regional integration 
due to a divergence of overall foreign policy goals, which for the time being do not 
seem to allow regionalisation processes that go beyond the gradual approach of 
GMS committee governance. 
The fact that the GMS has been unable to manage conflicts such as the dam- 
building issue shows that it is bedevilled by the same fate that limits the influence of 
other multilateral institutions and denies them an independent capacity: it can only 
do what member states want it to do. The rambo situation remains in place and is 
mitigated only where China has a dominant strategy to cooperate, that is, where 
cooperation lies in China's national interest. This is the case for a few human 
security issues and the economic sector, as Beijing develops the western provinces 
and for that purpose needs the GMS as export market and transhipment area of its 
products to the wider ASEAN region. While an underlying antagonism remains, 
[u]nlike Vietnam's relations with other powers, Vietnam's relations with 
China are comprehensive and multifaceted. They go beyond state-to- 
state relations to also include party-to-party, province-to-province, and 
pcople-to-people [in particular through youth exchanges and 
scholarships] relations. Party leaders tied their two countries together in 
a web of relationships between governments, parties, and mass 
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organizations, from the central government down to the local level. In 
the last decade, no other country has sent more top leaders and 
delegations of all sizes and levels to Vietnam than China, and vice versa 
(Nguyen Manli Hung, 2002). 107 
Vietnam, having returned to pragmatism at the end of the 1980s, has realised 
that good relations with China are inevitable to maintain both national security and 
domestic political stability. At the same time, China's uncooperative attitude 
regarding the Lancang Cascade is an indicator for a predominance of Chinese 
influence in the region, whether achieved by peaceful or coercive means. While on 
the whole, some community building has replaced mere alliance building as strategic 
post-Cold War option and produced some remarkable cooperative successes, Hanoi 
has to take into consideration Beijing's security interests in particular when dealing 
with Washington. This makes Vietnam's leadership dependent on Beijing's 
interpretation of its security environment vis-A-vis Washington. Also, in its 
broadness and general layout, Vietnam's foreign policy seems to lack clear structure 
and orientation (interview in Birmingham in December 2003 with a Belgium-bascd 
senior researcher, who works on EU-ASEAN comparative regional integration). 
This pays tribute to an environment in which the future distribution of power is 
unclear and in which Vietnam is shifting uncomfortably between China and the 
United States, the foreign policies of which 'set the parameters of Vietnamese 
foreign policy' (Nguyen Manh Hung, 2002)108, and in which (sub)regional 
integration has produced contradictory results. Without clear orientation, results 
remain diffuse. Uncertainty about direction appears to be the main characteristic of 
Vietnam's situation for the foreseeable future, leaving the Chinese-Vietnamese 
antagonism in foreign policy essentially unaffected by the GMS. 
107 For details see the table High-level Meetings Between Vietnam and China 1989- 
2005 in the Appendix. 
108 Hung adds Russia as third power, on which Vietnam's foreign policy is 
contingent. 
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Map 6. Hydropower Projects in the GMS 
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Table 1. ADB-funded projects in the GMS 
htti): //w-vv-vv. adb. org/Projects/repor-ts. asp? keyfctly&val=TAR&scpe=9999 for 
general, and http: //www. adb. org/GMS/Projects/adb projects. qsR for GMS 
LOANS (as of May 2005) 
Month/Year Country Project Title 
April 2005 Lao PDR Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project 
Dali-Lijang Railway Project 
December 2004 China, People's Republic of 
(Yunnan Province) 
Loan 2052: Greater Mekong 
December 2003 Cambodia Subregion (GMS) Transmission 
Project 
Loan 2014: Western Yunnan Roads 
October 2003 China, People's Republic of 
Development Project 
Loan 1989: Northern Economic 
Lao PDR 
Corridor 
December 2002 Loan 1969,1970, and 1971: 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Viet Nam Mekong Tourism Development 
Project 
Loan 1945: Cambodia Road 
November 2002 Cambodia 
Improvement Project 
Loan 1727: East-West Corridor 
Lao PDR 
Project 
D b 1999 ecem er 
Loan 1728: East-West Corridor 
Viet Nam 
Project 
Loan 1691: Southern Yunnan Road 
June 1999 Cambodia 
Development 
Loan 1659: Phnom Penh-Ho Chi 
Minh City Highway 
N b 1998 C b di d Vi N ovem er am o a an et am 
Loan 1660: Phnom Penh-Ho Chi 
Minh City Highway 
December 1996 Cambodia Loan 1503: Siem Reap Airport 
Loan 1456: Nam Leuk Hydropower 
September 1996 Lao PDR 
Development 
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Loan 1369: Champassak Road 
August 1995 Lao PDR. 
Improvement 
Loan 1329: Theun Hinboun 
November 1994 Lao PDR. 
Hydropower 
September 1994 hina, People's Republic of Loan 1325: Yunnan Expressway 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (as of June 2005) 
e AeTiculture 
Approval 
P roj ect Title 
Date 
December RETA 6214: Strengthening Capacity and Regional Cooperation in Advanced 
2004 Agricultural Science and Technology in the Greater Mekong Subregion 
RETA 6192: Transboundary Animal Disease Control in the Greater Mekong 
October 2004 
Subregion 
* Enerp-v 
Approval 
Project Title 
Date 
RETA 4323: TA to the Lao PDR for Preparing the GMS: Nam Theun 2 
March 2004 
(NT2) Hydropower Development Project- Phase II 
December 
RETA 6147: Preparing the GMS Power Interconnection Project Phase 1 
2003 
November RETA 6100: TA for a Study for a Regional Power Trade Operating 
2002 Agreement in the GMS 
RETA 5920: Regional Indicative Master Plan on Power Interconnection in the 
July 2000 
Greater Mekong Subregion 
RETA 5697: Se Kong-Se San and Nam Theun River Basins Hydropower 
August 1996 
Development Study 
September 
RETA 5643: Subregional Electric Power Forum 
1995 
9 Environment 
Approval Project Title 
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Date 
December 
RETA 6213: GMS Biodiversity Conservation Corridors (BCC) Initiative 
2004 
RETA 6167: Proposed Study on Cooperation Opportunities between ADB 
February 2004 
and the Mekong River Conunission (MRC) 
December RETA 6149: Support for the Mekong River Commission Flood Management 
2003 and Mitigation Program 
RETA 6115: Poverty Reduction in Upland Communities in the Mekong 
August 2003 
Through Improved Community and Industrial Forestry 
December RETA 6069: National Performance Assessment and Subregional Strategic 
2002 Environment Framework (SEF) 
December RETA 5899: Subregional Environrnent Monitoring and Information System 
1999 (Phase II) 
December RETA 5822: Protection and Management of Critical Wetlands in the Lower 
1998 Mekong Basin 
March 1998 RETA 5783: Strategic Environmental Framework for the GMS 
December RETA 5771: Poverty Reduction and Environmental Management in Remote 
1997 GMS Watersheds 
RETA 5684: Subregional Environmental Training and Institutional 
May 1996 
Strengthening in the GMS 
February 1995 RETA 5622: Subregional Environmental Monitoring and Information System 
9 Human Resources Development 
Approval 
Project Title 
Date 
RETA 6247: HIV/AIDS Vulnerability and Risk Reduction among Ethnic 
July 2005 
Minority Groups through Communication Strategies 
March 2005 RETA 6237 GMS Phnom Penh Plan for Development Management (Phase 11) 
RETA 6194: GMS Regional Communicable Disease Control (formerly 
October 2004 
Communicable Disease Control in GMS) 
RETA 6190: Preventing the Trafficking of Women and Children and October 2004 
Promoting Safe Migration in the GMS 
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May 2005 RETA 6243: Strengthening Malaria Control for Ethnic Minorities 
November RETA 6198: Capacity Building for Promoting Sustainable Development in 
2004 the GMS 
RETA 6130: Study on Urban Violence in the Public Realm - Towards a More 
October 2003 
Effective Urban Upgrading 
RETA 6110: Promoting Partnerships to Accelerate Agriculture Development 
January 2003 
and Poverty Reduction in the GMS 
RETA 6106: SSTA for Financing Needs for HIV/ AIDS Prevention and Care 
May 2003 
in Asia and the Pacific 
RETA 6083: ICT and HIV/ AIDS Preventive Education in the Cross-Border 
December Areas 
2002 
RETA 6056: Phnom Penh Plan for Development Management 
RETA 5970: Small Scale Regional Technical Assistance (SSRETA) for Drug 
December Eradication in the GMS 
2000 
RETA 5958: Roll Back Malaria Initiative for the Greater Mekong Subregion 
December RETA 588 1: Preventing HIV/AIDS among Mobile Populations in the Greater 
1999 Mekong Subregion 
RETA 5794: Study of Health and Education Needs of Ethnic Minorities in the 
June 1998 
GMS 
September 
RETA 575 1: Prevention and Control of HIV/AIDS in the GMS 
1997 
RETA 5681: Cooperation in Employment Promotion and Training in the 
April 1996 
GMS 
o Telemmmimiritinns 
Approval 
Project Title 
Date 
November RETA 6004: Telecommunications Sector Policy Formulation and Capacity 
2001 Building 
RETA 5915: Establishment of Backbone Telecommunications Network 
May 2000 
Project Phase I 
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9 Tourism 
Approval 
Project Title 
Date 
July 2004 RETA 6179: Greater Mekong Subregion Tourism Sector Strategy 
September 
RETA 5807: Tourism Skills Development in the GMS 
1998 
June 1997 RETA 5743: Mekong/Lancang River Tourism Planning Study 
October 1995 RETA 5647: Regional Program to Train Trainers in Tourism in the GMS 
9 Transnort 
Approval 
Project Title 
Date 
December RETA 6227: Coordinating for GMS: North-South Economic Corridor Bridge 
2004 Project (formerly Third Mekong Bridge) 
December 
RETA 6228: Facilitating Cross-Border Trade and Investment in the GMS 
2004 
RETA 6193: GMS Infrastructure Connections in Northern Lao (SSTA) 
October 2004 
RETA 6195: GMS Transport Sector Strategy Study 
RETA 5850: Facilitating the Cross-Border Movement of Goods and People in 
July 1999 
the GMS 
August 1997 RETA 5749: Cross-Border Movement of Goods and People in the GMS 
RETA 5686: Mitigation of Nonphysical Barrier to Cross-Border Movement of 
May 1996 
Goods and People 
November RETA 5649: Greater Mekong Subregion Infrastructure Improvement: Ho Chi 
1995 Minh to Phnom Penh Highway 
RETA 5566: Study of the Lao-Thailand-Vict Nam-East-West Transport 
July 1994 
Corridor, financed by France Nvith the Bank acting as the Executing Agency 
e Multisector 
Approval 
Project Title 
Date 
Small Scale Technical Assistance for Developing New Policy Paradigms for 
May 2005 
Sustainable Livelihoods Protection and Natural Resource Management 
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Among Ethnic Minorities of the Greater Mekong Subregion: A Study of 
Policies and Their Impacts, Strategies for Change (SSTA 6242) 
RETA 6171: Reviewing Poverty Impact of Regional Economic Integration in 
May 2004 
the GMS (TA No. 617 1) 
December RETA 6148: Strengthening the Capacity of Financial Sector Regulators and 
2003 Supervisors 
September RETA 6121: Rural, Urban, and Subregional Linkages in the Mekong Region: 
2003 A Holistic Approach to Development and Poverty Reduction 
RETA 6118: Small Scale Technical Assistance for Promoting NGO Support 
August 2003 
for Poverty Reduction in the GMS 
May 2003 RETA 6113: Making Markets Work Better for the Poor 
RETA 6098: Implementing the Agreement for Facilitation of the Cross- 
April 2003 Border Movement of Goods and People in the Greater Mekong Subregion - 
Phase I 
May 2002 RETA 6032: Support to the GMS Sununit of Leaders and Related Activities 
RETA 6020: Facilitating Cross-Border Trade and Investment for Small and 
December Medium Enterprise Development in the Greater Mekong Subregion 
2001 RETA 6017: Capacity Building for National Institutions Involved in the 
Greater Mekong Subregion Program 
December 
RETA 5885: GMS Preinvestment Study for the East-West Economic Corridor 
1999 
RETA 5535: Promoting Subregional Cooperation Among Cambodia, People's 
July 1993 
Republic of China, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam 
* Private Sector Develonment 
Approval 
Project Title 
Date 
December RETA 6210: Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Growth and Development 
2004 Phase 11 
Source: ADB 
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Table 2. Statistics of FDI in Vietnam by countries: Foreign direct investment in 
Vietnam 1988-2003 (to 31 December 2003) 
Countries & regions Projects 
Total invested 
capital 
Authorized 
capital 
Realization 
I Singapore 288 7,370,110,027 2,484,612,826 2,977,508,563 
2 Taiwan 1,086 5,997,727,324 2,713,355,954 2,599,671,582 
31 Japan 418 4,480,429,976 2,279,578,418 3,948,802,353 
4 R. Korea 662 4,161,325,226 1,706,138,062 2,534,249,741 
5 Hong Kong 288 2,974,582,059 1,313,405,479 1,778,409,746 
6 France 134 2,114,154,185 1,322,272,776 1,044,877,885 
7 British Virgin Islands 187 2,090,429,757 801,303,267 1,075,510,403 
8 Netherlands 51 1,768,265,810 1,139,990,366 1,929,683,849 
9 Thailand 119 1,408,300,059 498,989,700 648,000,500 
10 UK 51 1,180,327,741 422,206,280 595,609,134 
11 USA 174 1,134,195,031 615,593,452 696,989,516 
12 Malaysia 131 1,104,668,423 539,527,562 757,985,415 
13 Switzerland 24 626,113,029 300,677,999 517,831,008 
14 Australia 87 561,484,088 269,084,733 279,708,967 
15 British West Indies 5 504,191,396 193,200,000 126,568,173 
16 China 243 503,553,229 284,470,869 145,758,881 
17 Sweden 11 455,433,005 439,683,005 358,849,980 
18 Bermuda 5 260,322,867 98,936,700 156,817,885 
19 Germany 49 243,868,803 102,011,134 122,030,522 
20 Cayman Islands 10 233,019,387 112,093,742 351,044,971 
21 Russia 43 230,740,848 143,314,147 180,593,430 
22 Philippines 20 224,623,899 114,557,446 83,470,734 
23 Channel Islands 13 196,350,788 118,505,729 78,802,357 
24 Indonesia 11 120,052,000 68,885,203 126,671,322 
25 Denmark 15 119,438,220 75,102,323 80,162,734 
26 Mauritius 7 88,176,800 74,471,519 626,572,331 
27 Belgium 22 53,285,211 22,688,736 39,428,893 
28 Canada 33 50,750,046 34,388,973 16,122,151 
29 Turkey 4 46,000,000 13,800,000 1,000,000 
30 India 9 45,413,710 26,541,891 550,378,900 
31 New Zealand 10 41,017,000 14,188,000 11,045,458 
32 Norway 11 40,291,246 25,477,306 14,944,258 
33 Italy 13 38,821,000 17,923,752 6,029,824 
34 Czech Republic 6 36,078,673 14,008,673 8,322,037 
35 Liechtenstein 2 35,500,000 10,828,425 31,188,345 
36 Luxemburg 12 34,735,324 15,459,400 14,729,132 
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37 Poland 6 30,000,000 15,604,000 13,903,000 
38 Iraq 2 27,100,000 27,100,000 15,100,000 
39 Ukraine 6 23,954,667 13,085,818 14,092,291 
40 Bahamas 3 17,350,000 5,400,000 5,350,000 
41 Isle of Man 1 15,000,000 5,200,000 1,000,000 
42 Panama 3 13,232,400 5,185,000 2,290,870 
43 Austria 7 12,845,000 6,109,497 3,965,132 
44 SriLanka 3 12,814,048 6,504,175 1,174,000 
45 Samoa 3 11,300,000 7,800,000 2,800,000 
46 Laos 4 11,053,528 5,323,527 5,478,527 
47 Macau 4 10,300,000 6,800,000 2,300,000 
48 Cuba 1 6,600,000 2,429,761 7,320,278 
49 Israel 3 6,531,136 3,841,136 5,186,787 
50 Brunei 4 6,000,000 4,000,000 - 
51 Hungary 3 3,126,606 2,019,688 1,740,460 
52 Belize 1 3,000,000 3,000,000 979,000 
53 Western Samoa 1 2,300,000 690,000 1,707,493 
54 Guatemala 1 1,866,185 894,000 - 
55 Yugoslavia 1 1,580,000 1,000,000 
56 Syria 3 1,050,000 430,000 - 
57 Turks & Caicos Islands 1 1,000,000 700,000 700,000 
58 Spain 2 754,865 614,865 60,000 
59 Cambodia 2 700,000 500,000 400,000 
60 Sip 1 500,000 150,000 150,000 
61 Guam 1 500,000 500,000 - 
62 Belarus 1 400,000 400,000 - 
63 Argentina 1 120,000 506,489 120,000 
64 R. D. P. Korea 1 100,000 100,000 - 
Total 4,324 40,794,854,622 18,553,161,803 24,601,188,818 
Source: The Foreign Investment Department - The Ministry of Planning and Investment 
T10i b6o Kinh le Viet Nam (Vietnam Economic Times), 5 January 2004, w%vNv. vneconomy. com. vn 
Vietnamese version under 
http: //,, vNv%v. vneconomy. coni. vn/vie/index. php? 12aram=article&catid=03&id=031230181003 
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Table 3. Statistics of FDI in localities across Vietnam: Foreign direct investment 
in Vietnam 1988-2003 (to 31 December 2003) 
(provinces bordering China in bold) 
Location 
I 
Projects Total invested 
capital 
Authorized 
capital 
Realization 
I HCMC 1,367 10,755,121,005 5,326,331,562 5,683,192,727 
2 Ha Noi 482 7,563,260,698 3,323,852,164 3,338,517,693 
3 Dong Nai 510 6,504,478,324 2,634,323,822 3,029,827,514 
4 Binh Duong 752 3,378,090,668 1,502,953,865 1,665,521,427 
5 Ba Ria-Vung Tau 96 2,064,531,631 762,816,782 1,377,805,249 
6 Dau Khi 26 1,872,183,340 1,379,583,340 4,410,983,294 
7 HaiPhong 144 1,476,908,100 678,783,039 1,145,355,139 
8 Lam Dong 61 868,691,462 123,133,908 117,338,856 
9 Long An 78 541,316,165 258,920,249 278,487,656 
10 Hai Duong 49 526,053,360 224,356,997 246,373,645 
11 Kien Giang 6 447,618,000 192,558,000 393,490,402 
12 Thanh Hoa 11 444,210,339 138,505,061 410,562,608 
13 Vinh Phuc 48 431,473,119 191,350,747 355,597,670 
14 Ha Tay 37 419,919,309 177,346,688 217,260,566 
15 Khanh Hoa 53 381,539,076 139,011,952 292,033,527 
16 Quang Ninh 58 366,003,490 162,671,128 214,845,009 
17 Da Nang 51 291,456,580 121,159,252 150,139,240 
18 Tay Ninh 59 247,371,182 188,751,186 170,161,311 
19 Nghe An 10 238,425,823 100,734,882 109,494,123 
20 PhuTbo 28 212,345,817 109,271,618 149,576,001 
21 Quang Nam 31 181,301,571 85,518,733 33,094,555 
22 Bac Ninh 16 171,193,281 70,212,800 142,332,770 
23 Thua Thien-Hue 20 151,885,404 77,988,718 133,489,118 
24 Hung Yen 31 129,889,699 71,493,775 85,221,864 
25 Binh Thuan 32 114,517,940 43,309,224 30,820,475 
26 Phu Yen 19 112,707,200 37,842,200 44,762,259 
27 Can Tho 28 105,408,676 59,152,357 54,285,347 
28 Tien Giang 9 77,231,276 32,497,580 63,989,484 
29 Ninh Binh 5 67,732,486 26,555,000 12,196,370 
30 Nam Dinh 9 63,913,772 25,291,229 6,547,500 
31 Thai Nguyen 14 56,810,472 32,688,528 18,293,185 
32 Lang Son 17 37,620,000 20,436,077 10,262,773 
33 Binh Dinh 12 35,662,000 20,102,878 18,125,000 
34 Quang Binh 4 32,333,800 9,733,800 18,210,036 
35 Lao Cai 17 30,711,340 17,510,895 14,501,945 
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36 Ha Tinh 6 30,445,000 11,845,000 1,550,000 
37 Ninh Thuan 7 30,171,000 13,401,291 4,900,442 
38 Gia Lai 4 29,050,000 19,460,000 19,099,900 
39 Quang Ngai 7 28,323,689 13,353,425 10,7965572 
40 Son La 4 25,070,000 8,271,000 7,207,948 
41 Thai Binh 9 23,596,000 8,038,000 1,780,000 
42 Bac Lieu 5 23,578,646 13,522,687 13,664,016 
43 Dak Lak 5 22,083,050 6,960,520 18,307,018 
44 Binh Phuoc 9 21,218,000 14,195,009 16,236,571 
45 Bac Can 8 19,641,367 10,260,667 2,104,758 
46 Quang Tri 6 19,427,000 9,097,100 2,389,840 
47 Hoa Binh 8 16,992,020 8,203,818 5,361,062 
48 Bac Giang 14 15,863,500 11,485,600 12,108,893 
49 Vinh Long 7 15,711,641 9,075,000 5,918,271 
50 An Giang 3 14,831,895 4,516,000 12,537,401 
51 Ben Tre 4 10,494,048 4,454,175 3,550,397 
52 Yen Bai 4 10,220,688 5,873,081 6,511,737 
53 Cao Bang 2 7,500,000 4,200,000 200,000 
54 Dong Thap 7 6,328,037 4,998,037 1,284,970 
55 Ha Giang 2 5,925,000 2,633,000 - 
56 Ca Mau 3 5,175,000 3,619,721 6,005,355 
57 Kon Turn 1 4,400,000 2,200,000 61,500 
58 Lai Chau 2 3,000,000 2,000,000 180,898 
59 Soc Trang 2 2,286,000 1,806,000 2,055,617 
60 Tra Vinh 3 1,606,636 1,442,636 873,158 
61 Ha Nam 1 1,000,000 1,000,000 3,807,156 
62 Tuyen Quang 1 1,000,000 500,000 - 
Total 4,324 40,794,854,622 18,553,161,803 24,601,188,818 
Source: The Foreign Investment Department - The Ministry of Planning and Investment 
T10i bdo Kinh le Viet Nain (Vietnam Economic Times), 5 January 2004, %v%v%v. vneconomy. com. vn 
Vietnamese version under 
http: //N""v. vneconomy. com. vn/vie/index. phl2? param=article&catid=03&id=031230183018 
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Table 4. The Mekong Work Programme (Mekong Secretariat, 1992: xiii-xiv) 
The Mekong Work Programme consists of three main areas which are subdivided 
into twelve Subprograrnme areas: 
1. Policy and Planning 
1.1 Strategic Studies 
2. Technical Support 
2.1 Hydrology 
2.2 Databases and modelling 
2.3 - Remote sensing and mapping 
2.4 Environment 
3. Resources development 
3.1 Water resources and hydropower 
3.2 Agriculture 
3.3 Irrigation 
3.4 Watershed and forestry 
3.5 Fisheries 
3.6 River works and transport 
3.7 Human resources development 
Each project has a code number, e. g. 1.1.09/92. The first number refers to the project 
area, i. e. Policy and Planning. The second number refers to the subprogramme, i. e. 
Strategic Studies. The third number is the serial number (i. e. 09). The last two digits 
refer two the year of inclusion into the Mekong Work Programme (i. e. 1992). 
Table 5. High-level Meetings Between Vietnam and China 1989-2005 
(NB: sources often do not use the term Gulf of Tongkin but instead the Chinese - 
Beibu wan or Beibu Gulf - and Vietnamese - Vinh Bac, 130 or Bac 130 Gulf - 
versions. In the table, the English version is used. ) 
Date Persons visiting or met Purpose or outcome 
January 1989 one of Vietnam's deputy confidence-building and a general 
foreign ministers visits signification of interests in improving 
Beijing and meets his relations in the context of a reforming 
counterpart and China's USSR 
foreign minister 
August 1989 Vietnam's foreign irdnister confidence-building and a general 
meets China's vice foreign signification of interests in improving 
minister in connection Nvith relations. China-USSR normalisation 
the Cambodia conference in since May 1989 
Paris 
September 1990 Sino-Vietnamese Secret 
Summit in Chengdu, %vith 
Secretary-General Nguyen 
Van Linh and Prime Minister 
Do Muoi, but not the Foreign 
Minister Nguyen Co Thach 
due to Chinese opposition 
July 1991 General Le Due Anh invited 
to China 
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September 1991 newly appointed Foreign preparation of the high-level sunurdt of 
Minister Nguyen Manh Cam 5-10 November 
visits China 
5-10 November 1991 Secretary-General Do Muoi ofticial normalisation of bilateral 
and Chairman of the Council relations 
of Ministers Vo Van Kiet pay Five Principles for Peaceftil 
an official visit to China and Coexistence for the conduct of bilateral meet Secretary-General Jiang relations Zemin and Premier Li Peng 
provisional agreement concerning 
border affairs 
February 1992 Foreign Minister Qian Qichen agreement on a memorandum of 
visits Vietnam understanding on communication, 
transportation and economic 
cooperation 
agreement on the establishment of 
working groups for territorial disputes 
March 1992 Vietnam's minister for signing of agreements concerning post, 
transport and post visits telecommunication and transport 
China. Also visiting is a 
Vietnamese defence 
delegation and a delegation 
from the VCP 
September 1992 one of China's vice foreign no agreement on territorial disputes 
ministers visits Hanoi was reached, but agreement to hold 
talks on the issue in October 
October 1992 expert groups meet in Beijing agreement that next round of talks 
for the first time to work on should be on the land border 
the territorial disputes 
30 November Chinese Premier Li Peng pays four accords signed on bilateral 
-4 December 1992 
an official goodwill visit to economic and technical cooperation, 
Vietnam scientific and technological cooperation 
and culture exchange; China grants 
Vietnam interest-free loan of about 14 
million USD; step up efforts against 
smuggling at the land border; no 
progress on SCS issues, but 
commitment to solve the issue through 
negotiations 
December 1992 Vietnam's defence minister discussions on the territorial question 
visits China 
February 1993 second expert round on 
territorial issues 
May 1992 China's defence minister discussion on border issues 
visits Vietnam 
August 1992 governmental delegation understanding on 'fundamental 
visits Beijing principles' for solving the territorial 
issues 
April 1993 conclusion of agreement on scientific 
and technological cooperation 
October 1993 Chinese Vice Foreign agreement on the basic principles for 
Minister Tang Jiaxuan and resolving land border and Gulf of 
his Vietnamese counterpart es; while working to solve 
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Vu Khoan meet in Hanoi the issues, both sides were to continue 
talks on the SCS; agreement to set up 
joint working groups on the expert- 
level on the land border and the Gulf of 
Tongkin 
November 1993 Vietnamese President Le Duc settling disputes through negotiation, 
Anh pays an official goodwill curb smuggling at the border, deepen 
visit to China, the first by a economic cooperation 
Vietnamese head of state 
since Ho Chi Minh in 1959 
February 1994 first meeting of the joint 
working group on the expert- 
level on the land border 
Alarch 1994 first meeting of the joint 
working group on the expert- 
level on the Gulf of Tongkin 
June-July 1994 second meeting of the 
respective working groups on 
the expert-level; an army 
delegation visits China 
25 July 1994 both foreign ministers discuss to hold talks on vice foreign minister 
the territorial issues at the level 
inaugural ARF meeting 
August 1994 second government-level 
talks on the territorial issue 
September 1994 Deputy Prime Minister Phan 
Van Khai visits China 
22-27 October 1994 third round of the joint 
working group on the expert- 
level on the land border in 
Hanoi 
19-22 November 1994 Chinese President Jiang accords on the establishment of a Joint 
Zemin visits Vietnam Comn-iittee on Econon-dc and Trade 
Cooperation, an Automobile Transport 
agreement and a Cooperation in 
Guaranteeing the Quality of Import and 
Export Commodities in Mutual 
Certification; agreement to set up an 
expert group for the 'issue involving 
the seas' 
December 1994 third round of the joint 
working group on the expert- 
level on the Gulf of Tongkin 
January 1995 fourth round of the joint 
working group on the expert- 
level on the land border 
March 1995 fourth round of the joint 
working group on the expert- 
level on the Gulf of Tongkin 
April 1995 a military delegation visits 
Vietnam 
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May 1995 Vietnam's foreign minister taxation agreement 
visits his counterpart in 
Beijing; 
fifth round of the joint 
-working group on the expert- 
level on the land border 
June 1995 fifth round of the joint 
working group on the expert- 
level on the Gulf of Tongkin 
July 1995 third round of government- decision to form a joint working group 
level talks on border issues on the sea border in the SCS 
October 1995 sixth round of the joint agreement on measures for the 
working group on the expert- signature of border treaty 
level on the land border 
November 1995 first round of the 'Sino- consensus on working procedures for 
Vietnamese expert group on the settlement of the Spratly dispute 
maritime issues' according to international law 
November 1995 first meeting of the 'Sino- measures to observe and realise all 
Vietnamese Commission for bilateral agreements; intensified control 
Economic and Commercial of cross-border trade (i. e. smuggling) 
Cooperation' 
26 November Vietnamese Communist Party joint communiqu6 highlighting the 
-2 December 1995 
Secretary-General Do Muoi principles, agreements and 
visits China to meet his understanding achieved by the two 
counterpart Jiang Zemin and sides through various high-level 
other leaders meetings since 1991. The two sides 
reiterate their conuilitment to seek a 
resolution to their border issues through 
peaceful negotiations and to ftirther 
develop their ties despite the existing 
differences. An agreement in principle 
is reached on the resumption of cross- 
border train services 
January 1996 discussion between the preparation for a resumption of rail 
Chinese Ministry of Railways traffic - resumed on 14 February at the 
and the Vietnamese Ministry Lang Son border crossing 
of Cominunication and 
Transport 
January 1996 seventh round of the joint 
working group on the expert- 
level on the land border 
February 1996 a Guangzhou military border defence and 'order' in border 
delegation visits Vietnam areas 
June1996 Chinese Premier Li Peng 
attends the Eighth National 
Congress of the VCP and 
meets Vietnam's secretary- 
general and the prime and 
foreign ministers 
July 1996 second round of the 'Sino- 
Vietnamese expert group on 
maritime issues' 
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August 1996 Chief of the General Staff of enhance relations between both 
the PLA visits Vietnam countries, parties and aririies 
September 1996 fourth round of government- 
level talks on border issues 
October 1996 ninth round of the joint 
working group on the expert- 
level on the land border 
November 1996 deputy minister of trade visits 
China and his Chinese 
counterpart plus the minister 
for foreign trade and 
economic cooperation; 
Qiao Shi, Chain-nan of the 
Standing Committee of the 
NPC visits Vietnam 
December 1996 China's rninister of public 
security visits Vietnam to 
hold talkswith the minister of 
the interior 
January 1997 eighth round of the joint 
working group on the expert- 
level on the Gulf of Tongkin 
February-March 1997 a military delegation visits 
Vietnam and meets, among 
others, the defence minister 
March 1997 a VCP delegation visits China 
at the invitation of the Central 
Conuriittee of the CCP 
17-21 March 1997 Chinese state councillor visits 
Vietnam and meets the prime 
and foreign ministers 
April 1997 Vietnam's interior minister 
leads a delegation to China 
and meets Jiang Zemin; a 
military delegation visits 
China to talk to, among 
others, the defence minister 
14-20 April 1997 a CCP delegation led by Cao working sessions on external relations, 
Keming, member of the inspection, organisation and personnel, 
Central Discipline Inspection party building and corruption fighting 
Comiriission, Deputy 
Secretary of the Jiangsu 
provincial party committee 
and head of Jiangsu's 
discipline inspection 
commission, visits Vietnam at 
the invitation of the VCP 
Central Committee and 
meets, among others, Nguyen 
Van Song, member of the 
Central Comirdttee and head 
of the External Relations 
Cominission 
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17-18 April 1997 the deputy foreign ministers bilateral discussion of the ongoing SCS 
of China and Vietnam meet at disputes, land border and Gulf of 
the occasion of the third Tongkin 
round of political 
consultations of ASEAN 
senior officials and China in 
the province of Anhui 
22-25 April 1997 third round of the 'Sino- 
Vietnamese expert group on 
maritime issues' 
7-12 Alay 1997 tenth round of the joint 
working group on the expert- 
level on the land border 
Junel. 997 Vice Minister of protocol on the implementation of an 
Communication Hong agreement on road transport of 
Shanxiang leads a delegation passengers and luggage 
to Vietnam and meets Vice 
Premier Tran Duc Luong and 
Vietnamese Vice Transport 
Minister Bui Van Suong 
10-17 June 1997 Vietnamese army delegation 
visits China 
14-18 July 1997 Secretary-General Do Muoi first announcement of plans to reach 
visits China and meets agreements on the demarcation of the 
President Jiang Zemin and Gulf of Tongkin and the land border 
Premier Li Peng; the foreign before the turn of the decade; 
ministers meet, and the Vice expansion of economic cooperation; 
Premiers Wu Bangguo and China continues limited amount of 'free 
Phan Van Khai aid' for Vietnam 
16-18 July 1997 ninth round of the joint talks enter the 'real stage' 
working group on the expert- 
level on the Gulf of Tongkin 
13-15 August 1997 fiflh round of government- 
level talks on border issues 
21-28 October 1997 Vietnamese army delegation 
visits China 
23-26 October 1997 China's Vice Premier in signing of two loan agreements, an 
charge of economic affairs, agreement on non-refundable aid of 10 
Wu Bangguo, visits Vietnam million USD, agreements on 
and meets his counterpart, technology transfer, agriculture and 
Secretary-General Do Muoi, civil aviation, expansion of border 
President Tran Duc Luong cooperation, start negotiations for 
and Premier Phan Van Khai. regulation of cross-border economic 
Wu's visit is the first visit to cooperation 
Vietnam since 1991 by a vice 
premier in charge of 
economic affairs 
December 1997 Li Ruihuan, member of the 
Standing Committee of the 
Political Bureau of the CCP 
Central Cominittee, visits 
Vietnam and meets President 
Tran Duc Luong, Premier 
Phan Van Khai and 
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Secretary-General Du Muoi. 
As Chairman of the Chinese 
People's Political 
Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC), Li meets the 
President of the Vietnam 
Fatherland Front (VFF) Le 
Quang Dao 
21-22 January 1998 eleventh round of the joint 
working group on the expert- 
level on the land border 
24-30 March 1998 tenth round of the joint 
working group on the expert- 
level on the Gulf of Tongkin 
26 May-5 June 1998 twelfth round of the joint 
working group on the expert- 
level on the land border 
June1998 Vietnam's defence minister 
visits China and meets his 
counterpart, the president, 
and chief of staff of the PLA 
8-10 July 1998 fourth round of the 'Sino- 
Vietnamese expert group on 
maritime issues' 
17-22 September 1998 CCP delegation led by Wei 
Jianxing, member of the 
Political Bureau of the 
Standing Committee of the 
CCP, visits China and meets 
Secretary-General Le Kha 
Phieu, the prime minister, and 
the former Secretary-General 
Do Muoi 
25-26 September 1998 sixth round of government- 
level talks on border issues in 
Hanoi 
October 1998 Premier Phan Van Khai visits accords on cross-border trade, consular 
China and meets Premier Zhu cooperation and mutual judicial 
Rongji assistance 
October 1998 Jiang Zemin, President and 
CCP Secretary-General meets 
Vietnam's premier; Li Peng, 
Chairman of the Standing 
Comn-littee of the National 
People's Congress meets 
Premier Phan Van Khai 
December 1998 Chinese Vice President Hu agreement on economic and 
Jintao visits Vietnam and technological cooperation 
meets his counterpart Nguyen 
Thi Binh 
9-15 January 1999 delegation of Chinese PLA 
visits Vietnam for defence 
talks at the invitation of the 
Vietnamese Ministry of 
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National Defence 
25 February Vietnamese Communist Party joint statement: cooperation based on 
-2 March 1999 
Secretary-General Le Kha long-term stability, future-oriented, 
Phieu pays a visit to China good-neighbourly and all-round 
and meets his counterpart cooperative bilateral relations (= 16- 
Jiang Zemin character principle 109); 
plans confirmed to formalise 
agreements on demarcation of the land 
border by the end of 1999 and the Gulf 
of Tongkin by the end of 2000 
6 April 1999 agreement to boost bilateral 
cooperation in tourism for 1999-2000 
8-15 October 1999 Pham The Duyet, member of 
the Vietnamese Politburo, 
leads a Vietnamese 
Communist Party delegation 
to Beijing at invitations of 
CCP Central Committee 
1-4 December 1999 Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji conclusion of negotiations on disputed 
visits Vietnam and meets his borders and discussion on pending 
counterpart Phan Van Khai China-US and Vietnam-US trade deals 
30 December 1999 Chinese Foreign Minister land border treaty 
Tang Jiaxuan and Vietnamese 
Deputy Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister Nguyen 
Manh Cam meet in Hanoi. 
Attending the meetings Nvere 
Prime Minister Phan Van 
Khai, Wang Yi, head of the 
Chinese delegation for border 
negotiations and Assistant 
Foreign Minister, and 
Perinanent Deputy Foreign 
Minister Vu Khoan 
17 January 2000 Li Peng, NPC Standing agreement on judicial cooperation 
Committee Chairman meets 
Procurator-General Ha Manh 
Tri in Beijing. The 
Vietnamese delegating visits 
at the invitation of Chinese 
Procurator-General Han 
Zhubin 
25 February 2000 Premier Zhu Rongji meets discussion on the Gulf of Tongkin 
Premier Phan Van Khai 
February 2000 Foreign Minister Tang discussion of the demarcation of the 
Jiaxuan meets Vietnamese 
109 Shiliu zi fangzhen: 'Changqi wending, mianxiang weilai, mulin youhao, 
quam-nian hezuo' (+Afr-)Yýt: '-rKjNRNZ, ffff 
IV. ). 
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Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Gulf of Tongkin 
Nien in Beijing 
April 2000 NPC Chairman Li Peng and continued cooperation and exchange 
President Jiang Zemin meet visits of both parliaments 
Vietnam National Assembly 
Chairman Nong Due Manh in 
Beijing 
May 2000 Prernier Zhu Rongji meets discussion of the demarcation of the 
Deputy Prime Minister Gulf of Tongkin 
Nguyen Manh Cam 
June 2000 exchange of documents on the 
ratification of a bilateral consular 
agreement 
6 July 2000 Assistant Foreign Minister exchange of letters of ratification on the 
Wang Yi and Vietnamese land border treaty (signed December 
Assistant Foreign Minister Le 1999), which takes effect on the same 
Cong Phung meet day 
11-12 July 2000 Le Minh Huong, Minister of 
Public Security and VCP 
politburo member, visits 
Beijing 
19 July 2000 Pham Van Tra, Minister of 
National Defence and VCP 
politburo member, meets a 
PLA border niilitary district 
delegation in Hanoi 
21 July 2000 Defence Minister Chi Haotian 
meets his counterpart Pham 
Van Tra in Beijing 
9-18 August 2000 Chinese Communist Youth 
League delegation visits 
Hanoi 
7-9 September 2000 new round of negotiations on 
the demarcation of the Gulf 
of Tongkin opened 
12-19 September 2000 VCP Central Committee 
delegation visits CCP Central 
Comriýiittcc 
21 September 2000 Minister of Industry Dang Vu 
Chu visits Beijing; Li Peng 
receives national assembly 
delegation to discuss social 
security legislation 
25-28 September 2000 Prime Minister Phan Van 
Khai visits China and meets 
Zhu Rongii 
December 2000 Vietnamese President Tran joint statement on the all-round 
Due Luong visits China and development of bilateral relations in the 
meets Prime Minister Zhu new century; accords on the 
Rongji and President Jiang demarcation of and fisheries 
Zemin cooperation in the Gulf of Tongkin (25 
December) 
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February 2001 Defence Minister Chi Haotian agreement on military exchanges and 
visits Vietnam and meets security cooperation amidst debates in 
Secretary-General Le Kha the VCP about Phieu's China-leaning 
Phieu. policy 
April 2001 Vice Premier Hu Jintao 
attends VCP's 9h Party 
Congress on which Le Kha 
Phieu is replaced with Nong 
Due Manh 
September 2001 Li Peng visits Vietnam and 
meets former Vietnamese 
party leaders Do Muoi and Le 
Kba Phieu, President Tran 
Due Luong, and National 
Assembly Chainnan Nguyen 
Van An 
November 2001 Secretary-General Nong Due Manh characterises the relationship as 
Manh visits China and meets one between 'comrades plus brothers' 
Chinese President Jiang 
Zemin 
27 February Jiang Zemin visits Vietnam at no resolve of the issue of the Gulf of 
-I March 2002 
the invitation of Secretary- Tongkin (boundaries, fisheries 
General of the Central agreement), both sides agree to 
Comn-dttee Nong Due Manh maintain the current negotiation 
110 The 5-point proposal reads as follows: 
'Firstly, to carry on the good tradition of high-level exchanges between the two 
parties and two countries and maintain frequent contact and meetings of their 
leaders so as to frankly and extensively exchange opinions on issues of common 
concern from time to time. 
Secondly, to continuously expand and deepen trade and economic cooperation 
between China and Vietnam, consolidate the material foundation of fhendly 
bilateral relations, keep improving the efficiency and quality of cooperation and 
substantially lift bilateral trade and economic cooperation to a new level. 
Thirdly, to educate the people, especially young people of the two countries, with the 
spirit of long-term friendship. To further strengthen exchanges among the young 
people in various forms so as to foster and bring up millions of successors of the 
cause of Sino-Vietnamese friendship. 
Fourthly, to strengthen bilateral cooperation on the issue of borders, accelerate the 
process of various follow-up work of the land boundary and the delimitation of 
the Beibu Bay territorial sea and build the borders between China and Vietnam 
into borders of long-term peace, stability and friendship. 
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and Vietnamese President mechanism; framework agreement for 
Tran Due Luong and meets providing Chinese preferential loans to 
both as, %vell as the Chairman Vietnam and an economic and technical 
of Vietnam's National cooperation agreement; 
Assembly Nguyen Van An, during his speech at Hanoi University, Prime Minister Phan Van Jiang pronounces the 16-character Khai, and former VCP principle and proposes a 5-point General-Secretaries Do Muoi 
proposal on mutual cooperation. I 10 and Le Kha Phieu 
The much publicised visit has little 
impact on the issue of the maritime 
boundaries. 
May 2004 a Chinese delegation attends 
Vietnam's celebration of the 
50"' anniversary of the Dien 
Bien Phu battle 
20 May 2004 Preniier Phan Van Khai leads announcement to build two economic 
a government delegation to corridors from Kunming and Nanning 
China at the invitation of to Hanoi and Hai Phong via Lang Son 
China's Premier Wen Jiabao and Lao Cai, and a third corridor along 
the coast of the Gulf of Tongkin; 
accelerate delineation and marking of 
the land border; 
closer coordination to implement the 
Gulf of Tongkin agreements on 
fisheries and demarcation; 
peaceful settlement of maritime border 
problems and closer coordination -with 
ASEAN in implementing the 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties 
in the South China Sea; 
strengthening AFTA and GMS 
30 June 2004 a Chinese delegation led by both deputy foreign ministers sign the 
Deputy Foreign Minister demarcation agreement on the Gulf of 
Wang Yi, principle negotiator Tongkin regarding territorial waters, 
in the border settlements, exclusive econon-dc zones, and 
visits Hanoi and meets continental shelfs, plus the fisheries 
Vietnam's Deputy Foreign agreement for the gulf. Both 
Minister Vu Dung and agreements were originally concluded 
Deputy Prime Minister Vu on 25 December 2000, but comes into 
Khoan effect only now with the signature on 
30 June 2004. The relationship 
according to the 16-character principle 
is emphasised, plus it is characterised 
as one of 'good neigbbours, good 
friends, goo comrades and good 
Fifthly, to deepen the share of the experience between the parties and governments 
of the two countries and strengthen their consultation, cooperation and 
coordination on international issues so as to facilitate and try to create a better 
external environment for the construction and development of both countries' 
(Xinhua, 27 February 2002). 
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partners' 
October 2004 Premier Wen Jiabao visits bilateral trade target set to USD 10 
Vietnam and meets Premier billion by 2010 
Phan Van Khai 
cooperation on the "Two Corridors 
One Circle" plan: the corridors are 
Nanning-Lang Son-Hanoi-Haiphong- 
Quang Ninb, and Kunming-Lao Cai- 
Hanoi-Haiphong. The circle is the Gulf 
of Tongkin 
October 2005 both sides agree to joint 
military patrols of the Gulf of 
Tongkin 
1-3 November 2005 President and Secretary- attempts to allay fears by maintaining 
General Hu Jintao visits that China's rise is peaceful 
Vietnam and meets President 
of the parliament, Nguyen 
Van An, President Tran Duc 
Luong, Premier Phan Van 
Khai and Secretary-General 
Nong Duc Manh. Hu. 
addresses Vietnam's 
parliament 
Source: adapted from Amer (1999: 73-98); BBC, I November 2005; BBC Szoninary of World 
Broadcasts, 22 April 1997b: FE/2899/B/3; BBC Sunnnary of World Broadcasts, 5 June 1997: 
FE/2937/B/4; BBC Sununmy of World Broadcasts, 25 October 1997: FE/3059/B/6; Gu, 2003: 1-2; 
Coniparative Connections, 2000; Reninin Ribao (English and Chinese) of 31 December 1999,18 
January 2000a and b, 26 February 2000,27 April 2000a and b, II May 2000,26 November 2000b, 8 
September 2001a and b; 'Create Together a Fine Future for Sino-Vietnamese Relations. ' Jiang 
Zen-ýin's speech at Hanoi National University, 28 February 2002; Gu, 2004: 1-2; Xinhua, 26 February 
2002; Viet Nain News, 20 May 2004a: 1; Viet Nain News, I July 2004: 1-2. The table lists a selection 
of visits of high-ranking party and state functionaries and is not comprehensive. 
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